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ABSTRACT 
‘RACE, POLICING, AND PUBLIC INQUIRIES DURING THE  
1980-81 COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN ENGLAND’ 
 
This thesis examines the collective violence throughout England in 1980-
81; these were largely spontaneous incidents of hostility directed against police 
from predominantly the youth of local black communities. Rejecting 
characterisations of ‘mindless criminality’, most often endorsed by British 
authorities to direct attention away from their actions and policies, this thesis 
argues that such violence was an aspect of broader attempts to increase 
political participation for black communities within Britain. A recent growth in 
mobilisation and resistance, fostered by the brief existence of the British Black 
Power movement, resulted in intensified battles with the police when it 
appeared that other avenues to protest the perceived harassment and 
discrimination that they faced had been closed. 
By rejecting public inquiries into all but the most controversial incidents, 
the British State continued the marginalisation of racial issues. Utilising newly 
released records this thesis examines in detail the accusations of misconduct 
and brutality levelled against the police during the disorders themselves which 
went unexamined. It argues that such refusal by the government and police to 
admit culpability, or even adequately investigate such allegations, was a 
continuation of a lack of accountability despite the clear community desire for 
the legitimacy of state-endorsed investigations. Other aspects, such as the 
limitations of blaming the media for the spread of ‘copycat’ disturbances and the 
persistent influence of Northern Ireland on both police and public, are further 
discussed throughout. 
Such discussion exists within a wider context regarding police 
accountability during the period due to recent revelations regarding Hillsborough 
and the miners’ strike, with this thesis adding to such discourse. However its 
focus remains firmly upon the black community of Britain; concluding that the 
dual attempts of increased political participation through ‘bargaining by riot’, as 
well as consistent demands for public inquiries and clear desire to remain 
engaged in the political process, must ultimately be seen as having failed to 
achieve their aims. 
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To Mum and Dad – I hope you don’t regret taking us 
as children to castles instead of banks! 
6 
 
 
7 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Firstly I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for 
supporting this project. Thanks to my brilliant supervisors, Dr Matthias Reiss 
and Professor Andrew Thorpe, whose feedback and advice has always been 
extremely helpful, constructive, and unquestionably improved the quality of this 
project and of my own research abilities. I would also like to thank Dr Matt 
Rendle, whose constant advice, enthusiasm, and support on a wide range of 
matters has been extremely appreciated for a number of years. Also to Exeter 
University staff and colleagues, for providing an excellent environment for 
research and for me to develop as an academic, as well as numerous enjoyable 
teaching opportunities. 
 
My thanks also go to: Dr John Stevenson, whose personal records 
generously provided a great deal of unique materials; staff at Bristol Records 
Office and Avon and Somerset Constabulary (particularly archivist Graham Tratt 
and Information Access Manager Jeff Hines) who were always helpful and 
allowed access to sources otherwise unattainable; and to the offices of Ben 
Bradshaw MP who were of great help in my year-long attempts to access 
government records central to this thesis. Furthermore to everyone that has 
offered feedback on aspects of this research as presented in various research 
papers, or made suggestions or comments in general discussions.  
 
My thanks also go to Professor Gavin Schaffer and Professor Richard 
Toye for a thoughtful and rigorous examination of my thesis. I very much 
enjoyed discussions of this research and beyond, and am extremely grateful for 
your time, comments, and advice. 
 
Thanks to friends, both in Exeter and elsewhere, for support and some 
much-needed alternatives from the thesis. Especially Office Two and the 
Monkswell House, as well as Luke and Nay, and Hannah, Will, and Jack, for 
providing me with friendly faces, warm food, and a place to sleep after hours 
spent in London archives. 
 
Most of all thank you to Mum, Dad, Emma, and Lorna. Their constant 
love, advice, extremely helpful (and foolhardy!) proofreading endeavours, and 
unwavering support have been invaluable - it is absolutely no overstatement to 
say that I could not have got to this point without them. 
8 
 
 
9 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Abstract          3 
Acknowledgements         7 
Contents          9 
List of Abbreviations        11 
Introduction          13 
Chapter One: The Background Situation      47 
Chapter Two: The Beginning?: St Pauls, Bristol, 2 April 1980   94 
Chapter Three: Lacking Conviction?: Inquiries and Trials after Bristol 130 
Chapter Four: Escalation: Brixton, 10-12 April 1981    167 
Chapter Five: Development or Deterioration?: Inquiries after Brixton  202 
Chapter Six: Disturbances Spread: July 1981     233 
Chapter Seven: Taking Stock: Hytner and Scarman    271 
Conclusion          316 
Bibliography          325 
10 
 
 
11 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACPO    Association of Chief Police Officers 
BCRE    Bristol Council for Racial Equality 
CCRL    Council for Community Relations in Lambeth 
CIB    Metropolitan Criminal Investigation Board 
CRE    Commission for Racial Equality 
DPP    Director of Public Prosecutions 
GMC    Greater Manchester County Council 
IRR    Institute of Race Relations 
MCCR    Manchester Council for Community Relations 
MCRC    Merseyside Community Relations Council 
NCCI     National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants 
NCCL    National Council for Civil Liberties 
NF    National Front 
PACE    Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
RRA    Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, and 1976) 
SPG    Special Patrol Group 
TUC    Trades Union Congress 
 
12 
 
 
13 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite being a topic which includes much discussion of the UK police 
force, it is important to begin by noting that this thesis is not a detailed history of 
that institution. Rather this is a social and political study of a marginalised and 
disempowered ethnic group within modern Britain. The recent 2011 riots in 
major English cities provided a stark reminder, if needed, of the impact and 
devastation of such public disorder. This work examines the disturbances 
occurring in numerous locations around England in 1980 and 1981 which 
undoubtedly shocked the country in their scope and severity and whose impact 
remains relevant to contemporary society. Following increased immigration into 
Britain after World War Two, the British ethnic landscape was changing and 
became increasingly multiracial. However, racial discrimination and 
disadvantage led young black Britons to feel alienated from British society and 
let down by the systems ostensibly protecting them. This growing sense of 
discontentment was exacerbated by a police force which appeared to be 
unaccountable for their actions and who rejected legitimate concerns and 
criticisms regarding treatment of groups on the fringes of the political landscape, 
namely working classes and ethnic minorities. It is generally agreed that the 
1980-81 collective violence began after ‘trigger events’ involving police officers 
and black people and those areas experiencing such disorder shared five 
common characteristics: racial disadvantage and discrimination, high 
unemployment, widespread deprivation, visible political exclusion and 
powerlessness, and common mistrust of and hostility towards the police.1 
This thesis focusses mainly upon questions of differing levels and 
expressions of political engagement; i.e., the dichotomous response from local 
communities who continuously appealed for full independent public inquiries 
into events whilst others violently protested the police’s actions viewed as 
discriminatory and improper from obvious representatives of the state. Despite 
the growing distrust of the British authorities, public inquiries run by the same 
government and part of the British political establishment were seemingly 
regarded as a panacea for the problems faced. Whether this was through 
                                                     
1 John Solomos, Black Youth, Racism and the State: The Politics of Ideology and Policy 
(Cambridge, 1988) p. 237; John Benyon, ‘Interpretations of Civil Disorder’, in John Benyon and 
John Solomos (eds.), The Roots of Urban Unrest (Oxford, 1987) pp. 33-35. 
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genuine belief that inquiries would achieve their aims, or simply a method for 
obtaining resources in attention, time, and money will be discussed throughout; 
it is my intention to show that this dichotomy fundamentally suggests a desire to 
be included within the British constitutional system, rather than feelings of 
alienation leading to mindless chaotic violence as has been argued. Likewise 
the numerous meetings and attempts to liaise with the police throughout the 
disorder shows a desire to remain engaged with and part of the political 
process. It is argued that government rejection of most calls for public inquiries, 
partly due to cost, was also linked to Thatcherite ideas of a rejection of 
conciliation and movement away from postwar consensus politics. In a similar 
vein, it is argued that the collective violence of 1980-81 can be viewed as an 
attempt to employ historic British political tactics (‘bargaining by riot’) in order to 
further democratise Britain, shed the last remnants of deference previously 
exhibited towards the now collapsed British Empire, and achieve further 
participation for this marginalised group within the British political system. 
Furthermore this work examines recently released documents and previously 
unstudied records to investigate accusations of police misconduct largely 
overlooked by any official investigations, suggesting that this likely added to 
growing feelings of discontent from members of the British black community and 
did nothing to prevent further violent disorders later in the decade. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Whilst more has been written within the broad topics than can be 
discussed below, this literature review acts as a concise introduction to the most 
important works in relation to this study. Additionally further specific discussion 
of literature is addressed where appropriate throughout this thesis. 
IMMIGRATION, NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITY 
There has been a long history of settlers relocating to Britain and, as 
Colin Holmes notes, it is difficult to locate a period within British history where 
immigration into Britain did not take place.2 Consequently much has been 
written regarding the long history of immigration into Britain and the resulting 
situation for ethnic minorities.3 The 1950s and 1960s saw an increase of 
                                                     
2 Colin Holmes, John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (Basingstoke, 
1988) p. 3. 
3 As just a short example, see: Holmes, John Bull's Island; Robert Winder, Bloody Foreigners: 
The Story of Immigration to Britain (London, 2004); Peter Fryer, Staying Power: The History of 
Black People in Britain (London, 1984); Dilip Hiro, Black British, White British (London, 1971). 
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sociologists turning attention to British race relations and ethnic minorities within 
Britain, earning the reputation of being a ‘race relations industry’.4 The majority 
of these are very much products of their time and are now of more use as 
primary sources of the period rather than secondary literature.5 Most writings on 
British postwar race relations, to some degree, focus on the contemporary 
situation or lessons for the future and Alice Bloch and John Solomos argued 
that such research conducted on race ‘has inevitably been politicised, at least in 
the sense that it has been heavily influenced by wider political pressures and 
realities’.6 This has resulted in a significant proportion of works being framed 
within the current situation they were written, and some have thus suffered as a 
result. 
Much work has been conducted regarding changing ideas of ‘Britishness’ 
following the Second World War.7 Harry Goulbourne argued that the most 
influential attempts to redefine the post-imperial British national identity 
excluded non-white former colonial peoples and, ‘whilst the membership of 
people with backgrounds in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean are accorded formal 
recognition, this recognition is constructed in such a manner that their legitimate 
presence and participation in Britain are nearly always questioned’.8 This 
refutes the traditional historical view of the state as being negligible in the 
development of postwar racism before the ‘race riots’ of 1958.9 Numerous 
writers have portrayed the postwar years as a period of laissez faire immigration 
                                                     
4 Examples include: Michael Banton, The Coloured Quarter: Negro Immigrants in an English 
City (London, 1955); Anthony H. Richmond, The Colour Problem: A Study of Racial Relations 
(Harmondsworth, 1955); Sheila Patterson, Dark Strangers: A Sociological Study of the 
Absorption of a Recent West Indian Migrant Group in Brixton, South London (London, 1963); 
Nicholas Deakin, Colour, Citizenship and British Society (London, 1970). 
5 As argued by Chris Waters, ‘“Dark Strangers” in Our Midst: Discourses of Race and Nation in 
Britain, 1947-1963’, The Journal of British Studies, 36 (1997), 207-38. 
6 Alice Bloch and John Solomos (eds.), Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century (Basingstoke, 
2009) p. 3. 
7 Paul Ward, Britishness since 1870 (London, 2004); Jodi Burkett, Constructing Post-Imperial 
Britain: Britishness, 'Race' and the Radical Left in the 1960s (Basingstoke, 2013). 
8 Harry Goulbourne, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Imperial Britain (New York, 1991) pp. 1-2. 
9 Ruth Glass, Newcomers: the West Indians in London (Michigan, 1960) pp. 127-46; Paul Foot, 
Immigration and Race in British Politics (California, 1960) p. 233; E. J. B. Rose, Colour and 
Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969) pp. 494-6 ; Sheila Patterson, 
Immigration and Race Relations in Britain, 1960-1967 (London, 1969) p. 17 ; Deakin, Colour, 
Citizenship and British Society, pp. 96-100; Hiro, Black British, p. 201; Kathleen Paul, ‘From 
Subjects to Immigrants: Black Britons and National Identity, 1948-62’, in Richard Weight and 
Abigail Beach (eds.), The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-
1960 (New York, 1998) p. 238; Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics and 
Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (Oxford, 1973) pp. 129-31; Kenan 
Malik, The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society (Basingstoke, 1996) 
p. 23. 
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where various governments did nothing about colonial immigration until popular 
anxiety forced the creation of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.10 Two 
main strands of the historiography have been presented to explain the 
movement towards immigration controls, firstly as a response to the weight of 
popular opinion towards black immigration.11 The second economic explanation 
is that controls were necessitated by a migrant labour system undermining the 
right of black workers to migrate and settle freely within Britain.12 
This view of postwar relaxed immigration policy yielding to stricter 
immigration control was later challenged; for example Bob Carter, Clive Harris, 
and Shirley Joshi  argued that, rather than insignificant before 1962, the state 
was instrumental in constructing black immigration as a ‘problem’ and ‘racist 
policies and practices were an integral part of this construction’.13 This was later 
supported by Kenneth Lunn who likened earlier British immigration policy to 
nineteenth century imperialism, relying upon informal controls until required to 
intervene officially, all in the belief that reduced colonial immigration was 
required to diminish ‘problems’ in British society: ‘Thus, control of immigration 
was avoided in the Windrush years, at least in an overtly political fashion, but its 
basis was being constructed.’14 Writers have shown how ideas of immigration 
have been inextricably associated with black immigration and thus how 
successive governments have attempted to limit colonial immigration whilst 
perpetuating arguments that too many black immigrants caused problems within 
Britain.15  
                                                     
10 Hiro, Black British, p. 201; Paul, ‘From Subjects to Immigrants’, p. 238; Katznelson, Black 
Men, White Cities, pp. 129-31; Tom Rees, ‘Immigration Policies in the United Kingdom’, in 
Charles Husband (ed.), Race in Britain (London, 1982) pp. 75-96; David Mason, Race and 
Ethnicity in Modern Britain (Oxford, 1995) pp. 28-9. 
11 Paul Foot, ‘Immigration and the British Labour Movement’, International Socialism, 22 (1965), 
8-13; Rose, Colour and Citizenship. 
12 M. D. A. Freeman and Sarah Spencer, ‘Immigration Control, Black Workers and the 
Economy’, British Journal of Law and Society, 6 (1979), 63-8; Ambalavaner Sivanandan, A 
Different Hunger: Writings on Black Resistance (London, 1982) pp. 101-26. 
13 Bob Carter, Clive Harris and Shirley Joshi, ‘The 1951-1955 Conservative Government and 
the Racialisation of Black Immigration’, Immigrants and Minorities, 6 (1987), 335. See also 
Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, White Man's Country: Racism in British Politics (London, 
1984) pp. 22-3. 
14 Kenneth Lunn, ‘The British State and Immigration, 1945-51: New Light on the Empire 
Windrush’, in Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds.), The Politics of Marginality: Race, the 
Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth Century Britain (London, 1990) pp. 171-2. 
15 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities; Gary Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in 
Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975 (Guilford, 1979); Zig Layton-
Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain (London, 1984); Sivanandan, A Different Hunger; Miles 
and Phizacklea, White Man's Country. 
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Furthering discussion into later years some works, such as Stuart Hall et 
al.’s seminal 1978 work regarding popular moral panic around ‘mugging’ in the 
1970s, highlighted the level which political and social discourses portrayed 
black communities as a problem in contemporary Britain, including incorporating 
pre-existing views related to black masculinity.16 Zig Layton-Henry’s work is 
particularly effective at highlighting how Conservative Party policy linked racism 
to ideas of immigration through increasing restrictions rather than addressing 
the aspects which foster racism due to specific anxieties, such as increased 
competition for housing or employment for example.17 Thus black immigration 
was characterised as a problem and, by extension, so were black people 
themselves.18 An assumed increase in violence and disorder was linked with 
increased black immigration, leading to calls for increased controls and even 
repatriation: ‘Traces of black life have been removed from the British past to 
ensure that blacks are not part of the British future’.19 Thus the black population 
was marginalised from British society, becoming a so-called ‘alien wedge’ 
lacking a true sense of belonging, electoral representation to exert political 
influence, and reduced access to the political agenda.20 This political 
marginalisation and relative deprivation has been forwarded as factors in the 
violent disorder of 1980-81.21 
In contrast, large sections of the historiography have been critical of the 
role played by ethnic minorities in their worsening situation within Britain. Erik 
Bleich contended that politicians were the primary forces behind anti-
discrimination legislation, claiming there was no ‘substantial pressure from 
                                                     
16 Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: 
Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (London, 1978). 
17 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, ‘Race’ and ‘Race’ Relations in 
Post-War Britain (Oxford, 1992). See also Michael Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and 
Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society (London, 1993). 
18 Ellis Cashmore and Eugene McLaughlin, ‘Introduction’, in Ellis Cashmore and Eugene 
McLaughlin (eds.), Out of Order?: Policing Black People (London, 1991) pp. 1-9; Fryer, Staying 
Power, pp. 381-6. 
19 John Solomos, Bob Findlay, Simon Jones and Paul Gilroy, ‘The Organic Crisis of British 
Capitalism and Race: The Experience of the Seventies’, in Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain (London, 1982) p. 30. 
20 Stuart Hall, ‘Urban Unrest in Britain’, in John Benyon and John Solomos (eds.), The Roots of 
Urban Unrest (Oxford, 1987) p. 50; William E. Nelson, Jr, Black Atlantic Politics: Dilemmas of 
Political Empowerment in Boston and Liverpool (Albany, 2000) pp. 187, 261-2; John Benyon, 
‘The Riots, Lord Scarman and the Political Agenda’, in John Benyon (ed.), Scarman and After: 
Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman's Report, the Riots and Their Aftermath (Oxford, 1984) p. 
12. 
21 Benyon, ‘Interpretations of Civil Disorder’, pp. 23-41; John Lea and Jock Young, ‘Race and 
Crime’, Marxism Today (1982), 38-9; John Lea and Jock Young, What Is to Be Done About Law 
and Order? (London, 1984). 
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ethnic minorities’ who ‘played surprisingly minor roles in instigating the 
process’.22 This is consistent with the traditional interpretation which argued that 
British minorities either did nothing or used purely militant tactics in order to 
advance their situation. John Rex claimed that the British situation lacked an 
effective civil rights movement as seen in American and thus British civil rights 
victories came not from black people themselves but rather from white 
politicians with troubled consciences after restricting immigration; as 
summarised by Roy Hattersley: ‘Integration without control is impossible. 
Control without integration is morally indefensible.’23 Rex also stated that 
‘Nearly all the black leaders I have met make references to war and violence 
and it is not sufficient merely to dismiss them as extremists.’24 Despite this, very 
little research has been conducted into the Black Power movement within 
Britain, as noted by Rosalind Eleanor Wild who claimed her PhD thesis was the 
only book-length study.25 Robin Bunce and Paul Field have since released their 
important political biography of activist Darcus Howe, using his life as a 
framework through which to discuss Black Power in Britain; however this is still 
an understudied area which threatens to be ‘written out of history’.26 Wild 
contended that the British Black Power movement, whilst not able to prevent 
further generations facing the discrimination and disadvantages inherent for 
them from British society, ‘did equip future generations with the ability to 
recognise such a fate and rebel against it, constructively or otherwise’.27  
The development of more radical, autonomist movements in British black 
politics ‘were not, however, matched by the emergence of a black political 
culture with any purchase on the mainstream political process.’28 Instead so-
called ‘buffer institutions’, such as community relations councils or the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), were created by the government to deal 
with racial issues outside of the traditional political arena.29 This allowed the 
                                                     
22 Erik Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France (Cambridge, 2003) pp. 59-60.  
23 John Rex, ‘Black Militancy and Class Conflict’, in Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea (eds.), 
Racism and Political Action in Britain (London, 1979) p. 89. 
24 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
25 Rosalind Eleanor Wild, ‘“Black Was the Colour of Our Fight.” Black Power in Britain, 1955-
1976’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Sheffield (2008). 
26 Robin Bunce and Paul Field, Darcus Howe: A Political Biography (London, 2014) p. ii. 
27 Wild, ‘“Black Was the Colour of Our Fight.”’, p. 19. 
28 Martin Kettle and Lucy Hodges, Uprising!: The Police, the People and the Riots in Britain's 
Cities (London, 1982) pp. 49, 60. 
29 Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities; Terri Sewell, Black Political Participation in Britain 
(London, 1993) pp. 50-1. 
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ruling classes to claim that specific issues faced by ethnic minorities in Britain 
were being addressed, whilst controlling and limiting such institutions. As 
Ambalavaner Sivanandan summarised, ‘the CRE took up the Black cause and 
killed it’.30 Thus, as Layton-Henry concluded, it might be expected that black 
Britons would grow frustrated with such weak and ineffective institutions, 
leading to uprisings in attempts to obtain political influence through their own 
independent institutions.31 
However Kalbir Shukra criticised subsequent developments with her 
blunt statement that ‘Radical black politics in Britain is dead.’ Arguing that black 
political activists drew closer to the state from the 1980s onwards, a greater 
reliance on the state and involvement of black professionals and politicians 
gave the impression that the state could be effective in anti-racism: ‘In looking 
to the state to oppose racism, today’s black organisers seem to have forgotten 
that it was the British state which framed racism in the first place.’32 In a similar 
vein Paul Gilroy, in his influential 1993 work The Black Atlantic: Modernity and 
Double Consciousness, argued for a rejection of nationalist theoretical and 
ideological politics and offers the concept of the Black Atlantic as a space of 
transnational cultural construction which ‘transcend both the structures of the 
nation state and the constraints of ethnicity and national particularity’.33 In a 
comparative study of black politics through case studies of Boston and 
Liverpool, William E. Nelson, Jr shared such views of ‘transcultural identities’ 
but believed the cultural dimension could only be understood in the context of 
race and power relations: ‘mainstream studies in political science and sociology 
have often failed to address the implications of dominant-subordinate 
relationships in racially hierarchical political systems’.34 He argued that the end 
of slavery did not end the relegation of black people to subordinate positions 
throughout the Atlantic world; rather these were entrenched within the 
institutions of Western society. Thus fundamental to Black Atlantic politics is the 
desire for justice and participation within such racially hierarchical political 
systems. Such desire, it is argued by this thesis, played a role in collective 
violence of 1980-81. 
                                                     
30 Sivanandan, A Different Hunger, p. 120.  
31 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race, p. 168. 
32 Kalbir Shukra, The Changing Pattern of Black Politics in Britain (London, 1998) pp. 110-1. 
33 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (London, 1993) p. 19. 
34 Nelson, Black Atlantic Politics, p. 12. 
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Similarly many studies have examined the causes and consequences of 
the 1980-81 disturbances at the heart of this thesis, although many of these 
have been sociological studies published soon after events. One such 
collection, based upon papers presented at a conference convened by John 
Benyon to discuss the subsequent Scarman Inquiry, provides a wide range of 
opinions from diverse individuals such as social scientists, senior police and 
governmental officials, journalists, and black activists.35 Accordingly the 
responses are in keeping with expectations; police and black activists attempted 
to explain and justify their respective side’s actions, governmental officials 
described actions undertaken to prevent violence reoccurring, and social 
scientists lamented how violence could have been avoided. As well as differing 
reactions to the disturbances, the role of the media in the perceptions and 
spread of the disorder is also thoroughly debated. Benyon would later 
collaborate with John Solomos in a similar conference following further unrest 
around England in 1985, recording contributions from a number of similar 
speakers examining the social and political situation, American equivalents, and 
policing context.36  
Martin Kettle and Lucy Hodges systematically discussed the main 
outbreaks of disorder with a heavy focus, as mentioned above, on the 
contemporary importance of improving relations between local black 
communities and the police. Although the broader social and economic situation 
is not disregarded, their attention remains throughout firmly on the policing 
aspects of the disturbances.37 Alternatively Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace, and 
Heather Booth placed the 1980 disturbance of St Pauls, Bristol within a broader 
social context, arguing their theoretical approach to collective violence is ‘based 
upon social groupings competing for power, informed by identifiable ideologies, 
pursuing specific objectives’, and as such could apply to previous inter-racial 
violence in Britain previously throughout the twentieth century.38 Despite 
detailed discussion of examples from other cities, they seemingly ignore 
previous studies undertaken into immigration and race relations within Bristol 
                                                     
35 John Benyon (ed.), Scarman and After: Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman’s Report, the 
Riots and Their Aftermath (Oxford, 1984). 
36 John Benyon and John Solomos (eds.) The Roots of Urban Unrest (Oxford, 1987). 
37 Kettle and Hodges, Uprising!. 
38 Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace and Heather Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol ‘Riot’ 
and the State (London, 1983) p. 13. 
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itself.39 They characterised collective racial violence ‘as an element in the 
political activity of identifiable social groups seeking influence or control over the 
social, economic and political mechanisms and institutions that determined their 
social location within society’, rejecting arguments that those involved were 
wholly alienated from society. They furthermore challenged the ‘official’ account 
of events in Bristol, provided by the Chief Constable and generally 
unquestioned, through systematic study of other witness accounts to show 
which issues were emphasised or overlooked and how that allowed or excluded 
subsequent responses to the event; an exercise that this thesis similarly 
undertakes for subsequent disorders.40 
CONSENSUS POLITICS 
Discussion of Britain’s race relations policies can be linked with the 
historiographical debate on whether there existed a widespread postwar 
political consensus within Britain.41 One of the most significant contributions to 
this was Paul Addison’s The Road to 1945, which argued that ideas of a 
postwar consensus had been developing since the 1930s and its foundations 
were cemented during the Second World War.42 Richard Toye furthered this 
with discussion of the political use of the term ‘consensus’, which can be traced 
to the 1940s, arguing that it was utilised for a number of different objectives 
including to undermine opponents’ arguments of national unity behind them, as 
well as being used in suggestions that the political establishment were actively 
excluding alternative viewpoints.43 Kenan Malik summarised that the existence 
of the postwar liberal consensus was due in large part to the perceived failings 
of free market capitalism which had led to the horrors seen in the twentieth 
century, such as world wars, economic depression and the Holocaust.44 
Therefore ideological beliefs of the right that were prevalent prior to the Second 
World War, such as nationalism, imperialism, and racial inferiority or superiority, 
                                                     
39 Anthony H. Richmond, Michael Lyon, Sylvia Hale and Roy King, Migration and Race 
Relations in an English City: A Study in Bristol (London, 1973); Ken Pryce, Endless Pressure: A 
Study of West Indian Life-Styles in Bristol (Harmondsworth, 1979). 
40 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm, p. 185.  
41 Rodney Lowe, ‘The Second World War, Consensus, and the Foundation of the Welfare 
State’, Twentieth Century British History, 1 (1990), 152-82; Ben Pimlott, ‘The Myth of 
Consensus’, in L. M. Smith (ed.), The Making of Britain: Volume 5: Echoes of Greatness 
(London, 1988) pp. 129-42; Ben Pimlott, Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris, ‘Is the “Postwar 
Consensus” a Myth?’, Contemporary Record, 2 (1989), 12-5. 
42 Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London, 1977). 
43 Richard Toye, ‘From “Consensus” to “Common Ground”: The Rhetoric of the Postwar 
Settlement and Its Collapse’, Journal of Contemporary History, 48 (2013), 3-23. 
44 Malik, The Meaning of Race, pp. 13-4. 
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were questioned. Ideas of postwar consensus thus extended to race relations 
and many have viewed Britain’s numerous Race Relations Acts as being the 
high-water mark of the two-party consensus to take a moral stand and 
depoliticise the issue of race.45 These occurred concurrently with stricter 
immigration controls and, as Malik highlights, ‘The link between immigration 
control and race relations legislation expressed the contradictions of postwar 
liberalism. The acceptance of a liberal consensus on race did not mean that the 
ruling élite was any less racist than previously.’46 Furthermore Robert Miles and 
Annie Phizacklea contended that the linking of controls with race relations 
meant that immigration was thus viewed in racial terms: ‘By legislating for race 
relations instead of against racism, the government was giving further 
substance to the idea of “race”, ensuring that the problem was seen in terms of 
“colour”, in terms of “them”.’47 
It has similarly been debated to what extent the Conservative leadership 
of Margaret Thatcher was a departure from this consensus or simply a 
redefinition of it.48 In a recent article Martin J. Smith contented that Thatcher 
opposed political consensus and viewed it as weakness, thus disagreeing with 
the belief that negotiation was needed in order to reconcile conflicting interests. 
As such, one legacy of Thatcher’s government is the rejection of conciliation 
between social groups: ‘What she did question in politics was the need to 
conciliate or compromise and in that sense she had a very limited notion of 
democracy.’ Smith continued to link this argument with immigration debates, 
arguing that Thatcher’s rejection of the previous bipartisan consensus on 
immigration was replaced with aggressive tactics and Thatcherite exclusionary 
politics which increasingly characterised immigrants as the problem.49 
Conversely Camilla Schofield’s discussion of Enoch Powell through the 
backdrop of Postcolonial Britain suggested that ideas of postwar consensus 
were challenged prior to Thatcher’s leadership, arguing that Powell helped 
reframe the myth of the Second World War from the ‘People’s War’ into one of 
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Britain ‘permanently under siege’, subsequently extended to an assertion of 
public self-reliance against the liberal state.50 Similarly Mark Mitchell and Dave 
Russell argued that, upon their writing, no clear Thatcherite policies relating to 
race had emerged and her leadership therefore saw simply developments of 
previous policies. A lack of firm direction from central government allowed the 
police considerable scope for creating and implementing their own strategies 
and techniques regarding the policing of black communities.51 Regardless of 
Thatcher’s specific role in ideas of postwar consensus and race policies, Hall 
summarised the broad effect that Thatcherism had upon the black British 
community: 
…when public policies are reconstructed and redirected so as to enable 
the combination of possessive individualism, a strong and disciplinary 
state and the wild and untutored forces of the free market to prevail, it is 
slightly obscene to ask the question why those who are at the receiving 
end of those processes sometimes get so angry that they throw a brick.52 
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 
A broad and extensive historiography exists on the nature of collective 
violence which has gone through extensive developments.53 Gustave Le Bon 
suggested the collective approach in relation to outbreaks of violence, 
employing ‘group mind theory’ to characterise crowds as easily influenced and 
demonstrating primitive and destructive instincts.54 Collective violence was also 
considered a form of mass hysteria and that group actions were often led by 
social deviants, ‘especially recruited from the ranks of those morbidly nervous, 
excitable, half-deranged persons who are bordering on madness’.55 Conversely 
Floyd Allport dismissed ideas of the ‘group mind’ and forwarded the idea that 
‘the individual in the crowd behaves just as he would behave alone, only more 
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so’.56 Both theories share the connected viewpoint that, once individuals 
become a crowd, human behaviour is reduced to the most base and primitive 
characteristics: ‘the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the 
enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings’.57 These theories have thus been 
criticised by those who question the assessment of ‘blind and meaningless’ 
mass violence as ‘not a deliberately chosen response’, and further how 
collective action has been able to be organised by marginal and isolated 
individuals or groups.58 S. D. Reicher forwarded such an argument when 
contending that these approaches exclude a social basis for the coherence of 
crowd behaviour and do not answer key questions of participation and content; 
which is to say who does and does not participate in crowd events and what 
actions do and do not occur. His social identity model, which would later be 
expressed as Self-Categorization Theory, suggested that crowd behaviour is 
influenced through people defining themselves as sharing a common social 
identity and thus learning and exhibiting appropriate shared behaviour.59 
More recent theories have characterised collective violence as a form of 
protest, a key arrow in the broader quiver of political strategies as argued by 
Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn:  
Historically, collective violence has been part of the regular and normal 
political life of all nations, part of the process by which competing interest 
groups maintain power, gain power, or lose power in the process of 
jockeying for influence and control over governmental and other social 
institutions.60 
In this definition collective violence is used to ‘accompany, complement and 
extend organized peaceful attempts by the same people to accomplish their 
objectives’.61 This argument was pre-empted by Eric Hobsbawm, who 
previously coined the phrase ‘collective bargaining by riot’ during discussion of 
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the widespread machine-breaking by British workers in the 18th and early 19th 
centuries. Hobsbawm states such riots were more than simply protests; they 
wanted and expected to achieve positive results through such violence. Thus he 
described workers’ actions as ‘a means of coercing their employers into 
granting them concessions with regard to wages and other matters’.62  
Michael Keith criticised the entirety of collective behaviour theory, 
arguing that assumptions that ‘crowd psychology’ differs from ‘individual 
psychology’ have resulted in work which argues such ‘has tended to be 
speculative in the extreme’: ‘It took the unique (as opposed to theoretical) work 
of historians such as Hobsbawm and Rude…to debunk this manic image of 
collective behaviour and recast disorder as social protest, restore faces to the 
faceless members of the crowd’.63 Even works after this, such as Feagin and 
Hahn, are criticised as they are ‘replacing the de-individuated, primitive mob of 
behaviourism with a coldly calculating, politically conscious unit to be regarded 
as a lucid social actor on the stage of historical struggle’.64 He criticised those 
who legitimised the violence as part of broader racial mobilization and black 
struggle, concluding that attempting to bestow the disorders with post hoc 
meaning was academically questionable. Therefore he attempted to find an 
alternative to classifying the disorders as either ‘criminal subversion’ or ‘glorious 
revolution’, suggesting that such an explanation would require capturing the 
impromptu nature of the events without a reduction of individuals’ actions to a 
behaviourist response to given stimuli. The solution he thus puts forward is to 
avoid issues relating to common-sense models of causality as blame allocation: 
‘This is essentially a call for the need to incorporate a notion of contingency into 
all explanations.’65 This is something attempted to have been addressed 
throughout this thesis. 
Within such a theoretical framework, the 1980-81 disturbances can be 
viewed as a spontaneous rational response to the black communities’ lack of 
political participation, and thus an attempt to further their societal situation. E. P. 
Thompson, in his pivotal The Making of the English Working Class, documented 
how the British people ‘were noted throughout Europe for their turbulence’ and 
                                                     
62 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The Machine Breakers’, Past & Present, 1 (1952), 57-70. 
63 Keith, Race, Riots and Policing, p. 79. 
64 Ibid., p. 88. 
65 Ibid., pp. 90-5; emphasis in original. 
26 
 
that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were ‘punctuated by riot’.66 In 
many ways, those involved in the disorders of 1980-81 were simply continuing 
this British tradition of marginalised and isolated groups attempting to obtain 
increased levels of participation within society. Many writers have attributed 
immediate causes of the 1980-81 disturbances as being ‘rational’ responses to 
increasingly militant police tactics and, as such, a defence of their ‘territory’ 
against police ‘occupation’.67 In order to support this theory, specific incidents 
are cited through the disturbances of participants directing violence specifically 
against police and even stopping to direct traffic through the area.68  
David J. Smith, discussing the findings of research undertaken by the 
Policy Studies Institute, noted that there was evidence of a growth of a coherent 
political ideology emerging; not to the level of explicitly organising the 
disturbances themselves, but as a collective response to perceived police and 
societal oppression.69 David Waddington et al. portrayed rioters as viewing the 
state as an illegitimate authority which they could not influence otherwise.70 He 
sought to apply his ‘flashpoints’ model, which combines pre-existing ‘tinder’ 
conditions with a specific ‘spark’ incident, to a broader range of disorder. This 
approach has been criticised as too generalised and that his categorisation of 
disorders, between ‘issue-oriented’ and ‘issueless’, is rather a post hoc analysis 
attributed by subsequent commentators.71 Relatedly Keith rejected descriptions 
of ‘the average rioter’ as either ‘black youth’ or ‘the young’, instead highlighting 
how the disorders included ‘a broad cross-section of the Black communities of 
specific neighbourhoods’.72 Whilst black youth were predominant in the 
disturbances, these were very much mobilisations of large sections of British 
black communities in political attempts to improve their circumstances. 
                                                     
66 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963) p. 62. 
67 Paul Gilroy, There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation 
(London, 1987) pp. 236-45; Lea and Young, ‘Race and Crime’, 38-39; Reicher, ‘The St. Pauls 
riot’, 1-21; Devon Thomas, ‘Black Initiatives in Brixton’, in John Benyon (ed.), Scarman and 
After: Essays Reflecting on Lord Scarman’s Report, the Riots and Their Aftermath (Oxford, 
1984) p. 189. 
68 Reicher, ‘The St. Pauls riot’, 6-10; Gilroy, There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack, pp. 236-8. 
69 David J. Smith, ‘Policing and Urban Unrest’, in John Benyon and John Solomos (eds.), The 
Roots of Urban Unrest (Oxford, 1987) p. 72. 
70 David Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder: A Comparative and Historical 
Approach (London, 1992). 
71 P. A. J. Waddington, ‘Review of Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, by David 
Waddington’, The British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Autumn 1993) 577-579. 
72 Michael Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society (London, 
1993) p. 5. 
27 
 
SPREAD OF DISORDER 
There has also been detailed discussion of how such violent disorder 
spreads. Sidney Tarrow defined that ‘Protest becomes a protest cycle when it is 
diffused to several sectors of the population, is highly organized, and is widely 
used as the instrument to put forward demands’.73 Through a pioneering 
empirical study of almost 5,000 protest events in Italy, he demonstrated how 
protest cycles emerged and spread to multiple groups before subsequently 
declining, describing the entire cycle as ‘a phase of heightened conflict and 
contention across the social system’.74 Ruud Koopmans later replaced ‘cycle’ 
with ‘wave’, arguing that ‘cycle’ implied trends that would recur periodically 
whereas ‘wave’ merely denotes a ‘strong increase and subsequent decrease in 
the level of contention’.75 He argued that instances of collective action are not 
independent and occur within such broader protest waves: ‘contention is always 
a multi-actor process that cannot be adequately understood by focussing 
attention on one actor and reducing the others to the role of context variables. 
Instead, interactions between actors become the fundamental units of 
analysis.’76 The emergence of such protest waves is attributed to changes in the 
structure of political opportunities ‘which reduce the power disparity between 
authorities and challengers’.77  
Relatedly the theory of social diffusion posits that, through established 
social networks, actors in social systems are affected and influenced by the 
adoption of certain behaviours by other ‘contagious’ adopters.78 These potential 
actors first observe and assess the results of others’ actions before making their 
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own decision whether or not to adopt the same behaviour.79 Daniel J. Myers 
highlights how this contagion model has been used in multiple studies of 
collective behaviours such as rioting and protest.80 He continued to discuss how 
work conducted on contagious influence during collective disorder can be 
categorised into two themes, long-term contributions and short-term contagion 
effects.81 Long-term contributions include the positive results of previous 
disorders, either real or imagined, and an increased sense of pride toward their 
social group.82 Short-term contagions provoke others to discuss and consider 
such action themselves, dubbed by Pamela E. Oliver as an ‘occasion for 
deciding’.83 Myers, in an argument relevant to subsequent discussion of the 
1980-81 disturbances highlights that: ‘if additional events quickly follow the first 
and each is well publicized, a cascading effect may cause more and more 
individuals to make the decision to riot, and events can, at least for a short time, 
build on one another’.84 In his resultant report Lord Scarman concluded that it 
was likely that a ‘copycat’ element existed in many subsequent disorders, 
exacerbated by extensive media coverage, which characterised collective 
violence as irrational and imitative.85 Recently Roger Ball studied the case of 
Bristol in detail, carrying out a micro-history of events in 1980 that led to a city-
based ‘mini-wave’ of disorder raising interesting questions relating to the spread 
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of protest more generally.86 Utilising Jamie Przybysz and Myers’ definitions of 
‘copycat’ and ‘contagion’ in the spread of riots, he argued subsequent 
disturbances were not purely the ‘copycat’ result of an unconscious reaction to 
media coverage, rather a rational and evaluative decision-making process 
which had been influenced by ‘contagions’ spread via a social network of peer 
relationships, education, family links and others.87 
POLICE 
Whilst this thesis is not a history of the police, the existing historiography 
of relations between black people and the police must be acknowledged.88 If the 
police, as the visible representations of the government, are not perceived to be 
treating different groups fairly then this not only undermines the legitimacy of 
their own organisation but also potentially that of the state as well.89 Tony 
Jefferson and Monica A. Walker showed how a differential treatment of black 
people compared to white compatriots produced a less favourable attitude 
towards the police, and many noted how this relationship was becoming hostile 
by the mid-1970s.90 In fact Robert Reiner summarised how the numerous works 
on relations between the police and black communities within Britain constituted 
‘a depressing chorus of unheeded prophecies of doom’.91 Studies such as Hall 
et al., and Gilroy argued that racist discourses within Britain portrayed black 
communities as being more predisposed for criminality and, as such, led to their 
disproportional targeting by the police and characterisation as a ‘social 
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problem’.92 Gilroy furthered Hall et al.’s earlier points and argued that, by 
portraying events such as the 1980-81 disturbances as evidence of higher 
levels of criminality inherent within black people, this was used to justify policies 
of increased limits and controls on immigration.93 Michael Rowe concurs that 
the 1980-81 disorders were counter to the widespread depiction of Britishness 
characterised by law, order, fairness, and democracy and, as such, were 
received as ‘perceived threats to national identity’.94 Others further argued that 
such ‘army of occupation’ policing of British ethnic minorities was simply a 
continuation of colonial policing practices.95 Ellis Cashmore and Eugene 
McLaughlin’s edited collection considers policing examples from Britain and 
America, arguing that the police have utilised the notion of a ‘crime wave’ in 
order to justify increased resources and extended legal and political power.96  
In a review of the literature regarding ethnic minorities and the police, 
Georgios A. Antonopoulos categorised the debate in terms of three differing 
ideological positions: radical, liberal, and left-realist.97 Exponents of the radical 
viewpoint, characterised by Marxist doctrines, attributed the problems to a racist 
and oppressive police force.98 The liberal viewpoint argues that institutional 
racism and discrimination does exist, but that high black crime rates exacerbate 
such relations.99 And finally the left-realist approach accepts that black crime 
rates are comparatively higher, but attributes this to both police discrimination 
and disproportionate representation of black people amongst the poorest 
sections of society leading to increased criminality, amplified by the Afro-
Caribbean subculture: ‘increased…black crime and police predisposition to 
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associate blacks with crime become part of a vicious circle’.100 The Left Realist 
explanation has provoked the most criticism; being accused of surrendering to 
‘the weight of racist logic’ and that Keith for example argued that proponents ‘do 
not so much revise history as forget it’.101  
Multiple studies on policing and police culture during the 1970s and 
1980s suggested that racism in the police was more prevalent than existed 
within wider society.102 Despite claims to suggest that police officers acted 
without prejudice when it came to fulfilling their duties despite their private 
views, Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips later displayed that behaviour is 
affected by persons holding racially prejudiced attitudes.103 They described a 
number of explanations forwarded to explain discrimination in policing, such as 
‘bad apples’, ‘reflection of society’, and ‘institutional racism’.104 Reiner recorded 
that the ‘clear and distinguished genesis’ of British police research was Michael 
Banton’s 1964 work The Policeman in the Community, the first academic study 
of everyday policing as opposed to government-sponsored surveys or works of 
‘enthusiastic amateurs’.105 The most significant, in terms of impact, was the 
Policy Study Institute’s Police and People in London survey published in 
1983.106 Ordered by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Sir David 
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McNee in 1979, it generated ‘an extent of controversy and debate about 
policing that was unprecedented in recent times’.107 
CONTEXT 
A number of aspects are discussed repeatedly throughout this thesis 
and, as such, it is important to establish a relevant background and working 
knowledge of those organisations and processes. Accordingly the British police 
and governmental public inquiries are introduced briefly below. 
POLICE 
The police went through many changes in the years before 1980-81 in 
terms of their organisation and perception; both in the public’s view and their 
view of themselves. This was largely a movement away from a ‘traditional’ view 
of policing which had proliferated in various forms since their inception and 
professionalism following the Metropolitan Police Act passed by Home 
Secretary Sir Robert Peel in 1829. For example, use of new technologies such 
as ‘panda cars’ from the mid-1960s led to an increased movement away from 
the traditional view of the police as the local ‘bobby on the beat’, towards 
officers unfamiliar with the changing local communities who would only appear 
when trouble was occurring or, in more extreme views, to cause some.108 The 
1978 Edmund-Davies Report recommendations, implemented in full on the first 
working day of the 1979 Conservative Government, greatly increased police 
pay escalating the number of young officers in the early 1980s: in 1980 36 
percent were 18½-25 years old.109 This was coupled with an evolving image of 
the police in popular culture, which included the American Starsky and Hutch 
and London-based The Sweeney, which Frank Leishman and Paul Mason 
described as ‘perhaps the ultimate celebration of the police breaking the rules in 
order to obtain a conviction’.110 Clive Emsley similarly noted how the hero bent 
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or broke the rules, ‘But Detective Inspector Jack Regan in The Sweeney was 
always shown to be ultimately in the right; he only kicked against bureaucracy 
and petti-fogging functionaries who impeded the apprehension and punishment 
of “real criminals”.’111 This thus affected officers’ perception of their roles, with 
young recruits often attracted by the promise of action and David J. Smith and 
Jeremy Gray argued that many ‘look forward to disturbances and, in fact, tend 
to find anything else boring by comparison’.112 British police training was also 
criticised, with examples showing how new German police recruits acquired 
multiple years’ worth of experience before allowed to patrol on their own; in 
Britain it was merely ten weeks.113 It was believed that areas such as St Pauls 
and Brixton were used as a ‘training ground’ by police for young inexperienced 
officers, who were criticised as being less sympathetic to the views of local 
black communities and thus ‘quicker to react to things and people they did not 
understand’.114 
Additionally the Police Act 1964 included major reforms to the 
organisation of the police in England and Wales which endowed more power to 
chief constables and the Home Secretary, at the same time creating 43 local 
police authorities.115 Such authorities consisted of two-thirds elected members 
of county or borough councils and one-third local magistrates, responsible for 
‘maintaining an “adequate and efficient” police force which was properly housed 
and equipped’.116 Although the majority of police funding came from the Home 
Office, police authorities were able to raise additional funds through local 
Council Tax and it was their responsibility to set the budget for the police. Whist 
these authorities had the power to remove chief constables, subject to the 
Home Secretary’s approval, this was rarely used. Reiner highlighted how in 
practice most authorities did little and usually deferred to the local chief 
constable’s ‘professional’ expertise: ‘The police authorities paid the piper (or 
more precisely shared policing costs with central government) but did not call 
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any tunes.’117 This system excluded that of the Metropolitan Police, which was 
under the direct control of the Home Secretary. Police authorities in England 
and Wales were abolished in November 2012 and replaced with directly elected 
Police and Crime Commissioners, ostensibly allowing for increased levels of 
police accountability to local communities that they served; however the low 
voter turnout for such elections shows the continued apathy widely held for such 
issues.118 
This strengthening of police power was coupled with the election of 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government on 4 May 1979 ushering in an 
age of Thatcherism with, alongside related economic and social policies, a 
seeming unequivocal support for the police. The Labour Party, specifically then-
backbencher Jack Straw, unsuccessfully attempted in November 1979 to 
strengthen police authorities’ influence over general policy issues. Although 
day-to-day operational decisions were to remain the chief constable’s 
prerogative, the intention was to allow police authorities to ‘have some say in 
the way in which the area is to be policed’.119 A number of Labour-controlled 
police authorities attempted to exploit their limited powers and would come into 
conflict with their local chief constables, especially following Labour local 
election gains in 1981.120 The police and Conservatives constantly opposed 
what they deemed the ‘politicisation of the police’, arguing that their political 
independence was vital in order to maintain their impartiality. Reiner has 
documented that the independence the British police had historically enjoyed 
from elected government institutions was often touted as a positive feature, 
such as former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Robert Mark stating: 
‘The fact that the British police are answerable to the law, that we act on behalf 
of the community and not under the mantle of government, makes us the least 
powerful, the most accountable and therefore the most acceptable police in the 
world.’121 Police Federation Chairman Jim Jardine similarly argued that the 
police accepted the ‘principle of accountability’, but rejected political control of 
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the police: ‘Once they become subject to the whims of local politicians, police 
impartiality flies out of the window.’122  
Whilst undoubtedly an important point that there is a fine line to tread 
regarding politicisation of the police, similarly accountability can only exist if 
there are functioning mechanisms which allow for such. In his report of the 1981 
disturbances, Lord Scarman described the ‘withdrawal of consent’ as key to the 
problems in policing, concluding: ‘a police force which does not consult locally 
will fail to be efficient’.123 Timothy Brain summarised that the Conservatives 
attempted to rely upon increased police numbers and harsher punishments, 
whilst Labour attempted to increase political control over the police. Criticising 
both respectively for being in denial or pursuing political rather than practical 
solutions, Brain concluded that all political parties and groups, as well as the 
police itself, must take responsibility for the rising crime and connected 
problems.124 
It is vital to view the violent disorders of 1980-81 within a broader 
framework of disturbances and questioning of the police’s conduct within the 
‘long 1980s’. The subsequent 1984-85 miners’ strike was a particularly bitter 
dispute between trade unions and government, whose forceful response led to 
pitched battles between striking miners and the police. Police tactics employed 
during the strike have been widely condemned, with accusations of officers 
striking protestors and later fabricating or tampering with evidence leading to 
calls for a public inquiry into events. 125 Despite the South Yorkshire police in 
2012 referring themselves to the Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC) to investigate their own misconduct, allegedly including assault, perjury, 
perverting the course of justice, and misconduct in a public office, the IPCC 
recently rejected calls for a formal investigation as it was deemed too long 
ago.126 Similarly recent revelations about the Hillsborough disaster of 1989, 
where 96 people were crushed to death due to police error, has revealed that 
substantial effort was undertaken by the police to conceal the true events, 
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including the alteration of some 116 officer statements to ‘remove or alter 
comments unfavourable’ to the South Yorkshire Police.127  
As with discussions in this thesis, for instance the Operation Countryman 
investigation into police corruption and frequent dismissals of criticisms against 
the police, it is clear this was a period where many within the police did not feel 
that either they should be, or could be, accountable for their actions. 
Consequently polls recorded that respondents agreeing with the statement that 
they had ‘a great deal of respect for the police’ almost halved from 83 percent in 
1959 to 43 percent in 1989.128 Viewed within such a context the decision taken 
by many members of the black community, to either constantly demand full 
investigation of the police or to violently express their discontent, might not be 
surprising. 
PUBLIC INQUIRIES 
Throughout this thesis reference is made to appeals for public inquiries 
to investigate a variety of aspects causing discontent within local black 
communities. Despite the history and importance of public inquiries within the 
British legal system, there is a dearth of academic research on their history and 
structure. Indeed, the foreword to Jason Beer QC’s 2009 work declares: 
‘Astonishingly, this is the first book on public inquiries ever to be published.’129 
Public inquiries investigate issues of serious public concern, examining in a 
public manner the events under its remit; although Stephen Sedley provided an 
alternative definition: ‘the organizing of controversy into a form more catholic 
than litigation but less anarchic than street fighting’.130 The term ‘public inquiry’ 
has a very broad meaning within the British legal system and multiple forms of 
inquiries are available, such as departmental inquiries established by ministers, 
or more formal public inquiries established following a resolution of both Houses 
of Parliament. For some 84 years, before the introduction of the Inquiries Act 
2005, such public inquiries fell under the remit of the Tribunals and Inquiries 
(Evidence) Act 1921, initially enacted to investigate accusations that Ministry of 
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Munitions officials had destroyed papers relating to awarded contracts.131 The 
Act specified that if both Houses deemed a tribunal be established either by the 
Crown or by a Secretary of State for ‘inquiring into a definite matter described in 
the Resolution as of urgent public importance’, then such a tribunal should have 
all powers, rights, and privileges that are vested in the High Court.132 Thus such 
tribunals were endowed with the power to compel the production of documents 
and enforce witness attendance and examination under oath.  
A 1966 Royal Commission established that legal costs of anyone 
involved in an inquiry should be ‘met out of public funds’, and Beer 
subsequently highlighted how ‘it has proved very difficult for ministers and their 
departments to limit the cost of public inquiries’; going some way to explain the 
reluctance of successive Home Secretaries to establish such inquiries.133 The 
Royal Commission stated the strong opinion that a public inquiry: 
…should never be used for matters of local or minor public importance 
but always be confined to matters of vital public importance concerning 
which there is something in the nature of a nation-wide crisis of 
confidence. In such cases we consider that no other method of 
investigation would be adequate.134 
During its 84-year duration, just 24 inquiries were held under the provisions of 
the Tribunals and Inquiries (Evidence) Act 1921.135 It should be remembered 
that Scarman’s 1981 inquiry, established under Section 32 of the Police Act 
1964, was not one of these. Section 32 gave the Home Secretary the power to 
establish a ‘local inquiry’ into ‘any matter connected with the policing of any 
area’, to be held either in public or private.136 Its power to summon and examine 
witnesses fell under section 290 of the Local Government Act 1933, and costs 
incurred by any person could be directed from police funds.137 As discussed in 
Chapter Five, there were some who criticised this inquiry’s establishment under 
the Police Act due to it seemingly focussing investigations solely onto policing 
aspects rather than broader social or political conditions or governmental 
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policies. Within this thesis, the term ‘public inquiry’ thus refers to any 
governmental-established official inquiry into events with powers to summon 
and examine witnesses. 
There are many reasons why such public inquiries might be established, 
other than the simple reason of attempting to discover the truth behind events. 
As well as an important tool of public accountability, Diana Woodhouse listed a 
number of reasons governments may wish to establish inquiries, including: 
depoliticising the issue by removing it from the political arena; giving the 
appearance that ministers share public concern and curiosity into what 
happened (‘they could not have been personally involved, otherwise they would 
know’); and, most relevant to this thesis, that whilst inquiries are independent 
from the government they are still largely under its control in terms of members, 
terms of reference, and publishing of the inquiry report.138 Such inquiries exist 
within a political environment and, as such, are infused with intentions, 
language, and scope which fit within the political strategies of those who 
commissioned them.139 Michael Lipsky and David J. Olson have thus argued 
that such investigations create expectations that cannot be fulfilled.140 However, 
as discussed throughout, calls for such public inquiries throughout the period 
under examination were enduring. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Due to the nature of discussion in this thesis, it is important to initially 
discuss and define some terms often used in an attempt to avoid some of the 
inherent issues with their use. 
‘RIOT’ 
The events of 1980-81 were often described as ‘riots’, both at the time 
and subsequently. Peter Fryer highlighted how baffled politicians and 
sensationalist media accounts described and focussed upon looting and 
criminality, but their use of riot ‘to describe what were in fact uprisings by entire 
inner-city populations, black and white together, served to obscure the true 
nature and causes of these events’.141 Labelling such events riots, criminal, and 
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illegitimate, inherently removed the genuine sources of discontent and 
dissatisfaction with British society behind them. Kettle and Hodges argued that 
any description of events, including their titular Uprising!, contain their own 
problems and linguistic baggage, before concluding: ‘In the circumstances, “riot” 
will have to do.’142 With this taken into consideration and acknowledging the 
argument of this thesis that such collective violence was part of a political 
strategy, or ‘bargaining by riot’ as Hobsbawm coined, they are instead referred 
to as ‘disturbances’, ‘disorder’, or ‘unrest’. It is important to stress however that 
undoubtedly there were many who had no such ideas or designs as they were 
looting or using the opportunity to engage in violence under the cover of 
legitimate protest. Thus where appropriate, such as discussing these aspects or 
reactions of members of the public or the police, ‘riots’ or ‘rioters’ are used 
interchangeably. 
‘BLACK’ 
‘Black’ is a term that has had, and remains to have, a contested history. 
As Uvanney Maylor argued, employing collective terminology to describe 
groups of people with differing backgrounds, cultures, and self-identification, is 
extremely problematic.143 ‘Black’ had historically been used to describe 
essentially anyone who was not white, for example Fryer’s contention that 
evidence stating African soldiers were stationed on Hadrian’s Wall proved that 
‘black people’ were in Britain before the English. As Yasmin Alibhai-Brown 
highlighted there has been an ‘absurd assumption that all whites are part of the 
same homogenous group’.144 For the purposes of this thesis black will be used 
to refer to the group of immigrants who arrived from the Caribbean in years 
following World War Two and their descendants residing in Britain.145 Whilst 
other terms could be used to describe this group, such as ‘Afro-Caribbean’ 
(later supplanted by ‘African-Caribbean’), this is to highlight the growing 
contemporary use of the term ‘black’ as a positively empowering term of self-
description. The general response of other ethnic minority groups such as 
people of Asian descent living in Britain, both towards and from, the British 
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public and police differed and, whilst noted where relevant, is not the main focus 
of this thesis.146 
METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned at the outset, this study is a social and political 
examination of a marginalised and disempowered ethnic group within modern 
Britain, attempting to increase their representation and participation in the 
political arena. The focus of such discussion is predominantly upon members of 
local black communities but, at the time and since, some have argued that race 
did not in fact play the vital role in the disturbances, but rather underlying 
aspects of class were a more appropriate method of considering the underlying 
reasons for disorder. This thesis argues that such aspects are interconnected 
and can be subsumed within discussion of the racial aspect of the disorders 
which saw an overwhelmingly black composition of the crowds violently oppose 
police action. John Rex and Sally Tomlinson addressed the relationship 
between race and class arguing that, occupying an inferior class position 
throughout aspects such as housing, education, and employment, British ethnic 
minorities found themselves in an ‘underclass’. As such they formed an 
‘underclass-for-itself’ with their own forms of organisation, culture, political goals 
and ideology.147 Even Scarman noted in his inquiry report that, whilst 
unemployment affected everyone, ‘its weight falls disproportionately heavy on 
black people’.148 Therefore it is argued throughout that, whilst unemployment 
and economic hardship played a role in the disorder, viewing them as a political 
reaction from a marginalised ethnic group is a more appropriate perspective. 
Thus this work follows the models of ‘collective bargaining by riot’ as outlined in 
the literature review, in lieu of repeating discussion. 
In order to examine the research questions outlined above, this thesis 
utilises a traditional archival approach utilising primary source analysis of 
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records from a variety of personal, local, and national archives. This is almost 
exclusively qualitative in nature, although there are occasional aspects of 
quantitative data such as police numbers or arrest statistics. First and foremost 
of these primary sources are unstudied governmental files of the Scarman 
Inquiry, recently released in accordance with the Public Records Act 1967 
requiring that public records should be released after thirty years; documents 
were closed to public view until at least 2005, with the majority being 
unobtainable until 2012.149 Established to examine Brixton disorder, and 
subsequently extended to include broader events, the Scarman Inquiry obtained 
numerous police records such as transcripts of police radio messages and 
interviews with officers, as well as receiving submissions from numerous 
individuals and local organisations and groups. Occurring before the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which made tape recording of interviews with 
suspects in police stations the standard, the recording of police radio messages 
was a costly endeavour. The use of such evidence however by investigating 
officers and the judicial system, as well as in defence of growing accusations of 
police corruption, necessitated their recording.  
As with all evidence considered, it is important to note the background 
and possible biases inherent when considering these. For example, study of 
transcripts of interviews conducted with officers after events must acknowledge 
the officers’ knowledge and awareness that such records could, if incriminating, 
be subsequently used as evidence against them. Indeed a number of examples 
of police later admitting as such are cited throughout. Similarly submissions 
from interested groups and organisations, often attempting to use the inquiry as 
a means of airing personal grievances believed previously to have been 
disregarded, are not likely to be wholly impartial. Study of these records allows 
insight into those aspects believed most important within the final published 
report and, notably, which were omitted; thus this is a focal point of discussion. 
As the inquiry record holds some 141 files of information, attempts to 
simply read everything may well have taken another thirty years. The approach 
was adopted of selecting those files believed of greatest importance and 
interest to this study and research questions; namely police radio messages 
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sent during the disturbances, interviews with police officers, and submissions 
from individuals and organisations involved in the disturbances, both directly or 
indirectly. An unexpected delay of access to the inquiry records allowed for 
additional research undertaken in other aspects discussed, including inquests 
into the deaths of Kevin Gately, Blair Peach, and the 1981 New Cross Fire. 
Many such files had similarly only recently been released and have thus not yet 
received considerable academic attention, such as Commander John Cass’ 
report into Peach’s death at Southall and report of Gately’s death during the 
Red Lion Square disorders. 
As central to this thesis as the recently released records of the Scarman 
Inquiry are, they are not the only records consulted. Local government, 
organisations, and police records were consulted at Bristol Records Office, with 
specific permission obtained to sealed police records related to the 
disturbances which have, to the author’s knowledge, been accessed by only 
one other author with a differing research focus.150 Furthermore the personal 
collection of Dr John Stevenson, containing materials relating to the Manchester 
Moss Side disturbances collected whilst based at a local university, included 
numerous interviews, records, and minutes of the locally established Hytner 
Inquiry which allowed for further discussion and study of primary sources 
unavailable elsewhere.151 
There are five main themes of argument throughout this thesis adding to 
the historiography differing perspectives in addition to new sources. Firstly the 
dichotomy of ‘bargaining by riot’ and continuous appeals for public inquiries 
shows a community attempting increased political participation through various 
means, but it is argued neither were greatly successful. Relatedly the 
widespread discontent and lack of trust towards authorities, highlighted most 
obviously by belief of a wide array of largely anti-police rumours, were not 
addressed by any inquiries that were obtained, despite the clear desire from the 
community for the legitimacy of such state-endorsed investigations. Thirdly the 
seeming complete inability of the police and state to admit any failings, 
mistakes, or wrongdoing further enlarged the discontent. The spread of disorder 
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around the country is also addressed, agreeing that the media played a role in 
its dissemination but that personal connections and the movement of people, 
police and public, allowed the spread and proliferation of disorder. Additionally 
the influence of Northern Ireland is seen throughout, significantly influencing the 
actions and tactics of police, participants, and ruling authorities. 
STRUCTURE 
In order to portray the sense of growing momentum and events 
influencing subsequent reaction, the most expedient chapter structure for this 
thesis is in a chronological manner. One of the main arguments of this work is 
that continuing refusals to hold public inquiries and the actions of the police 
further deteriorated poor relations with local black communities; structuring the 
chapters in such a way most effectively highlighted this. Whilst chapters 
themselves are often arranged thematically to best discuss the events and 
provide clarity to analysis, this structure throughout would have lost some of this 
sense of momentum and increasing tensions. One possible consequence to be 
wary of when using a chronological approach such as this is that discussion 
becomes too narrative; however this has been attempted to be negated 
throughout. 
Chapter One begins with establishing the background situation and 
placing the disturbances of 1980-81 within a broader historical context of 
growing discontent from sections of the black community in Britain. It does so 
firstly with an overview of increased colonial immigration after the Second World 
War and, opposing traditional interpretations of the state’s role as negligible 
prior to 1958 ‘race riots’, it is argued that favourable policies for white migrants 
and a shifting definition of ‘Britishness’ constructed black immigration as a 
problem long before various postwar governments enacted increasing 
restrictions upon Commonwealth immigration. Numerous governmental policies, 
such as successive Race Relations Acts beginning in 1965, were ostensibly 
introduced to improve race relations and the situation for black people in Britain, 
but were in actuality weak ineffectual laws which both reduced confidence in the 
British legislative system and effectively allowed racial discrimination to 
continue unchallenged. Furthermore this chapter discusses a growing sense 
that police were openly racially prejudiced and in general not accountable for 
their actions. This includes consideration of key changes within police 
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accountability and several high-profile deaths, either during political protests or 
within police custody. The aim of this synopsis is to provide a context for events 
occurring in 1980-81, showing how the British authorities had repeatedly 
undermined the hopes and expectations of large sections of the black 
community. 
The remaining chapters consist of detailed examinations of collective 
violence around England in 1980-81. The disorders studied here followed the 
same basic pattern: widespread growing tension between police and sections of 
the local black community; police action deemed ‘the final straw’; various 
outbreaks of violence with subsequent and largely unconnected looting 
predominantly by white people not involved in initial disturbances; a robust 
police response itself criticised with accusations of police misconduct; and 
finally varying levels of governmental and local inquiries, all of which deemed 
unsatisfactory by local interested organisations and groups. The chapters are 
split into three two-chapter sections of different stages of the spread of 
disturbances around England in 1980-81. 
Chapter Two begins analysis of the first violence against the police in St 
Pauls, Bristol on 2 April 1980. This event reverberated around the country with 
people often reacting with shock and confusion. Conversely, to those familiar 
with the situation and growing levels of resentment, it came as no surprise that 
violence erupted. Using previously unstudied records, this chapter examines the 
police’s actions before and during the disturbance, reaction and involvement of 
local organisations, and relationship between the police and local community. 
Chapter Three continues this analysis, examining the response to disorder 
which included requests for and continuing rejections of a public inquiry, the 
resulting ‘three-pronged’ government response criticised as inadequate, 
establishment of local inquiries by other organisations, and subsequent trials of 
those arrested which resulted in no convictions. The government focus upon the 
trials and attempts at punishments rather than answering appeals for a full 
public inquiry clearly demonstrates attempts to portray unrest as a criminal 
action which should be dealt with as such. 
Chapter Four examines the most well-known and discussed disturbance 
of the period; Brixton on 10-12 April 1981. Occurring almost exactly one year 
after St Pauls, and five days after the acquittal of those charged with offences in 
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Bristol, violence emerged after a week-long massive police presence in the 
area. A seemingly innocuous incident between police and a local stabbed youth 
escalated wildly due to the level of distrust and discontent towards the police. 
Local police had been aware of a poor relationship with the local black 
population, resulting in the establishment of a Liaison Committee with local 
community representatives. However this Committee soon broke down due to 
the deployment of the unpopular Special Patrol Group and police belief that 
community representatives should have no say in the operational enforcement 
of the law. Similarly Chapter Five continues to discuss reactions, further 
discussing the government’s establishment of the inquiry into the disturbance 
led by Lord Scarman. Police actions during the disturbances are also examined, 
where contemporary evidence is compared to subsequent explanations and 
submissions included in the Scarman Report. This is explored through close 
examination of records submitted to or created by the Inquiry, such as 
transcripts of police radio messages sent at the time of the disturbances. 
Accusations of police misconduct are also examined. As these went 
unexamined by Scarman and, compared with the prevailing authority focus 
upon the criminality of the disorders, added to feelings that the British system 
was organised to protect the police at the expense of minority groups. 
Chapter Six continues to explore key events which followed Brixton, 
through brief discussion of particular notable developments such as significantly 
altered police equipment and tactics. The chapter subsequently examines in 
detail the case of Moss Side, Manchester. Advancing previous discussion about 
the role of local organisations, a meeting was called between the police and 
local community representatives after initial disturbances that agreed upon a 
low-level police presence to reduce tensions and avoid recurrences of violence. 
This meeting and tactic was subsequently accused of being a police ploy to 
legitimise their subsequent forceful response, again highlighting the level of 
distrust towards the police. Chapter Seven discusses the aftermath of the July 
1981 disturbances, including a local County Council inquiry and subsequent 
boycott from local organisations, and further accusations of police misconduct 
going unexamined and unpunished. The general reaction to and discussion of 
the nature of the 1980-81 disorders is discussed, including the report produced 
by the Scarman Inquiry, which finally leads to general conclusions and 
summaries. 
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The Conclusion summarises the main arguments made throughout this 
thesis; namely that the collective violence discussed should be viewed within a 
broader political response to perceived discrimination and lack of accountability 
of the British state and police in particular. Many from the black community in 
Britain, emboldened and hardened by the fate of the previous Black Power 
movement, decided that action must be taken to address their marginalisation 
within British society and increase their political participation. Furthermore the 
reluctance or refusal of governmental inquiries to consider numerous 
accusations of blatant police misconduct during the disorders increased 
discontent. This thesis concludes that this played a role in the continuing poor 
relations between police and aspects of the local black communities, leading to 
recurring violent disorder later in the decade. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE BACKGROUND SITUATION 
 
When discussing ideas of police and governmental accountability and to 
understand why numerous cities erupted into violence in the years 1980-81 it is 
necessary to examine the broader historical context. As Michael Keith stressed, 
‘Such periodization cannot on its own provide an explanation for such conflict, 
but without it any explanation will inevitably lack plausibility.’1 This first chapter 
addresses the background situation for black people in Britain following 
increased colonial migration after World War II, and their subsequent reception 
and position within society. It also examines some of the events which acted as 
precursors to later amplified disorder, characterised by recurrent calls for public 
inquiries but authorities’ reluctance, police rejection of criticism and feelings of 
victimisation. Events have been chosen to illustrate a growing momentum, 
gradual building of tension, and feelings of discontent towards the British 
system which appeared to offer black people little or no support, especially 
regarding their treatment at the hands of the police, as well as highlighting the 
increasing mobilisation of black communities. Many local committees and 
organisations were established in an attempt to participate in the political 
process and affect change, although these often went ignored or were 
marginalised by authorities. This thesis argues that this eventually led to some 
within the black community feeling that their only feasible recourse for political 
participation was to violently clash with the police as visual symbols of an 
authority system which had repeatedly failed them. Some explanations of the 
disturbances, especially those from politicians downplaying any connection to 
their policies, attempted to portray the disorder as ‘sheer criminality’ where 
participants simply wanted the reward of rioting, either through looting or 
excitement. Whilst the disturbances themselves were triggered by seemingly 
spontaneous outbursts, the disorder can be viewed within broader political 
activity attempting to improve their position in society and originating from the 
discontentment and anger that had been building for years previously. 
                                                     
1 Michael Keith, Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society (London, 
1993) p. 18. 
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THE ‘WINDRUSH GENERATION’ 
There is a long history of immigration into Britain; indeed the country was 
built upon immigrants and their descendants.2 This opposes the view, widely 
held at the time, that immigration was a phenomenon established following 
World War II. Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace, and Heather Booth correctly 
challenged assumptions that this period saw the ‘beginnings’ of race relations 
within Britain, detailing previous incidents of collective racial violence such as 
‘race riots’ between white and ethnic minority workers in major British seaports 
in 1919.3 Although not a postwar creation, immigration was certainly significant 
during this period; between 1945 and 1961 the British population rose by over a 
million due to an influx of European refugees, Irish citizens, and British subjects 
from the West Indies, India, and Pakistan.4 Many were recruited by the British 
Government to relieve substantial postwar labour shortages; although the 
reaction which greeted these different groups was noticeably disparate.  
Arrivals from Ireland were treated essentially as British citizens, a 
practice made explicit by the state in the 1948 Nationality Act and a 1954 
Working Party suggesting that, when discussing immigration restrictions, the 
government should ‘argue boldly that the population of the British Isles was 
essentially one’.5 Similarly European migrants benefited from government 
initiatives allowing them to integrate into British society such as favourable 
publicity campaigns, English language classes, and joining appropriate trade 
unions – a celebrated symbol of ‘Britishness’.6 Conversely those entering 
                                                     
2 As Zig Layton-Henry summarised: ‘Throughout its history Britain, especially England, has 
been a destination for immigrants and refugees. Early invaders, like the Angles, Jutes, Saxons, 
Danes, Norwegians and Normans, were attracted by hopes of booty and fertile land. Later 
immigrants, like the Flemings, Germans, Walloons and Dutch, were often invited…or were 
fleeing religious or political persecution’: Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: 
Immigration, ‘Race’ and ‘Race’ Relations in Post-War Britain (Oxford, 1992) p. 3. 
3 Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace and Heather Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol ‘Riot’ 
and the State (London, 1983) pp. 8-41. 
4 Kathleen Paul, ‘From Subjects to Immigrants: Black Britons and National Identity, 1948-62’, in 
Richard Weight and Abigail Beach (eds.), The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity 
in Britain, 1930-1960 (New York, 1998) pp. 224-5. 
5 W. H. Cornish, ‘Working party to consider restriction of right of British subject from overseas to 
enter and remain in UK’, The National Archives (TNA): HO 344/12; Draft of article 
‘Commonwealth immigration from the end of World War II to 1962’, TNA: HO 344/92; Paul, 
‘From Subjects to Immigrants’, p. 226. 
6 A joint government/Trades Union Congress publication created a policy that foreigners should 
be absorbed ‘into the British way of life and become in due course and to all intents and 
purposes, fully fledged British citizens’: ‘Foreign Labour in Great Britain, 1947-51’, Joint 
Consultative Committee Meeting, 25 November 1948, University of Warwick, Modern Records 
Centre, Trades Union Congress Papers, MSS 103.28, as cited in Paul, ‘From Subjects to 
Immigrants’, pp. 225-6, 241. 
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postwar Britain from its colonies, beginning with 492 passengers (and one 
stowaway) on board the Empire Windrush on 22 June 1948, acquired no such 
governmental support.7 On the contrary, eleven Labour MPs immediately wrote 
to Prime Minister Clement Attlee fearing the negative consequence such 
immigrants would have upon the ‘harmony, strength and cohesion of our public 
and social life’.8 Kenan Malik highlighted how the dichotomous view of such 
immigrants as ‘British citizens’ and ‘undesirables’ reveals the view that black 
people were unable to assimilate to British culture and, as such, would cause 
social tension.9 As subjects of the British Empire or citizens of the United 
Kingdom and Colonies, in theory they should have faced fewer immigration 
difficulties; however in practice the British Colonial Office and colonial 
governments conspired to limit migration into Britain by making the process 
more difficult.10 Lacking official support and being ‘visibly distinguishable by the 
colour of their skins’, it is not hard to imagine why Commonwealth immigrants 
received the brunt of animosity: ‘The coloured migrant, and particularly the 
Negro, appears to be the supreme and ultimate stranger.’11 
Therefore the British government, by assisting European migrants to 
assimilate into Britain and perpetuating the view that Irish were essentially 
British, escalated negative reactions towards Commonwealth immigrants who 
bore the brunt of popular discontent regarding rising immigration. As Zig Layton-
Henry summarised, ‘a more positive early lead by government and political 
leaders might have done much to assuage public anxieties’.12 Gary Freeman 
contrasted the British situation with that of France, showing how a more active 
publicising of the economic necessity and benefits of migrant workers by 
                                                     
7 David Kynaston, Austerity Britain, 1945-1951 (London, 2007) p. 274. 
8 J. Murray et al., 22 June 1948, TNA: HO 213/244, as cited in Kenan Malik, The Meaning of 
Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society (Basingstoke, 1996) p. 19. 
9 Malik, The Meaning of Race, p. 19. 
10 This included limiting distribution of passports, increasing application fees, and stressing the 
lack of British employment for potential migrants: Indian High Commissioner to Commonwealth 
Relations Office (CRO), 10 May 1958, TNA: CO 1032/195; Pakistan High Commissioner to 
CRO, 16 May 1958, TNA: CO 1032/195. See also Bob Carter and Shirley Joshi, ‘The Role of 
Labour in the Creation of a Racist Britain’, Race & Class, 25 (1984), 53-70; Bob Carter, Clive 
Harris and Shirley Joshi, ‘The 1951-1955 Conservative Government and the Racialisation of 
Black Immigration’, Immigrants and Minorities, 6 (1987), 335-47. 
11 Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, Second Report by the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Advisory Council, Cmnd. 2266 (London, 1964); Sheila Patterson, Dark Strangers: A 
Sociological Study of the Absorption of a Recent West Indian Migrant Group in Brixton, South 
London (London, 1963) p. 17. 
12 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain (London, 1984) p. 29. 
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politicians and employers resulted in less hostility towards immigrants.13 Thus 
this refutes the traditional historical view of the role of the British state as being 
‘negligible’ in the development of postwar racism before the 1958 ‘race riots’.14 
Contemporary government papers supported this theory; Cabinet Secretary 
Norman Brook observed in 1955 that an official inquiry into colonial migration 
‘would not be to find a solution (for it is evident what form control must take) but 
to enlist a sufficient body of public support for the legislation’.15 This can be 
viewed as merely the first in a list of actions undertaken by successive postwar 
British authorities which escalated discontent and eventually led to violent 
uprisings from sections of black communities in Britain. 
In an attempt to examine the situation, a long-term survey was 
established in 1963 by the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) into British race 
relations, modelled upon an influential American survey conducted some twenty 
years previously.16 Following the antecedent of American experience is 
something often repeated in all areas of British politics, but particularly 
noticeably so in race relations. Indeed, IRR director Philip Mason compared the 
British situation to American models, stating that increased immigration into 
Britain meant that ‘a menace once comfortably remote has appeared on the 
doorstep’.17 He believed studying American experiences could avoid the worst 
racial tensions they had faced and, whilst the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants 
                                                     
13 Gary Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and 
British Experience, 1945-1975 (Guilford, 1979) pp. 173-215. Although by no means claiming 
France are without racial issues, this is symbolic of broader differences in race policies between 
the two countries, as the British model of multiculturalism aimed to encourage development of 
semi-autonomous community identities, compared to France’s assimilatory model which 
demanded migrants incorporate into the ‘French way of a life’. For further discussion, see: 
David Waddington, Fabien Jobard and Mike King (eds.), Rioting in the U.K. And France: A 
Comparative Analysis (Cullompton, Devon, 2009). 
14 Ruth Glass, Newcomers: The West Indians in London (Michigan, 1960) pp. 127-46; Paul 
Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics (California, 1960) p. 233; E. J. B. Rose, Colour 
and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations (London, 1969) pp. 206-31; Sheila 
Patterson, Immigration and Race Relations in Britain, 1960-1967 (London, 1969) p. 17; 
Nicholas Deakin, Colour, Citizenship and British Society (London, 1970) pp. 96-100; Dilip Hiro, 
Black British, White British (London, 1971) p. 201; Paul, ‘From Subjects to Immigrants’, p. 238; 
Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics and Migration in the United States, 
1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68 (Oxford, 1973) pp. 129-31; Malik, The Meaning of Race, p. 23. 
15 Paul, ‘From Subjects to Immigrants’, p. 238. See also: Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, 
White Man's Country: Racism in British Politics (London, 1984); Carter, Harris and Joshi, ‘The 
Racialisation of Black Immigration’, 335. 
16 The Institute was a think tank established in 1958 to conduct and publish research on 
worldwide race relations: ‘About the Institute of Race Relations’, 
http://www.irr.org.uk/about/index.html (last accessed 20 August 2013). The report was 
published as Rose, Colour and Citizenship. The American survey was led by Swedish 
economist Gunnar Myrdal: ‘A Myrdal for Britain’, The Observer, 29 September 1963. 
17 Phillip Mason, ‘Long Look at Colour Question’, The Times, 27 September 1963; Phillip 
Mason, ‘Survey of Minorities in Britain’, 18 June 1963, TNA: HO 344/92. 
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Act had decreased immigration, it had not solved racial tensions: ‘The problem 
is clearly one that will stay with Britain permanently.’18 The IRR was clearly 
informing the government their attempts to decrease racial tensions by limiting 
immigration had failed, and that a different form of government action was 
required to improve race relations.  
However, representing a similar response that would be seen over the 
following years towards groups appealing for governmental action on matters 
concerning race, this research was greeted with scepticism and it was alleged 
that this was an attempt to ‘make trouble’ for the Government from an Institute 
who believed themselves better-informed than the authorities.19 Although the 
government’s own Commonwealth Immigration Committee produced detailed 
reports similarly recommending immediately: ‘translating into legislation and 
administrative action the answers to problems which have been sufficiently 
identified and on which the essential data are known’.20 Such legislative 
measures would later be implemented, but not before racially-motivated 
violence appeared within Britain. 
The original need for such research had been amplified in 1958 when 
racial unrest erupted in Nottingham and Notting Hill. Over one thousand people, 
black and white, took to the streets of St Ann’s in Nottingham on 23 August and 
the Nottingham Evening Post labelled it: ‘like a slaughterhouse.’21 The following 
week violence spread to Notting Hill and on 30 August seventeen people were 
arrested after attacks and petrol bombing of black peoples’ houses. Reporter 
Colin Eales described the scene which greeted him the following night: 
I saw a mob of over 700 men, women and children stretching 200 yards 
along the road. Young children of ten were treating the whole black affair 
as a great joke and shouting: ‘Come on, let’s get the blacks’...a fierce cry 
rent the air and the mob rushed off in the direction of Latimer Road 
shouting, ‘Kill the niggers!’22 
In a situation which echoes the later spread of disturbances around England in 
1981, gangs from other areas of London arrived to join the violence ‘on foot, by 
                                                     
18 Ibid. 
19 J. M. Roffey to R. F. Wood, 7 September 1962, TNA: HO 344/92. 
20 Commonwealth Immigration Committee, ‘Coloured Immigration - Social Effects and Economic 
Implications’, 30 September 1963, TNA: HO 376/128. 
21 Linda Pressly, ‘The “Forgotten” Race Riot’, BBC News, 21 May 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6675793.stm (last accessed 29 August 2013). 
22 Colin Eales, Kensington News, 5 September 1958, as cited in Panikos Panayi (ed.), The 
Impact of Immigration: A Documentary History of the Effects and Experiences of Immigrants in 
Britain since 1945 (Manchester, 1999) pp. 135-7. 
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train, bus, motor bike, car and lorry’.23 During a cabinet meeting the following 
week, Home Secretary Rab Butler stated it appeared that competition for 
housing and employment had led to violence.24 Rather than seeking methods 
for easing such competition through improving housing or employment policies, 
he advocated immigration controls and powers to deport ‘undesirable 
immigrants’.25 Similarly the Minister of Labour Iain Macleod proposed denying 
passports to potential West Indian immigrants who could not prove they were 
guaranteed British employment.26 A poll conducted by the Daily Mail 
immediately following the riots suggested that eighty percent of white Britons 
supported the introduction of hard-line immigration policies.27 Thus the events of 
1958 provided an opportunity for far-right parties to openly exploit growing anti-
immigrant sentiment, with the White Defence League, National Labour Party, 
and Oswald Mosley’s Union Movement becoming politically active in the area.28 
Reflecting a lack of governmental action, this was not the end to racial 
violence in Notting Hill. Antiguan immigrant Kelso Cochrane was murdered on 
17 May 1959, ‘stabbed to death in the sight of help’.29 His murder was the 
culmination of growing tensions and nightly outbreaks of minor violence which 
commentators blamed on people who ‘too easily assumed’ it would have 
disappeared following the exemplary sentences of the previous summer’s 
rioters.30 It was widely believed that not enough had been done following the 
violent warnings of the year before to have prevented Cochrane’s murder. As a 
result of his death, the Government and IRR both initiated further investigations 
into race relations; although for many, not least Cochrane himself, this was too 
little too late.31 The New Statesman argued that, despite such violent warnings, 
‘little official action has followed…the government has a far greater 
                                                     
23 Ibid. 
24 Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 8 September 1958, TNA: CAB/128/32. 
25 Ibid.; Tony Benn, Years of Hope: Diaries, Letters and Papers 1940-1962 (London, 1994) p. 
286. 
26 Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet, 11 September 1958, TNA: CAB/128/32.  
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(London, 2001) p. 60. 
28 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race, p. 89. 
29 ‘Knives in Notting Hill’, New Statesman, 23 May 1959; Steve Silver, ‘Who Killed my Brother?’, 
Searchlight, May 2006. 
30 ‘Knives in Notting Hill’. Judge Justice Salmon had sentenced nine white youths who had gone 
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responsibility than it has yet admitted’.32 This would be a recurring accusation 
throughout the postwar years as the feeling grew that the British government 
were not doing enough to protect and improve the situation of the black 
population.  
Labour MP George Rogers proposed appointing a Select Committee to 
examine areas with large immigrant populations, but this was rejected by 
Conservative ministers.33 A subsequent suggestion of creating an independent 
body to examine the problems and suggest remedies was also rejected on the 
basis that it might offer recommendations that the Government deemed 
unacceptable.34 A government which refused to establish an independent 
inquiry, in case it advised something they disagreed with, was clearly not one 
which felt accountable to those who may have benefited from such actions. 
Additionally, following the riots and Cochrane murder, the Commission in the 
United Kingdom for the West Indies, British Guana and British Honduras 
recorded that it continuously received reports of a persistent feeling that the 
police were not impartial, and the police thus contemplated steps to improve 
their relations with ethnic minorities.35 Whilst this clearly shows that the police 
were aware at this stage of issues relating to relations between the police and 
local black communities, little was done to resolve them. 
Despite evidence suggesting minimal blame upon immigrants for 
incidents of sporadic violence, such events led to increased demands for 
immigration control and even deportations. In response the Home Secretary 
publically announced the government had ‘for some little time been examining 
the result of this country’s time-honoured practice to allow free entry of 
immigrants from Commonwealth and colonial countries’.36 Such events 
politicised British race relations and allowed the government to move from 
private contemplations to openly suggesting immigration controls. The 
Conservative Government in 1959 acknowledged Labour would oppose 
deportations, but they believed that a numerical limitation on immigration would 
                                                     
32 ‘Knives in Notting Hill’. 
33 HC Deb 04 June 1959 vol. 606 c. 369; Note of a Meeting, 2 June 1959, TNA: CO 1031/2539. 
34 Note of a Meeting, 2 June 1959. 
35 The Commission in the United Kingdom for the West Indies, British Guana and British 
Honduras to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 September 1959, TNA: CO 1028/50, as 
cited in Panayi, The Impact of Immigration, pp. 137-8; ‘Causes of Racial Tension in Notting Hill’, 
25 May 1959, TNA: HO 344/43. 
36 Statement from Downing Street by Home Secretary Rab Butler, as cited in Brian David 
Jacobs, Black Politics and Urban Crisis in Britain (Cambridge, 1986) p. 33. 
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be generally supported.37 Those who had immigrated into Britain in search of 
better lives were blamed for racial tension, thus being used as scapegoats and 
avoiding addressing the growing issues of race relations in Britain. The 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 created such immigration controls, with 
only bearers of government-issued employment vouchers permitted to enter 
Britain. Outwardly characterised as being introduced for economic reasons, it 
was instead correctly viewed by many as exclusionary on the basis of race. 
Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Leader representing the political right of the party, 
stated during parliamentary debate on the Bill that ‘It is a plain anti-
Commonwealth Measure in theory and it is a plain anti-colour Measure in 
practice’, and Minister without Portfolio William Deedes later admitted: ‘The 
Bill’s real purpose was to restrict the influx of coloured immigrants. We were 
reluctant to say as much openly.’38 
Even those granted admission to Britain faced many obstacles and 
inequalities in their daily lives. One peaceful attempt to address such 
inequalities was the 1963 Bristol Bus Boycott, a successful non-violent boycott 
of a local bus company refusing to employ black people on frontline services. 
Led by local youth officer Paul Stephenson after a potential employee, Guy 
Bailey, was denied an interview because he was black, the boycott of the Bristol 
Omnibus Company by West Indians and many white supporters lasted four 
months and effectively ended the company’s colour bar.39 Largely overlooked in 
the historiography, Madge Dresser’s work is the only publication to study the 
event in detail.40 Elsewhere I concluded that the boycott had an important 
impact on British race relations as it brought the problem of racial discrimination 
to the knowledge of the wider public, whose reaction effectively demonstrated to 
the Government a need for change.41 The boycott boasted the support of such 
influential figures as Sir Learie Constantine, later member of the Race Relations 
                                                     
37 Home Office Meeting, 2 June 1959, TNA: CO 1031/2539. 
38 HC Deb 16 November 1961 vol. 649 c. 799; William Deedes, Race without Rancour (London, 
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Board, and prominent Bristol MP Tony Benn.42 Its influence repeatedly 
permeated Parliament, where it was presented as a potential result of increased 
racial tension.43 Moreover Labour leader Harold Wilson personally met 
organiser Stephenson, promising that a Labour Government would pass a law 
to prevent such racial discrimination.44 This vow was certainly credible as 
Labour MP Reginald Sorensen had attempted unsuccessfully in 1950 to 
introduce legislation to combat racial discrimination, Fenner Brockway MP did 
the same every year between 1956 to 1964, and in 1959 the Labour 
Opposition’s Front Bench spokesman, James Callaghan, urged the 
Conservative Government to introduce legislation prohibiting racial 
discrimination in any public place – again without success.45 
Thus when Labour returned to government in October 1964, they did so 
with their campaign promise of introducing anti-discrimination legislation. Just 
one month after the 1958 ‘race riots’, Labour's National Executive Committee 
committed itself to creating such legislation: ‘Although we believe that the 
fundamental and long-term solution of this problem is educational, nonetheless 
there are public manifestations of racial prejudice so serious that they must be 
dealt with by legislation.’46 Also significant upon the aspiration to create race 
legislation were the failures of policies established under Harold Macmillan’s 
Conservative Government who, in Ira Katznelson’s words, ‘were convinced that 
immigration controls and the appointment of an advisory council [would] provide 
for harmonious race relations’.47 Many countered that limiting immigration is 
more likely to increase racism than reduce it: ‘If you talk and behave as if the 
black man were some kind of virus that must be kept out of the body politic, 
then it is the shabbiest hypocrisy to preach racial harmony at the same time.’48 
Certainly these differing outward positions led black Britons to generally 
                                                     
42 The Race Relations Board was established in 1966 in order to consider complaints under the 
Race Relations Act 1965. 
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perceive Labour as the party furthering their interests and linked Conservatives 
with harsher immigration restrictions. 
1965 RACE RELATIONS ACT 
 Thus was created the Race Relations Act 1965, the first legislation in 
Britain to address racial discrimination and punish incitement to racial hatred. 
However the Act was a weak, ineffectual law which did not address main areas 
of discrimination within employment and housing.49 The Act has since been 
almost universally criticised for being ineffective or too narrow in scope; Shamit 
Saggar summarised that the Act received widespread condemnation primarily 
for its ‘softly, softly’ approach to discrimination, and Erik Bleich labelled it ‘truly a 
whimper of a law’.50 Fewer works have acknowledged the basic fact that, 
despite its obvious failings, the 1965 Act was the beginning of such legislation 
and set a framework for future laws. Michael Banton argued the shift in public 
and governmental opinion and underlying debate about discrimination was of 
greater significance than the Act itself.51 Many others agreed with this 
assessment, with Steven Fielding adding that, despite its limitations, ‘it did 
constitute the first legal challenge to white prejudice’.52  
Conversely the 1965 Act has often been portrayed as a means of 
passing harsher immigration controls whilst appearing to reward the 
disadvantaged immigrant population, or ‘sops to black interests following racist 
immigration legislation’, as Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea described.53 
Douglas Ashford contended that concessions made by Labour in order to pass 
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the Act were harmful for race relations legislation and, as a much diluted 
version of the earlier Bill, it represented a bipartisan agreement ‘to do little or 
nothing’ regarding racial discrimination.54 Previous Labour opposition to 
immigration controls had not been sustained, leading to their maintaining the 
1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and even extending restrictions in 1968.55 
Part of this altered standpoint was due to the surprise 1964 Smethwick general 
election victory for Conservative Peter Griffiths, who defended his supporters’ 
use of the controversial slogan ‘if you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote 
Labour’ as merely ‘a manifestation of popular feeling’.56 Viewing this result as 
too significant to ignore, Layton-Henry summarised how ‘It was a shattering 
result and a disaster for race relations as it appeared to show that racial 
prejudices could be effectively exploited for electoral advantage.’57  
Andrew Geddes concluded that coupling of immigration controls with 
race relations legislation confirmed that the authorities’ assumed a numerical 
limit on immigration would improve race relations and there was a bipartisan 
agreement that immigration had to be controlled, initiated by Labour in order to 
diminish its electoral significance and ‘depoliticise race issues’.58 Katznelson 
agreed that the successful enactment of the 1965 Act marked the highest level 
of two-party consensus on race.59 Those people who had believed the Act 
would improve their situation were left disappointed with a weak law, often 
useless for addressing their problems. Indeed, it undermined the core of the 
British legal system by being cited as the authority’s attempt to tackle issues 
faced by black people in Britain, but in reality being largely ineffectual.60 
Labour Home Secretary Frank Soskice had been faced with the difficult 
task of passing the bill through the House of Commons with a small majority of 
only three; thus he attempted to secure wider support by making substantial 
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concessions, weakening the resulting law.61 Whilst most Acts differ from their 
initially proposed Bill, Bleich described the extent to which it differed being 
‘virtually unknown in Britain’.62 Initial criminal sanctions were replaced with civil 
remedies, due both to the police’s belief that enforcing such an unpopular law 
would be detrimental to public relations, and the belief that US styled 
conciliation committees would allow most cases to be ‘settled amicably and 
privately without reference to the courts and without even being heard in 
public’.63 This indulgence of police wishes and desire that such cases of racial 
discrimination be kept out of the courts and public eye shows where the 
authorities’ priorities lay. Labour backbenchers had argued housing and 
employment be covered as these saw ‘some of the worst abuses’ and vocal 
popular support for legislation.64 Indeed after the Bill was first published, 
Soskice privately conceded that public reaction complained ‘it does not deal 
with what are the real problems, namely, employment, housing, education’.65 He 
believed however the Government had no obligation to pass broader legislation, 
despite it being popularly demanded: ‘We have only promised legislation 
against discrimination in public places.’66 A memo defending such limitations 
sent to British High Commissions worldwide claimed it would be ‘extremely 
difficult’ to enforce extended legislation.67 Lord Kilbracken eloquently disagreed: 
‘I would say that almost all laws are very difficult to enforce. It is hard to catch a 
thief, but it does not stop us from legislating.’68 
Although passing the first anti-discriminatory legislation despite such a 
small majority is to be commended, the weakened Act differed drastically from 
the original Bill and Soskice’s performance as Home Secretary was more of a 
factor than has been previously acknowledged. His successor Roy Jenkins 
described him as ‘a remarkably bad Home Secretary’ and a ‘hard-liner’ on 
immigration, with Wilson later commenting that one of his speeches was so 
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negative it had to be virtually rewritten.69 By exchanging criminal sanctions for 
civil remedies and conciliation, but not broadening its scope, the Act was 
severely diluted. This was deemed vital to allow the Bill’s passage through 
Parliament and Anthony Lester and Geoffrey Bindman argued that ‘Soskice’s 
strategy had succeeded.’70 Despite initial exuberance, the consequences of 
introducing flawed legislation which further dissatisfied British black 
communities were yet to be fully realised. 
The Act also created the Race Relations Board, tasked with enforcing 
the law and the ‘linch-pin on which the success of the whole system will 
depend’.71 Despite its undeniable prominence in determining the Act’s 
effectiveness, it has only obtained occasional passing mentions in the 
historiography; generally noting that the Board had three members and its role 
was to create local conciliation committees.72 The actual process of finding 
Board members has never been discussed, the only work coming close being 
Lester and Bindman mentioning Mark Bonham Carter’s appointment to Board 
chairmanship ‘which was fortunately still vacant’.73 The Board’s formation was a 
protracted process with numerous failures and increasing panic to appoint 
suitable members, extending far beyond the Act becoming operative.74 Bonham 
Carter, a ‘close friend’ of Home Secretary Roy Jenkins who ‘was doing me and 
the Government a favour by accepting a thankless job’, was eventually 
appointed as Board Chairman, the thirty-fifth potential candidate proposed for 
the role.75 Despite governmental acknowledgement that the Act was likely to be 
immediately tested, and ‘there would be trouble if it were then found that the 
committees were not in existence to consider complaints’, this was indeed the 
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case.76 The Government’s Public Relations Branch advised announcing this 
delay in order to forestall criticism, but it was ‘best made in Parliament and not 
to the Press…because it would probably generate less vocal public criticism’.77 
Indeed many complaints were addressed to the yet un-appointed Race 
Relations Board, receiving the answer the Board would be informed of their 
complaint once it had actually been established.78 The complainants were also 
notified that ‘in the meantime, while the Secretary of State greatly deplores 
manifestations of racial prejudice of the kind that you describe, he has no power 
to intervene in particular cases’.79 This insistence that the government 
disapproved of racial discrimination could have served as only cold comfort to 
disillusioned people suffering the insult of discrimination despite such actions 
now being legally prohibited. It undermined the British legal system and further 
alienated many. 
Delays establishing the Board limited the Act’s immediate short-term 
effectiveness, but its long-term success was constrained by limitations of the 
Act itself. The Board could only investigate matters falling within the narrow 
remit of the Act and it became immediately clear this scope was insufficient. 
Bonham Carter appeared fully aware of the Act’s deficiencies and correctly 
believed that the majority of complaints the Board would receive would fall 
outside of its scope, causing great discontentment towards the government and 
the Board itself.80 In fact 73 percent of complaints received by the Board in its 
first year were deemed to be outside the scope of the Act.81 The combination of 
these short and long term failings led to increased disillusionment regarding the 
British political system as those hopeful about new legislation soon became 
disappointed upon discovering its severe limitations. 
The Act’s limitations had been exposed even before the Board met for 
the first time. In Brixton an 18 year old Jamaican woman was refused service 
and told ‘“black bastards” were not served at the shop’ but, upon submitting a 
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complaint to the Board, received only the blunt reply that the Act did not apply to 
shops.82 This highlights the gap between legislator and general public; whilst 
the government may have believed that simply passing such an act would have 
improved the situation, it was clear to those suffering discrimination that more 
action was required. It also furthers the argument that, rather than simply not 
improving the situation, the government were actively fostering further 
discontent.  
The first conviction under the Act was subsequently quashed by the 
Court of Appeal, who determined that posting a pamphlet declaring ‘Blacks not 
wanted here’ on a local MP’s door could not be deemed as distribution to the 
public: ‘It might amount to publication if passers-by could see them, but at the 
time it had been dark.’83 Moreover Enoch Powell’s infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ 
speech in Birmingham on 20 April 1968 is arguably the embodiment of 
‘incitement to racial hatred’.84 Despite at least twenty-five individuals and 
numerous organisations urging Attorney-General Sir Elwyn Jones to prosecute 
Powell, Jones decided not to initiate criminal proceedings.85 It was argued that 
Powell could easily escape prosecution by simply stating he had no intention of 
inciting racial hatred and he had not been speaking at a public meeting, despite 
extensive press coverage awarded to his speech.86 In fact, Powell had primed 
local newspapers beforehand of the potential impact of his speech.87 Tariq Ali, a 
demonstration leader against racial discrimination, concluded that Jones’ 
decision ‘makes a mockery of the whole law and establishes a very bad 
precedent’.88 Coupled with the apparent willingness to pursue prosecutions 
against black activists more readily than white counterparts, reasoned by Gavin 
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Schaffer to be more related to the considered language employed and previous 
precedent rather than flagrant racism, this furthered the discontent directed 
towards the British state: 
Because of their social status and proximity to power, white politicians 
initially negotiated the new terrain better than the Black Power leaders, 
creating an atmosphere where justice was not seen to be done, and 
where it appeared that new race relations laws were actually designed to 
prosecute black Britons.89  
Layton-Henry later detailed the impact of ‘Rivers of Blood’, citing the ‘deluge of 
favourable letters [Powell] received and the public demonstrations of support’, 
such as studies showing between 60-75 percent of the public disagreed with 
Powell’s subsequent dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet and that some eighty 
resolutions on immigration were submitted for debate by constituency parties at 
the 1968 Conservative Party conference, at which Powell received a standing 
ovation. Further than this, the fact that Powell escaped punishment for 
expressing such views allowed others who shared his beliefs, uncertain about 
the powers of the Race Relations Act, the freedom to express them.90 Where 
more robust legislation or zealous enforcement against racial discrimination 
might have altered the country’s relationship with race and immigration politics, 
Powell’s unimpeded ‘Rivers of Blood’ prediction marked the beginnings of 
increasingly severe attitudes towards immigration. 
Despite the traditional historiographical viewpoint claiming that ethnic 
minorities ‘played surprisingly minor roles in instigating’ anti-discrimination 
legislation, Bristol Bus Boycott leader Paul Stephenson firmly believed in the 
influence of the boycott: ‘The first Act of discrimination was based on what we 
did in Bristol’.91 Whilst this is overstating the boycott’s impact upon a 1965 Act 
which did not address employment, various campaigns demanding anti-
discriminatory legislation undoubtedly affected policymakers’ views. The 
success of this non-violent campaign suggested to those protesting racial 
discrimination and disadvantage facing black people within Britain that they 
could affect change and create significant legislation. It is undeniable however 
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that no sustained US-style civil rights movement existed within Britain, arguably 
due to governmental so-called ‘buffer institutions’ which removed ethnic 
minorities’ issues outside of the main political arena and diverted talented black 
individuals away from more militant organisations.  
For example the government’s establishment in 1965 of the National 
Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), ‘to promote and co-ordinate 
on a national basis efforts directed towards the integration of Commonwealth 
immigrants into the community’, was ostensibly positive. However the 
Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, founded by white and black activists in 
1964 following a UK visit from Martin Luther King, lost both its chairman and 
vice-chairman to NCCI.92 The NCCI was denounced as Labour’s attempt to 
balance harsher immigration controls and, similar to local Voluntary Liaison 
Committees, created a space away from the political arena where issues 
relating to black communities were being seen to being addressed so ‘They 
could thus be ignored with impunity’.93  
Similarly the 1976 Race Relations Act established the Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE), replacing the Race Relations Board and Community 
Relations Commission established by the 1965 and 1968 Acts respectively. 
These bodies had been removed from mainstream government departments 
and thus received little support from central government.94 The CRE appeared 
more powerful and capable than its predecessors to enforce laws against racial 
discrimination; however this too was a disappointment for British black 
communities. Its members were largely drawn from the bodies it replaced, 
leading to fierce competition and accusations that most senior posts were 
obtained by white people and it itself was guilty of the racial discrimination it 
was established to combat. Furthermore by the end of 1981 it had only begun 
47 investigations into racial discrimination and published reports on 12.95 Such 
accusations and statistics do not suggest a well-supported and effective 
organisation. 
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The 1965 Race Relations Act was soon strengthened in 1968 and 1976, 
extending legislation into housing, employment, the provision of goods and 
services, and education. Successive Home Secretaries Roy Jenkins and James 
Callaghan possessed more desire and skill for extended Acts, combined with a 
larger majority allowing fewer concessions for Labour following the 1966 
General Election.96 By this time, much damage had been done; Paul Rose, MP 
for Manchester Blackley, complained that it took ten years for his suggested 
amendments to be embodied by the 1976 Act: ‘by which time it was too late’.97 
Moreover, beginning after the 1968 Act, government services such as the police 
were not included. Even proposals to amend the police discipline code, ‘no 
more than a presentational device’ to counter criticism of such a situation, were 
dropped after ‘intense and deep-seated’ opposition from the Police Federation 
and Police Advisory Board: ‘to have a specific provision in the code about racial 
discrimination would be to pick out the service in such a way as to put a slur on 
it’.98 This capitulation was later lamented by Callaghan: ‘We should have 
insisted on the police being in there at that time, but there was very strong 
representation and we gave way on it. I regret that we did’.99 But, to borrow 
Rose’s words, by this time it was too late.  
Even the extended legislation which did exist did not appear that 
effective. Research conducted by the Policy Studies Institute showed that levels 
of racial discrimination were largely unaffected by successive legislation, and 
Tom Rees argued that widespread institutional, cultural, and societal 
discrimination could not be effectively challenged through systems relying upon 
complaints from victims.100 For instance following a Sikh schoolboy’s murder in 
1976 John Kingsley Read, founder of the British National Front splinter group 
the National Party, publically announced: ‘One down, a million to go.’ Read was 
subsequently acquitted of incitement to racial hatred charges, and even told by 
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the judge ‘By all means propagate the view you hold. I wish you well.’101 The 
passing of race relations legislation was believed by many to solve some of the 
problems associated with postwar immigration and race relations in multiracial 
Britain. Instead these laws did not prevent or ease many of the problems; in fact 
they arguably exacerbated the underlying issues. Weak and ineffectual laws 
prevented further advancement, due to the belief that problems had already 
been legally addressed or the seeming disproportionate targeting of black 
activists, leading many black people to become disillusioned and believe it was 
a way for the government to be seen to be doing something without actually 
helping. As Claus Offe summarised: ‘The increasingly visible conflict between 
the promise and experience, form and content of state policies can lead…to a 
growing difficulty for state policies to win acceptance for the legitimating rules 
on which political power is based.’102 Linked with the passing of harsher 
immigration laws and growing criticism of the police discussed below, this 
resulted in the further disillusionment of minorities and rising suspicion of an 
incurable institutional racism within the British legal system. 
DEATHS LINKED WITH POLICE 
Further to these growing racial tensions and cynicism regarding the 
British authorities, there was also wider mounting distrust of the British police 
and that they were not being held accountable for their actions. This was seen 
most extensively with the deaths of five men: Kevin Gately and Blair Peach, 
who died during public political demonstrations in 1974 and 1979 respectively; 
and Liddle Towers (1976), James McGeown (1978), and James Kelly (1979), 
who died due to injuries obtained during arrests and detainment. Phil Scraton 
and Kathryn Chadwick detailed how these deaths did not fall into the non-
controversial ‘type’ of typical people who died after contact with the police, likely 
why their cases became so well-known.103 They argued that the police 
attempted to establish narratives which passed the blame upon the victims, 
establishing negative reputations which justified the brutality they received.104 
For those who knew the men or could see a pattern emerging, this further 
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suggested the police were not being held accountable: ‘That wasn’t our Jimmy 
in there…that was someone they created for their own purposes’ and ‘Call that 
justice? You could see what they were doing…complete fabrication’.105 This 
was extended to those who were critical of the police with personal details ‘and 
any behaviour that could be used to discredit their reliability’ presented in order 
to discredit anti-police claims.106 Roger Geary added that, as the police were 
inexorably linked with authority, to question the integrity of the police was seen 
to be questioning the legitimacy of the state itself, resulting in the authority’s 
‘tendency to repudiate any allegation of improper police behaviour’.107  
Indeed this response to any form of police criticism can be seen 
throughout, to the extent that any criticism of police actions or tactics was 
portrayed as an attempt to undermine the police or part of a radical left-wing 
conspiracy. Sir David McNee, Metropolitan Police Commissioner, criticised the 
practice of taking ‘a few unconnected incidents’ and linking them together to 
conclude that ‘there is a crisis of confidence in the police’.108 Whilst this likely 
would be his interpretation of the following discussion, Geary’s summary is 
nonetheless pertinent: ‘The press did not invent the deaths of Liddle Towers, 
James Kelly or Blair Peach. Left wing subversives did not fabricate the 274 
deaths which occurred in police custody’.109 Such events were very much 
connected and responses did represent a growth of a crisis of confidence in the 
police and of law and order. 
Some general themes emerge from the five notable cases mentioned, 
including demands for public inquiries being largely rejected, subsequent 
disapproval of any resulting inquiry, the formation of local organisations, and 
subsequent changes in policing tactics. Such recurrent features added 
momentum to feelings of discontent and disillusionment towards the British 
authorities. 
INQUIRIES 
Throughout all deaths discussed there were repeated calls for the 
government to instigate full public inquiries. Unsurprisingly these often came 
from the families of the deceased; for example Gately’s father stated: ‘Only the 
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strongest, fullest inquiry into Kevin’s death will satisfy me’.110 Throughout this 
thesis constant calls for full public inquires can be seen, despite the obvious 
point that these would ostensibly be conducted by the authorities which many 
mistrusted. It is obvious that public inquiries were seen as the pinnacle of the 
legal system, of British justice and ‘fair play’ and, for marginalised groups, an 
instrument of inclusion which would legitimise their position and participation 
within British society. Despite often obtaining support from the media and local 
MPs, for example over fifty MPs supported an inquiry into Tower’s death to 
avoid further damaging the Northumbria Police’s reputation, such inquiries were 
predominantly unforthcoming.111 Successive Home Secretaries, Labour Merlyn 
Rees and Conservative William Whitelaw, repeatedly argued against public 
inquiries and cited the various existing investigations as adequate.112 
Furthermore records released in 2010 showed that government officials 
prevented the release of certain documents they believed would add weight to 
calls for a public inquiry.113 Dr John Burton, coroner in Blair Peach’s inquest, 
had been accused of prejudicing the jury and complaining of ‘a widespread 
campaign to damage the institutions concerned with the law’. Therefore senior 
civil servants supressed release of his account of Peach’s death, which 
overlooked discrepancies in police testimony but claimed some civilian witness 
statements were not trustworthy evidence, as they believed this would fuel calls 
for a public inquiry.114 It was believed that such inquiries should be reserved for 
national scandals which undermined the reputation of the entire force, as well 
as reasons of cost and fear of undermining the authority and reputation of the 
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police and government.115 The case of Northern Ireland was an oft-employed 
comparison and is repeatedly discussed in subsequent chapters, such as 
patterns of street violence and police tactics in response, due to the continuous 
influence of the ‘Troubles’ upon British society. In this case it was suggested 
that, unlike that situation where public inquiries were constantly demanded 
purely to undermine police morale and discredit authorities, these situations 
required more than the normal cause of investigations.116 This is an important 
point. Comparisons with Northern Ireland were utilised throughout the period 
addressed in this thesis, therefore it is safe to assume it had an effect and 
impact upon the views and opinions of British police. Experience of an opponent 
constantly attempting to destabilise British rule by questioning and undermining 
police actions could have contributed to the feelings of victimisation and 
tendency to view every examination of them as being a conspiracy – addressed 
in further detail later in this chapter. 
Simon Holdaway, as well as Tim Newburn and Stephanie Hayman, 
highlighted the barriers faced by groups requesting public inquires, respectively 
noting the ‘considerable protection from public scrutiny afforded to the police’, 
and ‘the difficulties in securing any form of official condemnation of police 
action’.117 Additionally Stephen Sedley reasoned that the persistent rejection of 
public inquiries into all but the most controversial events showed a calculated 
governmental response that ‘a full public investigation of facts that are likely to 
help its political opponents is not a price worth paying for the stilling of public 
clamour’.118 It was clearly believed that build-up of tensions and discontent, and 
ongoing accusations of police misconduct from a marginalised societal group 
was not deemed worthy of public inquiries; the collective violence of 1980-81 
was an attempt to address that. 
The only event deemed worthy of a public inquiry, the Red Lion Square 
disorders at which Kevin Gately died, was headed by Lord Leslie Scarman who 
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previously led an inquiry into 1969 riots in Ulster and would later investigate the 
1981 disorders.119 By being entrusted to lead multiple inquiries it is clear 
authorities saw Scarman as a ‘safe pair of hands’, although some detractors 
claimed such hands were protecting the authorities and concealing police 
misconduct. The inquiry would solely investigate the actions leading to disorder 
and excluded the death of Gately, upon suggestion from the police counsel, due 
to it already having been settled by the coroner’s inquest.120 This was to mirror 
later investigations into disturbances which refused to consider specific 
allegations of police misconduct as they were not deemed an appropriate 
platform. It appeared to some that, even when a public inquiry was achieved, 
the most important aspects were purposefully omitted. As well as concluding 
police actions were generally justified by the ferocity of aggression against 
them, Scarman did not blame police for Gately’s death or criticise the 
controversial Special Patrol Group (SPG).121 Despite undoubted disappointment 
at Scarman’s findings, this did not dampen the desire for inquiries in providing 
political participation for black communities within Britain. 
As seen during the 1980-81 disturbances, a lack of state-initiated public 
inquiries prompted interested bodies to launch their own investigations. For 
instance, the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) inquiry chaired by 
Oxford professor Michael Dummett, was described by Martin Kettle and Lucy 
Hodges as ‘far and away the most thorough, scrupulous and principled piece of 
research on any police operation in postwar Britain’.122 The police and Home 
Office refused to offer any evidence or cooperation to the inquiry, despite it itself 
highlighting the importance of racial minorities having the police and legal 
systems as ‘some rock to cling to’.123 Dummett astutely warned: 
Deprive people of the sense that they enjoy the protection of the law and 
of the agencies that enforce and administer it, and you destroy their 
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whole feeling of security and any sense that they might otherwise have 
preserved that they are part of the society within which they live.124 
Growing discontent towards the police and state coupled with political 
marginalisation would eventually lead to the situation in 1980-81 wherein some 
black youths concluded their only method of political participation was violent 
conflict with the police. The NCCL inquiry team warned Whitelaw that many felt 
alienated from society, but they may be largely reassured if Whitelaw made 
public their concern about events and a public inquiry would be a prime 
example of how to do so.125 Again, the importance awarded to public inquiries, 
despite their being conducted by the same state and authorities mistrusted by 
sections of society, is clear to see. However the Home Office was not moved 
into taking action, privately deeming the NCCL’s report a ‘tedious 
correspondence’, and failing to assuage growing public concern.126 
POLICE INVESTIGATIONS 
Where public inquiries were deemed unnecessary the police themselves 
were left to investigate. They repeatedly stated public inquiries were 
unnecessary as they argued police investigations, such as this or Commander 
John Cass’ internal report into Blair Peach’s death, provided more rigorous 
examinations.127 This did not appease those who believed that police 
investigating themselves was not fair and it was believed by many that 
reluctance to hold inquiries was due to fears of what would be uncovered about 
police actions.128 For example, following the initial police inquiry into Kelly’s 
death, Assistant Chief Constable of West Midlands Police David Gerty was 
called in by Merseyside Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford to conduct an external 
investigation.129 As Howard Sharron highlighted in the New Statesman, Gerty 
arrived from a police force itself receiving growing public criticism regarding 
racism and police malpractice. Sharron concluded with a sarcastic statement 
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that perhaps a Merseyside officer should likewise investigate the West Midlands 
Police, ‘just to keep it all in the family’.130  
Similarly the police investigation into Blair Peach’s death stated that ‘The 
most serious aspect of this case has, without doubt, been the obstruction of the 
investigating officers in the execution of their duty.’131 Indeed it does appear that 
this played a large role in the inability of the inquest to determine the exact 
events leading to Peach’s death.132 There were also numerous instances where 
inquiry leader Cass deemed officers’ testimony ‘dubious’, ‘easily recognisable 
lies’, and that some ‘must have conspired to pervert the course of justice’.133 
Additionally SPG members reportedly either grew or shaved beards before 
long-delayed identification parades, deemed indicative of a ‘massive cover-
up’.134 Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Sir Tony Hetherington however 
reasoned that insufficient evidence prevented initiating criminal proceedings 
against officers.135 When viewed within a broader trend of confirmed examples 
of police collusion and tampering with evidence, for example Hillsborough or the 
miners’ strikes, it threatens to somewhat undermine the ability of police to 
investigate their own affairs. A cold case review into the investigation in 1999 
concluded that, whilst impossible to identify whom or justify any arrest, ‘On a 
balance of probabilities it is likely that an officer struck Mr Peach.’136 As well as 
the repeated failure to achieve convictions, it is interesting to note that it 
required the involvement of one of the first black British MPs, Paul Boateng, 
before this review was achieved. 
The DPP also faced criticism for the ‘unacceptable practice’ of 
demanding stronger evidence against police than an equivalent civilian case 
and consequently, of 2,820 alleged assaults by the police investigated by the 
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DPP in 1978, only 37 reached the courts with just 16 convictions.137 Assistant 
DPP Peter Barnes admitted that even ‘quite strong evidence’ was usually 
insufficient to convince juries to convict the police.138 Michael Meacher, left-wing 
Labour MP, questioned how much evidence would be sufficient to prosecute 
and suggested it would propagate the idea that no death in police custody 
would ever lead to a prosecution: ‘And if it is then widely felt (rightly or wrongly) 
that the police can cause the death of a person with virtual impunity, that is not 
only a terrifying indictment of our standards of public life, but also must severely 
dissipate any public confidence in the police.’139 Such ideas were indeed a 
growing sentiment amongst sections of society and, although numerous calls 
were made for an inquiry into the role of the DPP itself to dispel the belief that 
‘the Establishment is rapidly closing ranks’, this never materialised.140 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ORGANISATIONS 
Each death discussed here attracted vast amounts of attention and 
interested parties, feeling that the British legal system was failing them, 
established their own organisations to demand justice. This can be seen as an 
attempt to succeed where local and national government had failed and as 
political participation for marginalised groups which had previously been 
excluded. Such attempts at taking matters into their own hands can also be 
viewed within a growing militancy and as a precursor to the collective violence 
of 1980-81. Once these community organisations were perceived to have been 
similarly unsuccessful, it left some with a belief that their only recourse was 
violence. The raison d'être of such organisations was to demand further 
investigations after police and government inquiries had not provided complete 
answers and to obtain justice for those who had died. Funded and established 
locally by those with personal interest in the case or broader political situation, 
they are clear examples of political ‘pressure groups’ attempting to provide 
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marginalised groups with fair and equal treatment. For example counsel for the 
inquest into his death was partly funded by the Blair Peach Memorial Fund, with 
an advert imploring further donations notably pleading: ‘Whereas all police 
expenses involved in this case come from public funds, ours we have to raise 
ourselves.’141 This clearly highlights the belief that the system favoured the 
authorities and police, able to defend themselves using taxes paid by those 
accusing them of misconduct in the first place. Also, as seen in subsequent 
chapters, many such groups refused to submit evidence to local inquiries. 
Although this limited their potential conclusions it was believed such action 
would either legitimise these as adequate investigations, therefore removing 
demand for a full public inquiry, or would provide evidence to the police that 
would be manipulated and used against them. 
CORONER’S INQUEST 
Each death was initially investigated by a coroner’s inquest, and in some 
cases this was the only investigation. These simply examined how the victim 
died, were not full investigations or methods of apportioning blame, and 
coroners usually directed the jury to the verdict that they should return; it was 
‘an inquiry and not a trial’.142 The description of the inquest into Kelly’s death, 
which failed to either establish or disprove police responsibility, was indicative of 
the situation in general: ‘In the end, it satisfied no-one.’143 In addition their 
apparent favouritism towards police was roundly condemned. For example, 
during multiple inquests into Tower’s death, civilian evidence suggesting he had 
been assaulted in police cells was deemed hearsay and therefore 
inadmissible.144 Towers’ mother appeared to strike a chord when questioning 
the coroner: ‘Why is it that policemen are allowed to say what Liddle said to 
them but I am not allowed to say what he said to me?’145 This inconsistency 
further angered many who believed that the system was biased in favour of 
defending the police. 
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The Daily Star erroneously claimed that the ‘law wisely insists’ upon an 
inquest with a jury investigate any death in police custody, whereas actually an 
automatic inquest only occurred following a death in police cells, rather than 
simply police custody.146 Despite this being addressed by the 1971 Committee 
on Death Certification and Coroners, known as the Brodrick Report, it was at 
this point entirely at the discretion of the coroner whether to hold an inquest into 
a death in custody at all, let alone whether it should sit with a jury.147 It was 
suggested that such a panel, in Kelly’s case dubbed a ‘Jury for Jimmy’, would 
ensure the public would be satisfied that the truth had been revealed and there 
had been no cover-up by the police or authorities.148 However, as previously 
mentioned, the coroner usually directed the jury to the verdict which they should 
return; questioning to what extent this could be viewed as ‘justice’. Even 
medical examiners were accused of being under the influence of the authorities 
and, some believed, aiding a cover-up of police wrongdoings; although the 
Coroners' Society of England and Wales, aggravated by Meacher’s ‘frequent 
mis-statements in the Press’, was at pains to assert their independence and not 
being ‘Police Coroners’.149 
DEATHS IN CUSTODY 
Following Kelly’s death, the third high-profile death related to a police 
arrest or detainment in as many years, the government answered calls to 
release the number of deaths in police custody and it was subsequently 
revealed that 273 people had died in custody between 1970 and 1979, with a 
significant rise in the previous few years.150 Characteristically Whitelaw rejected 
demands for a public inquiry as he was ‘not convinced’ it was needed; 
nevertheless the level of public disquiet necessitated some form of response, 
leading to the all-party Select Committee on Home Affairs to consider deaths in 
custody.151 It was declared however they did not intend to review or comment 
upon individual cases and, during hearings, police representatives refused to 
comment upon individual cases and attempts to cloak real-life examples as 
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‘hypothetical cases’ failed to provide answers.152 It was noted that in the 
previous ten years almost ten percent of deaths in police custody had not held 
inquests, a situation described as ‘slightly awkward and inconsistent with the 
recommendation made in the report of the Brodrick Committee’.153 It is not 
difficult to imagine the discontent at a situation where, although an issue with 
investigating deaths in police custody had been identified ten years previously, 
nothing had been done to resolve this. The Select Committee’s published report 
stated it found no evidence to support generalised allegations of police brutality, 
but recommendations were made that all deaths in police custody should be 
investigated by a coroner’s jury and the DPP should provide complainants more 
explanation in cases where deciding not to prosecute.154 The report concluded 
that it hoped its findings would relieve some public anxiety which had arisen 
regarding deaths in police custody and that over 95 percent of cases contained 
no suggestion of police being criminally responsible.155 Nevertheless, it failed to 
placate those who considered a growing amount of evidence that the police and 
authorities were not held accountable for their actions. 
POLICE VICTIMISATION 
Moreover the police often portrayed any criticism of them or their actions 
as part of a wider conspiracy. For example Chief Superintendent John Keyte, 
Secretary of the Police Superintendents’ Association of England and Wales, 
named Meacher’s on-going campaign as being detrimental to the public image 
of the police and accused him of presenting statistics on deaths in police 
custody as to imply the police were responsible.156 Some senior police officials 
appeared to be personally offended at their officers being questioned, often 
leading to a blanket refusal to investigate such accusations which only furthered 
discontent and distrust of the police.157 Highlighting the close relationship 
between police and Party, several Conservative MPs spoke out against criticism 
of the police which they perceived as having an ulterior motive. For example, 
Peter Emery alleged that an ‘assiduous campaign was being mounted to 
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undermine the forces of law and order’.158 There were also suggestions that the 
volume of criticism had risen excessively since the Conservatives’ return to 
government. In some situations there may have been some weight to this 
suggestion as Meacher, who led a sustained campaign for an inquiry in many of 
these cases, might have been using the situation to enhance his reputation as 
in 1983 he would make an unsuccessful bid for deputy leader of the Labour 
Party.159  
Edward Gardiner, Chairman of the Conservative backbench Home 
Affairs Committee, accused the left of instigating a campaign to grant locally 
elected authorities control over the operational policies and tactics of police 
forces, resulting in ‘bringing politics into policing’.160 Chairman of the Police 
Federation Jim Jardine negatively linked this to arguments for greater police 
accountability which he argued would mean ‘political control of the police’.161 He 
also stated that the left-wing inspired campaign contained some groups who 
wished to disrepute the police in a bid to generate anarchy: ‘They have tried the 
ballot box and failed.’162 Conversely Scraton and Chadwick highlighted how the 
media reports of Kelly’s death reflected the ‘official’ interpretations of the cases 
promoted by the government; for example a Daily Mail editorial described Kelly 
as ‘THE CORPSE THAT BECAME TRENDY’, baselessly blaming left-wing 
groups for manipulating the case in order to discredit the police and courts.163 
The general response from the police did appear to be a hostile one. 
Jardine told Merseyside Police that a ‘campaign of abuse’ was being waged 
against them by the ‘usual rag-bag of people who spend most of their time in 
sniping at the police service’.164 He argued that Britain was one of a few 
countries in the world which had enshrined into law a system to allow and 
regulate the investigation of complaints against the police, supported by every 
honest policeman: ‘We do not complain about being accountable…we do not 
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seek to protect the corrupt policeman or the violent policeman. What we object 
to is the constant attacks on a system of accountability that is greater than 
which exists in any other public service in this country.’165 Jardine rejected the 
charge that police were deaf to criticism, rather that the ‘vociferous campaign’ 
waged against the police disregarded the ‘hard evidence’ supporting police 
procedures and safeguards: ‘Are we suddenly to assume that coroners, 
coroners’ officers, pathologists and medical practitioners are all either fools or 
willing accomplices in what amounts to police murder?’166  
Similarly the Police Federation’s monthly magazine, Police, criticised the 
‘concerted campaign being waged in certain quarters to stir up public anxiety 
about the relations between the police and the public’.167 It also stated that a 
public inquiry into deaths in police custody ‘would provide a forum for the airing 
of the most outrageous suggestions, unsupported by evidence, and for police 
officers to be pilloried’.168 Such staunch opposition to public inquiries and stated 
belief they would be attacked in such forums does not seem to support 
Jardine’s claim they were not ‘deaf to criticism’. Additionally individual Chief 
Constables made their positions clear. Alan Goodson,  President of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), argued that the campaign 
suggesting police brutality had drawn ‘sinister inferences’ and was a ‘disgraceful 
example of verbal licence’.169 Chief Constable of Greater Manchester James 
Anderton believed that society fell into two separate sections; people who 
understood the police, and those who ‘with other perverse responses, roar with 
disapproval at one single alleged assault by police but remain completely and 
odiously silent over evidence of a thousand battered policemen’.170 Those who 
criticised any aspect of the police at all appeared to be placed firmly into the 
second category. It is clear that the police were not open and receptive to any 
allegations which criticised their conduct. 
Consequently a common theme which emerged was the need for police 
to be less defensive and dismissive of legitimate public concern or criticism. 
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Various police representatives were called to provide evidence to the Select 
Committee on Home Affairs’ inquiry into deaths in police custody and journalist 
Peter Simmonds recorded it obvious from the outset that the police believed 
they were on trial.171 The Police Superintendents’ Association of England and 
Wales declared they were ‘somewhat annoyed’ when minority groups or MPs 
attacked the police with views that ‘did not represent the true voice of most of 
the people’.172 It is difficult to see how minority groups, such as black 
communities, were thus able to voice their concern at police actions without 
resorting to the violence seen in later years. The Times argued that the police 
must learn to be less sensitive to honest criticism, deeming their response as 
‘truculent and perhaps intemperate’, and that it would benefit them to respond 
more positively to sincere feelings of unrest or else risk further alienating their 
support.173 Scraton and Chadwick deemed the authorities’ response to such 
serious allegations as ‘almost neurotic’.174 At one stage even the Home 
Secretary advised the Police Federation that some criticism levelled against 
them was rooted in genuine feelings of anxiety from ‘moderate and thoughtful 
people’.175  
Kettle described the police’s response and questioning of the motives of 
anyone who questions their actions as ‘one of the most worrying aspects of the 
affair’.176 This alarm was undoubtedly shared by many who believed the police 
simply would not admit to their failings within these specific cases and beyond, 
and that there appeared no judicial method of holding them accountable. 
A CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 
Amongst this growing wave of discontent and distrust of the police and 
authorities, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party returned to power in 1979 
following extensive strike action during the ‘Winter of Discontent’ some months 
previously.177 Layton-Henry highlighted how the Conservatives had become 
increasingly aware after the 1974 General Election of the electoral importance 
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of black voters and had taken steps in order to appeal to them.178 However the 
fact that Labour were the party visibly championing anti-discrimination 
legislation, although not always for the reasons or to the extent most black 
people wished, likely led to the Conservative party being linked in the minds of 
many black people as not being a party that supported them; thus their return to 
power added to some general feelings of discontent towards the British State.179 
This is supported by various polls which suggested that 96 percent of the ‘West 
Indians’ category voted Labour in the 1966 General Election, citing as a key 
explanation the belief that Labour best represented the rights of ethnic 
minorities, and that by 1970 the majority of the electorate saw the 
Conservatives as being toughest on immigration control.180 Rightly or wrongly 
and successfully or otherwise, Labour was given credit by many ethnic 
minorities for at least appearing sympathetic to their situation and the 
Conservatives largely obtained the opposite perception. 
As public opinion again swayed against immigration in the late 1970s, 
Thatcher’s Conservatives appeared to harden their stance. Home Secretary 
William Whitelaw told the party conference that they would end ‘immigration as 
we have seen it in the postwar years’ and Thatcher appeared on a World in 
Action television programme sympathising with voters ‘afraid that this country 
might be rather swamped by people with a different culture’.181 Such comments 
were widely criticised as ‘pandering to popular prejudices’ and Conservative MP 
Peter Walker warned: ‘if you exploit people’s worries in a way which shows 
hostility to minorities, you will do immense damage to racial harmony’.182 The 
Conservatives however gained a 9 percent poll lead over Labour immediately 
after this speech which appeared to vindicate Thatcher’s comments and, 
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despite warnings of damaging racial harmony, the lady was not for turning.183 
Thus the party’s strategy on race continued to link stricter immigration controls 
with improving community relations, despite ample evidence suggesting 
otherwise.184 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown summarised that Thatcher shared Powell’s 
views ‘that this island belonged to white people, but unlike him she was able to 
make this view respectable and admired’.185 If it had appeared previously that 
the Conservative Party was less likely to further the position of black people 
within Britain, Thatcher’s Conservatives seemed in many ways to be outwardly 
attacking them. 
The Conservative Party under Thatcher also concentrated upon law and 
order, rejecting later arguments that rising crime levels were linked to rising 
unemployment – as to do so would challenge their own economic policies – and 
instead focused upon strengthening the police.186 Their party manifesto 
promised increased police numbers and ‘short, sharp shock’ treatment of youth 
offenders.187 Ex-Chief Constable Timothy Brain highlighted how this would have 
appealed to many officers who had grown critical of Labour’s policies towards 
the police. The Police Federation publically criticised Labour’s record on crime 
and policing in many national newspapers prior to the 1979 election and Brain 
concluded that, whilst the content was ‘pretty mild stuff’, it was nonetheless 
significant that the Federation publically took such a politicised stance.188 
Alistair Henry agreed that the police were ‘more explicitly politically active than 
at any other time’, to the extent that some Federation members were concerned 
with the way that they had ‘nailed its flag for all to see to the Conservative Party 
mast’.189 Ex-Metropolitan Police Commissioner Robert Mark similarly criticised 
the Labour party prior to the election, comparing the relationship between 
Labour and trade unions to that of Nazi Germany.190  
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Accordingly, on the first working day after the Conservative election 
victory, police leaders were informed their personnel would receive the 
substantial pay increase recommended in a 1978 government inquiry; although 
in reality this was simply moving forward by a few months a step already agreed 
by their Labour predecessors, it further provoked anti-police sentiment at a time 
of high unemployment and economic difficulty.191 It appeared clear to many 
observers that the Conservative party and police were seemingly moving closer 
together and undoubtedly new Home Secretary William Whitelaw’s ‘position of 
putting the police first in any issue of doubt’ added to feelings of discontent and 
lack of police accountability.192 For example Ray Wardle, Liberal candidate for 
Bath County Council, argued that Conservative tactics had spawned a ‘Carte 
Blanch [sic] “Do as you like”’ attitude within the police, which he described as: ‘A 
gift for any Police Force.’193 Such a situation worried and angered many within 
minority groups in society, seemingly unable to voice opposition to the 
increasingly forceful tendencies of the police. 
OPERATION COUNTRYMAN 
Running parallel to these deaths causing great public disquiet were 
several other incidents and continuing situations further adding to discontent 
and suspicion regarding the police and authorities. Not least of these was an 
investigation into police corruption termed ‘Operation Countryman’, initiated in 
August 1978 after Metropolitan Police officers obtained evidence from an 
informant that indicated police corruption suggesting that officers were helping 
criminals evade justice or, at worst, were actively involved in planning and 
conducting robberies.194 Arthur Hambleton, Chief Constable of Dorset 
Constabulary and Leonard Burt, Assistant Chief Constable, were placed in 
charge of the investigation team of nearly one hundred officers, which relocated 
to Dorset as the scope of corruption throughout London forces was unknown.195 
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A later letter from an unnamed senior officer in relation to the 1984-85 miners’ 
strike stated how provincial forces often described the Metropolitan police as 
‘the Banana Squad – all bent and yellow’.196 Brain stated however that even 
those officers opposed to corruption resented the intrusion of the investigation 
and Metropolitan officers derogatorily referred to the West Country-based 
investigation as ‘The Sweedey’.197 Regardless of how much officers resented 
the intrusion, outside observers expected tangible results and a subsequent 
rebuilding of trust in their police force. 
Despite compiling files on 200 officers and submitting 41 reports to the 
DPP, only three detectives stood trial and were convicted.198  Such a statistic is 
a damning indictment of the police’s ability to investigate themselves and the 
difficulty in obtaining convictions against the police. Hambleton and Burt publicly 
blamed this upon obstruction from the Metropolitan Police and lack of support 
from the DPP, whereas Brain conversely described it as being for ‘a variety of 
procedural and evidential reasons’.199 Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir 
David McNee later claimed that any lack of support from the DPP was likely due 
to concerns ‘about the length of time the inquiry was taking’ and ‘doubts about 
the expertise of the team’.200 McNee complained that Burt encouraged 
Countryman officers to ‘see themselves as being some general anti-corruption 
squad’ who ‘cast their net wide, so as to cover complaints received from all 
quarters instead of getting on with the job they had been given to do’.201 He 
deemed allegations of obstruction as unfounded and Hambleton and Burt’s 
distrust of the DPP as ‘extraordinary and unprecedented’.202 Steven Box alleged 
that the Countryman team were instructed by ‘its political masters’ to confine 
future investigations to the three robberies which had originally launched the 
investigation, and pass all other evidence to the Metropolitan Criminal 
Investigation Board (CIB). In Box’s words, ‘The Met. CIB do not seem to have 
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pursued this evidence with the energy or enthusiasm it deserved.’203 Indeed, 
Countryman officers alleged that many cases were near completion when 
handed to the CIB and expressed surprise that more prosecutions were not 
forthcoming.204 When the Countryman team initiated their investigations, they 
believed informers would be granted immunity from prosecution for disclosing 
participation in offences in return for providing evidence against officers. 
However the DPP’s office reneged on this apparent offer and consequently 
more informers were arrested than the police named in their evidence.205 Box 
questioned whether this was ‘a calculated attempt to frighten informers into 
changing their evidence and to deter other potential informers?’206  
McNee later described the facts of Operation Countryman ‘a sad record’, 
and that an internal Metropolitan investigation would have achieved more than 
this outside investigation had.207 As Maurice Punch summarised, ‘again, a 
commissioner of the Met missed the vital point that however professional and 
successful that internal investigation might have been by the highest of 
objective standards, a police agency with a long record of corruption would 
have been investigating itself’.208 The lasting result of the investigation was that 
further damage had been done to the police’s reputation and they were now 
even more reluctant to allow external investigators to examine their activities.209 
As Graeme McLagan highlighted, this additionally made officers more reluctant 
to inform on their corrupt colleagues: ‘What was the point of speaking out if your 
complaint against Met detectives was to be investigated by Met detectives?’210 
If the police could not be trusted to thoroughly investigate accusations, report 
misconduct, or effectively utilise the police complaints procedure, then it 
appeared that members of marginalise communities had even less chance. 
POLICE POLICIES AND ACTIONS 
The police’s general policies were also criticised and accused of creating 
and raising tensions with local black communities. For example Brain 
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summarised that, even allowing for the lack of riot or disturbances within 
mainland Britain for many years previously, police tactics and equipment used 
during the 1974 Red Lion Square disorders had been ‘extraordinarily low-
key’.211 The prevalent feeling at the time was that riots and specialised 
equipment used to combat them belonged in other countries and not in Britain. 
Senior police officers, such as Metropolitan Police Commissioner Robert Mark, 
believed maintaining public confidence in the police was more important than 
dispersing a riot; or, in his words, ‘winning by appearing to lose’.212 However a 
movement towards stronger policing tactics can be seen in the policing of the 
later events which led to the death of Blair Peach when a more heavy-handed 
police response flooded the streets with officers. The police tactic of 
‘overpolicing’, literally meaning to deliberately deploy large amounts of officers 
in an attempt to dissuade disorder, has been cited as one such police tactic 
which often actually caused more tension and problems than it prevented.213 By 
1981 it was deemed more important to be seen to be actively engaging with 
rioters including widespread demands for specialised equipment to combat 
them; as Reiner eloquently summarised, ‘Darth Vader displaced Dixon in riot 
control tactics.’214 This was undoubtedly influenced by the negative response 
awarded to the tactical police withdrawal during the 1980 St Pauls disturbance 
in Bristol, where a lack of police was reported to have left ‘the innocent to 
struggle against crazed destroyers for four solid hours on their own’, as well as 
experience in Northern Ireland where constant battles took places between the 
police and protestors leading to the dissemination of police tactics in responding 
to violent street protests.215 
A common thread running through many incidents was criticism of the 
Metropolitan Police’s Special Patrol Group (SPG). Formed in 1961, Brain 
highlighted how they were not specialist ‘riot’ police such as the French 
Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité, but their training and ability led critics 
to view them as ‘a force within a force’.216 The use of the SPG has been well 
                                                     
211 Brain, A History of Policing, p. 14. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Kettle and Hodges, Uprising!, p. 79. 
214 Dixon of Dock Green (1955-1976) was a BBC television series depicting the daily life of an 
understanding and likeable police constable. Alternatively Darth Vader, villain in the Star Wars 
film series, has become a synonym for evil in popular culture. Reiner, The Politics of the Police, 
p. 87. 
215 ‘When the Law Breaks Down’, Daily Mail, 9 April 1980. 
216 Brain, A History of Policing, p. 13. 
85 
 
documented, as has the resulting negative impact upon relations between 
police and local communities. John Benyon highlighted a speech by Trades 
Union Congress General Secretary, Len Murray, which criticised the SPG as 
‘alien to the tradition of this country of leaving policing to a local constabulary 
with knowledge of and sympathy with the local community’.217 In stark contrast 
with ideas of ‘community policing’, which encouraged close relationships with 
the local community, the SPG had a ‘burgeoning reputation as an élite, 
aggressive, unaccountable squad’.218 Meacher argued that the SPG had never 
been endorsed either by public opinion or Parliamentary debate, and that it was 
a ‘para-military force heavily equipped and armed for anti-terrorist work, but is 
actually repeatedly used against civilian targets’.219 It was also suggested by 
some that their ease of identification was what marked them out for criticism; 
just as the police were to become visible representations of authority for violent 
uprisings in 1980-81, the SPG were the most visible of those police. For 
example, the SPG were at the heart of the most apparent criticism of the 
police’s tactics during the disturbances leading to Blair Peach’s death.220 
Their use was defended as it was argued that their small numbers and 
mobility gave them a tactical advantage.221 Commander Cass’ inquiry into 
violent disorder in Southall concluded that an organised mobile taskforce, with 
the ability to be drafted in at short notice as opposed to recruiting small 
numbers of officers from various police districts, was ‘absolutely essential for 
present day policing’.222 The Home Office stated that the SPG received no 
special training or equipment, simply a reserve of experienced officers whose 
primary function was crime prevention and subject to the same disciplinary and 
complaints system as other officers.223 Kenneth Oxford, Merseyside Chief 
Constable and ACPO President 1982-83, argued that ‘Much of the criticism, 
that [the SPG] are elitist, highly trained, paramilitary officers, is both emotive 
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and inaccurate.’224 This argument had previously been made by Chairman of 
the Police Federation, Jim Jardine, who criticised how the relatively small SPG 
had been depicted by some areas of society as being closer to the Nazi 
Gestapo and SS than British police.225 Such a histrionic comparison shows his 
attempt to ridicule those articulating legitimate concerns about the SPG. 
Metropolitan Commissioner Sir David McNee stated that he supported the SPG 
‘to the hilt’.226 This explicit backing for this controversial group clearly convinced 
some that it was impossible for SPG members to be held accountable for their 
perceived transgressions. McNee also told a black journalist, the day after Blair 
Peach’s funeral: ‘I understand the concern of your people. But if you keep off 
the streets of London and behave yourselves you won’t have the SPG to worry 
about.’227 Statements such as these question whether McNee really did 
understand the concerns. 
After events in Southall the Deputy Commissioner, Patrick Kavanagh, 
launched a review into the SPG and recommended three major organisational 
changes to reinforce links with local communities, prevent elitism and 
insensitivity to local policing situations, and added supervision.228 Welcoming 
the changes, McNee stated that Kavanagh’s report had ‘not revealed any 
serious defect’ in the SPG.229 On the other hand, socialist newspaper Morning 
Star implored the authorities to release the full report as none of the 
recommendations and changes announced would have been suggested if ‘all 
was rosy in the SPG garden’.230 A less radical response came from the NCCL 
who stated that, whilst more needed to be done, such reorganisations were a 
‘move in the right direction’ in making the SPG ‘more accountable’.231 However 
many more simply agreed with Labour Minister of State at the Home Office, 
Alex Lyon, that the SPG should have been disbanded.232 On the contrary, 
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following this review their strength was increased and controversial name 
retained as ‘a change would be detrimental to the morale of the Group, since it 
would almost certainly be interpreted as a victory for their more vociferous and 
unreasonable critics’.233 This was clearly damaging to the morale of those, 
particularly within black communities, who perceived the SPG as an 
unaccountable tool of police and authority oppression. 
The SPG was also routinely employed in saturation policing. The police’s 
response to ‘high crime areas’ this tactic consisted of extra police officers 
descending upon an area to deter criminal activity, known as ‘targeting’ and 
imported from anti-terrorist police operations in Northern Ireland. It was a tactic 
used frequently in black residential areas, such as Brixton in 1981’s ‘Operation 
Swamp 81’ merely days before the area descended into disorder.234 Study of 
such operations concluded that the number of stops was disproportionate to the 
reasonable suspicion of criminal offences, amounting to a form of 
harassment.235 Increased and disproportionate use of stop and search laws 
caused widespread resentment amongst young black men, the most infamous 
of which was ‘sus’, the shorthand for suspicious behaviour under the Vagrancy 
Act 1824. This was an arrestable offence, without any other crime having to be 
committed, a victim, or any witnesses other than two police officers.236 Kettle 
and Hodges highlighted how the offence was only tried in the magistrates’ court, 
‘so there was no right to trial by jury and the “sus” charge put the onus on 
defendants to prove that they were not acting suspiciously’.237  
Black people believed they were unfairly targeted by police as ‘acting 
suspiciously’, and not without supporting evidence. A disproportionate number 
of Afro-British people were stopped and/or arrested for ‘sus’ throughout the 
1960s and 1970s and, during the years 1977 to 1979, around three-quarters of 
those arrested for ‘sus’ were black.238 Many have noted the detrimental effect of 
‘sus’ on police and community relations, but it was not the only policy causing 
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discontentment; not least because it did not apply outside of London.239 1,469 
people, both black and white, were arrested under the ‘sus’ law throughout the 
whole of London in 1980; equivalent to only one third of the number of police 
stops of black people in the Brixton division alone during the same year.240 
Reiner continued to detail how police activity has always been focused upon the 
‘economically marginal elements in society’ that spent most of their lives in the 
street and other public places.241 Young black men fit that description in 1970s 
and 1980s Britain. Development of self-conscious youth cultures and increasing 
militancy led to further questioning of the police, with a 1972 select 
parliamentary committee on relations between black people and the police 
surprised at a submission from the West Indian Standing Conference which 
characterised the situation as ‘almost akin to civil war’.242 Reflecting a broader 
shift towards a more combative stance, black communities organised a ‘Scrap 
Sus’ campaign which combined campaigners of all ages to question and 
challenge the police harassment of black youth.243 ‘Sus’ was subsequently 
repealed on 27 August 1981, demonstrating to black communities that it was 
possible to achieve positive change through the political system: ‘it wasn’t black 
people asking white people to do something for them, it was black people 
organising to make sure something happened’.244 
The movement towards increased militancy also saw in the 1970s an 
increased number of violent conflicts between black youth and the police. Peter 
Fryer suggested that this was the ‘logical and…inevitable response’ to previous 
racist attacks where black people ‘had been forced to defend themselves, since 
nobody else could or would defend them’.245 One such example, the 1976 
Notting Hill Carnival rioting which injured 500, was blamed on a massive police 
presence of 1,600 attempting to prevent crime but rather causing local anger 
that the police had attempted to take over ‘their carnival’.246 Despite calls to do 
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so, the Home Secretary remained consistent and rejected inquiry appeals with 
Joshua et al. concluding that, by maintaining ‘that the courts would decide who 
was guilty or not and the law would deal with the situation; discussion of the 
issues was thus drastically curtailed’.247 
Paul Boateng argued that use of saturation policing, ‘sus’ laws, and the 
SPG prevented the tactic of community policing from being effective, as local 
communities could not be expected to instantly absorb the change from forceful 
specialised units to the ‘friendly bobby on the beat’.248 Contrary to community 
policing, the Institute of Race Relations termed such actions ‘policing against 
the community’ and Geoffrey Dear, Assistant Chief Constable of 
Nottinghamshire, described the difficulties raised: 
They might apparently solve one problem but in its wake create another 
of aggravated relationships between minority groups and the police in 
general. It is then in this atmosphere that the permanent beat officer is 
expected to continue his work, often finding that his task, which was 
always difficult and delicate, has now been made almost impossible.249 
Lord Scarman would later highlight the dilemma faced by the police. Violent 
crime and robberies had increased by 138 percent in Brixton and the police 
concluded that black people ‘were disproportionately involved’.250 Police in 1976 
had described crime rates amongst black people as a problem, despite four 
years earlier noting that the African-Caribbean community in Britain exhibited a 
relatively low involvement in crime.251 Nonetheless, Kenneth Oxford deemed it 
crucial for action to be seen to be taken against such a rise in offences if public 
confidence in the police was to continue.252 However this argument completely 
disregards the decreasing confidence in the police due to their perceived lack of 
accountability and desire to combat crime to the apparent detriment of good 
relations with the community they were charged with protecting.253  
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Conversely an April 1980 Select Committee inquiry concluded that the 
total number of black people arrested for ‘sus’ did not accurately reflect actual 
black involvement in street crimes.254 Whilst prior to the mid-1970s evidence 
showed that black people were less likely to be arrested than white, research 
after this date certainly proved this was no longer the case.255 It showed that 
black people were more likely to allege personal experience of excessive force 
and make complaints against the police, although they were less likely to have 
their complaints substantiated.256 Consequently, and unsurprisingly, black 
people were less positive about the complaints system than white counterparts, 
as discussed below. Furthering an argument pioneered by John Lea and Jock 
Young in 1984, Reiner concluded that ‘A vicious cycle of interaction developed 
between police stereotyping and black vulnerability to the situations that attract 
police attention.’257 The police persisted in such operations and methods, 
despite evidence suggesting a low level of success in combating street crime.258 
The negative effect however of such operations upon relations between police 
and certain sections of local communities was, in Scarman’s words, ‘beyond 
doubt’.259 
POLICE COMPLAINTS 
 Another area of concern highlighted by events discussed in this chapter 
was the function and effectiveness of the police complaints system. Under the 
system an ‘amazingly small number of complaints [were] substantiated’, and 
numerous studies showed that ethnic minority groups were much more likely to 
complain of police misconduct but they were significantly less likely to be 
substantiated.260 The Police Act of 1964 had introduced a complaints system 
against the police, albeit investigated purely by the police themselves. It would 
take until the Police Act 1976 before the independent Police Complaints Board 
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was introduced, although as a political compromise that appeased neither 
side.261 The Board was later described in 1981 by its new chairman, Sir Cyril 
Phillips, as having ‘kept so low a profile that it has climbed into a ditch’.262 The 
Board’s 1978 Annual Report stated that once the DPP had decided not to 
prosecute, it thus ruled out the possibility of a disciplinary charge occurring 
using the same evidence.263 Meacher argued that as senior police were aware 
of this they would thus refer most cases against the police to the DPP, who 
would invariably decide not to prosecute due to their high demands of levels of 
proof, in turn resulting in no further action by the Board. Supporting this 
accusation, figures from the 1978 Report showed there was not a single case 
where the Board challenged or disagreed with the police’s initial action, and 
Meacher questioned whether this ‘constitutional façade’ should remain such a 
‘toothless quango’.264 There appeared to be weight behind Meacher’s 
arguments as the Home Secretary was told privately that the referral of James 
Kelly’s case to the Board would most likely not produce a different outcome 
than the DPP’s decision as it was based upon the same evidence.265  
It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that the Police Complaints Board was 
branded by some as ‘a rubber stamp for police cover-ups’.266 It was even 
suggested that fear of retribution prevented many victims from pursuing 
complaints against the police, with a Liverpool Trade Council inquiry suggesting 
that ‘Even taking a police officer’s number, we have found, can and does lead to 
threats of abuse’.267 Such accusations undoubtedly further damaged the 
reputation of the police complaints system and were repeatedly voiced 
throughout the disturbances addressed in subsequent chapters. 
This oft-maligned situation of police investigating themselves was also 
addressed by the investigation into deaths in police custody. Labour MP Robert 
Kilroy-Silk questioned whether it was ‘unreasonable in a controversial or 
sensitive area’ for police to investigate fellow officers.268 Her Majesty's 
Inspectorate of Constabulary James Crane argued that his experience was that 
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such inquiries were ‘impartial and thorough’, although critics might suggest that 
he would not likely admit otherwise.269 When Kilroy-Silk suggested that special 
investigations, independent from the police, should be established in order to 
reassure the public that justice was being done and maintain the police’s 
reputation, Crane responded that he was satisfied as the current procedure 
involved the independent DPP and Police Complaints Board; seemingly missing 
the growing public concern about the role of both those statutory bodies.270 It 
certainly appears that, in many of the examples discussed above, trusting the 
police to investigate their own ranks seemed to spark the most fervent 
complaints and discontent, especially in the face of growing evidence that such 
investigations were inadequate. 
CONCLUSION 
The events discussed throughout this chapter certainly resulted in 
growing questioning of and disillusionment with the forces of British law and 
order. Also the way that the police reacted to, often minor, criticism undoubtedly 
worsened the situation in the minds of many who believed outright rejection of 
their legitimate concerns showed a lack of accountability. For example the Daily 
Star highlighted how the traditional worldwide image of the ‘British bobby’, with 
its reputation for honesty and fair play, was being challenged throughout the 
years leading to 1980-81 and there was a ‘growing suspicion that the system of 
accountability is not working as it should’.271 Labour MP Alex Lyon summed up 
many people’s views when he argued: ‘It is a disgrace that a man should be 
able to kill another person and he is dressed in a police uniform and gets away 
with it.’272 Despite the constant rejections by the government to hold public 
inquiries, both for financial reasons and to avoid undermining of their authority, 
the calls for such persisted. This was despite the distrust of the government 
who would run such inquiries and a lack of evidence that past examples had 
achieved anything. They were nonetheless viewed as key to increasing black 
communities’ political participation. Running parallel to this continual growth of 
disillusionment and anger was a growing willingness and acceptance within 
certain areas of society that such participation could only be achieved through 
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violent means, which would contribute to violent disorder erupting throughout 
England in 1980-81, beginning in St Pauls, Bristol. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BEGINNING?: ST PAULS, BRISTOL,  
2 APRIL 1980 
  
When violence erupted in the St Pauls area of Bristol on 2 April 1980, it 
came as a surprise to many. Timothy Brain later epitomised the view of this 
group: ‘With the passage of time it is difficult to emphasize just how unexpected 
the St Paul’s riot was.’1 Brain’s viewpoint was likely influenced by having been a 
police constable in Bristol at the time and Peter Fryer conversely argued that it 
only shocked ‘those blind to what had been happening all through the 1970s, 
and deaf to the many protests and warnings’.2  
There have been many references to St Pauls in the historiography, 
although most tend to be passing mentions of the event as a precursor to the 
following years’ intensified violence. 3  In one of the few extended works 
dedicated to examining this event in detail Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace, and 
Heather Booth characterised the disorder within the ‘bargaining by riot’ 
framework. They strongly argued that, although economic and social conditions 
in St Pauls were significant, police tactics and overreaction ignited violence 
subsequently fanned by media coverage and shaped by the state’s response as 
a problem of law and order, not race relations.4 Similarly Martin Kettle and Lucy 
Hodges focus primarily on the role played by the police as the most important 
factor and attempt to suggest ways to improve the relationship between them 
and black communities.5  
Their in-depth studies consider many aspects of the disturbance 
discussed below, as well as ensuing responses regarding local housing and 
education policies, unemployment figures, governmental financial aid etc., and 
therefore numerous references are made to them within this chapter. Such 
aspects are not the primary focus of this thesis and, accordingly, this chapter 
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and the next concentrate more heavily upon the response and involvement of 
local interested organisations, extensive calls for a full independent inquiry, and 
subsequent governmental rejection. This is achieved through examination of 
previously unstudied records relating to the disturbance and addresses one of 
the key research themes of this thesis; the involvement of local organisations 
and perceived failed attempts to effect change within the British legal system, 
with the subsequent increased disillusionment leading to collective violence 
outside of those boundaries. 
ST PAULS 
Like other areas in Britain, immigration of African-Caribbean people into 
Bristol increased after the Second World War as they were attracted to life in 
the ‘Mother Country’ and attempts from the British government to address 
labour shortages. Bristol was deemed an area with ‘diverse industries and thus 
good chances of employment’ and migration increased into the city 
accordingly.6 Faced with discriminatory housing practices, migrants often had 
little choice but to flock to the suburb of St Pauls.7 Situated just north east of the 
city centre it quickly became known for its relatively high proportion of black 
residents and was the location for the devising of the 1963 Bristol Bus Boycott. 
It attracted black people from all over Bristol for parties, games, and 
fundamentally acting as a meeting place for people with ‘nowhere else to go’.8 
Despite its growing reputation as a black ‘ghetto’, Madge Dresser and Peter 
Fleming would later counter that official statistics consistently overestimated the 
black population of St Pauls, having reached only 31 percent of its total 
population by 1991.9 
Numerous witnesses providing evidence to a Trades Union Congress 
inquiry argued that the level of unemployment in the area was higher than the 
35 percent estimated by the City of Bristol planning department in 1976.10 It is 
difficult to estimate the exact number of unemployed people in the area at the 
time due to a lack of figures and not every unemployed worker registering with 
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the Careers Service, but the subsequent report estimated that 9 percent of the 
ethnic minority working population was registered as unemployed, compared 
with 5.6 percent of the white population.11 Also between 1977 and 1980 the 
percentage of black youth registered unemployed grew whereas those of white 
counterparts declined.12  
A common debate following the disturbance was whether an injection of 
investment into the St Pauls area would actually solve any of the inherent 
problems.13 Numerous commentators blamed the disturbance upon a lack of 
investment, although others countered that changing people’s perceptions of 
black immigration was more important than money. 14  In addition to above 
average unemployment, the area was infamous for its abundance of brothels 
long before the influx of a West Indian community in the 1950s, who themselves 
dubbed it ‘the jungle’. Ken Pryce, a West Indian sociologist, produced a study of 
St Pauls soon before the disorder which recorded it was ‘regarded as a place of 
“vice and shame”, with a high potential for trouble’.15  
Fryer contended that this capacity for disorder was a reflection of 
Bristol’s history as a chief slave port. Alongside London and Liverpool, areas 
with extensive activity during the slave trade that would experience similar 
disturbances the following year, he argued ‘There, if anywhere, the persistent 
bullying of black people was bound, sooner or later, to provoke rebellion.’16 It is 
debatable the extent to which a past history of slavery would specifically incite 
violence in 1980-81, whereas their position as port cities with various 
employment opportunities leading to increased immigrant settlement likely 
played more of a role; however it remains historically noteworthy.  
S.D. Reicher added that whilst black youth experienced the same kinds 
of deprivation as other areas of the country, there was more of a local sense in 
St Pauls of their entire community being under siege.17 This was aggravated by 
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the building of the M32 motorway in the 1970s which further reduced housing 
standards and fragmented the local community who resented the intrusion upon 
their desires to ‘lead much of their social life in the open air and on the 
streets’.18 In almost all regards, it appeared to the local black community that 
their lives were under attack. 
THE RAID 
Against this backdrop the St Pauls disturbances began after a police raid 
on the Black and White Café, a local meeting place for black residents which 
had taken on greater significance in recent months due to forced closure of 
other similar establishments. Despite the possibility of its name being an 
attempt to spread a social integrationist message within an area known locally 
as the ‘frontline’, this was actually due to it being run by a black and white 
husband and wife - although in itself noteworthy. 19  The police obtained 
information it was being used for illegal drinking and that cannabis was being 
openly smoked within the premises.  
There are many details which differ between accounts, but a brief 
summary of the generally accepted events is as follows.20 Around 3.00pm or 
3.30pm a number of police officers entered the Black and White Café searching 
for the illegal sale of alcohol and drugs. A number of officers were plain clothed 
and there were several officers in reserve positioned nearby if needed, which 
included dogs. The inhabitants of the café were questioned and crates of 
alcohol were seized as evidence. At some point, and the reasons why vary in 
different accounts, the growing crowd of people outside the café became 
engaged in confrontation with the police, throwing stones and missiles at them. 
Police reinforcements were thus summoned to attempt to rescue those trapped 
inside the café, but vehicles which had entered the area to provide backup were 
overturned and one was set on fire. There then followed a period variously 
described as ‘uneasy calm’ or ‘rearmament’. During this time, the majority of the 
police had been withdrawn to less visible positions – attributed by Chief 
Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Brian Weigh, as being the 
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reason for the reduction in violence.21 A breakdown vehicle, escorted by around 
thirty officers, arrived to remove the burnt-out car from the scene around 
6.30pm; however both the vehicle and officers came under attack from missiles 
and the police vacated the area. Around the same time approximately thirty riot 
shields were delivered into the area, authorised for use by the Superintendent in 
command. The police formed a cordon and attempted to establish a position 
across City Road, but were forced to retreat due to a barrage of missiles from 
all sides. Another police car was set alight and Lloyds Bank broken into, 
causing a Superintendent to order a transit van and Land Rover full of officers 
with riot shields to attempt to reach the bank. They came under such fierce 
attack that it was at this point the decision was made to withdraw police around 
7.30pm. Police returned to the area at 11pm and by midnight had retaken 
control. 
The raid was later described by police officials as ‘routine’ and that 
officers were not anticipating trouble.22 However, as pointed out by Joshua et 
al., the numbers of police involved suggested that they were at least aware of 
the possibility.23 When questioned on police numbers and the positioning of 
auxiliary reserves nearby, senior police officers argued: ‘That’s prudent. That 
doesn’t mean to say you’re expecting trouble.’24 The numbers actually involved 
differ in various accounts. During a press conference the morning after the 
disorder, the police initially stated 12 officers entered the café with some in 
reserve, rising to ‘12 to 15’ when questioned specifically.25 This was supported 
by the Commission for Racial Equality’s Paul Stephenson who placed the 
number of uniformed police who entered the café at fourteen.26  
Alternatively the memorandum placed in the Library of the House of 
Commons by Home Secretary William Whitelaw suggested 20 officers went to 
the café and, during later Crown Court trials, Justice Stocker stated 39 officers 
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were involved in the raid.27 Utilising various sources, including numerous written 
police statements, Joshua et al. contested that the briefing specified that 
twenty-four officers were to enter the café, six to be posted outside and the 
remainder on stand-by at the nearby Inkerman pub, some 100 yards away. 
They argued this clearly showed more police were present than Weigh stated in 
his report which claimed minimum numbers would keep the operation low key.28 
This claim of higher numbers of police actually involved than acknowledged by 
Weigh is supported by the Police Operational Order for the raid; although this 
numerical discrepancy concerned reserve police initially not tasked with 
entering the café, which Weigh could claim was what he was addressing when 
he provided the lower number.29 Nevertheless the conspicuous absence from 
the Chief Constable’s report of six Task Force ‘A’ officers, a local equivalent of 
the infamous Special Patrol Group, suggests an attempt to minimise possible 
criticism of heavy-handed police tactics. 
A senior police officer stated that they did not believe police numbers 
during the raid to be a material factor for causing the disturbance. They 
described a follow-up question, querying if there were initially too many police in 
St Pauls and subsequently not enough to effectively manage the resulting 
situation, as being: ‘rather an Irish question’.30 The exact meaning behind this 
response is unknown, as various possibilities present themselves. Firstly, they 
could be referring to the question as a foolish one by using the widely-held 
stereotype of Irish stupidity; although at a press conference discussing the 
violent consequences of indelicate handling of cultural differences, this is at 
best unlikely and at worst extremely tactless.31 Secondly, and more likely given 
the circumstances, they could have been claiming that the question was 
unanswerable by referencing the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ and claiming that 
police numbers were largely immaterial when faced with this kind of 
unpredictable, unknown disorder. A Northern Ireland influence can be seen 
throughout discussions in 1980-81, addressed later in more depth. But 
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nonetheless the police agreed that, whilst they did not believe there had initially 
been too many officers present to carry out the raid, once the situation had 
escalated there was not really enough to ‘do what we wanted to do there’.32 
RESPONSE 
After the disturbance subsided, questions regarding why it had happened 
began in earnest. A crude – if fairly accurate – method of dividing people into 
those surprised by the events and those who were not, would be the division of 
the ‘establishment’ opposed to members of ethnic minority communities or 
those involved with organisations supporting them. This was the view of 
partisan newspaper The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner, when writer L.C. Francis 
claimed that: ‘The trouble was expected by everyone in the area except the 
police.’33  Indeed Bristol City Council leader Claude Draper emphasised the 
shock of the events for many, even admitting he believed the telephone call 
notifying him of the disturbance had been a joke.34 Not least surprising to the 
authorities was the location of Bristol; this ‘sleepy, easy-going conservative City 
of the South West’ had long been regarded as a ‘model city’ in dealing with 
inner city problems.35 Leon Brittan, junior Minister to Whitelaw, had recently 
heard a ‘glowing report’ regarding relations between the police and black 
community in Bristol.36 A further example was Deputy Under-Secretary of State 
for the Home Office, Phillip Woodfield, responding to questions whether there 
had been surprise at events: ‘Taking place in Bristol, yes.’37 Fred Emery, writing 
in The Times after the event, summarised that ‘no one at Westminster would 
have even shortlisted Bristol as the potential powder keg which many, 
afterwards, said it had long been’.38  
This synopsis does a disservice to the many people who had been 
warning of such violent possibilities but were disregarded. The level of surprise 
expressed that Bristol saw an eruption of anti-police unrest shows precisely 
what many continued to argue; that the problems and concerns of black 
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communities such as within St Pauls had not been treated as a serious 
problem. 
Bill Nicks, Chairman of the Bristol Council for Racial Equality (BCRE), 
countered that it could have happened at any time and the prolonged period of 
calm prior to the disturbance should not have been viewed as indicative of a 
healthy situation.39 A subsequent BCRE report recorded that 2 April ‘shocked 
but did not surprise’ those involved with the situation at ground level who had 
been warning authorities for more than a decade about the possibility of 
violence. 40  BCRE Senior Community Relations Officer Carmen Beckford 
phrased it in a more poetic manner: ‘the artificial icing has been ruthlessly 
removed from the Bristol cake’.41 In a similar vein Nicks accused people in 
Bristol of mistakenly congratulating themselves that there was no racial 
problem, and hence the disturbance displayed a widespread feeling amongst 
local black people that there was ‘no other way to make their points of view 
known’.42 If the authorities did not even acknowledge the severity of problems 
and difficulties faced, it is not difficult to imagine why a lack of accountability 
was perceived, leading to the feeling that such collective violence was the only 
recourse. Monique Courtier, married to Peter Courtier, Bristol’s full-time 
Assistant Community Relations Officer, questioned whether the authorities 
would delve deeper into the issues or simply blame black people for the 
violence. She also accused authority figures of learning nothing from the past 
and astutely warned: ‘this could be just the beginning’.43 
Belief that the black community would be blamed for the violence 
stemmed from previous criticism of oppressive police strategies. Kettle and 
Hodges showed that, even where illegal activities were undertaken, the belief 
proliferated in the local community that illicit drinking and cannabis smoking did 
not harm other people and therefore did not require such a heavy-handed police 
response.44 Following the unrest, there were many calls for certain laws to be 
reconsidered in order to promote better racial harmony. Reverend Keith Kimber, 
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Vicar of St Agnes Church in St Pauls, advocated the decriminalisation of 
cannabis as laws preventing its use ‘grate against the cultural traditions of the 
immigrants, and their needs’.45 An inquiry conducted by The Sun reported that 
black youths in St Pauls believed smoking cannabis did not negatively affect 
anybody else and police efforts against this were in actuality attempts to 
suppress their culture.46 Thus the violent response to the police raid of the Black 
and White was portrayed as an attempt to protect a culture that was under 
constant attack from the British State. Robert Wilkes, brother of the café owner, 
reasoned: ‘I know we can’t be treated separately, but there is no need for the 
police to be heavy-handed.’47 This argument was later countered by The Sun 
itself, which argued that strong action was required as all drugs were harmful 
and that Kimber should be supporting the police rather than ‘sniping at the very 
laws which the country has asked them to enforce’. 48  This was hardly an 
unsurprising argument from a newspaper which had recently begun to support 
the Conservative Party in such an unambiguous manner.49 
Nicks connected this complicated drug decriminalisation debate to the 
widely-held stereotypical belief that all backs were predisposed to be unlawful 
and would not accept British law and order.50 He argued that people in Britain 
had spent centuries being raised to believe that black people were inferior, or ‘at 
best as a source of entertainment’, and further warned that, until it was fully 
accepted that British society had changed and thus included black people, 
potential lessons from 2 April would never be learnt.51  In the words of Fryer: ‘To 
the black communities the police had become, in effect, an army of occupation 
charged with the task of keeping black people in their place.’52 Use of such anti-
colonial rhetoric as ‘an army of occupation’ was prevalent and is telling of the 
mind-set of many within British black communities who believed their culture 
and neighbourhoods were under attack from an outside force. Viewing the 
situation within this context, it appeared that it would only be a matter of time 
before unrest occurred. 
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‘RACE RIOT’? 
Whilst some newspapers pronounced ‘19 POLICE HURT IN BLACK 
RIOT’ or ‘RACE RIOT’, in the immediate aftermath the police were keen to 
diminish the racial element of the disturbance.53  This is consistent with the 
authorities’ attempts to discourage public discourse about race. Chairman of the 
Avon and Somerset Police Authority Ian Crawford asserted that the event was 
not a race riot, and senior police officials added: ‘it was purely a riot against 
authority’.54 MP for Bristol West, William Waldegrave, echoed that it was not a 
race riot ‘in the simplistic sense of those words’. Both he and Tony Benn, Bristol 
South East MP, declared that it was not a case of one community attacking 
another; rather it was a ‘difficult policing problem’ and relations between the 
police and all communities needed to be considered.55 This response was not 
limited to simply the view of the authorities. At an emergency meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the BCRE it was stressed that the incident was not a 
race riot; although it ‘undoubtedly had racial implications’. It was instead seen 
as a violent reaction against ‘heavy handed and ill-timed’ police activities and 
indicative of the level of frustration felt by black youth towards a ‘hostile 
society’.56 However The Sun pointed out that it would be ‘absurd’ to completely 
ignore the racial overtones of an act of rebellion from a predominantly black 
population against a predominantly white police force.57 
This reluctance to blame events on race, even to the extent of trying to 
remove it completely, can be seen to be similar to the state’s response to other 
previous racial events such as the 1958 Notting Hill race riots. Kettle and 
Hodges highlighted that this diminishing of racial characteristics was seen by 
black people as a typically British response and in essence a denial that they 
faced particular challenges of disadvantage and discrimination: ‘Not to 
recognize the racial nature of them is to bury one’s head in the sand, to lump 
black people’s problems in the same bracket as poor housing and 
unemployment and to treat outbreaks of violence as aberrations.’58 This was 
certainly consistent with the state’s broader response to St Pauls and added 
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further weight to the feeling that the British framework would not improve their 
particular situation which led others to contemplate similarly violent actions. 
POLICE ACTIONS 
Unsurprisingly much subsequent attention was focussed upon the police 
raid of the café; the event which, it was suggested, ‘lit the touch paper’. A BCRE 
press release placed the blame squarely upon this raid and, condemning the 
nature of the police action, claimed it ‘led the Black Community to stand up 
against this type of police intimidation’.59 Clinton Brown, who would later appear 
in court on charges of riotous assembly, described the violence as an 
unleashing of frustrations and resentment: ‘It was the first time we had the 
chance to give them a lick back and get evens.’60 The police on the other hand 
repeatedly stated that they did not know why violence had erupted. During a 
press conference the day following the disorder, senior police officials identified 
that objection to the police presence in the area had very quickly escalated, but 
that they ‘just wouldn’t know’ why. Also labelling accusations of provocative 
police action as ‘a very subjective statement’, a police representative retorted: ‘I 
suppose all police action to some extent is provocative and it depends who you 
are and what you’re doing at the time’, before repeating that it had been a 
‘perfectly normal police operation’.61 A statement from the Avon and Somerset 
Police Authority continued to attempt to diminish the police’s blame for the 
outburst by stating it was ‘sad’ that years of work to improve community 
relations had been shattered by this ‘totally unforeseeable situation’. 62  As 
previously discussed, it had certainly been predicted by many familiar with the 
situation in St Pauls. 
The raid itself was planned ten days in advance, although at no point 
during this time was it noted or believed important that it fell upon the local 
policeman’s weekly day off, an officer known and reasonably liked within the 
community.63 As seen in many examples of other disturbances it was argued 
that, had the local community faced someone familiar to the community and its 
particular issues and nuances, the likelihood of violence would have been 
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decreased. Weigh reasoned that previous raids had been carried out at the 
same time of day with no trouble, but did later admit that the day and time 
chosen was not ideal as the local school had closed at lunch for Easter 
holidays. 64  Furthermore the Police Community Relations Officer was not 
consulted about the raid, although members of the West Indian community had 
been consulted in a ‘temperature-taking exercise’; Superintendent Vincent 
Arkell stated community leaders attending this meeting had claimed that ‘police-
black relations could not have been better’.65 Clearly the ‘temperature’ had been 
vastly misjudged, either though misunderstanding between police and 
community leaders or the inherent issue with denoting anybody a ‘leader’ of the 
entire community.  
On top of such oversights Joshua et al. argued that removing the alcohol 
from the café added to other potentially provocative actions, but was 
unnecessary as it had already been photographed for later use as evidence.66 
The Police Operational Order clearly stated the object of the raid was to 
discover and seize any items relating to the illegal sale, supply, or offer to 
supply of alcohol.67 Thus the decision to confiscate items was clearly taken at 
the planning stage and not by officers on the scene, and many stated they had 
carried crates of alcohol from the café into a police van for around 20-30 
minutes before serious incidents occurred.68  Whether or not officers should 
have sensed the possible provocative nature of removing alcohol through the 
already disgruntled gathered crowd is another question, but their operational 
order shows that they were, to borrow an infamous phrase, simply following 
orders. 
This is not to say that there were not some decisions taken on the day 
which could have added to feelings of police provocation. Several witnesses 
later interviewed by Reicher accused officers of failing to produce a search 
warrant, harassing those inside the café, or even that some officers had been 
involved in buying or smoking drugs. As Reicher concluded: ‘Whether true or 
not, these perceptions indicate a general feeling about the illegitimacy of the 
                                                            
64 Whitelaw, ‘Serious Disturbances in St. Paul’s’, p. 1. 
65 Vincent Arkell, ‘St Pauls “Riot” Crown Court Trial’, Bristol Resource Centre, 4 February 1981, 
p. 2; Kettle and Hodges, Uprising!, p. 26. 
66 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm, p. 76. 
67 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, ‘Operational Order, Re: Black and White Cafe’, BRO: 
Pol/LG/1/9. 
68 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm, p. 77. 
 106 
 
police action.’ 69  The willingness to make such accusations and, more 
importantly, for others to believe them, is more significant than whether or not 
such accusations were true. When discussing why events became violent, 
some referenced an argument that had occurred after a police officer was 
accused of ripping a black youth’s trousers as a crate was carried past, 
although officers stated that this situation was quickly resolved and anger 
dissipated. 70  This account was questioned by Dr Alfonso ‘Prince’ Brown, a 
member of the West Indian Development Council who had been present at the 
café and ‘had seen the explosion coming’. He reiterated the story of torn 
trousers but, rather than agreeing that the police had quickly resolved the 
situation, Brown alleged that officers ignored requests for compensation and 
instead warned those present they would be arrested if they did not move 
away.71 Paul Stephenson recorded that the man with torn trousers had insisted 
on ‘immediate cash compensation’ from the police.72 It is unlikely that, whatever 
the circumstances, the officer in question would simply reimburse the angry 
man from his own pocket; but it provided to the black community another 
apparent example of the police not being held accountable for their actions. 
Stephenson added that, after being threatened with arrest, the youth defiantly 
replied ‘arrest my ras’ which caused the officer, according to Brown, to use a 
beer crate to push the boy backwards and thus initiating the disturbance.73 
At the later trial defence lawyers emphasised that the police had no legal 
right to document innocent people inside the café and Justice Stocker agreed 
these actions would certainly generate animosity. At the very least, he believed, 
these actions undermined the Superintendent’s statement that the majority of 
those inside the café were law-abiding customers whose rights had to be 
respected.74 In addition Joshua et al. argued that, as customers inside the café 
had offered no resistance and were likely already outnumbered by police, 
Superintendent Arkell’s decision to send for additional officers was ‘difficult to 
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understand’.75 The official reason given for these reinforcements was that more 
alcohol had been found than expected and, with numbers congregating outside 
the café, it was felt increased manpower would hasten the removal of alcohol 
and enable a level of crowd control. In addition, there were two arrests visible to 
the crowd causing great agitation. One man, arrested for illegal consumption of 
alcohol, was detained for half an hour before being transferred to the police 
station. Also the proprietor of the café, Bertram Wilks, was handcuffed and 
restrained despite being known to the police and unlikely to flee or become 
violent. Joshua et al. highlighted that he could have instead been summonsed 
to appear later at the police station, and knowledge of this therefore caused 
every senior officer to later in court deny ordering his arrest.76  Stephenson 
documented that only a brief time after Wilks had been driven off in police 
custody missiles had begun to be thrown at the café from black youths 
assembled across the road.77 In such a volatile atmosphere the police perhaps 
would have been wise to err on the side of level-headedness. 
After such actions which may have fuelled antagonism, numerous 
eyewitness reports blamed the police’s response to initial low-level tensions for 
the subsequent eruption of violence. Providing evidence at the Crown Court 
trial, Howard Wright stated that the police marching through the streets with riot 
shields incited a response from the black community: ‘It was obvious they were 
going to react. If the National Front marched through St Paul’s it would have 
been the same.’78 As some officers were being trained to use such shields in 
the police station yard immediately prior to deployment, they likely did not have 
comprehensive experience of how to appropriately use such equipment. 79 
Partisan publication Out West later quoted Superintendent Arkell’s statement 
‘There was a group who were hell-bent on causing trouble that day’, before 
asking: ‘Which group? The rioters or the police? Taken out of context, the 
statement is appropriately double-edged.’80  
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Accusations of police misconduct also appeared, with one call to the 
police demonstrating displeasure at police ‘running people over’. 81  Further 
examples exist in subsequent disturbances of police driving into crowds at high 
speed, a tactic likely influenced by Northern Irish examples. Kettle and Hodges 
reasoned that despite police hoping that a show of strength would disperse the 
crowd police numbers were insufficient to successfully impose control.82 Prince 
Brown stated that police use of dogs against crowds ‘infuriated the black 
population’ leading to increased conflict.83 There was a history of police use of 
dogs in the area and Owen Henry, chairman of the West Indian Parents and 
Friends Association, claimed that he could not remember any occasion when 
the police entered the St Pauls area without being accompanied by dogs.84 In 
fact, the police had been forewarned about the local community’s aversion to 
the use of dogs as The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner recorded that the police had 
been informed several times that the repeated use of dogs branded people as 
criminals despite having committed no crime.85 Despite the fact that police dogs 
were not officially meant to be used for crowd control, frequent references to 
them in testimony and evidence suggest that they undoubtedly were. Notably, 
more than one officer admitted to being frightened by the police dogs 
themselves.86 The apparent callous use of dogs to ‘control’ St Pauls residents 
created the impression amongst many in the black community that the police 
and state treated them differently from other British citizens; an inhuman ‘other’ 
that were treated as such. After the disturbance Weigh acknowledged that the 
use of dogs required ‘very careful consideration’ and that this was something 
which could be learned from the disturbance.87 However, as will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters, this was not the case. 
PREVIOUS POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
The disorder took place against the backdrop of poor relations between 
the police and black community of St Pauls. Many reports after the disturbance 
showed this was not an isolated incident, and Nicks stated that the BCRE had 
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previously encountered ‘great disquiet’ regarding police activities. 88  More 
problematically the police mistakenly believed relations were good, or at least 
claimed so afterwards in an attempt to absolve themselves from responsibility. 
Brain, a police constable in Bristol at the time, encapsulated this when he later 
argued that ‘there was no history of general disorder or poor police-community 
relations. Nor was there any noticeable background build-up of tension.’ 89 
Chairman of the Avon and Somerset Police Authority, Ian Crawford, stated the 
police had believed relations were improving, but ‘apparently they had not 
improved so much as he had thought’.90 Senior police officials conceded that 
the disturbance represented a major failure in efforts to improve relations, but 
repeated the assessment that the police had a very good relationship with St 
Pauls; or that they ‘always thought we had’.91 Weigh argued that the media 
picture of ‘continual conflict’ between police and ethnic minorities was incorrect 
and that on-going police efforts had improved relations; to the extent that police 
even acted in a mediatory capacity in some quarrels between ethnic groups.92 
Indeed, the BCRE stated that they enjoyed close liaison with the Community 
Relations Officer Chief Inspector Derek Lane.93  
Despite this, and further suggesting an attempt to clear police of blame 
for the disturbance, Weigh had previously warned in his annual report the year 
before about the possibility of such violence. Blaming the disorder upon a ‘hard 
core’ group of young males who occasionally broke the law and were then 
resentful of authority figures that punished them, he argued that the ‘double 
standards’ that this group desired were unacceptable and unfair to the law-
abiding public.94 He stated that, although the police had attempted much to 
improve community relations, it was ‘clearly not enough’ and he was ‘always 
willing’ to meet with anyone to improve the situation.95 When questioned on 
introducing more black officers into the St Pauls area, police officials responded 
that they did not have many black officers but would consider doing so; 
although past experience suggested it would not necessarily be welcomed by 
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the black community.96 This is reflective of other studies and opinions, as black 
officers were often treated as traitors by local communities and Scarman later 
rejected suggested quotas for recruiting black officers. 
Conversely Owen Henry believed that there had never been friendly 
relations between the black community and the police. He argued the police did 
not appear to be familiar with people in the area and communicated wrong 
information from one area to another, both of which fostered distrust.97 He and 
Prince Brown claimed St Pauls was used as a training ground for young 
inexperienced constables who were ‘quicker to react to things and people they 
did not understand’.98 This was a similar accusation made against other areas 
where disturbances occurred in the following year such as Brixton, and often 
used as an explanation for the disorders. Robert Reiner’s 1974 study of Bristol 
police noted common hostility towards black people, with one constable 
claiming that ‘90 per cent of the force are against coloured immigrants’.99 When 
Leader of the Conservative Opposition for Bristol City Council, Councillor Bob 
Wall, suggested that the majority of Bristolians were supportive of the police 
force, Roy de Freitas of the African-Caribbean Community Association 
emphasised that Bristol’s minorities also largely backed the police when they 
were appropriately conducting their jobs. For example he claimed that Weigh 
had described the St Pauls events as ‘a minor incident which had got out of 
hand’, and countered that, for local residents, the incident was far from minor.100 
This is indicative of broader arguments that the violent stance against the 
police was symbolic of a community fighting for its rights, that those involved in 
the violence were somehow predisposed to be less supportive of the police than 
the average resident, and that many in positions of authority did not appear to 
sympathise with or understand the concerns and frustrations of local black 
communities. In a later City Council debate regarding a public inquiry, 
Councillor Bassett argued that, whilst such people may not have supported the 
violence, the ‘bitterness and resentment’ of black youths was apparent in other 
groups, including white people.101 Although possibly not intending to be, the 
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connotations of Bassett’s words appear to be that the situation was becoming 
particularly bad as even white people were becoming dissatisfied. He concluded 
that it was very important to direct this bitterness through the ‘political machine’; 
otherwise there would be more outbursts.102 This further illustrates how those in 
positions of power seemingly did not appreciate the level of discontent and 
feelings that this ‘political machine’ was itself the problem, and how the 
outbursts were an attempt at political participation on their own terms. Despite 
this discontent emerging following the disturbance, the Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary recorded only nine official complaints from black people in 1980. 
This, as Assistant Community Relations Officer Peter Courtier pointed out, was 
somewhat of a false figure due to the prevalent reluctance to use the official 
complaints procedure. Echoing criticisms made repeatedly through the period, 
Courtier argued the main reasons for this disinclination was the belief it would 
not be productive or even fear of increased future persecution; both linked to 
the fact that the police directly investigated such complaints against 
themselves. 103  This was to become a major cause pursued by community 
groups in the following years. 
Police Federation Chairman Jim Jardine contended that, whilst much 
was said about the problems faced by young black people, difficulties for the 
police were often forgotten. He argued that officers were aware that ‘a simple 
exercise of a police power’ would be regarded as prejudice and ‘add yet another 
statistic to the complaints against the police’, criticising that portrayals of the 
police as the enemy was a ‘classic example of the old propaganda trick, if you 
repeat an untruth often enough, people begin to believe it’.104 Jardine would 
continue to respond to accusations of police misconduct with a similar blunt 
refusal to admit there may be some truth behind such complaints. Agreeing with 
suggestions of police difficulties, local MP Tony Benn argued that it was not fair 
to ask the police to ‘carry a burden’ which had emerged, to some extent, from 
rising unemployment, social deprivation and other problems in urban areas 
which affected everyone and not solely ethnic minorities.105 This opinion defined 
the police as the identifiable face for the problems of urban areas and perceived 
government failings. This was somewhat corroborated when De Freitas claimed 
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the disturbance was more a reflection of the larger feelings of the black 
community rather than specifically connected with the café raid. 106  Many 
facilities and resources in St Pauls had been eroded and the café was seen as 
the last place where unemployed youths could gather. Henry supported this 
view and claimed that St Pauls’ residents were ‘deprived, like chattels, herded 
in a pen’.107 Three other prominent meeting places - a disco and two bars - had 
been shut recently and the Black and White was described as ‘the last 
survivor’.108 De Freitas claimed the general feeling amongst the youth was: ‘if 
they close this place, where will we be able to go?’109 After witnessing their 
other meeting places being, in their view, unfairly taken from them the black 
community was now prepared to fight to use the café as they liked, which can 
be viewed within the widely suggested broader theme of a departure from the 
peaceful compliance of earlier years.110 
POLICE WITHDRAWAL 
One aspect which garnered much attention was the police withdrawal 
from the area at the height of the disturbance, later described by Brain as ‘a 
fateful decision’.111 It was criticised by many who believed the police’s primary 
role was to maintain law and order and protect citizens, being viewed as the 
police having conceded defeat.112 The police log of events recorded numerous 
emergency calls from the public questioning why, despite the ‘mob which is 
running wild like rats in St. Pauls’, there was ‘not a Policeman in sight’. Indeed, 
the log of emergency calls received show a wide range of responses to the 
incident and the role that members of the public believed the police should be 
playing. A motorist, compelled to stop and find a telephone kiosk to inform the 
police of the scene in St Pauls, ended their description with the damning 
phrase: ‘no sign of police’. Less subtle attempts to encourage police action 
included one caller bluntly predicting: ‘someone will be killed soon’.113 Officers 
stated that their subsequent return was greeted with cheers, various residents 
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wishing them well, and older black tenants apologising for the actions of the 
black youth. 114  This is in keeping with arguments that it was younger 
generations who had grown disillusioned with the situation they faced and were 
thus more willing and likely to engage in violence against the police, that older 
generations of black people in Britain were more deferential to authority. Whilst 
the police, now with sufficient reinforcements, were praised for quickly regaining 
control of St Pauls, various observers qualified this by stating that most of the 
streets were by then deserted and only around a dozen officers were actually 
needed.115 
The decision for the police withdrawal was taken by Chief Constable 
Brian Weigh, and senior police officials later described it as a ‘very violent…very 
very dangerous situation’.116 Weigh argued the ‘clearly overwhelmed’ police had 
no other choice than to leave as they were not sufficient in number to contain 
the situation and a maintained police presence would continue to exacerbate 
the situation: ‘They weren’t throwing at anyone else, they were throwing at the 
police.’117 This belief was seemingly vindicated by Detective Sergeant Patrick 
Ward, who alleged that an interviewed suspect had told him: ‘There would have 
been a lot more of you in hospital if you hadn’t run away.’ 118  Furthermore 
Reicher’s participant interviews recorded that the message being spread was: 
‘the object was the police, direct your antagonism that way’.119 It was reasoned 
that photographers and cameramen had only been targeted because of fear of 
the film being used for police identifications.120  
It certainly appears that the violence and looting was specifically 
directed, with local shops either owned by Asians or known to employ black 
workers protected and looting prevented.121 Injuries and some damages were 
blamed on accidental cross-fire or people missing police targets, and the 
numbers of cars attacked was rationalised as either punishment for apparent 
endorsement of police harassment or the belief that they were unmarked police 
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vehicles.122 However many examples exist of non-police damage, such as the 
Black and White Café being itself looted during the disturbance; although this 
may have been an attempt to remove the remaining alcohol before the police 
could. 123  Similarly the burning of Lloyds Bank was justified as ‘part of the 
Establishment we are rebelling against’, although this may have been a 
convenient rationalisation for spreading violence.124 
Weigh argued that simply retreating a marginal distance from the café 
would have encouraged confrontation to follow police out of St Pauls, and that a 
complete police withdrawal from the area, to regroup and ‘obtain sufficient 
reinforcements to ensure a speedy return to law and order with a minimum of 
bloodshed’, might in itself diffuse the situation.125 Whether a marginal retreat 
would have expanded violence is obviously impossible to know, but The 
Sunday Times did note the clear geographical limits of the crowd remaining 
within the boundaries of St Pauls and, once the police had withdrawn, even 
helped direct traffic through the area.126 This is another example of the sense of 
community attached to the disturbance as highlighted by Reicher, who believed 
participants saw themselves as ‘representing the entirety of St. Pauls in the 
sense of an independent community, fighting for its right to survive’.127 This 
spatial, territorial aspect can also be seen by one St Pauls’ resident: ‘The police 
after they had been reinforced did not retake St Paul’s: we decided to go home 
and allow them to move in.’128 
A question posed during a police press conference the following morning 
summed up the main criticism of this withdrawal; with rioters ‘left to run wild’, did 
that not increase the chance of fatalities? Police representatives dismissed this 
as conjecture and stated that several injuries had occurred whilst officers were 
present, but that they were not aware of any following their departure. Whilst 
confirming that more damage had been caused after the police withdrew, they 
argued that the police’s main objective was preservation of life. A follow up 
question began that shopkeepers who had lost their premises and stock were 
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very angry at the police’s withdrawal, but a senior police officer interrupted and 
reaffirmed that, despite having ‘the utmost sympathy’ with them, the ‘necessary 
but regrettable’ withdrawal had been ‘for the greater good’.129 This was not likely 
to placate those who had incurred a large expense from the disorder and the 
related looting, reportedly undertaken mostly by white people, which totalled an 
estimated £150,000 alone.130 This was a pattern repeated around the country 
the following year, as events portrayed as being black criminality were actually 
perpetrated by a white majority. However of the 134 arrests made by the police 
in relation to St Pauls, 88 were black and 46 white; of these, over 100 were 
charged with offences such as theft, receiving stolen property, and threatening 
behaviour; whereas 16 would face the more serious charge of riotous assembly, 
discussed in detail in the following chapter.131 
One shopkeeper summarised sentiment when stating the police had 
instigated the riot through heavy-handed actions and then retreated, ‘leaving us 
to bear the brunt’. 132  Introducing a social class argument, they questioned 
whether the police would have similarly fled if looting had started in Broadmead, 
home to big business interests in Bristol.133 The Daily Mail later demanded that, 
‘when society leaves the innocent to struggle against crazed destroyers for four 
solid hours on their own’, they must be ‘recompensed, to the last bottle of 
toffees, out of public funds’.134 The characterisation of the ‘innocent’ struggling 
against ‘crazed destroyers’ leaves little room for nuanced discussion of the 
underlying causes for the disturbance, or indeed where blame and financial 
relief should be attributed. Ian Crawford responded that a considerable amount 
of damage had actually taken place when the police were present, suggesting 
the police withdrawal may not have had an impact upon that aspect. Peter 
Courtier countered that, prior to the withdrawal, only police property had been 
damaged; once they had vacated the area, looting and arson began.135 Much 
police property had been damaged before their withdrawal as twenty-one police 
cars alone sustained damage, of which six were completely destroyed. Adding 
insult to injury for the police, the day before the disturbance insurance of 664 
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police vehicles had been downgraded from comprehensive cover, ironically in 
order to save money.136  
Arguments over the police withdrawal highlights the disputed issue of 
who and what exactly the police’s main responsibilities are; whether it be 
upholding law and order, the general public’s welfare, tenants and owners of the 
buildings and items damaged in the riot, ethnic minorities at the centre of the 
disturbances, or even the personal safety of the police themselves. Contrary to 
the criticism he received from many areas for the withdrawal, it is clear that 
Weigh believed that his responsibility rested more upon the safety of his officers 
and general public than the defence of material possessions and livelihoods. 
Unsurprisingly this view of the well-being of police personnel being the most 
important was shared by many officers. The Avon and Somerset Police 
Authority ‘strongly and unanimously supported’ Weigh and believed that, due to 
his ‘cool and firm leadership, no lives were lost, nor was any serious injury 
suffered by any of those involved’. 137  Similarly Constable Dennis Sherman 
believed that, during the riot, it had been more important to help protect fellow 
officers than make arrests.138 Local community leaders also praised the police 
withdrawal and De Freitas described the action as ‘an inspired move’ which 
avoided serious injuries or the riot spreading to other localities. He believed that 
anger had only been directed towards merchants who had previously 
demonstrated contempt for the black community whilst making a living out of 
them but, ‘Had the police tried to suppress the black anger with force, traders 
and other people’s lives could have been in danger’.139 
Home Secretary William Whitelaw stated that police actions had been ‘in 
the highest traditions’ of service and hoped it would be recognised and 
accepted that, regardless of criticisms concerning actions or tactics, ‘individual 
police officers perform their duties with dedication to the service of this 
country’. 140  Similarly Conservative MP Sir Graham Page called for the 
policemen to be venerated for remaining in the area for so long with so many 
casualties until they were forced to retreat to obtain reinforcements.141 Whitelaw 
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believed that the fact there had been no loss of life or serious injury might go 
some way to justifying the decision to withdraw, although some countered that 
this could simply have been a matter of luck.142 Despite Whitelaw’s apparent 
public backing of Weigh, the Daily Mail characterised him as being sufficiently 
‘shaken’ by the withdrawal to ‘urgently’ review procedures for handling large 
civil disorders.143 Whitelaw later stated that ‘The removal of police protection in 
this way could not be allowed to happen again’, and therefore arrangements 
were implemented which allowed for adequate reserves of police from other 
forces in the future.144 Whitelaw also made a point of publically stating that there 
would be no appearance of so-called ‘no go’ areas in the country. The 
perceived strength of public feeling regarding fear of ‘no go’ areas reaching 
England from Northern Ireland was highlighted by Whitelaw explaining how 
important it was for him to say it, ‘to be heard to say it, and for it to be realised 
that that will not happen in the future’.145  
Indeed it is not a stretch to believe that this was a prominent public fear 
when newspapers printed headings such as: ‘We never dreamed that they 
could come here; that in the England of 1980 we could have “no-go” areas like 
those of Londonderry.’146 A further connection across the Irish Sea came from 
Shadow Home Secretary Merlyn Rees, previously Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland during a particularly turbulent period of 1974-76. He would 
maintain a keen interest in the Irish Troubles for the rest of his life, and it is not 
too unreasonable to suggest that this influenced his views on policing.147 He 
subsequently served as Home Secretary 1976-79 and, despite the obvious 
outward Conservative policy of favouring law and order over other 
considerations, Whitelaw’s response can be viewed as a continuation of 
previous policy from that outgoing Labour government as Rees agreed he was 
‘inclined to accept’ the police decision to fall back in order to regroup, but that 
he also fundamentally rejected ‘no-go’ areas.148 
Others were not inclined to be quite so accepting. Clearly from the 
reaction to the withdrawal many believed that the police should view the 
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protection of the populace and property as a priority. As highlighted by centre-
right newspaper The Times, this was especially felt by Conservatives whose 
‘intense’ shock at the police withdrawal expressed ‘that classic Tory 
commitment to the sanctity of property above all else’. 149  Similarly, local 
Conservative-leaning newspaper Western Daily Press cited several 
Conservative MPs likely to demand Weigh’s resignation for his withdrawal.150 It 
was argued that the laws of Britain must be the same for everybody and the 
police’s role was to protect the law-abiding, in which they had failed: ‘we naively 
believed that police protection was but a telephone call away, we now know this 
is no longer true’. 151  Home Affairs Committee Secretary Alan Clark further 
argued that it was worrying that those who had contacted the police were given 
the response ‘Sorry we’re frightened’ and, as it had never previously happened 
in England, ‘Someone has some hefty explaining to do.’152  A senior officer 
disagreed that this was the first example where police had not been present 
during large scale violence, citing the example of the St Pancras Rent Riots in 
1960 where it was claimed the Metropolitan Police had been forced to delay 
their entrance before accumulating sufficient numbers. 153  However it was 
recorded that several other chief constables, privately and off the record, 
claimed that they would have maintained a police presence in the area even at 
the risk of serious injury or death.154 Many would soon have the opportunity to 
do just that when violence spread around the country the following year. 
The phrasing used in much of the media when describing the police 
withdrawal included such emotive sentences as: ‘leaving an area of the city 
unprotected’; ‘as police moved out, rioters moved in to ransack’; and ‘There was 
no law, no protection of property or even of the safety of the people of the 
area’.155 These all reflected the view that the police withdrawal had been an 
abandoning of the general public left behind. A description of other police chiefs 
being unwilling to comment upon Weigh’s decision was utilised to infer that they 
believed it was an incorrect decision; although it is difficult to see what exactly 
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the personal benefit for other police chiefs would be for them backing Weigh’s 
controversial withdrawal, regardless of their genuine beliefs.156 Certainly this 
was an area addressed by many observers; rather than focusing upon the 
reasons behind the eruption of violence, questions were asked of the police’s 
failure to preserve law and order and why it took four hours to be sufficiently 
reinforced to return. 157  Some newspapers highlighted the importance of 
Whitelaw’s role in fulfilling the Conservative election campaign promise to focus 
upon law and order and support the police: the ‘short, sharp shock’ treatment of 
offenders. He needed to make sure no other British city suffered a similar fate to 
Bristol due to police inability to combat a ‘roaming band of thugs’.158 This led to 
an increased focus upon police procedures and equipment, with the demand 
that they should not be caught out in such a way again. Weigh’s subsequent 
annual report recorded that organisational lessons when responding to such 
occurrences of sporadic violence had been very quickly implemented, so that 
the police were now adequately trained and equipped to appropriately respond 
to any recurrence of similar violence.159  
It is interesting to note that the reaction to complaints of the local black 
population was not so immediate and it appears that the public discourse and 
media attention, focussed upon the police’s lack of protection for the ‘general 
public’, had an impact upon this swiftness. This is consistent with the argument 
that the state successfully framed the reaction to the disturbance around ideas 
of law and order, criminalising those involved and diminishing the real 
discontent at the heart of the uprising.  
This focus was not purely a Conservative response. Shadow Home 
Secretary Merlyn Rees, again seemingly influenced by experience with 
Northern Ireland, proposed mobile police units which could deal with such 
emergencies; simultaneously overlooking the condemnation by black 
communities of such specialised ‘task forces’ for not being familiar with the local 
communities and situations, as well as making the foremost focus on law and 
order a cross-party response.160 Fitting within a broader aversion to changing 
methods of police accountability and questioning of their methods, it was 
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suggested that this had a negative effect upon the police’s role. Implying that 
fear of potential racial criticism if they had engaged with black protesters played 
a role in the police withdrawal, it was argued that the police ‘must not be 
allowed to be either too weak or too inhibited to function effectively’.161 When all 
of these reactions are considered, as barrister John Spokes argued in his 
closing arguments during the Crown Court Trial, it perhaps ‘took considerably 
more courage to give the order to withdraw than an order to stay’.162 
ARMED POLICE? 
A recurring theme throughout the 1980-81 disturbances was questioning 
whether police should be armed in order to effectively respond to such 
outbreaks of disorder. The police were asked whether they had been armed 
once the St Pauls violence had escalated, to which they confirmed they had 
not.163 The police log of events does record that the police were prepared, at 
Bristol headquarters at least, to deploy firearms personnel if required.164 This 
would not have been an unprecedented measure, as Avon and Somerset 
Constabulary records show that 150 officers were trained to use firearms and 
officers were required to carry weapons on 142 occasions in 1980.165 Equally 
many rumours spread around St Pauls during the unrest that rioters were 
themselves armed, and numerous references were made in the police log of 
emergency calls reporting such possibilities.166 Questions were asked after the 
disturbance about rioters carrying firearms and notably, suggesting the level of 
panic and sensationalism in some aspects of the media’s response, the answer 
that none were used was taken to imply that they may have been carried 
unused.167 Some 370 weapons had been seized by local police during 1980 so, 
again, this was not an impossibility; although police officials interceded and 
clarified that there was no evidence that any firearms had been present.168 
During later disturbances throughout the country in July 1981 Prime Minister 
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Margaret Thatcher briefly considered a Liverpool MP’s request to deploy the 
army but, with Whitelaw, agreed that this ‘could not be contemplated’ and would 
prefer instead to arm the police if necessary.169 However William Humphries, 
who had barricaded himself and his family in his home, claimed that the threat 
of the army being summoned appeared to be the only thing which frightened the 
rioters.170 The focus upon law and order to the detriment of further examination 
of the particular problems facing the British black population would lead to 
significant changes during the following year’s disorder. Neither armed police 
nor the army would be seen on the streets of England but significantly 
transformed police tactics and supplies, including riot control equipment and CS 
gas, would become commonplace for police use in 1981. 
INQUIRY? 
Immediately after the St Pauls disorder there were calls for a full 
independent inquiry into why it had happened, and talk of such dominated the 
following day’s press conference. Councillor John McLaren stated that the City 
Council would support an independent inquiry into events, provided it was truly 
independent and had the support of all.171 Despite applauding the idealistic aim 
of unanimous backing, obtaining support from all sections of society is a difficult 
if not impossible task. BCRE Chairman Bill Nicks suggested that an 
independent tribunal was needed to produce a report ‘to satisfy the black 
community that this would not happen again’.172 Conversely Roy de Freitas 
suggested that any inquiry would ‘go over the heads of the black community, 
although it might satisfy the whites’ and complained that organisations 
attempting to help the black community were often ignored or had little or no 
finances, despite being ‘the eyes and ears of the community’. 173  Similarly 
Francis Salandy, who ran an advice centre in the centre of St Pauls, dismissed 
ideas of a state-run inquiry believing that the police and white authority would 
be reflected favourably and that black people could not rely upon white 
counterparts, even liberals, to act in their interests.174 This shows a desire for 
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political participation by the black community themselves, rather than ineffective 
state organisations to act on their behalf without understanding their situation. 
This scepticism towards state inquiries was reinforced by the belief that 
previous investigations had identified the problems, but nothing had been done 
subsequently to resolve them. An interim report emerging from a Bristol inquiry 
into employment and inequality, backed by the Commission for Racial Equality 
(CRE), later summarised that this call for an inquiry was ‘in part a tactical 
manoeuvre to apply pressure to politicians at all levels to respond appropriately 
to the “riot”, in the absence of helpful responses in the past’.175 This clearly 
shows how calls for a public inquiry were part of a wider strategy, including the 
violence itself, to achieve their political goals and improve their situation. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the Conservative leader of Avon County Council, Sir 
Gervas Walker, also discouraged a public inquiry as he believed it would take 
too much account of evidence provided by ‘the wrong people’.176 Clearly Walker 
did not deem the disorder as anything further than criminality, rather than a 
means for a marginalised group to achieve political participation. Ian Crawford 
stated that the Chief Constable would be holding a police inquiry, but such 
inquiries ‘may or may not produce results’.177  
Bristol City Council leader Claude Draper confirmed they wished ‘that a 
suitable enquiry be held and that ultimately goodwill would be regained’.178 
Nicks was initially highly critical of this reaction, calling their organised press 
conference ‘a showpiece’ and claiming Councillors and MPs were simply 
‘jumping on the bandwagon’.179 He later stated that he warmly welcomed that at 
last both local and national governments were now apparently willing to discuss 
and search for solutions.180 By this time, Nicks had been reminded that Tony 
Benn had stated during that press conference he had already proposed a public 
inquiry to Whitelaw; a fact believed ‘sufficiently important for it to be 
recorded’.181 It is likely however that Nicks’ initial argument was that authorities 
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had been sufficiently warned that action should have occurred prior to the 
eruption of violence, rather than at the press conference following it. Alongside 
local MP Waldegrave who also called for a full public inquiry, Benn in particular 
placed events into a broader context when he implored that such an inquiry 
should be wide enough in scope to consider and provide recommendations 
upon a wide range of problems.182 Whitelaw responded that, before establishing 
any inquiry, he wished to receive reports from the Bristol Chief Constable and 
MPs as ‘it is right to get the initial reactions first, and then to decide what is 
best’.183 At this point, outwardly at least, Whitelaw claimed to have not ruled out 
the possibility of holding the inquiry which would have appeased many 
repeatedly calling for such action. 
At a City Council meeting on 15 April, Councillor McLaren followed 
through on his previous promise by introducing a motion calling for a ‘full 
independent public enquiry’ into the events in St Pauls.184 McLaren emphasised 
that he did not see the inquiry as an exercise in ‘Police bashing’, stating his 
belief that Bristol Police were, generally speaking, excellent, but there was still 
some room for improvement.185 Councillor Stephen Williams reasoned that it 
would be naïve not to accept that mistakes had been made by the police, but 
that the difficulty of their duties also had to be acknowledged. 186  These 
arguments highlight the tendency towards leniency often awarded to the police 
due to the perceived difficulty and importance of their role within society, 
meaning a marginalised community faced a struggle for recognition. McLaren 
contended that it was not his desire to engage in blind attacks upon the police, 
but equally that it was important that the process of investigations into police 
affairs were reviewed, asking: ‘Why were the Police different from anyone else?’ 
He argued that any inquiry conducted by the internal Police Authority worked 
within the ‘police’s own machinery’, but that it was not appropriate in reassuring 
the general public.187 This argument echoed the vast number of people likewise 
maintaining that it would be impossible for the police to regain the trust and 
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consent of the entire community if they were to continue to investigate their own 
controversies. 
Similarly, Councillor Alderson highlighted the wider debate when he 
stated that there would be disagreements from different groups about what 
exactly constituted an independent inquiry. Therefore it was decided that the 
term ‘independent’ inquiry would be replaced with ‘judicial’, allowing the inquiry 
to be conducted by those experienced in considering evidence from a high 
number of submissions, as well as allowing participants to have legal 
representation. However with such a level of distrust and discontent with the 
British legal system, there were some who believed this removed any chance of 
the inquiry being independent in nature. Councillor Trench argued that holding 
judicial inquiries was an important part of the British constitution; proving that 
there were systems in place for holding the authorities accountable for their 
actions, just so long as you were in a sufficiently powerful position of authority to 
be able to utilise them. Councillor Hewlett argued such a point, believing that a 
judicial inquiry would simply be an ‘establishment exercise’; the last thing that 
the people of St Pauls wanted. Indeed, when Alderson attempted to claim that a 
judicial inquiry would in fact be accepted by all involved parties, many members 
of the council loudly disagreed. Draper argued that the inquiry must be 
‘sufficiently representative of authority’ so its report would be deemed worthy of 
reading, and Councillor Keeley stated it was inevitable that the authorities would 
be involved in setting up an inquiry, as if people ‘sought to forget the 
establishment, the result would be anarchy’. The resolution was eventually 
passed without opposition and Whitelaw was informed of the Council’s decision 
and that, whilst the Council would examine their own policies without waiting for 
the results of the inquiry, this action alone was insufficient and a full 
independent public inquiry was essential.188 
In the process of discussing the above proposal Councillor Bassett 
conveyed that, during a meeting of the St Pauls Ward the previous night, it had 
been expressed that a public inquiry may become ‘bureaucratic, long drawn out 
and legalistic’. A suggestion was thus made to supplement it with a local inquiry 
led by Trades and Labour groups, from which evidence could later be submitted 
to the full public inquiry. The implication was that this would not be received in 
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such negative terms. However Councillors Trench and Draper both pointed out 
that such an inquiry would not have the standing or personnel required to 
impress ministers and, whilst a judicial inquiry would have powers to compel 
attendance and submission of evidence, other inquiries may just be shunned.189 
Although the obvious practicalities of having authority figures appear at every 
possibly conceivable private inquiry would render their jobs unfeasible, such 
situations added another layer of discontent amongst people who believed that 
those in positions of power were unaccountable for their actions.  
A different view of this St Pauls Ward meeting came from Labour Party 
member Trevor Morgan, who described it as a ‘shambolic rambling 
catastrophe’.190 Rather than supporting the idea that this meeting should be 
seen as an indication of what the disgruntled St Pauls community desired he 
instead argued it achieved nothing and was not representative of the views of 
the local community, as most were not present. The proposed local inquiry had 
been suggested by Labour members, not the ‘alienated poor of St. Paul’s’, and 
the fate of the local black community  
…will not be influenced by this meeting of cranks, well-intentioned do-
gooders and weaklings. It will not be influenced in any way by this event; 
for the actors who will take part in the drama that is to unfold were not in 
the room or anywhere near the meeting.191 
Morgan seemed to recognise, more so than some other colleagues, that 
believing to know what was best for the community or their needs, was not the 
same as their actual participation in the process. 
A meeting which appeared to boast more local support was of the Bristol 
Council for Racial Equality (BCRE), held the following day. This also called for a 
full public inquiry and that the police drop any charges or investigations relating 
to the disturbance. Demonstrating the importance attributed to such demands, it 
was decided that any BCRE member not fully supporting these resolutions 
would henceforth be denied membership. Due to this meeting being freely open 
to the public, it was well attended and stimulated great discussion.192 From a 
population who felt that the British democratic system had repeatedly excluded 
them, the opportunity to voice opinions on their own future was an appealing 
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prospect and representative of a desire for political participation. During the 
meeting there was much criticism of both the City and County Councils, 
suggesting that the black community saw these local authorities as easily 
recognisable groups to which they could express their frustrations about 
enduring racial discrimination, mirroring arguments of the police’s similar 
position as frontline targets.193 Indeed, during discussion it was suggested that 
the lack of a focal point within the Council had resulted in the police being the 
only body which the black community had regular contact with. Nicks stated 
that, whilst the violence could be interpreted as anti-police, he believed it was 
rather a build-up of frustrations within the community and that the police were 
‘the butt end of this accumulation’. In this argument the police represented an 
easily identifiable face of authority, and the collective violence was an attempt to 
hold the authorities as a whole accountable for their perceived failings, rather 
than the police specifically.  
During this meeting other groups were not immune from criticism, 
including the BCRE and community itself. The BCRE was charged with being 
turned away too easily from the Council’s offices and that they ‘should have 
kept knocking until they were listened to’. A description of the overall feeling of 
the meeting recorded that most believed any possible lessons of the 
disturbance would either be buried or deliberately misinterpreted by any official 
inquiry, and regardless nobody would be willing to learn them.194 This clearly 
shows the continuation of a pessimistic view of the British authorities which had 
led to collective violence in the first place. 
Despite the contention that the disturbance had not been purely anti-
police, many at this meeting believed that any complaints against the police 
made by ethnic minorities were not investigated in a fair and impartial manner. 
This had thus led many to completely lose faith in the police. The level of anger 
was shown by a proposed BCRE motion calling for the immediate resignations 
of the Divisional Commander and Head of the Criminal Investigation 
Department. Although eventually dropped, this suggestion clearly shows the 
backlash created due a perceived lack of accountability on behalf of the police. 
Furthermore one speaker alleged that the police had previously assured the 
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BCRE that no further arrests would be made in relation to the disturbance, but 
that a number of subsequent arrests further reduced ‘what credence the 
coloured people could put in Police promises’. Community Relations Officer 
Chief Inspector Derek Lane attempted to respond to this accusation, but it was 
reported his ‘valiant attempts’ were not accepted by the crowd.195 It appears 
that this accusation was not in fact wholly accurate, but again the importance of 
the widespread willingness to believe it is noteworthy. A BCRE report stated 
that, during a meeting of representatives and senior officers of the Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary one week after the disturbance, it was argued that the 
level of police inquiries and interrogation was being interpreted as a campaign 
directed against the black community in order to regain police authority lost 
during their withdrawal. Weigh had assured the Committee that house to house 
inquiries had ceased and agreed to allow members of the local community to 
visit cells to prove that nobody was still being held in relation to St Pauls.196 This 
latter privilege was wholly conditional upon black social workers ‘accompanying’ 
those still wanted for questioning to the police station (i.e. finding and rounding 
them up), suggesting that any police concessions would be decidedly on their 
own terms; although the police contended that this was simply so that black 
social workers could be present if requested to aid those who may be unfamiliar 
with or intimidated by the legal system.197  A so-called ‘wanted list’, initially 
predicted by the police to contain twenty-five names, only actually resulted in 
six.198  
Deputy Chief Constable Donald Smith informed the BCRE on 29 April 
that the police did not have the power to grant their demand for an amnesty of 
charges relating to the disturbance.199 It was thus agreed by the BCRE that they 
would pursue this request with the Attorney General and Director of Public 
Prosecutions.200 Regardless of this inability to actually grant such an amnesty, it 
was felt that the apparent rejection to exonerate participants from any legal 
backlash was a further refusal to acknowledge the local community’s 
perspective and admit mutual culpability. It was not only the BCRE who 
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requested such an amnesty for those arrested in relation to the riot. Dr Leslie 
Wollen, former Chairman of the Community Relations Council, informed 
Whitelaw that he believed any attempts to punish those involved would further 
damage race relations and suggested an amnesty would be ‘not only generous 
but wise’: 
…it seems to me that nothing would do more to re-establish confidence 
in the police and our judicial system. Any punishment inflicted is bound to 
be arbitrary, falling on innocent and guilty, and leaving many yet more 
guilty to get off free. This will only increase the sense of grievance which 
many already understandably have and further worsen the relations with 
the police.201 
The Bristol community workers’ branch of the National Union of Public 
Employees also backed calls for an amnesty, similarly receiving the response 
from the Police Authority that they did not possess the power to do so.202 Thus 
the trials of those arrested in relation to the disturbance proceeded, causing 
much discontent and maintaining tensions between the local black community 
and authorities, and are discussed in the following chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
The explosion of violence in St Pauls certainly shocked many, although 
not those involved with the local black community. The police argued that they 
had previously enjoyed a good relationship with the local black community, 
proven to be at best woefully mistaken and at worst wilfully disingenuous as an 
attempt to avoid criticism. Their temporary withdrawal from the area during the 
height of the disorder was branded by many as deeply worrying and increased 
calls for police to be adequately equipped with resources and manpower to 
appropriately respond to any further violent outbreaks. This surely shaped the 
response of future disturbances in making sure such ‘weaknesses’ were not 
again displayed by the police; but such a response undermined the discontent 
at the heart of the disorder. Despite numerous discussions about the best way 
to study events in order to obtain any possible lessons, as Roy de Freitas 
summarised: ‘The future depended not on enquiries but on what [action] 
actually happened.’203 As will be shown in the following chapters, the absence 
of either governmental public inquiries or related action ensured that the 
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immediate future would see a recurrence of the St Pauls violence, when similar 
disturbances spread around England the following year. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LACKING CONVICTION?: INQUIRIES AND  
TRIALS AFTER BRISTOL 
 
Calls for public inquiries into events in St Pauls continued, as they did 
during all of the main events discussed. It was believed that a lack of such an 
inquiry demonstrated the government did not care about the plight of local black 
communities, or that they were attempting to protect and conceal police 
misconduct. Other measures that were implemented by the government were 
thus boycotted by various groups who believed their attendance would imply 
satisfaction with such a limited response, although such a tactic resulted in the 
only actions sanctioned by the government being less productive than they 
might otherwise have been with more participation. Continuing the focus upon 
criminality aspects to the detriment of race relations, the state appeared more 
focussed upon obtaining sentences for those involved in the disturbances in 
attempts to provide a deterrent for future violence and to reassure the general 
public. This was possibly influenced by the criticism directed towards the Bristol 
police for their temporary withdrawal. This chapter concludes with discussion of 
how news of the disturbances spread, first within the city and subsequently 
around the country, linking into ideas of how the disorder would extend around 
the country the following year. 
NO INQUIRY – BUT A ‘THREE-PRONGED RESPONSE’ 
Governmental action that did follow the Bristol disturbances was limited 
and criticised as an inadequate response. For example the Commission for 
Racial Equality (CRE)-backed inquiry into employment and inequality within 
Bristol described how a ‘plea for recognition’ after St Pauls had been ‘fobbed 
off’.1 Home Secretary William Whitelaw, in the words of Martin Kettle and Lucy 
Hodges, ‘got himself off the hook of having to announce an inquiry’ by outlining 
a three-pronged response which was immediately seen as a ‘tacit refusal’ of the 
                                                            
1 Bristol Resource Centre, ‘Race, Employment and Inequality in the Bristol Area: An Action 
Research and Education Project sponsored by the Commission for Racial Equality: Interim 
Report’, (1980), p. 25, BRO: 32080/TC1/10/8. 
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demand for a full public inquiry.2 Bristol’s Assistant Community Relations Officer 
Peter Courtier told government officials how ‘many local people are confused as 
there was almost unanimous support in the call for a full independent public 
inquiry’.3 Such confusion undoubtedly led to anger in many who believed the 
government were not answering the pleas of the community, even after 
collective violence. Whitelaw privately told the Cabinet he believed ‘Such an 
inquiry would be undesirable’ as ‘the Chief Constable and the police would be 
pilloried to no good purpose’.4 Furthermore he believed ‘the pressure to hold a 
public inquiry into every controversial matter affecting the police ought to be 
resisted, not least because of the demands such inquiries made on the time of 
senior judges’.5  
This governmental response, alongside many other similarities, was 
linked by Bishop Norman Sargant to the refusal to grant a public inquiry 
following the 1831 Bristol riots in favour of a similar ‘three pronged approach’.6 
At that time Unitarian minister Dr Lant Carpenter had stated that, if he were a 
member of the magistracy, he would call for a full investigation because ‘the 
public odium would not be increased by the knowledge of the whole truth’.7 A 
similar argument was made in 1980 by chairman of the West Indian Parents 
and Friends Association Owen Henry, who asked; if the Home Office had 
nothing to hide or to be ashamed of, ‘why not have a public inquiry?’8 Whilst 
arguments of cost can be directed against such questions, both financially and 
of undermining governmental or police authority, without a strong governmental 
response or full explanation for the lack of an inquiry it appeared to many 
observers that authorities still believed, in 1980 as in 1831, that revealing ‘the 
whole truth’ would indeed increase ‘the public odium’. 
                                                            
2 Martin Kettle and Lucy Hodges, Uprising!: The Police, the People and the Riots in Britain's 
Cities (London, 1982) p. 32; Bristol Council for Racial Equality, ‘“Picking up the pieces” A Report 
on the aftermath of the St. Paul’s Riot – 2nd April 1980’, Bristol Council for Racial Equality, 
Annual Report (Bristol, 1980) p. 27, BRO Pol/LG/1/11. 
3 Peter Courtier to David Natzler, 15 May 1980, BRO 43129 (Box 105). 
4 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 24 April 1980, 
The National Archives (TNA): CAB 128/67/17. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Bishop Norman Sargant, Honorary Archivist of Bristol Cathedral, ‘The Bristol Riots – 1831’, 
(October 1980), BRO 43129 (Box 105). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Owen Henry to David Natzler, 14 May 1980, BRO 43129 (Box 106). 
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HOME OFFICE REPORT 
The first of Whitelaw’s three prongs was a request for senior government 
officials to ‘thoroughly and urgently’ examine arrangements for handling 
spontaneous public disorder.9 The CRE detailed how this completed 
assessment was ‘“published”, i.e. placed in the Library of the House of 
Commons’, clearly showing how little relation they believed this response bore 
to the calls for a full public inquiry that addressed the situation and how 
marginalised groups could not even access such discussion: 
The report…is lodged in the House of Commons Library for the perusal 
of all with access to that institution. This would seem to indicate that 
certain matters are either too weighty and complex to be entrusted, or 
too trivial to be of interest, to ordinary people, and in particular to the 
black people of inner-city Bristol whose situation brought about the 
review in the first place.10 
Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace, and Heather Booth argued that, by focusing 
foremost upon this aspect of the disturbances, it further disseminated the idea 
that it had been an unprovoked attack upon the police by the local black 
community and that a better police response to public disorder would be the 
solution. Without a public inquiry, the primacy placed upon the Chief 
Constable’s report and later riot trials formulated a response which removed 
social, political, and economic dimensions and instead discussions were 
‘reduced to its lowest common denominator – a crisis of law and public order’.11 
In what Kettle and Hodges labelled ‘a revealing priority’, the government tactic 
of framing the post-disturbance debate around issues of law and order rather 
than their social, economic or racial policies, diminished the potential threat to 
their authority.12  
Joshua et al. dedicated sizeable discussion to how there was little 
dispute in public regarding the ‘facts’ of the disorder and the legitimacy of the 
official version was not generally questioned, despite resting largely on a highly 
selective and confused account provided by the Chief Constable.13 St Pauls 
was a clear indictment that government policies, such as the belief immigration 
controls combined with successive Race Relations Acts would improve race 
                                                            
9 HC Deb 28 April 1980 vol. 983 cc. 971-2. 
10 Bristol Resource Centre, ‘Race, Employment and Inequality in the Bristol Area’, pp. 25-6. 
11 Harris Joshua, Tina Wallace and Heather Booth, To Ride the Storm: The 1980 Bristol 'Riot' 
and the State (London, 1983) pp. 72, 190. 
12 Kettle and Hodges, Uprising!, p. 32. 
13 Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm, chapters 2-3. 
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relations and reduce discrimination, had failed; but rather than reconsider their 
position on racial issues the government instead focused to ‘suppress the 
symptom of that failure – collective racial violence’.14 By presenting and 
focusing reaction to events in order to further their own ends, it is difficult to 
claim that this was a governmental response demonstrating accountability for its 
policies and actions. 
Some contemporaries did challenge this concentration upon law and 
order; for example local MP Tony Benn commented that if, for example, it was 
recommended that the Special Patrol Group were expanded this would not 
‘constitute a proper answer’ to the problems.15 The Bristol Council for Racial 
Equality (BCRE) implored Whitelaw to thoroughly examine underlying reasons 
for the disorder and that ‘it would be a tragedy if this unhappy incident was seen 
simply as a “law and order issue”’.16 Mike and Trevor Phillips later commented 
that the absence of an inquiry into conditions which produced the disturbances, 
despite these same conditions existing elsewhere, suggested, especially to the 
black population, that the government’s strategy for dealing with such conflicts 
was a ‘crude reliance on the police to contain trouble’.17 When outlining his 
response, Whitelaw stated that it was important that ‘we consider carefully the 
lessons to be learnt’ from the event; and in framing governmental response to 
reduce public criticism of their policies, it appears that it was indeed extremely 
carefully considered.18 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS 
The second of Whitelaw’s three-pronged response was announcing the 
Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee of the Select Committee on 
Home Affairs would undertake an inquiry into racial disadvantage. However 
Whitelaw actually had no control over the Sub-Committee’s actions and they 
had already elected to consider racial disadvantage prior to both Whitelaw’s 
                                                            
14 Ibid., p. 192. 
15 HC Deb 28 April 1980 vol. 983 c. 975. 
16 Bristol Council for Racial Equality to William Whitelaw, 14 April 1980, BRO 42974/1. 
17 Mike Phillips and Trevor Phillips, Windrush: The Irresistible Rise of Multi-Racial Britain 
(London, 1998) p. 362. 
18 HC Deb 28 April 1980 vol. 983 c. 978. 
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announcement and even the disorder itself.19 Summarising the belief that this 
was an inadequate and inappropriate response, the CRE inquiry described this 
as ‘A fortuitous use (or misuse?) of an existing body’.20 In the process of their 
inquiry, the Sub-Committee visited Bristol on 22 May and met with various 
interested parties.21 City Clerk John Brown illuminated the subtext when stating 
that the Sub-Committee’s visit ‘seems to be the Government’s response to the 
City Council’s resolution seeking a full independent public inquiry’.22 A letter 
from Brown to Bristol Councillors detailed the Sub-Committee’s visit, stating that 
they wished to examine ‘racial disharmony’; although it was not to be limited to 
St Pauls or even Bristol itself.23 Any hope that this inquiry would be addressing 
the ‘disharmony’ of 2 April was dashed when this apparent mistake was quickly 
rectified and Brown stated the following day that the letter should have instead 
read ‘racial disadvantage’.24 Whether a genuine typing mistake on Brown’s part 
or a misunderstanding between Brown and the Sub-Committee of the focus of 
its investigations, it shows that an inquiry addressing disharmony and the unrest 
itself was certainly on the minds of those involved in Bristol.  
This issue was further addressed by the Sub-Committee when they 
clarified they ‘would not wish to examine the particular case’ of 2 April, but that 
the terms of reference for their enquiries was to study the underlying causes.25 
Similarly notes circulated for the guidance of witnesses prior to their visit stated 
that oral evidence would be collected in a ‘strictly question and answer form’, 
and that it would be helpful if witnesses could keep their answers as brief as 
possible.26 It is not difficult to imagine the frustration and further disillusionment 
of those calling for a full independent inquiry only to be subsequently told that 
the only chance for them to voice their opinions or vent their frustrations directly 
to government officials was in an atmosphere explicitly described as: ‘not in any 
                                                            
19 John Wheeler stated that the Sub-Committee had decided upon its inquiry in March: John 
Wheeler, ‘Sub-Committee on Race Relations & Immigration Visit to Bristol – Thursday 22 May’, 
14 May 1980, BRO 43129 (Box 105); Graham W. Reid, ‘Report of House of Commons Home 
Affairs Sub-Committee on Race Relations and Immigration Day Trip to Bristol on 22 May 1980’, 
BRO 43129 (Box 105). 
20 Bristol Resource Centre, ‘Race, Employment and Inequality in the Bristol Area’, p. 25. 
21 Reid, ‘Home Affairs Sub-Committee on Race Relations and Immigration’. 
22 John Brown to Michael Colvin MP, 12 May 1980, BRO 42974/1. 
23 John Brown to various Councillors, 6 May 1980, BRO 42974/1. 
24 John Brown to R. W. Wall, 7 May 1980, BRO 42974/1. 
25 R. J. W. / J. B. F., ‘Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee of the Home Affairs 
Select Committee’, 30 April 1980, BRO 42974/1. 
26 I. C. Bryan, ‘Notes for the Guidance of Witnesses’, p. 2, BRO 42974/1. 
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way a discussion’.27 Even this limited opportunity was only available to those 
actually granted permission to submit oral evidence to the Sub-Committee and 
many who wished to verbally make their views known to the government were 
unable to do so. It is hard to argue that increased political participation or full 
accountability was being achieved under such strict constraints. Leader of 
Bristol City Council Claude Draper, further to expressing disappointment that a 
public inquiry was not deemed ‘either necessary or appropriate’, wrote to 
Whitelaw to warn that many local residents would wish to provide oral evidence 
and ‘will most strongly object to any lack of opportunity to do so’.28 Conservative 
MP William Waldegrave responded that Draper ‘does not seem to have a very 
clear understanding of how select committees work’, that they had no limitations 
upon what they could examine, and had powers to subpoena if required.29 
However just because they had no limitations upon what they could look at, did 
not mean that they would look at everything that was requested of them; they 
had already rejected the idea of examining ‘the particular case’ of 2 April.  
Draper further deemed the Sub-Committee’s single day visit inadequate 
and ‘a failure to appreciate the complexity of the problems’.30 He believed a 
three-day visit would be far more realistic and warned that any attempt to limit 
the amount of time for evidence to be heard would have ‘serious 
repercussions’.31 MPs Michael Colvin and Arthur Palmer agreed and suggested 
that the BCRE should make it clear to the Sub-Committee that one day was 
inadequate.32 Waldegrave retorted that it was ‘perfectly possible’ for the Sub-
Committee to return to Bristol if they felt they needed more time to obtain oral 
evidence, although the assistant clerk had previously stated he did not think the 
Sub-Committee would be able to find the time to prolong the inquiry to more 
than one day.33 If a visit from a Sub-Committee was a poor response to the full 
independent public inquiry being requested, then such a fleeting visit added 
insult to injury. 
                                                            
27 Ibid. 
28 Councillor Claude Draper to William Whitelaw, 13 May 1980, BRO 42974/1. 
29 William Waldegrave MP to John Brown, 16 May 1980, BRO 42974/1. 
30 Draper to Whitelaw, 13 May 1980. 
31 R. J. W. / J. B. F., ‘Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee’. 
32 Michael Colvin to Peter Courtier, 19 May 1980, BRO 43129 (Box 106); Arthur Palmer to Peter 
Courtier, 24 May 1980, BRO 43129 (Box 106). 
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Draper also warned Whitelaw that the lack of a public inquiry would likely 
be unpopular and various organisations may undertake ‘other local 
“enquiries”…with all the implications that could result from such action’; clearly 
suggesting that such studies might not be balanced or impartial and likely 
increase resentment against the authorities.34 Draper attempted to argue that to 
avoid a government-sanctioned public inquiry, on the basis that it may provoke 
criticism of the police or authorities, would be counterproductive as local 
inquiries with less government influence would surely do so in a far more overtly 
partisan manner. Waldegrave countered that, as other inquiries had been 
announced prior to the government officially announcing their three-pronged 
response, it was ‘quite obvious’ that ‘whatever happened, there would have 
been other organisations jumping on the bandwagon’.35 Instead, as has been 
shown, it was likely that it was previous experience alongside the initial 
government sluggishness to announce a full and coherent response to events 
that provoked action from other interested parties. Furthermore it could be 
suggested that such partisan and unbalanced inquiries might actually be 
welcomed by the government, as they could afterwards be easily condemned 
as inaccurate and therefore add credence and strengthen the authorities’ 
‘official’ response. 
As the BCRE began collecting evidence to submit to the Sub-Committee, 
local feeling during a meeting in St Pauls promoted the tactic of boycotting their 
visit. The Sub-Committee was thus informed of this decision, as well as the 
continued demand from the local community for a public inquiry.36 Palmer, 
whilst agreeing with their objections, hoped that the BCRE would actually 
submit evidence as ‘my experience is that it always pays to use every channel 
when a protest is to be made’.37 Whilst this was undoubtedly sage advice and 
appeared to support that the disorder itself was another ‘channel’ used as 
protest rather than mindless violence, it was sent to the BCRE two days after 
the Sub-Committee’s actual visit. Even when local politicians attempted to give 
constructive advice, it did not always arrive in time. At an emergency Executive 
Committee meeting three days before the visit it was resolved that, whilst the 
BCRE should be represented at discussions to make its position clear, it should 
                                                            
34 Draper to Whitelaw, 13 May 1980. 
35 Waldegrave to Brown, 16 May 1980. 
36 Bristol Council for Racial Equality, ‘“Picking up the pieces”’, p. 28. 
37 Palmer to Courtier, 24 May 1980. 
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‘defer the submission of written evidence until such a time as it was satisfied 
that such evidence was likely to be used to the best advantage’.38 It was 
believed that providing evidence to the Sub-Committee would be seen as a tacit 
acceptance of Whitelaw’s response and refusal to conduct a full independent 
public inquiry. Such an inquiry was considered essential as previous Select 
Committee proceedings had little positive effect, such as the government’s 
previous rejection of the Committee’s earlier recommendation that ‘sus’ laws be 
abolished.39 Furthermore, echoing previous points, the BCRE did not believe an 
inquiry into racial disadvantage was required as this had already been 
confirmed multiple times by previous investigations: ‘An inquiry was needed to 
establish remedies for racial discrimination not the fact of it.’40 The Bristol West 
Indian Parents and Friends Association agreed and believed investigation into 
racial disadvantage in place of a public inquiry into the St Pauls disturbances 
would be ‘a cover up’.41 
It was not only the BCRE which planned to boycott the Sub-Committee’s 
visit to demonstrate their disapproval at the lack of a public inquiry. During a 
public meeting, the St Pauls United Defence Committee resolved to request the 
Sub-Committee not come to Bristol and boycott submitting oral evidence as it 
was ‘a wholly unacceptable response to the community’s demand’.42 A further 
oft-repeated criticism leading to boycott was the lack of time given to local 
organisations in order to prepare their evidence.43 Monique Courtier reasoned 
that, by not giving local community organisations sufficient notice or information 
as to how evidence was to be collected, that was itself racial disadvantage 
‘particularly to those of the minority groups who cannot read, write or get an 
opportunity like myself to know that there is such an exercise to take place’. It 
was deemed vital that ‘the common man must be reached’ if the inquiry was to 
serve any purpose and many believed the Sub-Committee had not sufficiently 
                                                            
38 Bristol Council for Racial Equality, ‘“Picking up the pieces”’, p. 28; Bill Nicks, ‘Sub-Committee 
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done enough to ensure this.44 Indeed, such a response did not appear to be 
granting marginalised groups the increased political participation they desired. 
In response to such fervent criticisms, Chairman of the Sub-Committee 
John Wheeler MP subsequently released a press statement stating he greatly 
regretted this boycott. He emphasised to the community that the Sub-
Committee was ‘not an organ of the government but an independent body’ and 
that, as Whitelaw had no control over their actions, their visit bore no relation to 
the demands for an independent public inquiry.45 He specified they were willing 
to revise the format of their day visit to Bristol in order to hear more testimony 
from the community and reiterated the possibility of a return to Bristol if 
considered necessary. In response to the strength of local opinion, two days 
prior to the visit the itinerary was restructured to include an extra hour of open 
discussion and an evening visit to St Pauls, during which the Sub-Committee 
would ‘of course also be open to approaches from individual residents’.46 This 
eleventh-hour attempt to appeal to the ‘common man’ and those who had 
deemed their visit an excuse for not conducting a full inquiry did not appear 
successful. Community leaders maintained their boycott threat as, despite this 
extra hour’s hearing, they repeated that a day’s visit was simply not enough. 
Less than two hours had been allocated for all community groups to make their 
views heard, which meant that each group would only have roughly ten minutes 
each to make their arguments to the Sub-Committee.47 Such a tight schedule 
would require witnesses to ‘beat the clock to get their views across’ during the 
visit of a Sub-Committee accused of ‘rushing in and rushing out again so it can 
say it has been to Bristol’.48 
Thus when the Sub-Committee eventually visited Bristol on 22 May 1980 
it was met with a largely negative response from the local community, described 
by one newspaper as ‘A wall of resentment’.49 The level of anger was such that 
a police presence was required for security reasons, advised to keep a low 
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profile and be plainclothed, undoubtedly in an attempt to avoid any recurrence 
of violence directed towards easily identifiable officers.50 Local authorities and 
statutory bodies attended and provided evidence to the Sub-Committee, but 
representatives of BCRE and others conducted their planned strategies of using 
the visit to repeat calls for a public inquiry.51 Whilst this ‘all-or-nothing’ tactic of 
refusing to submit evidence until a full public inquiry was held may have been 
believed to be a persuasive bargaining chip, the continued refusal of the Home 
Secretary to reverse his decision resulted in a situation where local 
organisations achieved neither a full inquiry nor submission of evidence to the 
only investigation into events originating from Westminster. Conservative Sub-
Committee Chairman John Wheeler accused those community leaders who 
called for a boycott of having ‘betrayed the ordinary people of the community’.52 
Labour Councillor John McLaren countered that the whole issue had stemmed 
from Whitelaw’s public insistence that the Sub-Committee’s visit was part of the 
government’s response, thus imposing ‘something on the Sub-Committee which 
was not in its original brief’ and instead suggesting that the government had 
betrayed the community.53 Such a response is possibly unsurprising from a 
political opponent, but it highlights the dissatisfaction felt by local people 
towards the apparent repeated failure for a full governmental-endorsed 
investigation. 
The open discussion of the Sub-Committee’s visit was a largely spiky 
affair with many occasions when emotions threatened to boil over. BCRE 
Chairman Bill Nicks stated that ‘No discourtesy was intended’ from their non-
submission of written evidence, but not all who attended seemed as keen to be 
as civil. One speaker described the session as ‘a complete farce’ and another 
curtly replied to the Sub-Committee’s questions with: ‘You’ve got my name 
wrong.’54 Despite the intention being for the visit to hear testimony from the local 
community, there were more members of the press present than the public; 
attributed by Graham Reid to the fact it fell on a Thursday, part of the common 
working week.55 It was thus impossible for many members of the local 
community, who had repeatedly wished to make their views known to the 
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democratically elected officials, to even attend this unsatisfactory inquiry. 
Newspaper estimates placed the number present at 42-50 with many pointing 
out that there were few black people present.56 Fred Walcott, a black 
magistrate, believed young people had stayed away due to fear of being 
identified on television cameras and subsequently targeted by the police, 
something he claimed had occurred following the disturbances.57 This is not 
implausible as such accusations had existed for years previously of police 
targeting individuals who provided evidence of misconduct; however it is just as 
likely that black youth simply did not believe this meeting was worth attending 
as it would not do anything to help them.58  
The Sub-Committee made it clear on numerous occasions that they were 
not involved in whether there should be a public inquiry and it was not why they 
had visited the area, but the majority of speakers wished to address this topic. 
This was epitomised by a solicitor who had attended the meeting, on behalf of a 
client charged in connection with the disturbances, upon the misunderstanding 
that it was the inquiry into the disturbances that so many had been calling for.59 
John McLaren stated the community felt ‘snubbed’ and, until the general public 
were allowed an opportunity to voice their opinions, the Sub-Committee’s 
‘presence in Bristol is a complete and utter waste of time’.60 Wheeler responded 
that their visit was exactly the opportunity for ‘ordinary people to make their 
points’, but few present accepted that argument. Rising tensions caused MP 
Alex Lyon to bluntly state ‘We are here to try to help black people’ and Wheeler 
subsequently complained: ‘How can we go back and report if you fail to tell us 
anything?’ He implored a reluctant Avon County Councillor to ‘Do go on’ on the 
rare occasion that detailed evidence was being given, but Draper appeared to 
correctly sum up the mood of the meeting when he remarked to the Sub-
Committee: ‘You are not going to get anywhere this morning, are you?’61 
The Sub-Committee also did not appear to endear themselves to the 
assembled locals. For example Wheeler questioned whether one speaker was 
planning to return to Kenya and questioned her ‘right to speak for the black 
                                                            
56 Colin Randall, ‘MPs’ Riot Scene Discussions “Utter Waste of Time”’, The Daily Telegraph, 23 
May 1980; ‘Bristol Riots: Snub for MPs’, Daily Mail, 23 May 1980. 
57 Dennis Johnson, ‘MP Tries to Clear Air Over Riot Inquiry’, The Guardian, 23 May 1980. 
58 Kettle and Hodges, Uprising!, p. 34. 
59 Reid, ‘Home Affairs Sub-Committee on Race Relations and Immigration’. 
60 Randall, ‘MPs’ Riot Scene Discussions “Utter Waste of Time”’. 
61 ‘“It’s a Snub” Protest in Race Probe’, Bristol Evening Post, 22 May 1980. 
141 
 
people here’. Another heated exchange occurred when Reverend Keith Kimber 
criticised the manner in which the Sub-Committee was collecting evidence. He 
argued that, as the open discussion was not being minuted or protected by 
Parliamentary privilege and its structure made even him ‘nervous and 
intimidated’, this disadvantaged those who could not prepare written 
submissions but whose oral evidence could have been recorded.62 Indeed it 
had also been circulated before the visit that nothing from this open discussion 
would be regarded as evidence or used in the report; presumably causing 
people to question the point of even making their feelings known.63 Lyon 
countered that Kimber was an educated man and knew why the Sub-Committee 
were in Bristol: ‘It’s no good striking a pose for us – we are not impressed. We 
want information.’64 Kimber objected to both himself and the local community 
being patronised to which Lyon, who had previously resigned as a Labour 
Home Office Minister in a row over immigration, appeared to take as an 
accusation that he was unsuited for this job: ‘I gave up my political career for 
race.’65 Despite this professed sacrifice and dedication, his visit as part of the 
Sub-Committee still did not appear to be welcomed by the local community. 
Kimber later clarified that the point he was attempting to make was that 
‘however much I and a host of so-called experts in race relations know of racial 
discrimination, our voices are no substitute for those of people actually 
suffering’.66 This was supported by Walcott who pointed out that none of those 
involved in the disturbance were currently present, admitting ‘We have failed to 
bring these people before you, and you must find a means of speaking to 
them.’67 Whether this was actually a failure on behalf of the government or local 
community, the end result was that the Sub-Committee’s visit did not appease 
the repeated pleas for a public inquiry into events in St Pauls. 
CITY/COUNTY COUNCIL PARTNERSHIP 
The third of Whitelaw’s three pronged approach was also an action that 
had largely nothing to do with him or central government. He informed the 
Commons that he welcomed the decision of the Avon County Council and 
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Bristol City Council to jointly examine how they could best improve community 
relations and declared that experts from all government departments concerned 
would ‘play a full part’ in this exercise.68 Whitelaw publicly stated a belief that, 
alongside the Select Committee’s work, it represented ‘the best way forward in 
tackling the complex and delicate issues that are involved’.69 However he 
privately told the Cabinet that this joint examination ‘might not, in fact, achieve 
much’.70 Furthermore, with the exception of the local department of the 
Manpower Services Commission, the ‘full part’ played by government 
departments in reality amounted to very little; a Home Office representative 
even admitted that his department ‘did not profess to know any answers to the 
problem or be able to provide solutions’.71 Minister for Home Affairs Timothy 
Raison, using this City and County Council exercise to defend the decision to 
not proceed with a public inquiry, emphasised the great importance the 
government placed on the ‘involvement of all locally-elected representatives in 
the Local Enquiry’.72 Not all such locally-elected representatives approved. The 
Bristol City Clerk later conveyed explicit information that this collaboration would 
not be an inquiry into the St Pauls disturbances, and the inability to secure a 
government endorsed public inquiry was thus labelled a ‘failure’ by City 
Councillor Parsons.73 In addition a City Council meeting noted that, prior to 
Whitelaw’s statement the day after the disturbances, joint discussions with the 
County Council had already been proposed.74  
Therefore, significantly, two of the government’s three-pronged response 
to the events in St Pauls were unconnected to the national government and had 
already begun before Whitelaw even publically addressed the situation. In an 
effort to frame the response to the disturbance around aspects of public 
disorder instead of governmental policies, the only response that was 
spearheaded by Whitelaw himself was in how the police would deal with future 
outbreaks of violence, not examination of the situation which had initially led to 
such collective violence. 
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REACTION AND OTHER INQUIRIES 
This three-pronged approach was met with varying immediate responses 
from MPs. A private note to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher informed that 
Whitelaw’s announcement to the Commons ‘went off very well’ and nobody was 
‘disposed to argue seriously for a public enquiry’. This was despite Tony Benn 
and William Waldegrave already having done so. It concluded, somewhat 
optimistically: ‘I think that the Home Secretary has successfully put this matter 
to bed for the time being.’75 Conservative MP Nicholas Budgen questioned 
Whitelaw in the Commons what ‘specific action – as opposed to discussion – is 
anticipated’, to which Whitelaw broadly replied improved community relations, 
police recruitment, and that the communities involved must ‘adopt a sensible 
attitude’.76 For a community who felt that some had been pushed into a violent 
uprising to demand equality and political participation due to the repeated 
failures of the authorities, such a statement could only have been patronising. 
Michael Colvin recorded that Bristol MPs, with the notable exception of 
Benn, conducted a lengthy conversation with Whitelaw prior to his 
announcement and agreed that his threefold inquiry proposals were the best 
way forward.77 Colvin believed that a public inquiry had a high likelihood of 
turning into a ‘witch hunt’ which necessitated someone to be found guilty, but 
that ‘the matter is so multifarious that it is quite impossible to lay the blame on 
any one particular individual organisation’.78 Despite initially asking for a public 
inquiry, Waldegrave agreed the Bristol MPs welcomed the Sub-Committee’s 
visit and believed it was a better approach than a judicial inquiry.79 Conversely 
Benn, possibly explaining his absence at the meeting with Whitelaw, continued 
to back calls for a public inquiry as seen by his support for a visit to the House 
of Commons by a Parliamentary Lobby organised by the West Indian Parents 
and Friends Association and supported by the BCRE.80  
Labour MP Arthur Palmer later reversed his opinion and stated that, 
whilst there was a time he believed the Sub-Committee’s enquiries would be 
adequate, ‘experience has now convinced me that this is not the case’.81 Such 
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experience is likely what convinced the local black community likewise. As a 
result Palmer questioned whether the government, in light of local 
disappointment at the ‘slowness of the so-called three-pronged inquiry’, would 
reconsider the original request to hold an official inquiry.82 Timothy Raison 
disputed claims that the three-pronged approach was proceeding slowly and, 
despite being aware of sustained calls for a public inquiry, stated that the 
current approach was the most productive. Previous dissenter Waldegrave, now 
seemingly fully toeing the party line, interjected by suggesting that, as the 
narrative of events of 2 April had been largely accepted, there would be nothing 
for an official inquiry to do except investigate the underlying causes; of which he 
pointed to several reports already or due to be published, concluding that ‘the 
time has come, not to have more inquiries, but to take the necessary action’.83 
There are many that would have agreed with such a sentiment, but not 
necessarily with the established narrative of events. As mentioned previously 
this narrative had been carefully constructed and managed by the authorities, 
relying heavily upon police accounts of events and dismissing others, to frame 
events as a breakdown of law and order rather than providing local black people 
with the political participation they were being systematically denied. 
Despite numerous calls to the government from several interested 
parties for a public inquiry they were instead answered with Whitelaw’s three-
pronged approach. One investigation into racial disadvantage which ‘would not 
wish to examine the particular case’ of 2 April, a joint initiative between City and 
County Councils which would not examine the violence and a third, the only 
action actually initiated by Whitelaw, which purely considered how authorities 
would suppress recurring violence. Prior to his announcement in the Commons, 
Whitelaw admitted to the Cabinet that ‘There would, undoubtedly, be criticism of 
the actions of the Chief Constable and of the decision not to hold a full public 
inquiry’.84 It is hard to argue that this was a Home Secretary that felt he needed 
to address demands of disillusioned and politically marginalised members of the 
black population of St Pauls. 
Reacting against a perceived lack of action from the government, several 
other inquiries into the disturbances were launched by local interested groups 
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and organisations. In response to a comment made by Palmer, that it took time 
for things to be done by the government, the CRE-backed inquiry into 
employment and inequality retorted: ‘This is cold comfort for the black 
population of inner-city Bristol, denied even minimal access to what is 
purportedly being said and done (behind closed doors) on their behalf.’85 As 
seen by the collective violence itself, demands for political participation had 
resulted in further action being taken. As early as 24 April, the General 
Committee of the Bristol West Constituency Labour Party passed a resolution 
calling for a Trade Union and Labour Movement-organised public inquiry.86 As 
previously mentioned, Conservative MP Waldegrave would later refer to this 
swiftness pre-empting the government’s response as simply ‘jumping on the 
bandwagon’ of discontent against the state. However for those involved it was 
more a case of seeing something being done, albeit through a partisan 
framework.  
This inquiry also boasted the involvement of Professor Michael Dummet, 
previous chair of the inquiry into Blair Peach’s death which received plaudits for 
its diligence and integrity. It also highlights the case that, throughout the events 
of this thesis, the same people often reappeared due to their prominence in the 
race relations field. The inquiry was chaired by Ian Mikardo, Labour MP for the 
Greater London constituency of Bethnal Green and Bow; not a Bristol local who 
would undoubtedly have been more accepted by the St Pauls community. 
Nonetheless he did have a history regarding issues relating to ethnic minorities. 
Mikardo, son of Jewish immigrants who arrived in Britain during the last stages 
of the Russian Empire, certainly earned his reputation for being an ardent 
socialist and had previously attempted to tackle relations between the police 
and local ethnic communities within the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.87 
He spearheaded a pilot scheme to improve confidence in the police which 
established a public body to investigate every alleged incident of racism. This 
scheme was, in his words, ‘sabotaged’ by the police who disliked ‘the concept 
of the accountability of the police to the public who pay their wages’, and he 
concluded: ‘Ah well, some you win and some you lose.’88 It is doubtful that 
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many black people would have been quite so philosophical about such a 
system capitulating to the power of the police. 
If not previously evident, it quickly became clear that party politics played 
a role in the decision to undertake the inquiry. A Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
and Labour Party poster soon appeared appealing for support for their inquiry 
with drawings of prominent Conservatives asking: ‘Who are the real looters’? 
The poster continued to list the ‘crimes’ of Prime Minister Margret Thatcher and 
Secretary of State for Industry Keith Joseph, including the ‘stealing’ of over 2½ 
million jobs as well as milk from 7-11 year old school children, and that they 
were ‘threatening to do even worse things unless stopped’.89 It is difficult to 
argue the impartiality of an inquiry which advertised for witnesses in such a 
partisan way. Unsurprisingly Michael Colvin, Conservative MP for Bristol North 
East, deemed it a ‘counter-productive witch hunt’ which lacked official backing 
as Whitelaw had ‘made the proper decision not to hold an inquiry’.90 This 
tendency to engage in actions seen as politicking was often criticised, and Peter 
Courtier was concerned at the political overtones of the inquiry suggesting the 
feeling within the community was that ‘political parties should be kept out of it’.91 
This was demonstrated by the lack of local support for a left-wing Labour 
protest march which had to be cancelled due to lack of numbers. The Western 
Daily Press reported that the ‘half-a-dozen white extremists’ were told by a local 
black youth that people objected to their attempts to ‘cash in on a cause’.92 It is 
not hard to imagine why a community who had directed violence towards the 
figurehead of a perceived unsympathetic state did not want their plight to 
become simply part of party politics. 
It is difficult to separate the report from its political biases and influences, 
most apparent when it stated there was little hope of the significant reforms 
required under the current government.93 Mikardo later stated, referencing 
government actions following later disturbances in the inner-city Liverpool area 
of Toxteth, that if there was another eruption of violence then the government 
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would send Michael Heseltine; a move he likened to ‘sending an arsonist down 
to the scene to find out the cause of the fire’.94 The Labour Party itself did not 
escape criticism in the inquiry. Don McLaren, former Labour St Pauls 
Councillor, stated that ‘very prevalent’ racism in the Labour Party influenced 
decisions on planning and housing, as well as general policies in Bristol.95 City 
Council Leader Claude Draper, also leader of the council’s Labour group, 
vehemently denied such an accusation stating that, although any political party 
is representative of the general attitude of society, he was sure the Labour Party 
was not generally racist.96 The juxtaposition of stating that the Labour Party was 
not generally racist despite being representative of general societal attitudes 
appears to be itself an implicit acknowledgement of the pervasiveness of racist 
attitudes throughout society. 
Another problem with this inquiry, previously anticipated by the City 
Council, was that the local authorities and police could not be forced to take 
part, and indeed they did not.97 Given the political slant of the inquiry it is 
perhaps unsurprising that Bristol City’s Conservative group refused to give 
evidence. The group’s leader, Councillor Bob Wall, argued they did not wish to 
‘indulge in police bashing’ and that Mikardo’s chairmanship was problematic 
due to being a ‘fairly controversial figure of the Left’.98 A brief letter from Chief 
Constable Brian Weigh informed that, as his officers had been involved in all of 
Whitelaw’s three-pronged response, the police would not provide evidence to 
this inquiry.99 A similar reply from William Hutchinson, Chief Executive of the 
County of Avon, provided a longer response, but the same refusal to meet the 
inquiry. In his detailed explanation Hutchinson drew attention to the amount of 
time and preparation spent providing evidence to the Sub-Committee and the 
on-going collaboration with the City Council, including meetings with the BCRE 
and CRE, concluding that the County Council were ‘already subjected to more 
difficulties and pressure than ever before’.100  
                                                            
94 Lucy Hodges, ‘Inquiry Allocates Blame for St Paul’s “Volcano”’, The Times, 24 July 1981. 
95 ‘Council Policies Blamed for Riot’, Bristol Evening Post, 19 January 1981. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Johnson, ‘Cautious Welcome for St Paul’s Riot Inquiry’; ‘Notes on Debate of Councillor John 
McLaren’s Motion’, City Council meeting, 15 April 1980, BRO: 42974/1. 
98 Julie Hendry, ‘Tory Group Say No to TUC Riot Probe’, Bristol Evening Post, 13 November 
1980. 
99 Brian Weigh to R. Thomas, 24 October 1980, BRO 32080/TC1/10/8.  
100 William J. Hutchinson to R. Thomas, 28 October 1980, BRO 32080/TC1/10/8. 
148 
 
The inquiry team did not accept these as legitimate reasons for not 
attending and were particularly incensed upon viewing two related letters on its 
first full day session. The first was a confidential memo sent to all Heads of 
Schools by Avon County’s Director of Education which, in the words of the 
inquiry team, ‘denigrated the Enquiry and described quite incorrectly both its 
composition and its purpose’.101 The inquiry’s resulting report stated that the 
Director later admitted these errors (‘only after some months’) but nevertheless 
refused to meet with the inquiry.102 The second letter was a response to a 
personal invitation to participate in the inquiry to Avon’s Specialist Youth Officer 
regarding Ethnic Minorities; however it was the Director of Education who 
responded to inform that the Youth Officer would not be participating.103 This 
was a particularly unwelcome response as it appeared to the inquiry that the 
Youth Officer was being actively prevented from giving evidence, thus showing 
the Director did not believe any staff should cooperate with the inquiry. This 
refusal for such members of the local authorities to even meet with the inquiry 
team was presented as an undemocratic position and another way in which the 
government were failing the local black population. Ron Thomas, Secretary of 
the Bristol TUC and organiser of the inquiry, stated: ‘It will be a denial of what 
we expect in a democracy if the chiefs refuse to meet us.’104 This was perhaps 
just a sample of the lack of political participation awarded to those black people 
who had deemed ‘bargaining by riot’ a suitable response to such undemocratic 
denials. 
Despite not being able to attract the attentions of such authorities, the 
TUC inquiry hoped to obtain much evidence from the local community. Instead 
the Bristol Evening Post reported how St Pauls had given the inquiry ‘a massive 
cold shoulder’ and the response had been ‘virtually nil’.105 Only 50 people, 
around half of them black, provided oral evidence to the inquiry.106 The TUC 
believed that people had been discouraged by the intimidating formal 
atmosphere of the inquiry, but attempts to meet people in the relaxed 
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environment of their own homes had only been achieved a few times.107 
Mikardo argued the ensuing report would have been more comprehensive if 
more people had offered evidence, but that ‘they just feel an inquiry, whoever 
does it, is part of the establishment’.108 This is of course also true of the public 
inquiries which were being demanded, highlighting the dichotomous view of 
public inquiries emanating from local black communities. Partly due to not 
wishing to be included in party politics and partly this belief that anyone in a 
position of power would not be able or willing to help them, this clearly highlights 
the level of distrust and disillusionment some members of the local black 
community had with the British state. 
Regardless of the report not being as full as the organisers wished, it still 
managed to include numerous comments and recommendations seen as 
controversial. The main example was the blunt accusation, in the final 
paragraph of the final appendix, that ‘for whatever denials and assurances are 
made, it is clear that the police hold deep, racist views, which are expressed 
when they harass black people’.109 This charge was strongly denied by Bristol 
police and Assistant Chief Constable Walter Girven countered that no evidence 
was provided in support of such a claim.110 Relatedly the report additionally 
stated that the system of the police investigating complaints against themselves 
needed to be altered as a matter of urgency as it was ‘like the devil investigating 
sin’.111 Without a doubt, self-investigation of police complaints was seen as a 
form of self-protection and a lack of accountability to the general public. The 
report made sixty-four recommendations covering areas such as housing, 
education, and community relations, with some of the less controversial being 
improved co-operation between City and County Councils, and closer 
consultation with local residents through the establishment of a community 
liaison committee.112 The report was hoped to be, above all, a call for action, as 
characterised by Mikardo’s explanation for the choice of Slumbering Volcano? 
as title: ‘[Bristol] is a slumbering volcano and, if nobody does anything about it, it 
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will erupt again.’113 Throughout the months following 2 April numerous calls for 
a full public inquiry were made. Each time these were ignored by the authorities 
and the level of discontent towards the seemingly unaccountable police and 
state grew. 
TRIALS 
What the government did continue to focus on was prosecuting those 
involved and persons charged in connection with the disorder began to appear 
in Bristol Magistrates Court. Between April and the end of November over 130 
people were arrested, 90 of whom faced charges in court with the majority 
being minor offences which even included looting of toilet paper.114 Sixteen 
defendants, who even prosecution lawyers admitted had been selected 
somewhat arbitrarily, faced the more serious charge of riotous assembly. Of 
these, Magistrates allowed twelve to stand leading to trials and, of these twelve, 
eleven were black. Crispin Aubrey implied that the reason for the substitution of 
all twelve defendants’ previous lesser charges with the more severe riotous 
assembly was due to ‘considerable political pressure on the police to justify their 
retreat’.115 Similarly defence lawyer Rudi Narayan suggested that, due to 
immediate intense questioning throughout the country of why the disturbances 
occurred, the police arrested 126 people within 24 hours in order to be seen to 
be responding appropriately. He stated that ‘A script had to be written, actors 
found to perform it and possibly even a crucifixion arranged’.116 
The defendants’ committal proceedings on 16 June was met with a 
march from St Pauls to the Court to demonstrate against their arrest and 
charging. A police operation named ‘Operation Discord’ aimed to ensure that 
the court appearances occurred with the ‘minimum of disruption’, although the 
name of the operation alone was a sign that the police realised at least some 
discontentment would be demonstrated.117 Indeed there was; ‘Noisy 
disturbances’ erupted, during which £900 worth of damage was inflicted upon 
the court buildings, and police reinforcements were called to prevent 
                                                            
113 Hodges, ‘Inquiry Allocates Blame for St Paul’s “Volcano”’. 
114 Graham W. Reid, ‘Comments on the Crown Court St. Paul’s Trial’, Bristol Council for Racial 
Equality, Annual Report (Bristol, 1980) BRO 43129 (Box 105). For detailed discussion of the 
trial proceedings, see Joshua, Wallace and Booth, To Ride the Storm, pp. 148-84; Kettle and 
Hodges, Uprising!, pp. 34-8. 
115 Crispin Aubrey, ‘Trial Re-opens Old Wounds in Bristol’, New Statesman, 27 March 1981. 
116 ‘Riots Police Humiliated’, Bristol Evening Post, 13 March 1981. 
117 Avon and Somerset Constabulary, ‘Operational Discord’, Police Operational Order 16/80, 13 
June 1980, BRO Pol/IO/7/8. 
151 
 
disturbances in the street.118 The melee inside the courtroom included 
defendants and some members of the public, leading to David Royal being 
charged with obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty, whilst 
others were reprimanded and at least one person ordered from the public 
gallery.119 One of the defendants, Clinton Brown, later recalled demonstrations 
outside the court every time they appeared which included a violent clash with 
police in October 1980 after another defendant, Franklin Rapier, was 
imprisoned for contempt after branding it a ‘kangaroo court’.120  
Certain observers believed this was a sign of worse things to come and 
Gareth Peirce, representing six of the twelve defendants later tried for riotous 
assembly, wrote a strongly worded letter to Director of Public Prosecutions Sir 
Thomas Hetherington warning that such charges were ‘intensely speculative’ 
and would result in ‘extended trials’ worsening relations between the St Pauls 
community and authorities.121 Peirce was to later become a noted human rights 
solicitor addressing high profile miscarriages of justice, including the successful 
overturning of life sentences for the men charged with the murder of PC Keith 
Blakelock during disturbances at the Broadwater Farm area of North London on 
6 October 1985.122 Her actions could not prevent the accused from standing 
trial, which commenced on 3 February 1981. 
Another part of the reason for the lengthy interval before the beginning of 
the trials was jury selection. Graham Reid noted that, during the week prior to 
the St Pauls trail, there was not a single black juror amongst the 108 people 
sitting on juries in the Bristol Crown Courts.123 This under-representation was 
not a new phenomenon and previous research in Birmingham showed there 
should have been twelve to fifteen times more black people on juries than there 
actually was.124 The defence counsel thus exercised their right to reject jury 
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candidates in order to obtain an ‘accurate reflection of the local population’.125 
Out of a possible thirty-six rejections, three for each defendant, thirty-four 
potential jurors were vetoed on sight; these were mostly older white men, 
resulting in the eventual jury containing four non-white members.126 Lord 
Denning, Master of the Rolls, later remarked that the eventual collapse of the 
trial was due to the composition of the jury. Kettle and Hodges believed that it 
was a fair assessment, although the system had not been abused as Denning 
suggested, rather it was the first time Denning had observed skin colour being a 
factor in jury selection.127  
Whilst not abusing the system, the defence lawyers were clearly using it 
to reduce a level of perceived discrimination from jurors who would not 
understand or relate to the issues of black people in Bristol. This tactic had 
been previously attempted by Darcus Howe and Ian Macdonald in the trial of 
the ‘Mangrove Nine’ in 1971. After a demonstration against repeated police 
raids on the Mangrove restaurant and meeting-place of black radicals in north 
Kensington led to nine facing charges including conspiracy to incite a riot, they 
unsuccessfully argued that their right to be tried by a jury of peers meant an all-
black jury was required to fully understand the situation of those accused.128  
Another aspect which delayed proceedings was the time taken for police 
officers to write up the case before sending it to Hetherington; one local 
newspaper described the police file being eighteen inches high and containing 
over 600 pages of witness statements.129 The majority of evidence used in the 
trail was that of the police and Joshua et al. detailed a great number of 
inconsistencies that arose such as incorrectly dated or altered statements.130 
Within the broader context of police corruption throughout the period, this was a 
serious but not implausible allegation. The main criticism was of officers not 
bringing their notebooks into court, despite the events they were describing 
having occurred ten months previously and it being common practice to do so. 
Defence lawyers accused the police of ordering officers not to bring notebooks 
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so that their testimony could not be checked against written evidence, but this 
was repudiated by the police. The majority of statements were written after 
officers had been briefed by senior police, during discussion with other officers, 
and after seeing photographs and videos of the incident.131 Thus it was argued 
that the police had enough time to fabricate a consistent response.  
Largely as a consequence of this, it was alleged during the trials that 
there was a police attempt to frame one of the defendants Franklin Rapier, a 
local outspoken critic of the police. Considered a spokesman for the local 
community, Rapier had already had numerous violent exchanges with the police 
prior to 2 April.132 Detective Constable Bernard Mattock, present during the raid 
of the café, inserted an apparent personal sighting of Rapier leading a crowd 
into his testimony after its initial submission. During cross-examination Mattock 
agreed with Rudi Narayan, Rapier’s defence lawyer, that this sighting was an 
important part of his evidence which should have been originally included and 
not inserted later as an afterthought. Mattock deemed it an omission on his part 
which he had added in shortly afterwards, but defended his actions as he’d had 
a ‘very busy day’ and: ‘Quite frankly, I had a lot to put in that statement.’ He 
denied the specific charge that he had added this reported sighting after 
discussion with other police officers in a concerted attempt to discredit and 
frame Rapier.133 Likewise Police Sergeant Terence Crees was questioned at 
length about his statement which had been completed in two sessions on 2 and 
6 April. Narayan similarly accused Crees of having changed his statement after 
discussions with fellow officers and alleged that, by 6 April, Crees: ‘had to write 
a script of the police line’. Crees denied this charge completely and argued that 
only his other police duties had stopped him from finishing his statement in a 
single session.134 Clearly the attempt to discredit the police’s testimony was a 
defence tactic, as other officers were similarly accused of perjury.135 That the 
idea of police dishonesty was so widely prevalent within the local community 
shows why this was chosen as an avenue for questioning for the defence, as 
well as suggesting further explanation for the anti-police violence in the first 
place. 
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Rapier definitely believed, or at least attempted to convince the jury, that 
he was victim of a ‘frame up’ by the nineteen officers giving evidence against 
him.136 Narayan claimed Rapier had been accused ‘by at least 29,000 police 
officers of tearing down St Paul’s single handedly on April 2’; this clearly 
hyperbolic figure apparently only a ‘slight exaggeration’.137 Reportedly wiping 
tears from his eyes during his testimony, Rapier stated: ‘I knew nothing about a 
riot. I did not take part in it. I had no reason to riot against anybody.’138 However 
this is directly contradicted by the recent memories of fellow defendant Clinton 
Brown who had been with Rapier that day and stated, after hearing of the raid, 
they ‘stood outside the cafe with bottles and said nobody is getting out’. Brown 
laughed when remembering Rapier’s emotional outburst during his testimony, 
describing them as ‘crocodile tears’.139 Whether Rapier honestly believed it was 
a ‘frame up’ or not is known only by him, but is also largely immaterial. The 
relevant point is that there was clearly the widespread belief amongst the St 
Pauls community that this was something that the police would do in order to 
defend themselves and persecute their vocal critics. 
After six weeks and an estimated £500,000, incidentally the same cost 
as the riot damage, the trial collapsed after five defendants were acquitted and 
the jury was deadlocked on most of the remainder.140 The main criticisms 
directed toward the trial were that it had been a waste of time and money, as 
well as preventing race relations from improving: ‘Half a million pounds of 
taxpayers’ money has gone down the drain without a single conviction’.141 
Defence counsel Edward Rees suggested that the cost of the trial could have 
been put to better use and partisan publication Caribbean Times claimed that 
more money was spent on this ‘Trial of Vengeance’ than had been invested in 
St Pauls over twenty-five years.142 Peter Courtier described the trial as ‘farcical’, 
claimed several policemen believed it had been a mistake to prosecute, and 
reasoned that it had exacerbated poor relations between the police and black 
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youth in the St Pauls area.143 He concluded that a ‘golden opportunity’ to 
improve St Pauls had been lost as any positive consequences had been 
hindered by unjustified trails as ‘even the police admit they lost control’.144 A 
BCRE Press Release immediately after the disturbances had supported 
demands that all charges be dropped and the police cease any further arrests 
relating to the event, labelling it ‘yet another attempt to criminalize the Black 
Community’.145 The continued focus upon law and order aspects of the 
disturbances at the seeming detriment of race relations was consistent with the 
state’s broader response. Similarly Reid concluded that the words used to deny 
the local community a public inquiry, ‘A great circus…which would have wasted 
time and probably not have clarified very much’, was in fact an appropriate 
description of the trial.146 Narayan claimed that there was a sufficient base for 
an investigation into how the ‘shabby prosecution’ had been mounted upon 
‘shabby evidence’ and Joshua et al. later agreed that the trial was based upon 
‘what seems to be appallingly flawed evidence’.147  
Weigh stated he was happy the case had been appropriately brought 
before the court and all evidence properly given.148 There had been discussion 
prior to the commencement of the trials that charges of affray would have been 
less problematic and easier to prove due to evidence of direct involvement in 
fighting. An unnamed detective, present at the raid and gave evidence during 
the trial, later told the Bristol Evening Post that it had been ‘a huge waste of 
money’ that would have had more chance of succeeding if charges such as 
criminal damage or public disorder had been pursued rather than riotous 
assembly: ‘I think they were too heavy, the charges. But hindsight is a 
wonderful thing.’149 Similarly, Kettle and Hodges concluded that this had 
probably been the key factor in the collapse of the trial, as did some 
contemporary commentators with The Daily Telegraph asking: ‘is not the idea of 
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“riotous assembly”…a recipe for hung juries?’150 The authorities’ belief that 
events were a ‘direct and deliberate challenge to police authority by a large 
number of people acting together’ resulted in the certainty that riot was the 
correct charge.151  
Joshua et al. studied in detail the definitions of what constitutes a ‘riot’ in 
legal terms, highlighting defence lawyers who argued that, by these definitions, 
it had been the police who had ‘acted together’ and ‘shared a common 
purpose’, not the crowd – although this argument was inadmissible in a court 
environment ‘in which the dice are heavily loaded’ in the police’s favour.152 The 
belief that the police were favoured in the court of law further built upon ideas 
that every part of the British law and order system would support the police over 
a member of the local black community. Hetherington argued: ‘…we thought 
that the evidence was good enough to get a conviction for riot and we thought it 
was in the public interest to prosecute as hard as we could those who in our 
view had been responsible’.153 This unambiguously shows where the authorities 
wished blame to be attributed and that their belief that such trials were in the 
public interest did not extent to answering public calls for an independent 
inquiry.154  
As previously mentioned, part of Rapier’s defence had been allegations 
that some police had been guilty of perjury in their submitted evidence. 
However the judge, Justice Stocker, refused to submit details of the case to 
Hetherington to examine this accusation as he made clear that ‘this has not 
been an investigation of police practice’, before commending the ‘perfectly plain’ 
fact that officers had acted ‘with great courage and gallantry in very difficult and 
dangerous circumstances’.155 Police behaviour and broader racial issues were 
not part of the legal debate in the Bristol courts, regardless of sections of 
society wishing that they had been. This mirrors later examples, where inquiries 
that were carried out into subsequent events the following year largely ignored 
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the numerous accusations of police misconduct as they were deemed 
inappropriate arenas for investigation of such allegations.  
Despite his refusal to advance such accusations, much praise was 
bestowed upon the way that Stocker handled and did not inflame the ‘potentially 
volatile’ situation. He approached the trial in a manner unbefitting the usual 
formalness of the legal system, tolerating accused individuals regularly arriving 
late at court, reading newspapers and completing crossword puzzles whilst in 
the dock, and one defendant even apparently fell asleep. As The Guardian 
highlighted, there appeared a conspicuous determined effort by the judge to 
avoid the repeat of any further disturbances similar to those seen at the 
committal proceedings.156 This did not appear to transfer to other courts 
officials’ attitudes towards members of the public attending the trials who 
regularly faced locked doors, discouraging comments, and a lack of space: ‘It 
required no little determination to enter the public gallery’.157 This was a very apt 
visual representation of how members of the local black community felt that 
they were being systematically excluded from the British legal system. 
As the final verdicts were announced, Rapier allegedly sprung to his feet 
and thanked the jury, only to be told by Stocker to be quiet.158 The jury foreman 
asked to say something, but was told by Stocker: ‘It would be better if you 
didn’t.’159 What exactly was to be said is unclear, but what is obvious is the care 
Stocker took to prevent anything being vocalised which might further escalate 
tensions. A crowd of several hundred people stopped traffic as they gathered on 
the street outside the courtroom to celebrate.160 Some jurors, both black and 
white, were seen shaking hands with the freshly acquitted defendants and The 
Sun reported that ‘Three of the jurors joined in the celebrations’ in a clear 
accusation that jurors were too close with the defendants and clearly happy with 
the result they had themselves produced.161 This accusation in fact may not 
have been far from the truth, as Clinton Brown later admitted that at least three 
of the four black jurors were known by some of the defendants, two lived in St 
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Pauls at the time, and that himself and Rapier had even followed two female 
jurors from the court to discuss the case: ‘Some of them we knew all right, but 
we never said…I was looking at between three and seven years in prison’.162 
One of the drug squad officers who gave evidence at the trial was ‘not at all 
surprised’ to later discover the two defendants had discussed the case with 
jurors: ‘They weren’t stupid people. I didn’t suspect anything at the time 
though.’163  
Those involved may argue that such measures were required to avoid a 
discriminatory trial, but it is just another example alongside the disturbances 
themselves how some in the black population felt it necessary to move outside 
of the British system of law and order to further their own situation. Following 
post-trial celebrations, the crowd soon relocated to the Black and White Café 
itself, where champagne revelries continued. This symbolic action showed 
again that the disturbance was centred around this small café that came to 
represent the struggle of a local black community against perceived oppression. 
A plan quickly emerged for a large street party to mark the anniversary of St 
Pauls, described by Rapier as a ‘freedom day’ and that ‘Every decent citizen of 
any colour should be there’.164 Clearly showing the sense of victory for the local 
community, defence barrister Sibghat Kadri noted that ‘What happened here is 
something people should be proud of’.165 Chairman of the Avon and Somerset 
Police Authority Ian Crawford however was ‘appalled’ at the suggestion, 
warning that racial hatred in Bristol could be incited by celebrations of ‘an 
incident most Bristolians are ashamed of’.166 It was clear that, despite the 
defendants being found not guilty during the trial, they had already been 
condemned by some in society. It was suggested the party’s date should be 
changed to make it clear that it was a celebration of the acquittals not the riot, 
but this was rejected. Such specific actions show the pride of a successful local 
rebellion against a perceived oppressive police force. In the end a ‘loud but 
                                                            
162 ‘My 30-year Secret: Defendants Knew at Least Three Jurors in St Paul’s Riot Trial of 1981’, 
Bristol Evening Post, 27 April 2011. 
163 ‘We Should Have Tried St Paul's Riot Suspects on Lesser Charges, Says Ex-detective’. 
164 Ian Williams, ‘St Paul’s Plan for Big Party’, Bristol Evening Post, 21 March 1981. 
165 Kettle and Hodges, Uprising!, p. 38. 
166 Sarah Mitchell, ‘Riot Party Plan Under Fire’, Western Daily Press, 23 March 1981. 
159 
 
uneventful party’, from which the police kept a low profile, on 2 April 1981 
passed without incident.167 
Following the Judge’s ending of the trial, considerable pressure was 
exhorted by the local community and MPs that remaining charges should be 
dropped on the four defendants. MPs Palmer and Waldegrave met with the 
Attorney-General to stress the benefits that such action would have on relations 
in St Pauls.168 BCRE Senior Community Relations Officer Carmen Beckford 
agreed and informed the Attorney-General that the trials had made it more 
difficult to improve relations and ‘it is now best to forget the past and work for a 
better future for all’.169 Indeed that is the view Hetherington subscribed to as, 
when announcing that all remaining charges would be dropped, he cited an 
important factor in this decision was advice provided by Weigh that doing so 
would promote racial harmony in Bristol.170  
This announcement was criticised by many who believed it was a 
worrying development that racial harmony had been cited as a reason to not 
proceed with re-trials. Right-leaning newspapers argued there ‘cannot be a 
trade-off’ between racial harmony and justice, and ‘The law is there to protect 
the innocent. It is not there to promote other ideals, however desirable. For to 
do so is to dabble in politics.’171 They argued that to create such a precedent 
would allow the situation where ‘if a white man hits a police man you charge 
him; if a black man does the same you don’t’.172 Conservative MP John Carlisle 
added that this possibility, rather than promote racial harmony, may even 
‘antagonise some people against ethnic minorities’ and that ‘The coloured 
population may use this as a protection or shield’.173 Just five days following 
Hetherington’s declaration that all remaining charges would be dropped the 
Brixton area of London erupted into violence, causing many to return to this 
accusation that a lack of punishment had emboldened others to conduct similar 
disturbances.174 It is difficult to argue wholly against such a suggestion, 
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especially considering the way that disturbances spread around England in 
1981 as discussed later. 
SPREAD OF IDEAS 
Relatedly, one aspect of the disturbances commonly not discussed in 
detail is how ideas and news of the disturbance spread throughout and beyond 
the St Pauls community. One of the most significant factors was the constant 
influence of American examples providing inspiration and stimuli: 
Our history shows us that the dominant community will give us no 
concessions unless we fight. It happened some years ago in cities in the 
United States and seems to have done them some good. We have no 
jobs, no equality of opportunity and if burning a few banks pushes us 
along the road, then so be it.175 
This is a clear sign that collective violence was seen as a method of ‘bargaining 
by riot’ to improve the situation of black people within society. St Pauls erupted 
during a period of high tension due to a planned trip by some locals to London 
the following day, proposing to protest police harassment in the wake of a local 
youth’s court appearance after a London ‘sus’ arrest.176 As Brain summarised, 
‘cross-current transmission of ideas between the Bristol and London Afro-
Caribbean communities was possible, indeed likely’.177 During the actual 
disturbance, Paul Stephenson noted that, as it was the beginning of the Easter 
half-term holiday, many black youths witnessed the raid and disseminated the 
situation quickly around the community.178 Furthermore several people who had 
initially been inside the café were allowed to leave, also taking news of the 
police action with them.179 This was significant in spreading news of the events 
quickly enough for more people to arrive whilst the police were still present and 
for tensions to increase with numbers. 
The Avon and Somerset Constabulary log of events contain many 
references to how the disturbance spread to affect other areas of the country. 
Weigh recorded that the disorders placed a great deal of strain upon the 
Constabulary and consequently he had needed to reinforce the Trinity Road 
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Sub-Division of the ‘A’ Division, which covered St Pauls, with a number of 
officers from other territorial Divisions.180 He also thanked nearby Police Forces 
for their immediate response to appeals for numerical support, as personnel 
from other Forces either entered Bristol or remained on standby at Cheltenham, 
Leigh Delamare, and Exeter.181 As discussed previously, the use of officers 
unfamiliar with the local community undoubtedly added to tensions in a way that 
local community officers likely would not. A telephone call from London even 
offered the assistance of a group of citizen volunteers to travel to Bristol and aid 
the police in regaining control of the area. Whilst this offer was acknowledged 
but declined, the caller promised he would try again later to see if they had 
changed their minds. The national importance of this disturbance was 
highlighted when a representative from the Home Office telephoned to request 
an update some six hours into events and requested to be kept up to date 
‘should any major developments take place before midnight’.182 
It was not just the police that were recorded to be moving around the 
country in relation to the evening’s disturbances. An emergency telephone call 
to the police after their return claimed that black people were threatening to get 
guns from Birmingham, Coventry, and London which would be at Bristol by 
3am. Similarly a police confidential informant stated they had heard that 
coachloads of black people were coming from Birmingham, armed ‘to kill the 
Policemen’. A request was thus sent for any coaches heading to Bristol on the 
M5 motorway to be stopped and searched. This was discontinued around 2am, 
but information received at approximately 3.30am that more than 25 vehicles 
had been ‘commandeered’ carrying over 100 black people ‘heading for Bristol’ 
resulted in the motorway stop checks being immediately reinstated.183 Whilst 
high levels of rumour characterised all the disorders discussed it appeared, or 
at least it was believed, that events were quickly spreading nationwide. 
Similarly reporters were quickly aware of the situation and telephone 
calls requesting information were logged from The Times, BBC News London 
and London’s Evening Standard.184 Councillor Bob Wall noted the prominence 
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awarded to the events even in American news bulletins, the BCRE recorded 
that at least one day was taken up giving interviews to Dutch and Swedish 
television reporters, and Narayan concluded that ‘Newspapers, television, the 
radio and politicians all descended, figuratively speaking, on St Paul’s.’185 
Despite this often welcome press coverage, it was also blamed for 
misrepresenting Bristol. Councillor Trench criticised the distortion of the media 
reportage of the events and the damaging effect it could have upon the city’s 
economy; further showing where priorities lay.186 Certainly the satirical 
treatment of St Pauls by television comedy Not the Nine O’Clock News did not 
paint the city’s police in a positive light.187  
The media are often at the forefront of disseminating ideas, especially 
during such action as rebellion and protest, and their involvement was widely 
discussed throughout events in 1980-81. Modern-day ‘Twitter Revolutions’ of 
Moldova, Iran, Tunisia, and Egypt all show how influential social media has 
become, but that is not to say that such ideas of rebellion did not or could not 
spread before the age of updating social media at our fingertips.188 Ruud 
Koopmans argued that instances of collective action are not independent and 
occur within broader protest cycles or waves.189 Events in St Pauls can be 
placed within such a framework as American examples influenced the action 
and Bristol itself provoked an attempt from British authorities to quickly regain 
the apparent loss of power whilst simultaneously serving as an example around 
the country. Fryer argued that it taught black youth around the country that they 
could tactically defeat the police.190 The police appeared aware; Diane Abbott, 
later Labour MP, suggested that, ‘in a novel exercise in community relations’, 
the Metropolitan Police had summoned ‘key black activists’ to warn them 
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against replicating the Bristol example.191 In Lewisham later in April black 
youths were heard to be chanting ‘Bristol, Bristol, Bristol’ at local police, and 
graffiti within South London correctly predicted ‘Bristol now, Brixton next?’ and 
later ‘Bristol yesterday, Brixton today’.192 Ideas were also spread simply by the 
movement of people; for example, as mentioned previously, coachloads of St 
Pauls’ residents travelled to London en masse to lobby MPs for an inquiry.193 
Regardless of how the information was relayed, it is undeniable that events in 
St Pauls reverberated around the country. Before the disturbance only those 
involved at a local level expressed concerns about the issues faced in the area 
and were largely ignored; ‘But after the violence the district’s name was on 
everyone’s lips.’194 
Part of this discussion following St Pauls often concentrated on how such 
an occurrence may reappear in other similar areas around the country. 
Waldegrave immediately placed St Pauls into a wider context when stating the 
Metropolitan Police periodically faced similar issues in London.195 Bill Nicks 
argued it would be a mistake to believe the violence of St Pauls would not be 
repeated elsewhere, clearly showing how local challenges were part of the 
broader perception of racial discrimination.196 Ray Wardle, Liberal candidate for 
Bath County Council, clearly demonstrated this feeling: ‘We too have a Black 
and White Café’ with the potential for violence, as did ‘every inner-city area 
where Black and White youths are trying to live peacefully together’.197 Similar 
conditions in other English cities such as Liverpool, Manchester, and London – 
locations where disorder would spread the following year – were highlighted as 
possible locations for reappearances of violence and thus ‘urgent action’ was 
needed to avoid it.198 Therefore organisations concerned with racial issues from 
other areas such as Scunthorpe and London supported Bristol’s calls for a 
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public inquiry so that reports and lessons could ‘be acted upon in other parts of 
the country’.199 However such an inquiry was not forthcoming and lessons were 
not learned by authorities. Violence would spread to numerous cities the 
following year due to rising tensions at another apparent failure from the state to 
respond appropriately to an obvious issue raised by members of the black 
population. As St Pauls defendant Clinton Brown later recollected: ‘In court I 
told the police “if you don’t stop this England will burn”, and it did burn.’200 
Despite this wide dissemination, the first similar disturbance after St 
Pauls occurred within a few miles when two days of disorder began in 
Southmead the following day. Roger Ball recently detailed this disturbance 
which went, in his words, ‘unnoticed and, more significantly, unheeded into 
obscurity’.201 After a relatively minor incident on 3 April, the following night saw 
an increased police presence reacting against the perceived police ‘defeat’ in St 
Pauls and, consequently, increased violence.202 The subsequent police report 
detailed that around 200 youths smashed shop windows and threw stones at 
police who attended the scene, with 31 people being arrested. Several plastic 
bags were found containing ‘milk bottles filled with petrol with rag fuses 
attached’, which police believed to have been undoubtedly planned to be 
thrown at officers.203  
Local MP Michael Colvin believed that such disorder the day after St 
Pauls ‘was more than coincidence’, and the later court trial of youths charged 
with disorderly conduct was told it had been ‘an attempt to imitate the St Paul’s 
riots’.204 Colvin requested that Whitelaw should ensure that the Southmead 
disturbance did not get overlooked by inquiries which he feared may focus 
purely on St Pauls. Whitelaw responded it was down to the inquiries themselves 
to determine what to include, so Colvin therefore requested that the City Council 
include his constituency in their joint venture with the County Council.205 The 
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City Clerk assured him that representatives of both City and County Councils 
acknowledged that ‘their considerations could not exclusively be focussed upon 
St. Pauls’ and other areas needed to be considered.206  
Events in Southmead did appear to be overlooked to a great extent, 
despite Ball explaining that it contained the ‘classic’ disturbance elements of 
growth, peak, and decline which characterised most of the subsequent 
disturbances the following year.207 Ball suggested that the ‘potent brew’ of word 
of mouth combined with mass media reports of the ‘successful uprising’ in St 
Pauls imbued the youth of Southmead with sufficient confidence to undertake 
such actions.208 He also highlighted the Avon County Council’s controversial 
late 1970s policy of transporting youths from St Pauls to secondary schools 
throughout other areas of Bristol, including two schools in Southmead, with the 
‘inadvertent consequence’ of being the creation of direct social links between 
youth of St Pauls and Southmead.209 Utilising J. Przybysz and D. Myers’ 
definitions of ‘copycat’ and ‘contagion’ ideas in the spread of disorder, he 
argued that Southmead was not purely the ‘copycat’ result of an unconscious 
reaction to media coverage, instead a rational and evaluative decision-making 
process which had been influenced by ‘contagions’ spread from St Pauls to 
Southmead via a social network of peer relationships, education, family links, 
and others.210 They believed in the possibility of a similarly positive outcome for 
conducting their own versions of the collective violence against police 
persecution in St Pauls. This would be the pattern for disorder to spread around 
the country the following year as other black communities in Britain attempted to 
obtain increased resources and attention as well as furthering levels of political 
participation. 
CONCLUSION 
 Following the events of 2 April, the reaction from the government was not 
sufficient to appease those calling for a public inquiry and Whitelaw’s ‘three-
pronged response’ was not what the local community envisioned as a response. 
As the CRE-backed inquiry into employment and inequality summarised: ‘Five 
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months on from ‘riots’ that supposedly shook the nation, those who most need 
shaking, those responsible for and empowered with providing social resources 
for black people, have managed to avoid significant commitment to the 
expressed wishes of the people themselves.’211 Therefore local interested 
organisations took it upon themselves to conduct such inquiries, clearly 
attempting to participate in a democratic process which had been denied to the 
local black community. These had differing levels of support and success, but 
ultimately could not alter the views of the government that a public inquiry was 
unnecessary and who instead focussed upon the criminality aspects of the 
disturbances. 
Despite the perceived lack of a meaningful response from central 
government and related intense criticism, local authorities and police appeared 
to learn some lessons. The St Pauls annual festival in July 1980 passed without 
incident, attributed by some to the deliberate police tactic to not appear 
prominently. Those police that were present were praised for their attempts to 
‘go out of their way to join in the festive spirit’.212 This tactic was repeated in 
1981 as, whilst violence spread around the country, more than 15,000 people 
attended the festival climax and witnessed local constables joining in with the 
dancing, being similarly praised for their ‘superb’ efforts to enter into the spirit of 
the festival.213 This altered police approach could go some way to explaining 
why Bristol, this time, remained peaceful. However St Pauls had provided an 
example to many black youths around the country that the police could be 
combatted, and the lack of effective response and inquiry into the disorder 
further increased the discontentment of sections of the black community who 
were increasingly willing to engage in collective violence. This would result in 
violent outbursts spreading around the country in 1981, beginning with Brixton 
almost exactly one year after St Pauls. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ESCALATION: BRIXTON, 10-12 APRIL 1981 
 
Despite the various warnings of growing tensions and frustration, the 
police and government did little to change their tactics and attitudes. Repeatedly 
ignoring calls for a public inquiry into events in Bristol, it appeared the general 
feeling was that the worst was over and, as John Benyon and John Solomos 
stated, the establishment appeared to view the violent disturbance as ‘a strange 
aberration in social behaviour’ that would not be repeated. In Brixton in April 
1981, almost exactly one year after the similar shock of St Pauls, such 
‘complacent interpretations were rudely shattered’.1 As Home Secretary William 
Whitelaw later summarised in his autobiography, ‘The St Paul’s district of Bristol 
was known to be a difficult area from a policing point of view. But this very fact 
meant that we in the Home Office, and indeed in the police service as a whole, 
failed to recognize this disturbance for the warning signal of danger which it 
turned out to be.’2 This view had not been shared by all. A poll in Brixton a few 
days after the Bristol disturbances showed that 70 percent of respondents had 
little or no confidence in the police, with two-thirds deeming it likely such 
violence would be repeated.3  
Utilising recently released government records, this chapter and the next 
addresses some of the gaps and discrepancies between what was submitted as 
evidence to the Scarman Inquiry, and what was published in his final report. 
These include transcripts of police radio messages, police statements, and 
individual contributions submitted to the inquiry. These documents were closed 
to public view until at least 2005, with the majority inaccessible until 2012.4 As 
such, they have not undergone rigorous examination by historians. The radio 
messages potentially offer an exciting insight into immediate police strategies 
and attitudes, but, as is shown, it was not forgotten by police that such 
messages would be recorded. The numerous interviews with officers present 
                                                     
1 John Benyon and John Solomos, ‘British Urban Unrest in the 1980s’, in John Benyon and 
John Solomos (eds.), The Roots of Urban Unrest (Oxford, 1987) p. 3. 
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during the disturbances were supplied to Lord Scarman in order to reconstruct a 
picture of events for his inquiry and, as such, most likely contain self-censored 
versions of events in order for officers to not incriminate themselves. However, 
careful study of them also allows an insight into the personal views of the police 
on the street and their beliefs regarding their role and responsibilities. In the 
same vein, individual contributions and witness reports sent to the inquiry must 
also be treated with a similar healthy scepticism, acknowledging the possible 
personal or political motives of submitting such testimony. 
NEW CROSS FIRE 
In the period between the St Pauls and Brixton disturbances another 
event occurred which furthered the belief of many within the black community 
that the police and government simply did not care about them; a house fire in 
New Cross, south-east London on 18 January 1981 claimed the lives of thirteen 
black youths. The police were accused of not treating the event with the same 
response that would have greeted deaths of white youths or seriously 
investigating claims that it had been an act of arson. Other black homes had 
been attacked in the area, a black community centre had been burnt down, and 
‘the entire community, not just the anguished parents, were convinced that the 
fire had been started by fascists’.5 The event had initially been reported as 
having been a fire-bomb and, although subsequent forensic evidence did not 
support such a theory, this belief permeated the local community.6  
David J. Smith and Jeremy Gray observed the police investigation and, 
whilst concluding the police were ‘probably right’ that the fire had been started 
by a house guest rather than a racist attack, they criticised the poorly handled 
police investigation. These criticisms included the unfounded police belief that 
black people would not cooperate with their investigation subsequently affecting 
their inquiries, failure to convince the local community they were investigating 
the possibility it was a racist attack, and failure to alleviate the community’s 
fears that they were under attack.7 Whilst the police firmly denied accusations of 
a cover-up or neglecting their duty to investigate thoroughly, the Sunday Times 
detailed that this no longer mattered: 
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Even if the cause of the Deptford fire in which 13 young blacks died last 
January is finally established, the proof will almost certainly come too 
late. Mutual suspicion between blacks and police is now so great that 
many people in the area will simply not believe the outcome of the 
investigation.8 
The perceived police indifference to the event led to the organisation, by the 
New Cross Massacre Action Committee as well as others such as Darcus 
Howe, of the Black People’s Day of Action on 2 March 1981 which saw a 
protest march attended by an estimated 6-15,000 people.9 Howe had been a 
prominent member of the British Black Panthers, first coming to national 
attention in 1970 as one of the ‘Mangrove Nine’. Starting in 1982, Howe was to 
become a well-known broadcaster investigating issues of race and it is likely 
that events in 1981 allowed such a media career to flourish. 10  His 
transformation from being viewed as a Black Power terrorist in the 1970s to a 
respected commentator by the mid-1980s suggests that the events discussed in 
this thesis allowed him a platform in a way black people had been previously 
denied; however it also lead people such as Kalbir Shukra to claim that radical 
black politics in Britain perished when former black radicals themselves drew 
closer to, and became representatives of, the state.11 
Further demonstrating a movement towards self-organisation and desire 
for political participation, the response to the house fire also demonstrated a 
collective consciousness from many within the black community: 
…a sense of solidarity with all other people belonging to the same ethnic 
group and a collective perception of threats to themselves from various 
forces in society, symbolised most strongly by the threat that they feel is 
posed to them by the police…it was a collective political response to 
events which were remote from the personal lives of many of the people 
taking part. People came from as far afield as Manchester and Leeds to 
take part in the Black People’s Day of Action about an event about which 
there was very little information as to what had really occurred.12 
Martin Kettle and Lucy Hodges argued that this response confirmed the fact that 
black people had become willing to protest their situation and perceived neglect 
from the British authorities: ‘This and the Bristol riot of 1980 were clear signs 
                                                     
8 Sunday Times, as cited in McNee, McNee’s Law, pp. 126-7. 
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that new levels of black resistance had at long last emerged.’13 Playwright and 
actor Kwame Kwei-Armah described the action as a ‘formative moment’, and 
even Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir David McNee, concluded 
that the event ‘brought about a change of mood and a sense of unity within the 
black community not previously seen’.14 Increasing desires for improved political 
participation and willingness and ability to organise and participate in protest 
and collective violence towards a common goal would be seen throughout the 
resulting disturbances and can be viewed within a broader political strategy. 
BRIXTON 
When examining the situation in Brixton prior to 1981, it is little wonder 
that it became the epicentre of the next violent outburst. As Scarman stated, 
Brixton exhibited ‘many of the features of other decaying inner city areas’ 
including poor local facilities, particularly in housing, leisure, and recreation 
facilities.15 A disproportionately high number of young people faced a lack of 
employment opportunities, and the unemployment rate for black males under 
nineteen was fifty-five percent. 16  Scarman noted how this, combined with 
prevalent racial discrimination, resulted in widespread discontentment in 
Brixton.17 Discrimination within education was blamed for many of the problems, 
seemingly not sufficiently preparing and educating local black youths to an 
acceptable level for gainful employment. Scarman quoted the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs report on Racial Disadvantage, 
conducted following events in St Pauls, which stated that ‘it has long been 
evident that we have not got ethnic minority education right’.18 This thus raises 
the question, if Brixton was in many ways typical in its conditions, why did it 
become the epicentre for disorder in 1981? As examined below, provocative 
police tactics and actions specific to Brixton were to spark unrest. 
Scarman also highlighted it was ‘regrettably also true’ that conditions 
within Brixton attracted some to a life of crime, particularly robbery, car theft, 
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and pick-pocketing offences.19 Not all observers agreed that unemployment and 
other social issues were linked with rising crime figures; perhaps unsurprisingly, 
those on the right did not accept such a link. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
particularly rejected this argument because, not least undermining the economic 
policies of her Government, it would also ‘suggest that individuals do not 
possess ultimate responsibility for their behaviour’, contrary to the individualism 
that was a main tenant of Thatcherism.20 However, as Timothy Brain pointed 
out, it appeared that Thatcher accepted that there was a link between crime, 
disorder, and unemployment when she appointed Michael Heseltine as ‘Minister 
for Liverpool’ with the job of restoring the city’s prosperity following its own 
disturbances in July 1981.21 
As discussed previously violent crime and robberies had increased by 
138 percent in recent years within Brixton, with police figures suggesting that 
black people ‘were disproportionately involved’.22 This led to an increased use 
of tactics such as ‘sus’ and stop and searches, often targeted against black 
people. Peter Bleksley, a Metropolitan police officer aged twenty-one in 1981, 
claimed that the ‘sus’ law was used by the police ‘to our ends to basically “fit up” 
and brutalise people that we didn’t like’. 23  Whether such accusations are 
accurate, many have noted the detrimental effect of ‘sus’ on police and 
community relations; but it was not the only policy causing discontentment.24 
1,469 people, both black and white, were arrested under the ‘sus’ law 
throughout London in 1980, equivalent to only one third of the police stops of 
black people in the Brixton division alone.25 As Zig Layton-Henry summarised, 
‘The police had to cope with a rising level of crime in Brixton and to retain the 
confidence of all sections of the community.’26 This, as will be seen, was an 
extremely difficult task made more difficult by inherent prejudices and racial 
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discrimination. Bleksley stated that: ‘Racism was compulsory in the police. It 
wasn’t institutionalised, if you weren’t a racist, you weren’t going to get on.’27 
Whilst there is no evidence to support the claim that racist attitudes were a 
requirement for a police career, it is certainly true that racism permeated all 
areas of British society at some level and this appeared to be no different within 
the police. 
POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
Further to increased and disproportionate use of ‘sus’ and stop and 
search, there were also circumstances specific to Brixton which caused 
discontentment. Brixton had a history of troubled relations between police and 
the black community, with Fryer detailing how Brixton police allegedly termed 
various operations ‘nigger-hunting’, and a report to the West Indian Standing 
Conference on Police Brutality subsequently concluded: ‘it has been confirmed 
from reliable sources that sergeants and constables do leave stations with the 
express purpose of going nigger hunting’28 Whether or not this was an actual 
term used by the police, the widespread belief that it was being used obviously 
had negative effects on relations between black people and the police.  
In response to the police’s description of black people being 
disproportionately involved in crime, Kettle and Hodges stated that figures 
supplied to the Scarman Inquiry regarding Lambeth suggested that black 
people were stopped disproportionately to their overall numbers and, once 
stopped, were more likely to be arrested than whites.29 They continued that it 
was ‘strange’ that Scarman’s inquiry subsequently ‘failed to investigate the 
matter further when it had the opportunity of doing so’. 30  Mike and Trevor 
Phillips quoted Wayne Haynes, a survivor of the 1981 New Cross Fire, when 
describing his experience with the police: 
At that time, you had the sus law going on, and they could do whatever 
they want, basically, and they did…And if they didn’t like your face, if 
your face didn’t fit, or you was a bit too lippy, as most black kids are, 
you’d get a little kicking. Maybe then you’d get taken down the cell and 
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get a good kicking, which quite a few of us did as well, for nothing. And 
that’s just how it was.31 
Conversely it was argued that the reaction that the police received in Brixton on 
a daily basis led to a hardening of their opinion: ‘I have seen the most liberal 
and left wing people come down here and within months completely change 
their attitudes. The hatred on the streets is so awful that you have to conform to 
the views of the rest of the group to survive.’32 A worsening cycle of animosity 
between the police and local community was constantly growing and, within this 
context, it was likely only a matter of time until tensions erupted into violent 
confrontation. 
COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS 
Running parallel to issues of relations with the police, there was a history 
of community organisations attempting to improve the situation for black people 
in Brixton. Devon Thomas, local activist and Lambeth Council worker, in a view 
mirrored by many commentators, detailed that it was second generation 
immigrants who formed such organisations to help support and defend 
themselves against the racist pressures they were being put under.33 Materials 
submitted to the Scarman Inquiry from the Council for Community Relations in 
Lambeth (CCRL) outlined various issues since its formation in 1970 which 
caused tensions to increase in Lambeth.34 One particularly illuminating example 
was a meeting of the National Front (NF) in Loughborough School in Brixton. 
Police figures reported that 1,500 police were present at a cost of £115,000, 
and their actions were perceived as defending and supporting the NF. 
Exacerbating the situation, the police arrested 6 black youths leaving the 
counter demonstration under ‘sus’ laws.35  
Another case in point was detailed that in 1976 the police had knocked a 
young pregnant woman to the ground whilst questioning a middle-aged black 
man about groceries he was carrying home. As George Greaves, Principal 
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Community Relations Officer for the CCRL detailed: ‘So intense was the anger 
generated in those who witnessed the incident that they marched as a body to 
Brixton Police Station to complain, and it was a spontaneous demonstration 
without any prompting from community leaders or community activists.’36 He 
stated the significance of this, that black youths were ‘no longer prepared to rely 
on intermediaries to win for them the justice which they felt was being denied to 
them’, was not lost on those familiar with the area.37 It did appear lost on those 
in positions of authority.  
Black youths were more willing to personally organise and protest 
perceived prejudices, an observation of obvious importance amongst discussion 
regarding disorders. The CCRL was just one of many organisations which had 
emerged in the area due to poor relations between the police and black 
community. Another organisation, established to defend respected and devout 
churchman Joshua Francis imprisoned for assaulting police when in fact he had 
been badly beaten by officers, was described by Harry Gouldbourne as a 
‘watershed moment’ which showed it was not just black youths who could suffer 
such a fate: ‘If a person such as he was not safe from the police, then who in 
the black community was safe from the long arm of injustice, which had the 
sanction of the state's legal instruments.’38 
As for the police, Brain detailed how successive police commanders 
undertook many of the methods outlined by Chief Constable of Devon and 
Cornwall, John Alderson. 39  Alderson was a strong proponent of community 
policing, including using home beat officers and forging strong links with the 
local community. Chief Constable of Merseyside Kenneth Oxford argued that 
community policing had received multiple definitions and should not be seen as 
‘the panacea for all problems with which we are faced’, and that similar 
approaches had been employed in all British police forces over many years.40 
Similarly Paul Gilroy reasoned that evidence which showed Devon and 
Cornwall police also utilised the same ‘fire-brigade’ policing tactics as 
elsewhere, ‘makes nonsense of the view of community policing as a miraculous 
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cure-all for urban ailments’.41 Despite this, a study by S. Jones and M. Levi in 
1983 of two opposing police forces, Devon and Cornwall together with 
Manchester, showed that Alderson’s community policing approach resulted in a 
high public approval and more accurate police perception of their public 
standing, suggesting a closer relationship. 42  Many countered that policing 
Devon and Cornwall, or ‘tranquil rural counties’ as described by Robert Reiner, 
was much different and in many ways easier than large cities such as 
Manchester or London.43  Jones and Levi’s study did suggest however that 
relatively large city Plymouth saw better results than relatively small town 
Wigan, suggesting that it was not purely a matter of size.44 
Regardless, such community policing efforts were hamstrung by a 
general lack of manpower in the Metropolitan Police. In an attempt to bolster 
low police numbers, the increasingly unpopular Special Patrol Group (SPG) was 
sporadically drafted into the area to conduct saturation policing which included 
increased use of stop and search methods. W. H. Gibson, Assistant 
Commissioner of New Scotland Yard, suggested that the SPG existed to solve 
such manpower shortages.45  The negative effect of such actions was later 
noted by Scarman: 
They provoked the hostility of young black people, who felt they were 
being hunted irrespective of their innocence or guilt. And their hostility 
infected older members of the community, who, hearing the stories of 
many innocent young black people who had been stopped and searched, 
began themselves to lose confidence in, and respect for, the police.46 
LIAISON COMMITTEE 
As part of the community policing strategy of forging strong links with the 
local community, attempts were made to improve relations between the police 
and black community, or at least be seen to be attempting to. Due in large part 
to the socioeconomic situation in Brixton, Scarman concluded that, whilst 
spending most of their time on the streets, black youths’ contact with the police 
was framed around viewing them as ‘visible symbols of the authority of a 
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society which has failed to bring them its benefits or do them justice’.47 In such a 
volatile and potentially explosive environment, good relations between the 
police and local community are vital. In recognition of such a fact, proposals for 
a formal liaison committee between the police and local community 
organisations, fronted by the CCRL, were established.  
The initial meeting of this Committee took place on 30 October 1978 
where, amongst other topics, the policing of NF demonstrations arose in 
discussions. The police declined to discuss such topics and stated that it was 
the sole responsibility of Leonard Adams, Commander of ‘L’ District within 
which Brixton was situated, to decide upon policing levels.48 Alan Goodson, 
President of the Association of Chief Police Officers 1979-1980, later argued 
that, whilst chief constables consulted the community more than ever before, 
‘he and he alone has [the] responsibility’ of deciding upon operational 
enforcement of the law.49 Citing arguments regarding police independence from 
politics, he used an example of industrial disputes to argue the possible 
detrimental situation of policing situations ‘in accordance with the dictates of any 
politician’. 50  Whilst a valid point, the apparent convergence of police and 
Conservative Party somewhat undermined such argument. Despite this dispute 
regarding specific police operations, which was suggested could be addressed 
further at subsequent meetings, there appeared to be optimism that the Liaison 
Committee could improve the situation. 
Three days following this meeting a saturation operation involving the 
SPG commenced in Brixton. Commander Adams had not informed community 
leaders beforehand because he believed that ‘any resultant publicity would alert 
the criminal factions in Lambeth’.51  This omission angered local community 
leaders as they did not believe the police saw the Committee as a two-way 
process: ‘The police appear to want help (and therefore agreement) from the 
community but only on their own terms and within their own conception of 
policing.’52 Community leaders argued that this relied upon trust between the 
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police and community, but that such trust and, by extension, consent had 
deteriorated. 53  Adding to this dissatisfaction, three CCRL members were 
arrested and questioned in relation to an assault on two plain-clothes officers in 
a Clapham pub. The incident was dubbed the ‘Sheepskin Saga’ locally, due to 
the only apparent connection between the suspects and those arrested being 
that they were black and wore sheepskin coats.54  
Ted Knight, leader of Lambeth Council, claimed that entering CCRL 
offices to make arrests was a ‘calculated decision’ which demonstrated the 
‘state of police minds when dealing with sensitive issues’.55 However the state 
of Knight’s own mind must also be noted. Widely known as ‘Red Ted’, he had 
been expelled aged 21 from the Labour Party due to his links with the 
newspaper Socialist Outlook where some contributors were ‘known for their 
previous association with the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist Party’.56 A 
member of the ‘London left’, he had gained a national reputation for his left-wing 
views and criticism of the police and his general opposition to Thatcher and the 
Conservatives would later be seen in his 1984 efforts to oppose government 
limiting council budgets by simply refusing to set a budget, leading to his being 
banned from office for five years. 57  Regardless of their intentions, the 
involvement of such figures in debates regarding policing issues undoubtedly 
furthered, and in some cases legitimised, the claims of senior police officials 
that there was a concerted effort to undermine the government and police force. 
Indeed Knight complained following the disturbances that his descriptions of 
Brixton as ‘a time-bomb’ were dismissed by the government as ‘pure political 
jargon’, and he had even reportedly received an abusive telephone call blaming 
him for the Brixton disturbances before even becoming aware of them.58 
Following the ‘Sheepskin Saga’ the CCRL were contacted by dismayed 
members of the community who believed that such an organisation would be 
immune from police harassment, but this event had demonstrated otherwise.59 
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The following day the CCRL withdrew from the Liaison Committee, citing the 
police’s ‘flagrant disregard for people’s rights and dignity and their utter 
contempt for black people’.60 They condemned the lack of a formal mechanism 
for voicing criticism of policing policies and argued that institutional racism 
affected the police’s strategies and tactics, but that police were unwilling to 
accept this.61 They also urged Knight to establish an inquiry into the state of 
Police/Community relations in Lambeth, which he agreed to; although given his 
political views discussed previously, this is hardly surprising.62 
The CCRL’s withdrawal from the Liaison Committee initiated an 
escalating correspondence between them and Adams, blaming each other for 
the breakdown of consultation. Adams decried the decision ‘not to support’ the 
Committee, to which the CCRL responded that it was their suggestion to 
establish it in the first place and their subsequent decision to withdraw was ‘not 
taken lightly or recklessly’.63 A subsequent police operation again utilising the 
SPG was once more met with criticism and objection from the CCRL.64 Adams 
curtly replied that the majority of the population welcomed their presence to 
uphold law and order and this was worth the negative effect upon some 
sections of the community, describing objections as frequently ‘subjective rather 
than objective.’65 This dismissal of criticisms from people who felt that they had 
genuine complaints of harassment and discrimination, further added to feelings 
of discontent and marginalisation from full participation in British society. 
It is true that the police received multiple letters from residents who 
welcomed and thanked them for use of SPG in the area, notably most often 
from businesses and elderly people appreciating the added security. 66  For 
example, a letter welcomed the enterprise to protect the lawful citizens ‘against 
the forces of evil’ in ‘this disgrace to civilised society called Lambeth’.67 As might 
be expected some of the letters, purportedly purely expressing support for the 
police, were thinly veiled criticisms of the black population. One such letter, from 
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a Brixton resident for the previous 50 years, stated that problems were caused 
by the influx of ‘youths who do not really belong here’. It ended with a plea for 
the increased use of the SPG in order ‘to help make this once again a pleasant 
place to live in for God knows what they are doing to the Country of ours – so 
please help the true residents of Brixton’.68 This accusation of not belonging or 
being the ‘true’ residents is one that can be seen throughout, and has endured 
to present day. A further writer claimed to be speaking for the opinions of the 
general public, which should be passed on to the ‘nut case left wingers and do 
gooders’ who were ruining the country and should ‘piss off to Russia’. It 
continued to claim that, as police were very well paid, they should protect the 
white population ‘and teach these animals a lesson’ by prosecuting them for 
their crimes.69 In a similar vein, it was alleged that those complaining about the 
‘very sensible decision’ to bring the SPG into the area were seeking ‘special 
privileges for various racial and ethnic minorities’.70 Similar letters were sent to 
Knight attacking his criticism of the police. For instance, one such letter stated 
how the police had an extremely difficult task to carry out in the area and that 
‘Nobody with respect for law and order would regard police questioning as 
“harassment”.’71 This theme that those unduly complaining did not wish for law 
and order to be maintained was often repeated; with the argument being that 
those campaigning for less intrusive police actions would alter their views if it 
was them who had been mugged.72 An obvious retort is to suggest that perhaps 
people with such views might have altered their opinions if they were the ones 
being continuously stopped and searched to the same level that black residents 
were. 
Adams concluded his letter to the CCRL defending use of the SPG by 
stating that if police actions were continuously questioned or opposed, this 
would hearten criminal factions and the public would ‘lose faith where officers 
appear to be required to fight crime with one arm tied behind their backs’.73 The 
CCRL admitted to being ‘a little surprised at the vehemence’ of his letter, 
countering that subjective objections are to be expected when a group believes 
they are being discriminated against: ‘It does not make these objections 
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invalid.’74 Rejecting the view that they unthinkingly criticised the police, they 
responded that the police had generally ignored any suggested policing 
improvements which was one of the reasons for their withdrawal from the 
Liaison Committee. 75  Communication between the CCRL and Adams 
deteriorated into addressing each other via the theatre of local newspaper the 
South London Press, likely further damaging the relationship between police 
and black community. 76  The CCRL foreshadowed later events when they 
warned: 
The long term consequences of your policy are that you will increasingly 
have to rely on coercion rather than consent. This could ultimately 
degenerate into open and physical conflict between the police and some 
sections of the community in which people, both from the community and 
the police will be injured.77 
This warning did not change police strategies to the extent desired. A further 
occasion where the SPG were drafted into Brixton saw Adams writing to inform 
the CCRL of such action before its implementation, even offering to meet and 
discuss it – which was seemingly a step towards healthier collaboration. 
However the tone of the letter was that, regardless of any concerns raised at 
the meeting, the deployment would still go ahead as planned.78 Unsurprisingly 
the CCRL’s response was that, whilst they remained opposed to the use of the 
SPG, as the decision had already been made there seemed ‘little point’ in 
meeting to discuss it.79 On this occasion, three of the four local MPs also wrote 
to Adams opposing the use of the SPG, concluding that, if they had to be 
repeatedly called in to help tackle normal crime levels, surely that was a sign of 
a lack of police manpower.80 It should be noted that all three of these authors 
were Labour, the one local MP remaining silent and refusing to question the 
police’s tactics being a Conservative. 
As mentioned previously and in part due to the noticeable rising 
hostilities after the CCRL’s withdrawal from the Liaison Committee, the London 
Borough of Lambeth Council passed a resolution on 21 March 1979 to establish 
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an inquiry into police/community relations in Lambeth. This was established 
largely in a response to calls from the CCRL and a report entitled ‘Inquiry into 
Police Conduct in Lambeth’, which proposed such an inquiry due to the 
repeated refusal of the Home Office to accept requests for a public inquiry.81 
Knight further stated that the Council’s Advice Bureaux had stated that evidence 
and documentation were needed of the considerable allegations regarding 
police harassment.82  
The inquiry’s task was made immediately more difficult when Adams 
withdrew police cooperation citing an alleged anti-police bias.83 He stated that 
he was being asked ‘to participate in an inquiry when I am the accused person 
to be judged by my accusers, without the rights and protection you are saying 
the police are denying the public. Clearly that would be a totally unfair system.’84 
He acknowledged that he would be duty-bound to participate in a Home Office 
inquiry but, as was painfully obvious to those requesting it for years, such an 
inquiry was not forthcoming.85 This refusal to acknowledge or cooperate with 
investigations is consistent with the police’s attitude at this time, as shown by 
the frequent previous refusals discussed in the preceding chapters. The 
investigation was also criticised by some members of the local community, who 
believed it would bring undeserved criticism upon the police: ‘Just as one 
swallow does not make a summer, so isolated incidents of unfairness or 
prejudices on the part of individual policemen do not warrant wholesale 
condemnation of our overworked, courageous and often good humoured 
police.’86 This response was typical of many, believing that the police deserved 
and needed the community’s trust. Such attitudes were almost certainly held 
mostly by residents who did not face discrimination or the constant intrusion of 
being stopped and searched, and that the police had to earn such trust from the 
community through fairness and professionalism. 
The Report of the Working Party on Community/Police Relations in 
Lambeth was published in January 1981, describing SPG excursions into 
Brixton as an ‘Army of Occupation’ and concluding that the situation was 
‘extremely grave’ with unrest a possible outcome. It made a number of 
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recommendations to improve the relationship between the police and black 
community, including the immediate repeal of ‘sus’ laws and ceasing any further 
deployment of SPG in Lambeth.87 Robin Bunce and Paul Field summarised how 
these ‘devastating conclusions’ were ignored by the police and politicians.88 
However, the report’s conclusions were not ignored by the local community, 
adding further weight to feelings of discontent at, and alienation from, the 
political process. William Shelton, Conservative MP for Streatham, would later 
highlight this when he cited the report as having greatly increased hostility 
against the police.89 It is therefore not surprising that, just three months after the 
authorities’ blatant disregard for the inquiry’s findings, violent outbursts occurred 
against the police. 
There did nonetheless appear to be some police recognition that 
relations had become particularly poor. Commander Brian Fairbairn had been 
transferred to ‘L’ District to replace Adams, and stated his desire to increase 
liaison between senior officers and the elected representatives of Lambeth 
Council.90 In an attempt to do so he wrote to various parties including Knight 
who responded with criticism of a recent police operation, forcing themselves 
into CCRL offices again after Fairbairn had assumed office. Knight stated that, 
regardless of Fairbairn’s professed desire to improve relations between the 
police and community, such actions would invariably mean he would ‘follow in 
Commander Adam’s footsteps of leaving such relationships in tatters’. 91 
Fairbairn replied that an investigation was ongoing regarding that incident and 
he was thus unable to comment, but he did passive-aggressively inform Knight 
that he was ‘sorry that you are, apparently, unable to discuss the matters 
mentioned in my letter to you’. 92  A subsequent letter from Knight informed 
Fairbairn that he was ‘constantly reassured by local community organisations’ 
that use of the SPG was preventing good relations between police and local 
community and, as such, suggested the reuniting of the Liaison Committee, to 
which Fairbairn agreed and wrote to the CCRL expressing such. 93  After 
additional letters and meetings, in which Fairbairn declared a willingness to 
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discuss any facet of policing with the CCRL, the situation appeared to be 
gradually improving.94 
SWAMP 81 
With this background of cautious developments the police launched 
‘Operation Swamp 81’, a plain-clothed saturation police operation beginning 
Monday 6 April 1981. Chief Superintendent Sidney Nicholson described the 
operation as ‘an experiment’ in reducing crime; due to the difficult relationship 
between the police and community, perhaps a less volatile area should have 
been used for such experimentations.95 Michael Keith highlighted an additional 
intention of the operation as a morale-boost for officers working in the difficult 
climate of Brixton; Detective Chief Superintendent Plowman deemed the 
operation a success because ‘It motivated officers.’96  
Regarding the naming of the operation, and referencing Thatcher’s 1978 
statement that ‘people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather 
swamped by people with a different culture’, Fryer described how this action 
saw Brixton ‘well and truly swamped’.97 This connection was also drawn by Paul 
Gilroy, who described the police operation as a ‘revenge swamping’.98 Many 
within the local community, already feeling that the British authorities were not 
addressing their situation to any extent, saw this as a movement towards 
actively targeting them. Detective Chief Superintendent Jeremy Plowman, 
taking responsibility for the official naming of the operation, stated that it was 
named thus after an earlier operation which had occurred some three years 
previously; however this therefore potentially aligned even more closely with 
Thatcher’s comments.99 Many black people viewed Swamp 81 as a direct police 
reply to the Black People’s Day of Action on 2 March, demonstrating a police 
desire to regain control of the streets.100 Brixton residents, even those deemed 
‘respectable’, commented on the increased police presence and believed the 
operation to simply be a display of police authority; ‘a boast (after the New 
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Cross march) that no one but the Met would rule the streets’.101 To some in the 
local black community, it appeared that their peaceful attempts to protest 
previous police misconduct or seemingly indifferent treatment of tragedies 
involving local black youths were greeted with nothing more than a show of 
police force, suggesting to some that responding in kind with collective violence 
was the only method to effect any real change. 
The police defended Swamp 81 as a necessary response to the high rate 
of crime in Brixton. However Fairbairn, seemingly willing to address previous 
complaints and learn some lessons, deliberately chose to not include the SPG 
in the operation due to previous concerns raised by the community. In the same 
vein he had not utilised the SPG since he became Commander of L District; the 
first time in fact that he did so was in response to the 1981 disturbances, at 
which point he acknowledged that he ‘was very glad to have them’.102 Despite 
this seeming willingness to acquiesce to the community’s wishes, once again 
the local community and leaders were not informed of the operation 
beforehand, seemingly a continuation of the belief verbalised previously by 
Commander Adams: ‘No good general ever declares his forces in a prelude to 
any kind of attack’. 103  This use of military language and invoking war-like 
comparisons suggests that police amalgamated the population of Brixton into 
an enemy that needed to be conquered, rather than as constituents requiring 
their protection. The failure to consult local community leaders beforehand was 
condemned by Scarman and, as Kettle and Hodges agreed, Adams’ statement 
and the police’s subsequent actions ‘spoke volumes on senior police 
attitudes’. 104  Variously described as ‘unwise’, ‘a serious mistake’, and an 
operation ‘poured’ on to an existing ‘combustible mixture’, contemporary and 
lasting opinion has condemned Swamp 81 as at best mistimed, and at worst 
wilfully irresponsible. 105  Despite the operation’s significance in the ensuing 
violence and contemporary reaction, and showing the mind-set of many police 
officials, a few days after the disturbances the head of the local CID quoted 
reduced crime figures (prior to its termination due to the disturbances) and thus 
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considered Swamp 81 ‘a resounding success’. 106  It is hard to see how an 
operation widely cited as being an immediate cause for violent uprisings could 
be viewed as such. In addition Michael Rowe later contested that, although 
police claimed that street robberies and burglaries declined by half during the 
operation, there was little apparent consideration paid to the possibility that 
such crimes may have just been displaced to a different locality.107 
Such a police response is symbolic of their broader response to relations 
between the police and local black community. The success of Swamp 81 was 
measured purely on its statistical reduction in crime, and the fact that it had 
increased black people’s feelings of discontent towards the police and led to 
such violent protests spreading around the country was seemingly deemed an 
acceptable consequence. The desire for the police to be seen to be the ones in 
control of the streets of Brixton was deemed representative of the semi-covert 
racism which characterised many of the police’s actions, leading to the 
collective violence against the police. 
DISTURBANCES 
Since the beginning of the week when Swamp 81 commenced, tensions 
in the area were described by various observers as having dramatically 
increased.108 Considering the noticeably increased numbers of police on the 
streets, additional instances of stops and searches, and police raids on 
properties, this is hardly surprising.109 Police described uneasy feelings in their 
dealings with local people and an unwillingness to be seen having ‘normal’ 
conversations with officers.110 The first few days of the operation resulted in 
local organisations being ‘overwhelmed’ by black youths protesting against their 
treatment by the police.111 Howe argued on the Monday night that ‘the place 
was going to explode’, having observed multiple scuffles between black youth 
and the so-called ‘sneaker squad’ plain-clothed police.112 During the course of 
the operation 120 officers within Brixton made 943 ‘stops’, of which over two-
thirds were under 21 and over half were black; disproportionate in a community 
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described as 36 percent ‘non-white’. 118 persons were arrested and just 75 
charges followed.113 Benyon summarised the view of critics who highlighted 
that, if the operation was judged by its own aims of arresting burglars and 
robbers, the operation was not a success and led to 868 law-abiding people 
suffering the inconvenience and indignity of being searched.114 More than one 
observer commented that, ‘as a white person safe in a position of some 
authority’, their negative reaction to the increased police numbers and stops 
showed how much more threatened and resentful many black people must 
have felt.115 
THURSDAY 9 APRIL 
With this growing tension, the first event which threatened to cause 
tensions to boil over was a minor incident on Thursday afternoon. A group of 
black youths were playing football in the road outside the S&M car hire office, 
causing issues for passing traffic. Officers reported that their suggestion to 
move the game to a quieter location was largely accepted, apart from one youth 
who allegedly challenged an officer to fight, but that the general atmosphere 
was extremely tense.116 Many officers noted they did not recognise any of the 
youths present and believed that they had come into the area from elsewhere, 
an observation supported by Edward Dove of youth organisation the Melting Pot 
Foundation.117  This accusation that those who were the troublemakers had 
come into the area from elsewhere is one seen repeatedly throughout the 
disturbances. Whilst in some cases there seems to be evidence to support the 
theory of agitators, it is also likely this was used as a scapegoat and a simple 
explanation for how violence spread around the country. Courtney Laws, 
Director of the Brixton Neighbourhood Community Association, informed 
officers that he had attempted to contact Community Liaison Officer 
Superintendent MacLennan to discuss the situation, but had been unable to do 
so.118 MacLennan stated that he attempted to telephone Laws back on Friday 
morning, but that he could not reach him and was then on leave over the 
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weekend.119 As mentioned elsewhere, perhaps if an officer with knowledge and 
understanding who was familiar to the local community had been present 
tensions may have been eased. This was not the case, and violence ensued. 
FRIDAY 10 APRIL 
The incident which lit the touch-paper in Brixton, described by Brain as 
‘an innocent action intended well’, shows the extent of distrust and cynicism 
which existed toward the police.120 Friday 10 April was described as the first 
warm day of the year and, as such, many more people were out on the streets 
than usual.121  Around 6pm an officer stopped a black youth called Michael 
Bailey who was running through the streets. PC Stephen Margiotta, despite his 
own admission of being in Brixton for a short time, stated he had experienced 
many crimes ‘involving mostly black youths’, so decided to stop Bailey as he 
was acting suspiciously.122 After a short struggle and assistance from another 
officer, Margiotta discovered that Bailey had been stabbed in the back. Witness 
statements later suggested that Bailey had been stabbed during a confrontation 
with two other youths and a subsequent hospital examination recorded that he 
had a one and a half inch wound in his back.123 Bailey later denied knowing who 
had stabbed him and, even if he did, would not identify or give evidence against 
them.124 This again shows the level of distrust towards the police as even a 
stabbed victim refused to cooperate with them; albeit there may have been 
other reasons why Bailey did not want to disclose information of his attackers to 
law enforcers.  
A crowd gathered around Bailey and the officers which, believing the 
police were attempting an arrest, become hostile and Bailey again ran from the 
police. He approached the house of a local white family begging for help who, 
after applying a rudimentary dressing to his wound and being informed by 
Bailey that ‘blacks’ had stabbed him, called him a minicab bound for the 
hospital.125 This cab only made it a short way before police again stopped it, 
                                                     
119 Commander Malcolm Ferguson, P.S. 1, WS 50, TNA: HO 266/96; Scarman, The Scarman 
Report, p. 96. 
120 Brain, A History of Policing, p. 66. 
121 John Fraser MP, 19 May 1981, O.S. 97, TNA: HO 266/103. 
122 PC Stephen Peter Margiotta, P.S. 13, TNA: HO 266/97. 
123 Unknown, 19 May 1981, O.S. 161, TNA: HO 266/103; Doctor who treated Michael Bailey, 
O.S. 854, TNA: HO 266/98; Roy Francis, 29 May 1981, O.S. 136, TNA: HO 266/103. 
124 Michael Bailey, O.S. 17, TNA: HO 266/98. 
125 Unknown, O.S. 18, TNA: HO 266/98; ‘Rubbish Clearance Contractor’, O.S. 31, TNA: HO 
266/98. 
188 
 
examined his wound, and called for an ambulance. Scarman noted that the call 
for the ambulance was made at 6.24.126 The published Report did not record 
the language that the officer used, in which he concluded ‘We think we might 
have a dead ‘n’ here’.127 Officers on the scene attempted to dress the wound 
more substantially as it was recorded that he was ‘bleeding like a good ‘n’’.128 
Shortly a crowd of black youths, estimated by officers at the time as 100 but 
subsequently as 30-40, surrounded the scene and, variously believing that the 
officer applying a dressing was attacking Bailey or that the police were not 
obtaining medical help because he was black, they seized Bailey away from the 
officers.129 A later witness statement estimated that Bailey had been kept in the 
car for ‘about half an hour’ before ‘he was rescued’.130 Whilst all other evidence 
suggests Bailey was in the stationary cab for only a matter of minutes, the use 
of the word ‘rescued’ clearly shows the view this observer had towards the 
police’s treatment of Baily and, by extension, black youths in general. A 
Detective Inspector later suggested that, as the officer applying direct pressure 
to the wound to prevent serious bleeding had to be above Bailey, those entering 
the scene may have assumed the police were attacking him.131  
The officers present reportedly attempted to tell the crowd that an 
ambulance was being called and they were administering first aid, but the crowd 
paid no attention and believed Bailey was being left to die.132 As the Deputy 
Community Liaison Officer for L District later explained, it was police procedure 
for injured persons not to be transported in police cars as it may be dangerous 
to move them in their wounded state.133 Indeed, PC Simon Lock reported that 
he had shouted at the crowd to leave Bailey, as moving him could be fatal. The 
crowd nonetheless responded that ‘they could look after their own’.134 The effort 
taken to prevent an injured boy from being left with the police visibly shows the 
levels of distrust and belief it was more dangerous for him to be left with the 
police. This is further supported by PC Michael Bullen, one of the officers 
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treating Bailey in the minicab, who stated the crowd were shouting ‘You white 
pigs, leave him alone’ and that ‘the mob did not want police to take any part in 
assisting the stabbed youth’.135 The use of Black Panther language, here with 
the term ‘pig’ referring to the police, is telling and revealing of the increased 
militancy of black youth and the possible influences of such tendencies.136 Once 
he had been removed from the officers Bailey was bundled into a passing car 
which, amid shouts of ‘drive, drive’, took him to a nearby hospital.137  
Such an event, far from being unique or particularly unusual on the 
streets of Brixton, could feasibly have ended at this point with the only wider 
consequence being a further example to add to the resentment between local 
black youth and the police. However on this occasion, in Scarman’s words, 
‘unfortunately the incident ended with a sinister twist’.138 A large crowd of black 
youths and numerous police, due to calls for assistance and high levels already 
in the area, had become involved in hostilities. ‘Inevitably’, in Brain’s view, an 
arrest was made for threatening behaviour towards the police, causing youths 
to begin throwing stones and the police attempting to clear the area and 
disperse the crowd.139 Due to the increased level of tensions already described 
by numerous officers throughout the week due to Swamp 81, and the reaction 
seen during the events with Bailey, it would likely have been more prudent for 
the police to withdraw from the area in order to allow anger towards the police 
to calm. This was however not in keeping with a police force which saw the 
answer to the problems of the area being high levels of invasive policing, and it 
is not difficult to see why many black people argued that police tactics were 
attempted shows of force rather than a proportional response to the situation. 
For example, a subsequent event described by various parties was the 
departure of a police van transporting some arrested youths to the police 
station. Scarman summarised the police account of events that a black youth 
had jumped onto the roof of the van and the driver, in Scarman’s words, 
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‘perhaps afraid it was about to be overtaken by the crowd’, drove away at speed 
causing the youth to fall to the ground where he was arrested.140 In an example 
of numerous such incidents where Scarman did not record the opposing view of 
events, various witness statements record the event slightly differently. Such 
accounts claim that when the youth stood in front of the van, it simply ran into 
him and, once he had climbed onto and subsequently fallen off the moving van, 
several policemen kicked and beat him with truncheons whilst on the ground.141 
This aggravated other youths in the area that then attacked the police and threw 
bricks at the vans. Similarly accusations that the arrival of a police van had 
intentionally driven quickly at a crowd of people and caused one youth to collide 
with the windscreen, incensing the crowd, did not appear in Scarman’s 
report.142 
COMMUNITY MEETING 
After the Friday disturbances died down, a meeting was requested by 
Chief Superintendent Sidney Nicholson with local community leaders in an 
attempt to defuse the situation and correct some rumours which had been 
spreading about the day’s events. Also joined by Commander Malcolm 
Ferguson, Head of the Community Relations Branch of the Metropolitan Police, 
numerous members of local community organisations attended between 9pm 
and 1am.143 As well as offering the police view of events they informed the 
meeting of the intention to increase police numbers in the area in response to 
the incident.144 Chief Superintendent Nicholson, deputy and acting Commander 
in Fairbairn’s absence, and Detective Chief Superintendent Jeremy Plowman, 
who was overseeing Swamp 81, both agreed that the operation should 
continue.145 Although in a response to the increased tension, it was settled that 
‘no unnecessary covert actions’ would occur on the Front Line, with the situation 
to be re-evaluated on Monday 13 April.146 Ferguson and Nicholson both claimed 
that representatives of the community accepted what was said and did not 
attempt to blame the police for the situation or their actions.147  Community 
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leaders did express their concern at police tactics and recommended that police 
numbers in the area should be reduced in order to defuse tensions.148  
Courtney Laws, Director of the Brixton Neighbourhood Community 
Association, stated that the police firmly indicated a determination to uphold law 
and order in Brixton, referencing preventing ‘No Go’ areas.149 This was likely a 
robust response to previous criticism directed towards Chief Constable Brian 
Weigh after his decision to withdraw from the St Pauls area, seen by many as 
an admittance that there were ‘no go’ areas in Britain. Therefore, and despite 
warnings, the police declined to discontinue the invasive Swamp 81 operation. 
Scarman would later describe its continuation as ‘unwise’ and, according to 
Howe, in maintaining the operation the police ‘refused to take the only action 
that could have averted serious disorder’.150 This meeting can be seen as the 
police attempting to inform the community leaders of their actions in a way not 
done so previously; however they were not yet willing to implement the 
suggestions and requests of the community representatives themselves. 
Similarly the meeting highlights the desire from many within the community to 
remain part of the political process but, as Paul Boateng later concluded, it was 
wrong to characterise this meeting as community policing in the style 
championed by Alderson: ‘If the community is to be consulted and then have its 
advice rejected by the police, then community policing is a nonsense.’151 
Additional to growing tensions regarding police presence there were 
numerous rumours which proliferated, especially regarding how Bailey received 
his injuries and if the police attempted to acquire medical assistance, which this 
meeting was attempting to address. Many have highlighted such rumours as a 
factor which increased tensions in the area over the weekend. 152  Police 
statements claimed that ‘many members of the population had misunderstood 
the situation’ and numerous witness statements reference being aware of 
widely-believed rumours that police had been questioning an injured Bailey 
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rather than helping him, or that he had subsequently died from his injuries.153 
Michael Rowbottom, a reporter for Independent Radio News, claimed he had 
spoken to both police and black youths that Friday night who independently 
agreed it had been ‘a big confusion’.154 The persistence of these rumours was 
shown by reports of children maintaining such stories the following Monday, 
seemingly ‘not eager to believe’ rebuttals of such allegations.155 If the police 
truly believed that such rumours could be quashed simply by those same police 
members informing a meeting of community representatives that they were 
incorrect, then they were mistaken.  
These were not the only rumours circulating around Brixton that 
weekend. More improbable rumours, which seemed plausible to the community 
that weekend, included that the police themselves had stabbed Bailey, that 
Bailey was actually an old man who had been beaten up by the police, that St. 
Thomas’ Hospital had previously been warned by the police to expect many 
civilian casualties on Saturday 11 April, and that Brixton’s home beat policemen 
were specifically told to avoid Brixton from the 10-12 April.156 The last example 
especially shows how widely it was believed that officers who were familiar to 
the area could positively reduce tensions between the police and local 
community. The rumour being spread was that home beat officers, known to the 
community and familiar with the situation, had been wilfully removed by senior 
officers in order to use ‘specialist’ units, as the SPG had a reputation for being. 
It was noted by some observers that not a single ‘L’ Division badge had been 
seen on any police uniform during the disturbances, causing a ‘feeling of 
invasion and oppression’. 157  This suggests that local officers had in fact 
managed to build some kind of relationship with parts of the local black 
community in a style of the community policing spearheaded by Alderson, but 
that it was the noticeable use of unfamiliar units within the locale which 
persuaded some of the local black youths to escalate violence against officers 
that were to them faceless representations of the authorities. Again debating the 
actual truth of these rumours is not the most significant aspect; if the police had 
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positively responded to suggestions regarding local recognisable police then the 
anger displayed over the following days may not have been as fierce. 
Despite the Friday night meeting appealing to local community leaders to 
dispel such rumours, they clearly endured and proliferated throughout the area. 
The manager of a local pub later summed up the opinion of many observers 
when stating, had such rumours been dispelled, the tensions may have 
decreased and ‘the mood of the people who became involved in the outburst 
late on Saturday would have been very different’.158 Whether or not this would 
have been the case of course will never be known, but the fact that the police 
did not deem the situation worthy of such a response is telling of their attitudes. 
SATURDAY 11 APRIL 
On Saturday, due to the police’s decision to continue Swamp 81 and 
even bolster police numbers following Friday’s events, a substantial police 
presence was present within Brixton. As one officer told an enquiring observer; 
‘Because of the previous night it was their duty to be on the street.’159 Police 
officials had disregarded warnings from local community organisations that this 
would increase tensions in the area, but numerous observers made reference to 
such an outcome. Many officers mentioned such in their evidence to Scarman, 
with reports of hostile comments being made about the police and an 
atmosphere ‘so tense you could cut it with a knife’. 160  Similarly, many 
statements made by members of the public cite the sheer police numbers in the 
area as a ‘very provocative gesture’, that they were ‘out for revenge’, and was 
seemingly an attempt at ‘re-establishing [their] rule of the streets’.161 Rather 
than attempting reconciliation with the local community, or realising that 
invasive tactics of Swamp 81 were increasing pre-existing tensions and thus 
scaling down the operation to remove the antagonism of an extremely visible 
police presence, the police instead met the low-level disturbance of Friday night 
with a swelling of police numbers. Officers poured into Brixton as the proverbial 
gasoline is poured onto the fire. Instead of intimidating the youth into 
maintaining peace, the amount of police prompted a swelling in the population 
on the streets ‘as if to meet the challenge’: ‘It was the feeling as if it was war 
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and thus, if the police wanted to kill anyone, then the people would defend 
themselves.’162 As one observer recognised, ‘Brixton is not the sort of area 
where large numbers of police can be poured into the streets without creating a 
mood of high tension and expectation.’163 It is highly unlikely that the police, at 
some level, were not aware of that. This was accompanied by the fact that, 
similarly to Community Liaison Officer Superintendent MacLennan, the two local 
beat officers who were familiar to the area and residents were both off duty from 
early Saturday afternoon and did not return until Monday morning. 164  This 
situation mirrored St Pauls the previous year where violence occurred on the 
local policeman’s weekly day off. Officers known to the community who 
seemingly enjoyed decent relations with the community were absent on both 
occasions, when they could have potentially alleviated some of the tensions. 
Moreover Derek McGhee highlighted that these officers had not even been 
consulted on the continuation of Swamp 81.165  This, alongside other police 
actions, led Courtney Laws to claim that ‘a child would have handled the 
situation better’.166  
It is difficult to argue that the police felt accountable to the local 
community when they so unwisely did not utilise those officers most familiar 
with the situation. However Scarman would later reject arguments that police 
should not have maintained their heavy presence in the area. He stated that, 
despite the fact that police numbers ‘must have heightened tension to some 
degree…The risk had to be taken, if the precarious tranquillity achieved on 
Friday evening was to be preserved.’ 167  This shows the mind-set of the 
authorities at the time, which could not consider that a partial or strategic 
withdrawal would calm the crowd by removing the obvious target for their anger, 
despite this occurring in St Pauls. And, as the events of Saturday evening 
demonstrated, it was a risk taken which certainly did not pay off. 
After a morning of increased tensions, a further seemingly minor incident 
in the afternoon erupted, beginning violent scenes ‘the like of which had not 
                                                     
162  Unknown, O.S. 178, TNA: HO 266/103; Unknown to Scarman, 14 May 1981, O.S. 46; 
Unknown, O.S. 46A, TNA: HO 266/103. 
163 Stewart Lansley, 1 June 1981, O.S. 147, TNA: HO 266/104. 
164 Lansley, O.S. 147. 
165 Derek McGhee, Intolerant Britain?: Hate, Citizenship and Difference (Maidenhead, 2005) pp. 
19-20. 
166 Laws, O.S. 167. 
167 Scarman, The Scarman Report, p. 46. 
195 
 
previously been seen in this century in Britain’.168 Around 4.40pm two plain-
clothed Swamp 81 officers, both young and white, stopped and searched a 
minicab driver claiming to have seen him hiding marijuana in his socks. 169 
Despite it being established that this was actually where he kept his money, 
officers decided to search his vehicle during which time a crowd gathered to 
protest the perceived harassment. The PCs later defended this search of the 
minicab as routine practice and Sergeant Donald Mackenzie, Commander of 
the Swamp 81 Squad of which the two officers were members, stated that it 
‘seemed reasonable’ for the officers to inquire what the minicab driver had 
placed in his sock.170 Mackenzie offered no judgement of the decision to extend 
the search to the minicab, commenting that officers are trained to make 
thorough searches in response to reasonable suspicion, but that such a 
decision ‘must be his and his alone’. 171  This lack of vocal support for the 
officers’ decision suggests that Mackenzie may have privately believed it was 
an unwise course of action; considering the circumstances, it may well have 
been wiser to have foregone routine practice in such a situation as there is 
arguably little suspicious about a taxi driver attempting to conceal his money. 
Indeed Mike and Trevor Phillips criticised the decision to search the car, 
claiming the ensuing hostile reaction from an assembled black crowd was 
‘inevitable’.172 Scarman concluded that, although the two officers’ actions were 
not unlawful, they had ‘failed to recognise real danger signals or to strike the 
correct balance between enforcing the law and keeping the peace’. 173  This 
description might be used to describe the police’s general response to the 
situation; the police’s priorities were more focussed upon enforcing the law and 
being seen not to have ‘lost the streets’ to some black youths. Scarman’s report 
stated that the ‘important question’ was not whether the officers had acted 
foolishly or even unlawfully, but why it initiated a riot.174 By focussing on the 
public disorder aspect, and seemingly overlooking the day-to-day heavy-handed 
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police tactics against innocent residents, he may well have unknowingly 
answered his own question. 
There are differing accounts of the police search of the vehicle and how 
the subsequent disturbance began, referenced by Scarman when he stated that 
exact events were disputed.175 Both officers maintained that the minicab driver 
was happy for himself and his vehicle to be searched, and PC Paul Thornton 
even recorded the driver seemed amused by the incident.176 The driver later 
explicitly stated that no such permission to search his vehicle was granted or 
even sought, and the police simply initiated the search themselves.177 Although 
he did not immediately halt the search, he told Thornton to leave a plastic bag 
he was carrying outside of the vehicle in case the police planted evidence – a 
telling reaction from a member of a community clearly distrusting the apparent 
enforcers of law and order. 178  The officers suggested that the driver 
subsequently demanded a stop to the search, implying this was due to a 
growing crowd of black males who surrounded the car and pressured him into 
doing so.179 The crowd purportedly accused the police of attempting to provoke 
them into a response; some reacted in kind, shouting at the officers: ‘Fuck off 
Babylon, come on we’ll fight you…there is going to be trouble now Babylon’.180 
Thornton documented that he told the crowd: ‘Calm down we’re going now.’181 
This would have been a sensible course of action which likely would have 
quietened the growing discontent.  
The driver conversely stated that the police actually attempted to arrest a 
young man who was simply telling officers to leave the driver alone.182 Other 
witnesses claimed officers hit the arrested man in the face and threw him into a 
police van, angering the previously ‘reasonably friendly’ crowd and causing 
them to start throwing missiles.183 Conversely the police’s account recorded that 
the man had obstructed officers, despite Thornton advising him to ‘be sensible 
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and move away’, to which he allegedly replied ‘Fuck off man, fucking 
harassment’ and pushed Thornton in the chest.184 Upon this action Thornton 
attempted to arrest the man, causing him and others in the crowd to become 
violent.185 Again a more serene response than attempting to arrest this man in 
front of an angry crowd may have been advisable. The sense that the police 
were attempting to be seen to be asserting their authority was not helped when 
uniformed officers arrived to help control the crowd, with Sergeant Terence 
Wisbey asking Thornton: ‘Are you going to nick him or muck about with him’?186 
Howe recalled that a few days prior, a local black youth had asked him 
what he was going to do regarding the police’s behaviour and actions, to which 
Howe simply replied: ‘What can I do?’ He later discovered that this youth was 
supposedly the same one arrested on Saturday after remonstrating with the 
police about their searching tactics.187 This is a clear example of one of the 
main arguments of this thesis; a local black youth had spoken to a famed civil 
liberties campaigner in an attempt to effect change and, after being told there 
was nothing that could be done, decided this was not good enough and took 
action into his own hands. George Greaves similarly argued that this minicab 
search was ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’ and that the youths who had 
witnessed it reacted in the only way they felt that they could: ‘Their complaints 
in the past, formal and informal, about police misconduct had gone unheeded, 
and as no one was helping them solve the problem of continued police 
harassment they therefore felt that they had to seek their own solution.’188  
Upon the arrest, the crowd began throwing bricks and bottles, smashing 
the back window of a police van and causing an officer to fall to the ground 
holding his stomach.189 It was believed that the officer had been stabbed and, 
mirroring the rumours surrounding Bailey’s stabbing, stories thus spread 
through word of mouth and radio amongst the police of such an injury.190 As 
discussed in detail later, such rumours and actual injuries undoubtedly created 
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a police desire for ‘revenge’ comparable to the sentiment leading some Brixton 
residents to the collective violence in the first place. 
This seemingly routine police search of a black male, far from uncommon 
on the streets of Brixton, led to major disorder and ‘An orgy of burning and 
looting took place that night.’191 Despite not being shocked at the disorders 
themselves, local community leaders did confess surprise at their scale and 
ferocity. 192  Brain noted that the speed that reinforcements, including senior 
officers, arrived at the scene was a sign of the gravity awarded the events by 
the police.193 The events were certainly severe and by the end of the night’s 
violence on ‘Bloody Saturday’ 82 people had been arrested, 279 officers and 45 
members of the public reported injured, 117 vehicles including 56 police 
vehicles had been damaged or destroyed, and 145 premises had been 
damaged.194 Specific examples of police actions and allegations of misconduct 
during the disorder is discussed in detail in the following chapter but the general 
outcome was, as Scarman later summarised, ‘that the scars of what had 
happened would linger in Brixton, and particularly in the relationship between 
the police and the public, for a long time to come.’195 
SUNDAY 12 APRIL 
By Sunday disturbances had largely died down, but few sporadic 
outbursts of violence occurred throughout the day as an uneasy tension 
remained in the area. Commander Ferguson chaired an additional meeting with 
community leaders on Sunday afternoon, during which serious disorder again 
erupted around Brixton.196 The timing might have been a coincidence, but it also 
may have been a reaction against community leaders meeting with the police – 
although no evidence specifically supports this theory. Many other meetings 
occurred on Sunday, such as a man with a loud hailer informing anyone within 
hearing range that a gathering was being held for ‘witnesses to the rioting by 
the Metropolitan Police’.197 Around the same time a police coach was attacked 
by a large crowd of black youths. Some twenty officers were injured and the 
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coach badly damaged, with all the windows being smashed by thrown bricks.198 
Chief Inspector Ralph Wilkinson stated his belief that, if backup had not arrived, 
this situation may have seen fatalities.199 Again this action, attacking an easily 
identifiable coach carrying a large number of officers into the area, fits within the 
broader theme of violence directed towards a perceived ‘army of occupation’. 
Adding to the list of rumours seeming to continuously exacerbate 
tensions, a widespread belief on Sunday was that the National Front were 
planning to hold a march in Brixton in response to the previous night’s events. 
Continuing the anti-colonial rhetoric of occupation, many references were made 
in witness statements to the NF ‘invading’ Brixton.200 Radio messages report 
that two hundred NF supporters had assembled in the area just after midnight 
Saturday night, ‘going to do what ever they normally do’; the response being a 
(presumably) sarcastic: ‘How lovely’.201 Other officers on Sunday repeatedly 
asked to be informed of the location of their march but police radio controllers 
were not aware of any such action. A District Commander informed that 
between fifty to sixty NF members were meeting at Brick Lane some five miles 
away, but they did not appear to have any plans to travel to Brixton.202 Even 
without such a nearby NF meeting, the fact that rumour spread is not 
particularly surprising; partly due to the infamous xenophobic nature of the NF, 
previous issues with the NF in the area, and the prevalent belief that many 
officers were members of, or at least sympathetic towards, the NF. Police 
statements make reference to black youths over the weekend accusing plain-
clothed officers of wearing NF badges and telling another officer to ‘Fuck off you 
National Front Pig’.203  Further mentions in individuals’ statements make the 
point that, with the way plain-clothed officers were conducting themselves over 
the weekend, ‘you could easily mistake them for members of the National 
Front’.204 The fact that police, due to past situations of legitimately defending NF 
from protests and their general behaviour that weekend, had become 
synonymous in the minds of many with a group actively opposed to black 
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immigration and supporting forced repatriation is extremely telling of the opinion 
awarded to police in Brixton. 
Scarman described Sunday’s events as widespread serious disorders, 
but ones which lacked the intensity of the previous day.205 Again the police’s 
response to events had been to maintain high levels of police, even to the 
extent of drafting a helicopter to patrol the area. It was reportedly the first 
occasion in which a ‘Nightsun’ helicopter, equipped with a powerful searchlight 
and infra-red cameras, had been used by the police.206 The police, in what 
would become a growing trend, seemed to believed that use of new equipment 
and technology was what was needed to tackle such disturbances, whereas 
many within the local community saw it as simply mounting police occupation. 
Certainly numerous references and criticisms were made of the police’s use of 
such technology, described as preventing the decrease of tensions and, 
particularly for innocent residents, ‘an unprovoked scare tactic’.207 Some officers 
allegedly even refused to admit it was a police helicopter when specific 
complaints were made to them.208  A meeting of St Matthew’s congregation 
claimed that the combination of the ‘unnerving’ constant presence of the 
helicopter and lack of public transport over the weekend resulted in feeling that 
they were ‘living in occupied territory’.209 This comparison was made numerous 
times, with accusations of police insensitivity and arrogance in the way that they 
were handling the situation.210 Even when violence had subsided, the police’s 
reaction appeared as heavy-handed as previously. Relatedly, the Right 
Reverend Ronald Bowlby, Bishop of Southwark, asked a senior police liaison 
officer if they would remove their presence as the violence had seemingly 
concluded. He was told firmly that ‘On no account will we withdraw’ and, when 
Bowlby clarified that he’d meant whether traffic through Brixton could return to 
normal, the officer curtly replied that it was ‘a matter for the Commander to 
decide’.211  
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Thus after a weekend of violence, directed largely as a response to 
insensitive and discriminatory police tactics, the police continued a heavy-
handed response which the local community likened to an armed occupation, 
refused to discuss operational tactics with respected members of the 
community, and equated suggestions for improvement with thinly-veiled attacks 
upon the institution of the police. It appeared that the collective violence had not 
resulted in the police implementing any changes that would prevent other 
discontented people to violently protest and, during July 1981, this is exactly 
what happened around the country. 
CONCLUSION 
Almost exactly one year after St Pauls, and just five days after all 
charges had been dropped against those involved, Brixton witnessed an 
escalated reappearance of violence.212 The local police had identified that the 
relationship between themselves and large sections of the local black 
community was poor, and thus established a formal liaison committee with 
representatives of the local community in attempts to improve relations. Whilst 
such efforts must be commended, the other policies and attitudes of police 
undermined this measure and led to the committee being disbanded. Mirroring 
similar situations in St Pauls and later Manchester, this undoubtedly increased 
discontent as local community representatives could be seen by the wider 
population to have attempted reconciliation with the police, only to end such 
efforts due to the belief the police were not paying attention to what they were 
advising or requesting. Attempts at increased political participation were 
rebuffed, leading some to conclude collective violence was the only strategy 
which could achieve positive results. The resulting disturbances led to the 
establishment of the Scarman Inquiry, a full independent public inquiry precisely 
which many had been calling for after St Pauls. This, along with other 
responses to the events, police radio messages and statements, and witness 
statements is examined in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEVELOPMENT OR DETERIORATION?:  
INQUIRIES AFTER BRIXTON 
 
The scale of the Brixton disturbances, coupled with the influence of its 
media coverage, provoked a particularly strong response. This was largely one 
of shock, and Lord Scarman summarised in his resulting report that ‘the British 
people watched with horror and incredulity’. 1  This chapter addresses initial 
response to the disturbances, which once more was focussed by the media and 
authorities upon the criminality of events leading to repeated calls for the police 
to be further equipped to respond to such violent unrest. Unlike St Pauls, due to 
the ferocity of events and also possibility its proximity to Westminster, an 
independent inquiry was established by Home Secretary William Whitelaw into 
events and its establishment and reaction will be examined below. Furthermore, 
radio messages sent between the police during the disturbances and police and 
witness statements recorded after events are examined in detail to shed new 
light on events. As with St Pauls, and as will be seen in Liverpool and 
Manchester, a great number of allegations of police misconduct emerged from 
investigations, most of which went unexamined and did not appear in 
Scarman’s published report. His reasoning for this was that his inquiry was not 
able to examine such accusations appropriately but, to the local black 
community, it appeared yet a further denial of participation in the political 
process. 
HOME SECRETARY VISIT 
In order to assess the situation, Sunday 12 April saw a visit to Brixton 
from Whitelaw and Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir David 
McNee.2 Whilst many in St Pauls decried that Brixton saw such a visit whilst 
Bristol had not, Whitelaw had a particular responsibility for events within 
London. As Home Secretary he was ultimately in charge of London's 
Metropolitan Police Service as the Metropolitan Commissioner was directly 
accountable to him. Whitelaw likened the scenes to the London blitz and was 
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described as being ‘tense and shaken’, reportedly remarking: ‘how completely 
and utterly senseless this is’.3 The fact that Whitelaw could not make any sense 
of the reasons behind the disturbances seems in itself to be a possible reason 
for why they occurred, not being aware of the level of discontent which had led 
to such action. Somewhat predictably, the reception the establishment 
delegation received was not particularly favourable; crowds chanted ‘Sieg Heil 
Fascist Pigs’ with clenched fist salutes, occasionally threw missiles, and 
generally shouted abuse at the visiting officials.4 Demonstrating the apparent 
mood of the crowd, one protestor loudly questioned ‘Why haven’t you been here 
before?’5 Whitelaw himself acknowledged that their presence had increased 
tensions, but that ‘it was essential that we were there personally’.6 For people 
who had grown disillusioned with the British state, it appeared that their 
collective violence had made authorities pay attention to their situation, quite 
literally overnight. Thus many stated that they would continue such actions until 
their specific problems were actually addressed ‘This will go on until they listen 
to us’, and, as Alex Wheatle summarised in a 2011 BBC London News 
interview: ‘For the first time, we were actually taken notice of by the wider 
world.’7 
RESPONSE 
The immediate political response was to condemn the violence and 
reaffirm support for the police, who were widely praised for displaying great 
bravery in the face of such criminality.8 Whitelaw visited many of the officers in 
hospital on the Sunday afternoon, ‘to express our disappointment and sadness 
about their injuries and our thanks for what they had done’.9 This visual support 
from the state for injured police officers, when many believed that the authorities 
did not care enough about members of their community who were injured by 
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police misconduct before and during the disturbances to even adequately 
investigate accusations of such, simply further added to widespread discontent. 
Moreover, in his speech regarding the disturbances in the Commons, Whitelaw 
stated that ‘Whatever grievances individuals or communities feel they suffer, 
such violence – from whatever quarter it comes – cannot and will not be 
condoned.’ 10  David Mellor, Conservative MP for Putney, summarised the 
response of many when he deemed it ‘grossly wrong and unfair to talk about 
social protest’ when events should be viewed as ‘sheer criminality’.11 This was 
consistent with a government which favoured the conservative portrayal of the 
disturbances as a rejection of law and order, rather than a more liberal or 
radical reading which stressed the ‘basic flaws’ within society that were being 
addressed by the violence.12  This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Seven, focussing on general reactions to the broader events of 1981. Whilst 
conceding that many of those involved in disorders were British-born, and 
further demonstrating the prevalent Conservative principle of combining racial 
harmony with immigration control, Whitelaw also argued that many participants 
‘came here between 1957 and 1962, and all of us who were in the House at that 
time bear a similar share of the responsibility’; the cause was thus immigration, 
not racial discrimination.13 
In his later report Scarman concluded that the disorders originated 
spontaneously in reaction to police action and quickly became a riot, the 
purpose of which was to attack the police: ‘The riots were essentially an 
outburst of anger and resentment by young black people against the police.’14 
This was later clearly supported by Brixton participant Alex Wheatle, who 
argued that black youth in the area had reached a point of despair and no hope, 
‘and when you have got no hope you’re just going to react and you’re not going 
to care about the consequences. Because we felt we’re going to get arrested 
and beaten up anyway, so we might as well try and get our revenge in first.’15 
Obviously this was not the reaction of everyone in the local area otherwise the 
proportion of Brixton which violently clashed with the police would have been 
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higher than the one percent cited; however it was the case for the small 
proportion who believed that there was no other recourse available to them. 
Parallel to similar testimonies during the St Pauls disturbances, the focus of 
violence being purely directed towards the police is supported by various 
mentions in statements provided to Scarman. 16  An unnamed freelance 
photographer recounted a story of being attacked by some black youths, only 
for two slightly older black men to command ‘Leave him alone, he’s not a pig’ 
and advise the photographer to leave the area.17 Similarly, a youth who threw a 
missile at a passing ambulance was chastised and reminded to focus such 
attacks on police vehicles.18  
These actions exhibit traits of what S. D. Reicher expressed in his study 
of the previous St Pauls riots. His social identity model suggested that people 
are able to act as one in crowd events due to sharing a common social identity; 
in this case the residents of Brixton attempting to defend their community 
against the perceived ‘attack’ of the specifically targeted police and their desire 
for them to leave the area.19 This is further supported and reminiscent of Bristol 
with the reasoning that, prior to the widespread looting, businesses locally 
known to be hostile to the black community were singled out for attack.20 As 
Reverend Nind summarised after spending time with those involved, ‘…there 
was no one who seemed to be their leader, no one was directing what they 
should do. There was plainly at work a common mind to stake out a territory 
and prevent the police from invading it.’21  Scarman concluded that, despite 
containing a ‘strong racial element’, whites as well as black participated and 
they were not race riots as some had described them.22 Prior to initiating his 
inquiry, he claimed that ‘black is merely an accident, as perhaps religion is an 
accident in Northern Ireland’.23 This, as well as clearly negating arguments that 
violence had occurred due to a predisposition of black people for violence, 
again shows the level of influence and examples drawn from Northern Ireland 
experiences. 
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Police statements and observations are also useful in further illuminating 
the views and actions of those involved in the disturbances themselves, 
although obviously it must be remembered that these are police descriptions of 
events. Many make reference to some residents, especially elder generations, 
expressing ‘shame and embarrassment’ of the actions of the youth with the fear 
that such actions would produce severe repercussions against the community.24 
This is both representative of the increased willingness on the part of the 
younger generations to violently protest perceived discrimination and suggests 
that such repercussions had previously been experienced following earlier 
protests from the black population. Accounts emerged of older black people 
being angrily condemned by younger generations for talking to the police.25 This 
generational divide between younger and older black people was evident on 
numerous occasions; for example, whilst some community leaders such as 
Tony Morgan did appear to have some level of influence upon the crowd, there 
were multiple reports of older black males complaining they could not stop the 
situation or were observed shouting at the youths to stop what they were doing 
and to go home, but reportedly none paid any attention.26 This was challenged 
by The Guardian who claimed the reaction of the black community was ‘four 
square behind the youths’.27 Youths who had grown up seeing their parents 
suffering largely unchallenged discrimination, and experiencing much 
themselves especially within education, employment, and from the local police, 
were now willing to violently oppose this situation. 
FOCUS ON CRIMINALITY AND LAW AND ORDER 
The focus by some purely on the criminality of the events, especially the 
largely unconnected looting, threatened to suppress feelings of discontent at the 
heart of the initial disorder. As many, including Scarman, have noted, such 
looting was generally conducted by people not involved in disturbances with the 
police and often by whites arriving in cars after the Saturday evening television 
news. 28  Michael Keith analysed those arrested during events in Brixton, 
concluding that there was in fact two riots; firstly a localised confrontation with 
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the police involving local people, and secondly the looting and criminality some 
distance away from the first.29 A submission to Scarman from Professor Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Director of the London School of Economics, made the point that 
many such disturbances followed the same basic pattern.30 Using examples of 
the ‘waves of violence’ which had swept through Europe the previous year, he 
highlighted many similarities between them. These included: being largely 
committed by young people who were not students; beginning with specific 
incidents but turning into conflict between youths and police; and that 
‘Demonstrations which turned violent provide a cover for looting, though quite 
often stealing goods is not the primary purpose of most.’31  
Notably from the reaction to events, many comparisons were drawn 
between the situation and environment in Brixton with warfare. Numerous police 
and public recorded that the scene was reminiscent of a battlefield, comparable 
with Northern Ireland and like a war.32 The Northern Ireland influence was seen 
throughout these disturbances in both police tactics and the actions of the 
participants, undoubtedly an influence in Brixton becoming the first ever use of 
petrol bombs within mainland Britain. Even Scarman in his official report made 
repeated reference to the association between the Brixton events and warfare.33 
It is not difficult to see why such a comparison kept appearing, not least as 
many from the local community had already been describing a situation where 
they were under siege from the police; add to that the street violence and to 
many the warfare comparison appeared to be apt. Such comparisons led to 
suggestions that the army should have been brought in to control the streets 
and that police required improved training and equipment in order to better 
respond to such violence. Rumours of the army being mobilised were apparent 
during the weekend and, although Scarman referred to this as an ‘awful 
requirement’, he believed it was one that was close to being required on the 
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Saturday night when ‘that thin blue line’ was almost overwhelmed. 34  As 
previously discussed and is later in relation to other disturbances, the possible 
use of the army was indeed deliberated by the highest levels of government, 
who decided that such a measure ‘could not be contemplated’.35 
Due almost certainly in part to the framing of unrest in terms of criminality 
and evoking war-like imagery, a large focus was upon how to improve the 
police’s equipment in controlling future violent outbreaks of mass protest. This is 
clear in the police stating at one point that they had neither the equipment nor 
manpower to go on the offensive against the numbers present.36 Also many 
subsequent witness statements and accounts comment on a need to reinforce 
police equipment in order to deal with such outbreaks. Numerous remarks from 
members of the public stated the lack of help from police and firefighters to 
prevent arson, questioning their role and capability in maintaining law and 
order. 37  This aspect is discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters 
following the July outbreaks of similar violence, which saw an increased and 
more forceful police response including the first use of CS gas within mainland 
Britain.  
However it is important to note here the immediate problem and effect of 
focussing on criminality following the Brixton disturbances. John Clare, a BBC 
reporter who witnessed the Brixton riots, concluded that such warfare 
comparisons led to the supremacy of the ‘wrong’ lessons; that the police 
needed to be given enhanced weaponry and that black people are ‘an alien, 
potentially revolutionary wedge’.38 Clare further criticised Scarman for helping 
proliferate such views by heavily exaggerating the relative seriousness of the 
disturbances:  
Horror and incredulity might well have been the feelings of a policeman 
cowering behind his riot shield as he watched the bricks and petrol 
bombs rain down upon him, and the police, many of whom gave 
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evidence to the inquiry, were right to emphasise it. However, that is not 
the vantage point from which the Report is supposedly written.39 
As discussed later, this reaction and focus potentially played a role in the 
violence around the country some three months later. John Benyon also noted 
that many commentators tended to exaggerate the scale of the disorders for 
‘sometimes nefarious’ reasons.40 Emphasising that the disturbances comprised 
of less than one percent of the Brixton population, he stated: ‘This is not to seek 
to minimise the significance of the disorders, rather to place them in 
perspective.’ 41  Despite the relatively small numbers involved, the main 
significance of the Brixton disorder was the further dissemination of the belief 
that collective violence was a strategy which would achieve for the black 
community the attention and resources they were otherwise denied. 
SPREAD OF EVENTS 
As elsewhere the events quickly spread within the area and then further, 
partly fostered by the media attention on events as, just as they had 
undoubtedly played a part in spreading consciousness of St Pauls, they were 
even more involved at the forefront in Brixton. Timothy Brain stated how 
television coverage ‘imprint[ed] it in the collective consciousness of the nation’, 
and Benyon and John Solomos concluded that millions of people ‘saw for 
themselves the fury that had been unleashed’. 42  The media were keen to 
document events and police logged queries from organisations such as the 
BBC questioning whether there had been outbreaks of violence on Saturday 
morning, with reporters appearing to be surprised when the answer was no.43 
Numerous reports were also made of similar telephone calls to local residents 
to ask if they knew of any violence in the area.44 Similarly, many commented on 
the speed that photographers and media arrived on the scene once the 
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disruption had begun, almost ‘as if they were expecting things to happen’.45 
Their presence was even suggested to have increased tensions in the area as it 
suggested an air of inevitability that some form of trouble would erupt.46  
The power of the media was clear to all involved, and there were multiple 
accusations from the police of local people attempting to provoke officers and, 
once they reacted, document their retaliation to use against them in 
independent publications.47 Whilst it could be a case that the police were simply 
inventing such accusations, the underlying tone of these suggest that such 
actions were seen as foreign to British ideals of ‘fair play’; something that 
Conservative MP Norman Tebbit would likely term ‘just not cricket’.48 As the 
argument of this thesis is that collective violence aimed to achieve greater 
political participation and resources for the local black community, the use of 
media to further this message was potentially a useful instrument. This was a 
tactic possibly influenced by the American Civil Rights Movement which often 
provoked arrests in order to gain publicity. In a tactic highly controversial within 
the Movement in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, a lack of local volunteers 
forced the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to enlist children for their 
demonstrations; resulting in children fighting on front lines and attracting 
attention and sympathy when answered with forceful responses from 
authorities.49 Certainly utilising the power and influence of the media appeared 
to be a tactic from many of those involved in the disturbances, as one 
participant explained to Reverend Nind: ‘We must reach the world Press, 
everybody’s got to know the oppression we’ve been under.’50 This is further 
supported by reports of Councillor John Boyle informing that participants he had 
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spoken with wanted a televised interview.51 The majority of mainstream media 
focussed rather on the violence against the police and depicted images of 
sympathetic police being attacked, so any attempts to provoke and document a 
hostile police response seemingly did not sway public opinion in their favour. 
The spread of events through the media and word of mouth resulted in a 
number of people travelling into the area to either observe or participate in the 
violence, especially on the Saturday night. One officer stated he had heard from 
numerous sources that, within half an hour of the initial outbreak of violence, ‘a 
white furniture lorry pulled up and about thirty blacks jumped out’.52 Numerous 
witness reports state how the youths involved in the violence were not 
recognised and that they must have come in from other areas.53 One statement 
provided the insightful comment that they believed that the travelling youths had 
viewed it as an opportunity of ‘getting their own back’ on the police.54 Whilst this 
likely occurred to some extent, it also led to the widespread accusation that 
outside agitators had initially planned the violence; which, as Benyon 
highlighted, ‘appears to have been advanced to explain almost all the disorders 
that have occurred in Britain since the Gordon Riots of 1780’. 55  Sir David 
McNee, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, was quoted on 12 April as 
suggesting that outside troublemakers might be behind the events.56 McNee 
later conceded that there was no evidence to support that theory, claiming that 
such a suggestion was due to being ‘caught…on the wrong foot’ by the media: 
‘Act in haste, repent at leisure.’57  
As discussed previously, it is likely true that people travelled from 
elsewhere to the scene as evidence does support this. However blaming all of 
the events on outsiders or political agitators further angered many as it removed 
the agency for events from those within the local community who had violently 
responded to perceived police misconduct: ‘As if we couldn’t have put on a riot 
without a white outsider to show us how. It’s typical.’58 
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Additionally the antecedent of Bristol did not appear to be far from many 
people’s minds, supporting the theory that this played a role in the ensuing 
disorders. More than one reference was made to members of the Brixton crowd 
shouting ‘Remember Bristol’ as they charged against police.59 Those criticising 
the disturbances claimed this was a result of no prosecutions arising from the St 
Pauls disturbances which had fostered ‘The belief that since Bristol “got away 
with it”, they can’.60 MP John Fraser recalled a conversation with Ted Knight on 
the Friday night which discussed the possibility of the situation becoming a ‘mini 
Bristol’.61 After the ensuing violence, it turned out that ‘mini’ was more than a 
slight understatement. 
SCARMAN INQUIRY 
As well as vociferously supporting the police, Whitelaw also quickly 
announced the establishment of an inquiry to be headed by Lord Scarman. 
Scarman was widely respected and had previously resided over inquiries into 
the Northern Ireland riots of August 1969 and the Red Lion Square inquiry into 
the 1974 death of Kevin Gately.62 Whitelaw later recorded that, in a sentiment 
often visible during the disturbances, his Northern Ireland experience was 
influential in deciding to appoint Scarman who himself had experience of ‘similar 
circumstances’.63 Scarman himself noted his ‘considerable experience of the 
administrative and organisational problems of enquiries of this sort’.64 It certainly 
appeared that to many he was the obvious choice, although this was not the 
view of all. Some believed that Scarman had absolved the police of 
responsibility for Gately’s death and that he had also backed the use of the 
Special Patrol Group (SPG); he stated at the time he was: ‘not prepared to 
make any recommendations which would have the effect of reducing the ability 
of the most lightly equipped urban police force in the world to deal swiftly and 
decisively with disorder’.65 Also the use of the same judge suggested to many a 
sense that this inquiry symbolised ‘business as usual’ from Westminster and 
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that there would be no differing outcome. Conversely Conservatives and right-
wing commentators believed Scarman was too left-wing, notably seen by 
disagreement with his 1977 inquiry into the Grunwick dispute, a two-year strike 
regarding union recognition at a small film processing plant in North London.66 
Thus Scarman was in the strange position of being criticised from multiple 
sides; simultaneously being too left-wing for some, and not radical enough for 
others. As well as personal criticisms of Scarman, the fact of an inquiry itself 
was criticised for example by Conservative MP William Benyon who stated that, 
regardless of who ran it, any inquiry appeared to be legitimising the violence.67 
However there appeared to be little acknowledgement awarded to the idea that 
this violence had been the last recourse from people who believed all other 
avenues of protest had been forcibly closed to them and, as such, an inquiry 
was indeed necessary. 
The inquiry was established under Section 32 of the Police Act 1964. 
This, as McNee later commented, meant it would concentrate upon policing 
rather than the broader social, political, and economic situation:  
I was, to say the least, unhappy…Some faults certainly lay at our door 
but there were faults elsewhere too…after the battering which the force 
had received over the last two days, morale was hardly likely to be 
improved by an announcement that there was to be an inquiry into the 
conduct of the police.68  
Labour Shadow Home Secretary Roy Hattersley similarly criticised the 
circumstances under which the inquiry was established, arguing that ‘at the very 
best that allows him to have an oblique look at the social conditions’.69 As Brain 
highlighted, it ‘certainly suited the Conservative government, already under fire 
for rising unemployment and cuts in unemployment benefit, to have the main 
focus on the police’.70 McNee shared this view and suggested it was an effort to 
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protect the Home Office and government at the expense of the police; not 
surprising from the head of that organisation:  
All this, set in the much wider context of successive governments’ 
dealings with unemployment, housing, welfare and social services in 
inner city areas and of the major cuts imposed on local authority and 
welfare services. An inquiry covering these matters could lead to an 
embarrassing outcome at a time when the Government’s fortunes were 
low. Was it for these reasons that the police were put into the dock?71 
Scarman himself stated upon launching the inquiry that it would ‘undoubtedly’ 
examine the underlying causes of the disturbances, and he did not feel inhibited 
by the nature of the inquiry as he believed that Section 32 was very wide in any 
matter connected with the policing of the area. 72  McNee labelled such 
descriptions as ‘moonshine’, believing that ‘the police were to be the political 
scapegoats’ and Scarman would himself later acknowledge that this inquiry into 
policing required further study within its broader social setting.73 
After years of appeals and demands for a Home Office initiated public 
inquiry, campaigners were eventually granted their wish. Arthur Palmer, Labour 
MP for Bristol North-East, reminded Whitelaw that he and others had appealed 
for a similar public inquiry after St Pauls, but Whitelaw refused to admit the 
Brixton disturbances showed it was ‘a mistake’ not to hold such an inquiry as 
Brixton ‘was far wider and of far more depth than was the case in Bristol’.74 
Rather than being seen to be admitting a connection between events and that it 
was a mistake not to have held an inquiry, Whitelaw appeared to claim that this 
had been such a different situation that no lessons could have been learned or 
situations improved from an inquiry into St Pauls. Many would argue differently. 
Nevertheless there still existed some reluctance to hold this Brixton inquiry. A 
note of a meeting between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and senior 
Ministers agreed that ‘there would have to be an inquiry’.75 The language of 
such a hesitant statement suggests that it was still not something actively 
wanted, rather something which could no longer be avoided given the scale and 
perception of the Brixton disturbances.  
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The same meeting concluded that it would be ideal for the inquiry to be 
conducted in private, although Whitelaw pointed out that Scarman himself might 
disagree.76 Indeed he did and in a meeting the day after being appointed head 
of the inquiry, Scarman stated that virtually all of the inquiry would be held in 
public as he ‘deprecate[d] enquiries of this sort in private’.77 It is unclear whether 
Scarman discussed this with Whitelaw prior to announcing it, but it is something 
that subsequently Scarman had the final word on. If this was the case, that 
Whitelaw did not authorise such a move but subsequently could not oppose that 
once Scarman had announced it, it is possible that this created private feelings 
of animosity between Scarman and the government, affecting their view of his 
eventual report. Without evidence of such, this remains merely a possibility.  
The conclusions, recommendations, and legacy of Scarman’s Inquiry are 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
POLICE RADIO MESSAGES AND STATEMENTS 
Despite the main facts and movements of the weekend having been 
relatively well addressed in the literature, transcripts of police radio messages 
sent during the disturbances and police statements taken subsequently have 
not received much, if any, attention due to their previous inaccessibility. These 
are discussed below with a view to further illuminate police opinions and 
actions, and their study can reveal aspects of the disturbances which did not 
appear in Scarman’s published report. Examples cited here have been chosen 
to best illustrate wider patterns appearing throughout the sources. A large 
proportion of the radio messages were regarding tactical locations, procedures 
or, understandably, from hungry and tired police officers requesting refreshment 
breaks. Whilst useful in suggesting attitudes and providing another view on 
events, it is clear that officers were aware of the need to maintain a level of 
professionalism. For example, one officer who complained after a struggle with 
the crowd that: ‘I’ve lost my fucking blasted watch now’, was quickly reminded 
to ‘watch your elocution’.78 Similarly statements and interviews with police after 
events can suggest their attitudes, although it must be remembered that such 
accounts occurred at a time after Scarman’s inquiry had been announced and, 
as such, officers were unlikely to record anything that would incriminate 
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themselves or colleagues. Nonetheless it appears that some were more careful 
about potentially inflammatory remarks than others; one particularly memorable 
police statement complained about ‘a fat ugly white woman’ taking numerous 
photographs of the police.79 
CONFUSION 
It is immediately clear from the radio messages sent during the disorder 
that there was a great deal of confusion amongst officers and often no real 
knowledge of who, if anyone, was in charge on the ground. The documents also 
reveal the confusion inherent in deploying police officers to an area with which 
they were unfamiliar; one example complaining that he was ‘a stranger here’.80 
Whilst intended as purely geographical, such language highlights the deeper 
issue of how a lack of familiarity with the area and community was problematic 
before and during the disorder. Confusion and a lack of clear leadership were 
especially obvious during the initial outbreak of violence, for example 
complaints that ‘It’s going barmy’, and ‘Never mind what the Governors say 
Shields please, shields’. Another unit complained that they were ‘going round 
and round in circles trying to find something to do’.81 This was also apparent in 
the police’s statements following events, with many references being made to a 
lack of instruction and officers not being aware of their orders.82 Even during the 
Home Secretary’s visit on the Sunday, an event which surely demanded 
increased security, officers complained of not being specifically briefed or aware 
of an overall policy.83  
This lack of specific instruction and general strategy undoubtedly led 
some officers to undertake actions not sanctioned by senior officers. Police 
Sergeant Stephen Bush, perhaps demonstrating frustration at the confusion 
regarding tactics and eagerness to fight the rioters, recorded the moment that 
the police ‘eventually’ charged.84 There were some reports of officers telling 
observers that senior police did not know what they were doing and even some 
examples of officers refusing the orders that they had been given.85 Scarman 
                                                     
79 PC Patrick Dunne, A 377, TNA: HO 266/100. 
80 Police Tape Transcripts, Saturday 11 April 1981, TNA: HO 266/76. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Dunne, A 377. 
83 Hoskins, P.S. 40. 
84 Police Sergeant Stephen Bush, P.S. 261, TNA: HO 266/99. 
85 Unknown, O.S. 124, 29 May 1981, TNA: HO 266/103; John David Lewis, 1 June 1981, O.S. 
153, TNA: HO 266/104. 
217 
 
himself, when collecting evidence from Commander Fairbairn, described some 
accounts of police activities during the riots as seeming ‘awfully haphazard’.86 It 
is not hard to see why so many accusations of police misconduct emerged 
following the disturbances when many officers were confused, probably fearful, 
and growing frustrated at a lack of coherent instruction from their superiors. 
BACKUP AND FEAR OF SERIOUS INJURY 
A recurring theme in police radio messages and statements, again not 
surprising under the circumstances, were demands for backup and relaying 
violence against them. One message early into the disorder from Commander 
Fairbairn noted that police were ‘seriously slipping into a bit of bother here we’re 
going to get totally overrun’. A later message from a Chief Inspector declared 
‘we are getting a good hiding and we can’t hold out for long’, adding that ‘if we 
don’t get some assistance soon we’re going to have the biggest…you’ve ever 
seen.’ 87  Unfortunately the missing word was not recorded, either through 
communication issues or a sensitive transcriber, but the possible omission can 
be imagined to be warning of possible dire consequences without 
reinforcements. However the police control room allegedly postponed the 
deployment of removal units to take away burned vehicles because they ‘saw 
no point in bringing them into the area to have a few more casualties to what 
we’ve already got’.88  
In addition, multiple police statements make reference to the fear of 
being overwhelmed, thus leading to a serious injury or death.89 Crowds were 
described as cheering and laughing when striking police or when officers were 
visibly injured, with shouts of ‘He’s dead’ triggering increased celebrations.90 
Those officers on the receiving end of such attacks recorded hearing shouts 
such as ‘Come on, kill the fucker’, truly believing that it was meant. 91  An 
example of such sentiments was even recorded in the transcripts of police radio 
message as someone, presumably a member of the crowd who had obtained a 
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police radio, shouted ‘I am going to kill the damn copper man’ before being 
abruptly cut off.92 Whether it was the rioters intention to actually kill any officers 
is difficult to know, but phrases such as ‘That’s one to us’ clearly illustrated the 
battle mind-set of the crowd and feeling that the violence was an attempted 
retribution.93 Whilst police later congratulated their colleagues for their bravery 
and behaviour whilst being ‘victims of sustained and sickening violence’, many 
of the protesters might have argued facing the same conditions is what led them 
to participate in the collective violence. Injuries that were obtained likely led to 
the police, particularly younger officers, attempting to seek their own form of 
vengeance against the crowds. One observer claimed that, as soon as fresh 
officers arrived on the scene, they were immediately taken to view an injured 
officer before being ordered to clear the streets.94 The unspoken implication 
was that this was in order to enrage and motivate officers into seeking 
retaliation upon the crowds who had injured their colleagues, which was an 
accusation often repeated. 
POLICE RETALIATION AND UNPOPULAR TACTICS 
A recurring criticism of the police was that some officers were throwing 
bricks and bottles back at crowds, having an antagonistic effect.95 There are 
many examples of officers admitting they had thrown items back at rioters in 
order to ‘keep them at a distance’. 96  ‘Particularly worrying’, according to 
Scarman, were allegations of police use of unlawful weapons.97 For example, 
Inspector Richard Monk recorded putting away his police truncheon in favour of 
picking up an iron bar and dustbin lid. He shouted encouragement to fellow 
officers whilst banging on the dustbin lid in an attempt to intimidate the crowd; 
others followed suit, banging truncheons against their own shields and objects 
such as cars.98 Scarman stated that such actions, whilst understandable in the 
circumstances, undoubtedly caused fear in some peaceful spectators, were not 
the actions of a disciplined force, and should not have occurred.99 Despite this 
criticism of the police’s tactics of using unlawful weapons, attempting to 
intimidate the crowd, and returning bottles and bricks in kind, no officer 
                                                     
92 Police Tape Transcripts, Saturday 11 April 1981, TNA: HO 266/77. 
93 Grace, A 226. 
94 Unknown, 5 June 1981, TNA: HO 266/103. 
95 Scarman, The Scarman Report, pp. 112-3. 
96 PC Robert Michael Saunders, P.S. 31, TNA: HO 266/98. 
97 Scarman, The Scarman Report, p. 112. 
98 Monk, P.S. 522. 
99 Scarman, The Scarman Report, pp. 112-3. 
219 
 
subsequently received any form of punishment for such actions. In comparison 
with the authorities’ focus on the criminality of events and related court 
proceedings, it again appeared that the police were not being held accountable 
for their actions to the same extent. Furthermore officers reported that such a 
tactic was ultimately unsuccessful as, rather than frighten the crowd, it 
appeared to provoke them.100 
Another controversial tactic employed by the police was the use of fire 
hoses to spray crowds with water. Brain described this as an improvised 
copying of tactics officially used only in Northern Ireland and Europe. 101 
Scarman’s report detailed how, during the disturbances, Chief Superintendent 
John Robinson believed ‘extraordinary measures’ were required to prevent 
firefighters retreating from the area leaving fires raging. Commandeering a hose 
from a firefighter, he ordered other officers to do the same and water was 
directed at the crowd forcing them to fall back.102 Upon being told by a senior 
fire officer that hoses should not be used for crowd control, Robinson replied 
that it was necessary to prevent the police and firefighters from being 
overrun.103 This again highlights the priorities of the police as, even as trained 
professionals were advising against their use, officers at the scene decided that 
it was more important to repel crowds and allow firefighters to tackle the fires. 
Despite this Scarman did not reach any judgements on hoses being used 
in such way or criticise Robinson’s actions; in fact McNee singled Robinson out 
for praise as a ‘brave and outstanding police officer’ who had ‘prevented 
disaster’, again generating displeasure from those who believed the police 
could effectively get away with anything they wanted to do. 104  Despite the 
characterisation of Robinson’s actions being as a unique reaction to a 
particularly calamitous situation, police statements show that hoses were used 
on more than one occasion and for much longer than was suggested in 
Scarman’s Report. Inspector Richard Monk similarly advocated the use of 
hoses against the crowd as he believed a withdrawal of firefighters would 
encourage the mob to charge police lines.105 Whilst the crowd was far enough 
away to not be reached by the water, Monk stated that the use of hoses as a 
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deterrent was ‘directly responsible’ for a decrease in missile throwing.106 Other 
members of the police and fire brigade recorded multiple use of hoses against 
the crowd; although firefighters notably differentiate that they were used only to 
protect imminently vulnerable persons, such as a police officer on the floor 
being kicked by a crowd yelling ‘Kill him’.107 Also, as opposed to the three 
minutes claimed by a senior officer, one officer claimed that a hose was used 
against the crowd for ‘about half an hour’, and only stopped once his arm grew 
tired.108 Whether or not in the circumstances fire hoses should have been used 
in such a way, the fact that they were again shows the influence of Northern 
Ireland examples infiltrating the British mainland and Scarman’s later refusal to 
criticise or question the police’s actions further antagonised many. 
Similarly a tactic noted for its negative reaction from many within the 
local community was the police use of dogs against the crowd. Scarman 
summarised that there was an overall agreement from police in their evidence 
that dogs should not be used to disperse crowds in such delicate situations.109 
However numerous references were made in individual submissions to the 
inquiry that the police had used dogs, despite a ‘widely known’ dislike of dogs 
by the black population and that such use undoubtedly aggravated the crowd.110 
The use and subsequent criticism of dogs during the St Pauls disturbances the 
previous year alone makes it difficult to believe that officers in Brixton were 
unaware of the provocative nature of such actions and that it would likely foster 
a hostile reaction. Indeed if Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Brian Weigh 
had admitted ‘very careful consideration’ should be undertaken before using 
dogs in a multi-racial area and this lesson should be learned from the St Pauls 
disorder, it was clear that either by accident or design police in Brixton had not 
learnt this lesson.111 One anecdote from the disturbances suggests that it was 
the latter and police were aware of the potential negative consequences. 
Teresa Nind, wife of local Reverend Robert Nind, recorded that her warning to 
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an officer with a dog about further damaging race relations was greeted with the 
response: ‘I don’t care about race relations. Fucking old bitch, piss off.’112 
Scarman suggested that the reason dogs had been at the scene in the 
first place was that dog handlers had responded to general calls for urgent 
assistance without a full understanding of the situation or that dogs would not 
be appropriate; and as such he recommended the introduction of arrangements 
to prevent such confusion.113  However police transcripts of radio messages 
state that, a short time after disturbances began on Saturday, a specific request 
was made for ‘more assistance and in particular dog units’.114 Clearly it was 
believed at the time they were necessary and would effectively control the 
growing hostility from the crowds, regardless of attempts to subsequently claim 
otherwise. 
WITHDRAWAL? 
Various suggestions were made that a police withdrawal may have 
decreased tensions and ended the violence, such as ITN reporter Michael 
Oliver who described police cordons ‘as a red rag to a bull to all the young 
people’.115 Whether amplified through megaphone, shouted at senior officers, or 
calmly relayed by those claiming to represent the protesters, the message 
appeared constant from the crowd that they wanted the police out and such 
action would lead to a ceasefire.116 On the Saturday evening local Councillors 
John Boyle and Stewart Lansley, together with black community worker Tony 
Morgan and journalist John Clare, all passed behind the barricades to discuss 
with the crowd their grievances and desires. It was clear from subsequent 
discussions that these men considered that if the police made even a limited 
withdrawal the tensions would have decreased and subsequent disorder 
prevented.117  Clare recorded how Boyle brought him to the rioters as they 
wanted their plight televised and that their demands, further to releasing all 
prisoners relating to the riots, clearly specified a principal desire for the police to 
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leave the area. 118  One observer succinctly summed up the situation: ‘The 
trouble seemed to continue merely because there was something to fight 
against.’119 It is clear that the prevailing message being expressed to the police 
was that a strategic withdrawal would be their best option; the police however 
refused to do so and see their authority undermined as it was in St Pauls. 
There were some isolated attempts to withdraw or serious consideration 
being given to it; such as, after the initial outburst of violence on Friday evening, 
police radio messages record controllers advising officers to withdraw from the 
area if the numbers surrounding them were too high and even to abandon 
attempts at arresting prisoners.120 Senior officers at the scene then withdrew 
some of the police numbers, viewed and praised by some commentators as an 
attempt to calm the situation.121 Likewise, after the incident involving the search 
of the taxi on Saturday afternoon, Chief Superintendent Ronald Boyling sensibly 
took the advice of Tony Morgan and removed the officer who had initially 
arrested the man who, as such, was the focus of the assembled crowd’s 
anger.122 Similarly a temporary mini-withdrawal of some officers, plainclothes 
officers being ordered to return to the station as their presence was stimulating 
anger, and all conspicuously marked police road traffic cars were removed from 
the area in apparent attempts to calm the situation. 123  Some police radio 
messages suggest that units being withdrawn was rather actually a reaction to 
decreasing violence, rather than a specific tactic to diffuse tensions: for example 
‘I’m thinking of withdrawing units, because it’s got relatively calm down here 
now’ was greeted with the response ‘I think we’re beating it then’.124  
Yet senior police officials were adamantly against mass police 
withdrawal. As summarised by Chief Superintendent Sidney Nicholson, the 
main argument appeared to be that the situation would deteriorate further if the 
police withdrew: ‘it would give [protestors] the impression they’ve got a victory 
and of course it’ll give them more ground in which to set cars up on their sides 
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on fire’.125 This view that a police withdrawal would allow law-breakers free 
roam, as well as characterising the collective violence as mindless criminality as 
opposed to specific action against the police, was countered by accusations 
that the police seemingly ignored the vast majority of looting occurring during 
the Saturday’s early evening. Police radio messages record that they were 
receiving continuous telephone calls regarding looting and, on the Saturday, 
whilst 92 burglary and robbery crimes were reported to the police only twelve 
related arrests were made.126 Councillor Stewart Lansley concluded that ‘the 
police apparently chose to ignore this in order to concentrate their numbers in 
an area of relative calm where there seemed little danger of damage to shops 
or property’.127 Scarman rejected this criticism, stating that the police could not 
have left the disorder unattended and that concentrating on the disturbances 
was an issue of limited police resources rather than a reluctance to address the 
looting.128 
Thus the prevalent order from senior police officers was ‘do not consider 
withdrawing’, leading to situations where deployed police were only permitted to 
leave an area if immediately replaced, despite it being acknowledged that it 
wasn’t clear how many men were deployed or where they actually were.129 
Consequently when faced with the delegation of Councillors, community worker, 
and journalist who relayed information received from the participants behind the 
barricade advising a police withdrawal, Commander Fairbairn steadfastly 
refused. He argued that it was his decision alone what to do, that his primary 
duty was to clear streets, and he refused to accept ‘no-go’ areas.130 It seemed 
obvious that refusal to withdraw was influenced by the withdrawal and 
subsequent criticism during the St Pauls disturbances of the previous year. 
Reverend Robert Nind even claimed Fairbairn openly told him as much: ‘We will 
not do what they did in Bristol. We are not going to withdraw at all.’131 As Mike 
Phillips stated a few days after events in Brixton, the Bristol police had been 
viewed as ‘ninnies for their withdrawal, inefficient for their failure to bring in 
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reinforcements, and undermined by their concern about community relations. 
The Met wouldn’t let it happen.’132 This refusal to see their authority undermined 
was summed up by a police spokesman: ‘The police will not withdraw. The only 
people who control the streets of London are the Met.’133  
Despite the argument that the police withdrawal had actually limited the 
scale of the St Pauls disturbances, police in Brixton firmly placed being seen 
combating the rioters ahead of a tactical withdrawal to reduce tensions and 
‘winning by appearing to lose’. As Peter Squires and Peter Kennison would later 
conclude, this altered style of ‘aggressive and confrontational policing may well 
be losing, even as it appears to win’.134 
Fairbairn’s action was praised by both sides of the House, as Home 
Secretary William Whitelaw and Shadow Home Secretary Roy Hattersley 
claimed that recommendations for the police to withdraw and desert the law-
abiding residents were ‘wholly misplaced’ and Fairbairn was ‘entirely and 
absolutely right’ to reject such suggestions. 135  These responses are not 
surprising from two with potentially a lot to lose politically. Whitelaw, seen as the 
‘acceptable face’ of Thatcherism who did not agree with all of her policies, 
needed to remain free from Thatcher’s wrath as she attempted to remove the 
‘wets’ from her government.136 Similarly Hattersley represented the moderate 
side of the Labour Party and, opposed to Michael Meacher’s left-wing 
radicalism, this was a key factor in later beating Meacher to become deputy 
leader in 1983.137  
Fairbairn’s refusal to withdraw was also supported by Scarman, 
disagreeing that such action would lessen the fury of the crowd:  
The arson and looting in Railton Road were already under way by the 
time of the attempted mediation. It is only necessary to imagine the 
criticism which would have fallen on the head of Commander Fairbairn if 
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he had withdrawn and, as I believe, the looting and disorder had 
continued, in order to realize how misdirected this argument is.138 
Therefore it could be seen that there was a uniform reaction of authority support 
for a decision not to withdraw police out of the area, despite that such a police 
presence and feeling of occupation had caused the uprising in the first place. As 
well as seeming to misinterpret the nature of disorder, this snubbing of their 
apparent expressed wishes further increased disillusionment from many black 
youths towards the authorities and suggested their collective violence still had a 
way to go before achieving all of their desires. 
POLICE MISCONDUCT 
Upon reading the numerous individual submissions and witness 
statements supplied to the Scarman Inquiry, it is hard not to be struck by the 
sheer number of reports of police misconduct, overreaction, or brutality that did 
not appear in the published report. Similar to other official investigations during 
this period, Lord Scarman claimed his inquiry was not the place to investigate 
specific incidents of police wrong-doing and, in general, rejected criticism 
suggesting that the police over-reacted in their handling of the disorders. He 
suggested that the courts or police disciplinary proceedings were the correct 
avenues for resolving such accusations, despite the growing sentiment and 
supporting evidence that such avenues were inadequate and discriminated 
against black complainants.139 As elsewhere the fact that, despite the level of 
criticisms appearing against the police, only nineteen official complaints were 
made against the police regarding the disturbances highlights the level of 
distrust and belief that such a complaints system would not achieve any positive 
results. 140  Scarman himself later had to acknowledge his report has been 
criticised for no such detailed investigations of specific incidents of police 
misconduct.141  
When such accusations of police impropriety are combined, it portrays 
quite a different atmosphere than the generally accepted version of events. 
Obviously it must not be forgotten that there are undoubtedly some accusations 
of police misconduct fuelled by motives other than attempts to chronicle factual 
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events and moreover, as Benyon highlighted, an observer only sees a portion of 
what occurs and that view itself is in the midst of confusion.142 Nonetheless, the 
sheer volume of accusations alone surely makes them worthy of consideration. 
The following section discusses some of those accusations, again being 
selected as the best examples in order to provide a general impression of the 
broader situation. 
The most apparent accusation of police misconduct during the weekend 
was the discriminatory selection of focussed attacks upon black people, to an 
even more blatant degree than had been previously claimed. There were 
numerous accounts of police approaching large groups and choosing to search 
or attack only the black people. For example, police vans pulled up and officers 
quietly exited the vehicle, only to then grab passive black observers from the 
crowd and push them into vans in handcuffs. 143  Another instance included 
officers pushing five white people aside to get to a black man, whom they then 
kicked, hit with batons, and set dogs upon.144 One resident observed three 
officers who ‘aggressively searched’ a black man, only to then ask a white man 
politely to go home whilst addressing him as ‘sir’.145 A ‘particularly well dressed’ 
black man reportedly asked for an officer’s badge number to which the officer 
allegedly pointed to his shoulder, where his number had been removed, and 
replied with a smirk ‘there’s my number’.146 Another black male was arrested 
and, after an apparently fabricated charge of drunk driving was levelled against 
him, was told that the truth did not matter; all that mattered is what the police 
said. 147  This is the situation that black residents had been describing and 
protesting for years previously. When an officer was seen holding a dustbin lid 
and large stick, repeatedly shouting: ‘Come on then, you black bastards, let’s 
have you’, a witness stated how ‘This did not seem to me to be the correct way 
for a policeman to behave, even though it was a riot situation.’148 As elsewhere 
there are numerous references made to people being called ‘black bastards’ 
and ‘black shit’, police making accusations that ‘your lot’ caused the 
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disturbances, and a particularly descriptive account of a senior police officer 
shouting at a black prisoner in a mock accent ‘something like a bad actor from 
the Black and White Minstrel show’. 149  In a similar vein, there are a few 
occasions in the police statements when they reference black people as West 
Indians.150 Whilst it is true that this term was used widely and those being 
discussed could have been first generation immigrants, their age makes it more 
than likely that they had been born in Britain. This suggests that possibly those 
officers did not see such people as British citizens, despite being born in the 
country, who were deserving of their protection.151 
Numerous accounts of unwarranted police violence appeared, generally, 
but not always, directed against black people. Accusations of police attacking 
and kicking seemingly innocent people are frequent, with some even suggesting 
that officers ‘behaved as if they were mad’.152 For example, one description of 
two youths being beaten by police and subsequently arrested stated how they 
‘did not resist arrest, mainly because they had been beaten incapable’. 153 
Another observer was advised by the crowd shortly before the police’s final 
charge that it would not matter if he was guilty as police would attack anyone 
present, and to ‘remember what had happened to Blair Peach at Southall’.154 
The police acting in such a ‘non-police manner’ was linked to their previous 
behaviour in the area, with suggestions that it was indicative of their general 
attitudes and what many claimed to be fiercely reacting against: ‘[Protestors] 
behaved towards the police in like manner’.155 A local couple, sat in their car 
whilst a ‘motley body of men’ rushed past, were surprised to discover these 
were police officers and argued it was no surprise that those on the streets 
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‘defend[ed] themselves very positively’ against ‘this apparent mob’. 156  Such 
actions caused Reverend Robert Nind to accuse officers, similarly to others 
discussed previously, of being ‘just the National Front in uniform’.157 Whether 
provoked or not, many perceived the police response as heavy-handed and 
unnecessary, confirming suspicions of previous police misconduct.  
A Probation Officer with the Inner London Probation Aftercare Service, 
who had spent the Saturday night on police placement with officers from 
Clapham Police Station, stated how ‘very young’ officers seemed excited and 
proud by events, claiming to hear a constable stating that ‘it was a bit naughty, 
we have been dashing into squats and batting anyone in sight’.158 Numerous 
witness statements make reference to older, more experienced police officers 
preventing their younger colleagues abusing people during the disturbances.159 
Councillor Ted Knight claimed that he overheard police messages during the 
disorders that a superintendent was concerned because ‘most of his men’ that 
were being ordered into the area had only two weeks service but that, 
regardless, they were ordered to continue.160 Though, as discussed previously, 
the political leanings of ‘Red Ted’ must be acknowledged when assessing such 
accusations. It was alleged that the police displayed an obvious lack of 
understanding regarding the causes of tension and hostility towards the police 
from black people. When discussing the night’s events, surrounded by 
extensive damage and still smoking buildings, the Probation Officer was struck 
by the ‘boisterous seemingly light-hearted manner’ the police adopted; this 
again undoubtedly further aggravated any local residents who happened to be 
within hearing distance and showed the mind-set of many officers.161  
As previously discussed, it was suggested by many observers that such 
examples of police violence were either acts of revenge for their colleagues’ 
injuries, motivated out of fear, or as a show of regaining control of the streets. 
Police were variously described as ‘very scared’ and ‘very edgy’, and on the 
offensive in order ‘to make an impression upon residents’.162 Scarman himself 
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concluded that he had ‘little doubt’ from the amount of evidence submitted to his 
inquiry that there were instances of police misconduct. 163  However, as 
previously stated, he did not believe his inquiry was the place to investigate 
specific incidents of police wrong-doing, thus disappointing again those who 
wished to see the police disciplined for their actions. 
Furthering the discontent at police actions, occasional references were 
made to police apparently being aware of the cameras and potential witnesses, 
thus stopping their attacks to prevent them from being documented. One 
statement described six police officers exiting an unmarked police van whilst 
brandishing police truncheons, lead piping, and pick axe handles to attack a 
nearby youth, claiming this only halted when BBC employees with equipment 
standing nearby were spotted, upon which one officer shouted ‘Watch out 
cameras, get back in the van’. 164  Another example of a black man being 
attacked with truncheons, punches, and kicks in the van en route to the police 
station claimed officers answered the posed question ‘What shall we do with 
this black bastard?’ with ‘Kill him’, and that a white man arrested with him was 
dubbed ‘white nigger lover’. Just before arrival at the station, one of the officers 
allegedly informed his colleagues there were cameras outside and for police to 
‘Ease up’, which they did as soon as they had left the van.165 The importance of 
the fact that such stories, whether true or not, were widely believed is twofold. 
Firstly that many in the local population deemed such police devious actions 
probable, and secondly that it further spread ideas that there was no way to 
punish police misconduct within the existing system as they were aware of how 
to exploit it for their own ends. 
In addition to the numerous submissions that criticised the police’s 
actions either before or during the disturbances, there were conversely also 
multiple statements from those who wholeheartedly supported police actions. 
Similar to the letters to the police and local authorities supporting the use of the 
SPG discussed earlier, there was a strong racial feeling to many submissions 
which backed the police. One such statement claimed that the only reason the 
black community objected to the use of SPG and increased numbers of stop 
and searches was that it was effective in curbing criminality, and the ‘Perfectly 
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justified’ questioning of black people should not be regarded as harassment 
because if they committed fewer crimes then there would be less need to 
question them.166 This grouping of the entire black community into a singular 
criminal whole showed a misunderstanding, either wilful or unwitting, of the 
discontent from many within the black community and their views and concerns; 
for example those questioning: ‘Why should anybody else get upset when there 
are more police about?’ clearly had a differing relationship with those officers 
than the majority of the local black community.167 
Police actions were defended as being the only protection for the local 
community against the violence; it was even suggested by one observer that 
Martial Law should be implemented to protect the law and order that ‘these 
immigrants are out to try and break’. 168  Thus many believed that police 
deserved ‘no criticism from any quarter.’169 This was extended into criticism of 
the Scarman Inquiry itself which, it was alleged, would provoke extreme anger 
from ‘native’ Britons towards any recommendations seen to be favouring black 
people: ‘When “your” riots start again, (this time with whites in the lead) I hope 
you can live with yourself and sleep easily at night, because I and people like 
me will never again be able to.’170 One writer who described herself as an 
‘ordinary member of the public’ and the wife of a policeman, seemingly not 
believing this would influence her opinions, declared that people were ‘sick and 
tired of hearing all these weak, feeble excuses’ for disturbances, concluding that 
‘Your Report is an insult to the members of the Metropolitan Police and to the 
public in general.’171 This was a view shared by many who did not believe that 
the apparent problems faced by the black community warranted their violent 
response or a specialised government inquiry to investigate them, and there 
were even some accounts of gangs of white people collecting together to exact 
their own revenge during the violence, including reports of a man travelling to 
Brixton armed with a scythe and ‘intends to cause mayhem’.172  
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However, as described, many within the black community felt that their 
collective violence was in fact the only way that they could hope to increase 
their political participation and for society to address some inherent 
discriminations and lack of accountability from those supposedly charged with 
protecting them. 
CONCLUSION 
Over a warm spring weekend in Brixton a tense situation exploded into 
violent scenes which shocked many. Previous negative relations between the 
police and local black population were compounded by the breakdown of the 
community Liaison Committee, largely due to the Police Commander’s refusal 
to inform and include representatives of the local community in planning police 
operations. This can clearly be seen with the immediate short term effect of 
Swamp 81 upon the area, in which a fairly routine incident escalated into 
collective violence due to the police’s heavy handed response. Despite an 
inquiry being instigated, a seeming victory after calls for inquiries into other 
incidents had gone unanswered, this largely ignored subsequent specific 
accusations of police misconduct at the heart of discontent. A response from 
the authorities which focussed more upon criminality rather than addressing the 
apparent issues with the police did not appear to give much hope for the future 
that their situation would be positively changed; suggesting this one instance of 
collective violence would not solve all of their problems.  
Before Scarman could publish his report, indeed during the hearing of 
evidence, further violent outbursts spread around the country, seeming to lead 
some credence to Enoch Powell’s warning following Brixton that the 
government and country ‘have seen nothing yet’.173 Thus Scarman’s inquiry, 
whilst not examining the subsequent disorders in detail as to do so would be 
beyond his inquiry’s stated terms of reference, did invite and receive evidence 
from other areas. 174  Subsequent disturbances are discussed in the next 
chapters, as well as their movement around the country and response from 
local and national government. Furthermore, the case study of documents 
relating to the Manchester Moss Side riots will be examined to further study the 
role of local organisations and bodies in attempting to improve police/black 
relations and increase police accountability. As Harry Goulbourne summarised, 
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‘Brixton led to the recognition that the police needed to be more accountable to 
the communities they ostensibly serve’.175 For those areas of the country which 
would descend into violent outbursts that summer, lessons were seemingly not 
learnt or implemented quickly enough. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISTURBANCES SPREAD: JULY 1981 
  
Just below three months after events in Brixton, and before Lord 
Scarman could finish and publish the report of his associated inquiry, further 
disturbances occurred around the country. Indeed, in the words of Chief 
Constable of Greater Manchester Police James Anderton, ‘all of us have been 
overtaken somewhat disastrously by events’.1 Timothy Brain described how this 
‘amazing series of riots then swept England’, including Liverpool, Manchester, 
Leeds, and Birmingham, and recent research by Roger Ball suggested that 
almost two hundred daily disorders occurred around England in July 1981 
alone.2 Due in part to the reaction to earlier disorder, these wider disturbances 
saw the utilisation of different police tactics and riot control equipment, including 
the first use of CS gas within mainland Britain and recently released documents 
suggest that government officials were considering mobilising the army or even 
arming the police.  
This chapter examines some of the events and key developments of 
these summer disorders, focussing mainly upon the case study of Moss Side, 
Manchester. This is due to the availability of records and interviews carried out 
with local residents and commentators kindly provided by John Stevenson 
which, to the best of my knowledge, are not available elsewhere.3 Moss Side is 
suitable as a case study due to receiving a dedicated local inquiry, examined in 
depth in Chapter Seven, as well as the substantial involvement of local 
community organisations including various meetings with local police. One of 
these meetings was highly contentious as, occurring the day after the initial 
outbreak of violence, it was decided that a low police presence would be 
deployed in Moss Side to avoid confrontations and discourage further rioting. 
After this failed to prevent recurrences of disorder Anderton switched to ‘hard 
policing’ tactics, including swamping the streets with police and using ‘snatch 
squads’ inspired by Northern Irish examples to utilise police vehicles to disperse 
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crowds and arrest influential rioters. Community leaders alleged that Anderton’s 
initial low profile approach had instead been a ‘no-profile’ approach, purely to 
allow violence to escalate and thus build support for a subsequent police 
crackdown. Conversely Anderton’s actions in dealing with the disturbances 
were described by Home Secretary William Whitelaw as a ‘conspicuous 
success’, but did little to improve poor relations between the police and the 
black community at the heart of the disturbances.4 This chapter first discusses 
key broader developments and situations in other areas, before moving on to 
examine in detail the specific case of Moss Side. 
TOXTETH, LIVERPOOL: 3-6 JULY 1981.  
The first violent scene of summer 1981 erupted in Toxteth, Liverpool on 
the evening of Friday 3 July.5 Again the trigger was an incident involving alleged 
police misconduct when anger generated by the perceived heavy-handed arrest 
of 20-year old Leroy Alphonse Cooper left three policemen injured. Whilst 
officers questioned Cooper, a black youth erroneously suspected of stealing a 
motor cycle, eight police vehicles arrived to deal with this one suspect.6 Such an 
excessive response incensed the local community and community relations 
leaders accused the police, through their actions and tactics, of both initiating 
the rioting and escalating it.7 Considering the events of Bristol and Brixton just 
weeks previously, such a heavy-handed response was surely a mistake. The 
following night it appeared the tactic of premeditated targeting the police 
reappeared when an anonymous caller to the police reported a stolen car and 
officers who went to investigate were pelted with bricks and stones.8 
Merseyside Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford estimated that during the 
disorders 468 officers were injured, 500 people arrested, and at least 70 
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buildings demolished; although later assessments suggested numbers were 
actually double initial estimates.9 Police cordoning of the Toxteth area on 
Sunday had provided the youths on the street an easy and obvious target and 
previous suggestions, that a lesser police presence would reduce violence by 
removing such a visible focal point, had again gone unheeded.10 There were 
also accusations that some officers had escalated the violence shouting racist 
slogans, similar to Brixton, or otherwise provoking the crowd and that some 
officers had removed their identifying numbers to prevent subsequent 
identification.11 
In an apparent effort to work with the local community, a police lower 
profile approach on Monday 6 July helped reduce tensions and calm the 
situation.12 The Archbishop of Liverpool, Derek Worlock, and the Bishop of 
Warrington, Michael Henshall, believed the police had helped control the 
disorders by accepting the advice given to them by community 
representatives.13 However the community leaders simultaneously blamed 
Oxford’s policing policy, arguing that those actively attempting to end the 
disturbances had been attacked by police and that, significantly, those police 
brought in from outside the area had seemed to have friendlier relations with the 
local community than local police.14 This was at odds with many other 
examples, where it had been suggested that personnel familiar to and liked by 
the community may have eased tensions before they erupted into violence. 
Here the accusation was that the local police were so disliked that many 
involved in the violent uprising were conducting personal attacks upon individual 
officers rather than the general police as a symbol of authority. This may have 
been the consequence of a Chief Constable who appeared weary of the idea of 
‘community policing’.15  
Additionally it was detailed that, whilst community leaders had 
succeeded in removing original rioters off the streets, they had been replaced 
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by ‘a mob of mostly white youngsters…who behaved like a wild crowd of 
football hooligans’.16 As elsewhere most people’s descriptions of, and reactions 
to, the events failed to differentiate between these two groups. 
As already noted, Toxteth shared a number of similarities with many of 
the other areas which experienced disturbances. Peter Fryer highlighted the 
‘remarkable historical symmetry’ which saw violent uprisings spread between 
cities which had been the country’s chief slave ports; Bristol, London, and 
Liverpool.17 Certainly Liverpool owed much of its wealth and history to its 
participation in the slave trade but, as discussed previously, it is questionable 
how much this influenced the disturbances in 1981. More pertinently, between 
1971 and 1981 black unemployment increased 100 percent for men and 95 
percent for women.18 Also there was a history in Toxteth of discontent towards 
the police and belief they targeted local black youths, with accusations that 
officers conducted ‘coon races’ where the first to arrest a black person won the 
pot of money.19 It was further alleged that Merseyside Police would plant drugs 
on youths, terming the practice ‘agriculture’ or ‘going farming’.20  
It was noted by numerous observers that hostility towards a police ‘task 
force’ had almost led to disturbances in 1971 and fear of ‘civil war in the city’.21 
William E. Nelson, Jr documented the growing conflict between the police and 
black community in Liverpool including incidents in 1972 and 1975 which 
threatened to erupt into wider disorder and an increasing black resistance which 
included organised protests such as a sit-in at a local Methodist Youth Centre, 
which refused permanent membership to Liverpool-born black people, shortly 
before the July disturbances.22 An interview conducted with a resident following 
the disorder confirmed that the growing sense of discontent had led to 
increased militancy:  
People had got to the point where they felt they had no territory, where 
they felt their rights, liberties, and personal freedoms were impinged 
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upon so much that they actually confronted it and said excuse me I have 
a right to stand on this street…In this case issues like fair economic 
conditions and employment were there, but on that day it was more you 
get out, we’ve had enough of this.23 
Mirroring other situations, the local Chief Constable had clashed with the 
local community and police authority regarding aspects of police tactics and 
appeared in denial at the extent of dissatisfaction towards the police. For 
example writing in his 1980 annual report that relations between the police and 
local community were ‘in a very healthy position and I do not foresee any 
difficulties in the future’.24 This was despite the fact the Merseyside Community 
Relations Council (MCRC) severed its relations with the police in 1980 due to 
the belief that the police liaison scheme had no value and police refused to 
admit racist attitudes existed within their ranks.25 In a statement which might 
have originated from any location discussed in this thesis, representatives from 
the County Council claimed that attempts by the police authority to enter into 
constructive discussions with senior members of the police force prior to the 
disturbances had failed, and that they hoped the disorders would encourage the 
police to be more receptive.26 
It was hoped that the collective violence would improve political 
participation and representation for a marginalised social group in a way that 
elected officials had previously been unable to achieve. Chairman of the County 
Police Committee, Margaret Simey, routinely criticised Oxford’s tactics, 
believing that politicians granting police extended powers allowed them to exist 
without ‘effective democratic scrutiny’ and ‘It was “government” and not the 
police which failed and continues to fail the people of Toxteth.’27 Simey herself 
reportedly remarked that the local community would have been ‘apathetic fools’ 
if they had not taken to the streets to protest their conditions.28 Despite Simey 
drawing extensive criticism for these comments, it was clearly a position held by 
many involved and aptly summarises a main argument of this thesis. Once all 
other avenues of registering protest had seemingly failed or been denied to 
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them, many black youths believed that collective violence was the only way for 
their voices to be heard and authorities to address their situation. 
WHITELAW AND THATCHER VISITS, AND A ‘MINISTER FOR MERSEYSIDE’ 
Such attention from the authorities came on 7 July, when Whitelaw 
visited Liverpool in order to assess the situation. Again Whitelaw would highlight 
the importance of Northern Irish examples when he compared this to past 
experience, both of the images of a riot-torn city and his own personal 
response: ‘there was the same pessimism, the same anxieties and the same 
need to maintain outward calm and good humour while internally suffering deep 
depression and self-doubt’.29 A meeting with local authority representatives saw 
general agreement that the police had done very well in controlling the unrest, 
although it was alleged that antagonistic police tactics had caused considerable 
local hostility in the first place.30 It was also noted that violence had been 
directed against those aspects representing the establishment, namely the 
police and businesses, which reflected the situation elsewhere.31 However it 
appeared that the establishment were inherently supporting their own as 
Whitelaw’s visit to Liverpool concluded with a visit to meet injured police officers 
in hospital.32 As elsewhere, no such visit or expression of condolence for 
members of the public hurt in the disturbances was forthcoming. Although such 
a gesture seeming to legitimise violence would be tantamount to political 
suicide, it was surely noted by those already believing the establishment was 
closing ranks to protect their own. 
Additionally to Whitelaw, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher subsequently 
visited Liverpool to meet local police, government, church representatives, and 
community leaders and youths. A visit to Liverpool had previously been planned 
in May, but subsequent disorder increased the importance of such a trip.33 
Informing community leaders and youths present that she was there to listen 
and hear their frank thoughts about the current situation, she appeared shocked 
by their response.34 She subsequently told a meeting with Church officials that 
she had been ‘amazed at their hatred for the police’ and, in later published 
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memoirs, she amplified this into being ‘appalled’ at their hostility towards the 
police.35 In a swipe at the media which hinted at her main concerns of being 
seen to meet participants, she also recorded how ‘The press were rather 
confused when, contrary to what they had been expecting, the youngsters told 
them that I had indeed listened.’36 Such a personal meeting would certainly 
have left some believing their collective violence had improved their political 
participation. However Thatcher stated that she had reminded the youths of the 
resources that had been ‘poured into Liverpool’ and policing issues were not 
about skin colour, they were about crime.37 Indeed, just before meeting 
community leaders, she had told local authority representatives that they must 
give the police their support as society would crumble if law and order could not 
be maintained.38 In keeping with her broader response, Thatcher informed 
Oxford and other senior police officers the police had her complete support and 
whatever equipment was required to handle the riots would be provided.39 Even 
if she had listened to the complaints of local community representatives, she 
had seemingly decided governmental support would remain firmly behind the 
police. She urged local youths ‘not to resort to violence or to try to live in 
separate communities from the rest of us’ but, for a section of the young black 
community, most other noises coming from the authorities were pushing them 
into doing so.40  
Records of Thatcher’s Merseyside meetings end with her thanking those 
attending and concluding that, whilst the problems had been identified some 
fifteen years ago, their belief that ‘if people were given good homes and good 
schooling, this would give them the basis they needed for a satisfactory life’ had 
not been wholly correct: ‘We should have to think again.’41 This rethinking of 
attitudes, as The New York Times pointed out, did not include a basic change in 
her economic policy, as to do so would be to publically admit her government’s 
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policies shouldered some blame for the disorder.42 As summarised by the BBC: 
‘Community leaders came out of the talks shaking their heads and saying that 
Mrs Thatcher had not wanted to discuss the root cause of the trouble…Instead, 
they said she had implored them to keep the stone-throwers off the street’.43 
Consequently Brain noted how Thatcher’s government ‘responded in a 
pragmatic, if financially limited, way’.44 To this end she appointed Michael 
Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, as ‘Minister for Merseyside’ 
to head a ministerial task force to address the problems of inner cities.45 Such 
action appeared to suggest that Thatcher privately accepted a link between 
crime, disorder, and unemployment, even if she would not admit it publicly and 
undermine her economic policies.46 Heseltine made it clear to Thatcher that 
there was need for the government to be seen to be showing real concern, but 
to do so ‘without raising expensive and largely unfulfillable expectations’.47 He 
stated it important to tackle the problems found in Liverpool without stimulating 
calls from other areas to receive similar financial attention: ‘and particularly 
without giving the impression that local communities can secure for their areas 
expenditure with riots’.48 Conversely the title of his resultant private report to the 
Cabinet, It Took a Riot, would suggest that the only reason the area was 
receiving this added attention and finances was in fact due to the violence, 
supporting the previous beliefs of many who had participated in them.49 This 
supports the overall argument of this thesis, that the collective violence of 1980-
81 was an attempt at achieving for themselves increased levels of political 
participation and attention through ‘bargaining by riot’. Furthermore reaction to 
his report, deemed by influential Policy Advisor John Hoskyns as not ‘an 
adequate basis for action’, also supports the argument that such attempts were 
ultimately unsuccessful.50 
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POLICE EQUIPMENT 
The worst violence seen in Toxteth occurred on Saturday 4 July, when 
police were confronted with bricks and other missiles, 10-feet-long scaffolding 
poles, beer barrels, oil drums, gas cylinders, and petrol bombs.51 The 
Merseyside Police were not equipped to deal with such disorder and Dave 
Potts, at that time a 20-year old constable, recalled being issued with ‘a very 
flimsy riot visor which attached to your helmet with elastic…a cricket box and a 
set of football shin pads’.52 Oxford himself later admitted that the police’s 
response had been ‘totally and utterly inadequate’.53 In order to combat the 
increasing violence and disorder, police reinforcements had been called in from 
forces across England including Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Cumbria, 
Birmingham, and even Devon, further spreading exposure to the disorder.54 
Similar to the situation in St Pauls where outside forces were utilised, such 
practices would later be demonstrated during the 1984-85 miners’ strike where 
the National Reporting Centre based at New Scotland Yard controlled 20,000 
officers drawn from 50 of the UK’s 52 forces.55 It has been suggested that this 
allowed the government to actively control the police’s response to the strikes 
and undermine the partially democratically-elected local police authorities.56 
Regardless this, just as it had in disturbances around the country in 1980-81, 
added to feelings of discontent and increased tensions that a force of officers 
unfamiliar to the area had been deployed to respond to the situation. 
Moreover at 2.15 on Monday 6 July Merseyside police officers became 
the first to use CS gas within mainland Britain, firing between 25-30 gas 
grenades.57  All police forces in Britain had access to small stocks of such 
equipment since the mid-1960s, another aspect of the disturbances which 
followed the Northern Irish antecedent.58 Echoing previous disorder, Potts 
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highlighted the number of rumours circulating between officers, such as claims 
that ‘a bobby’s been killed, somebody’s had their leg chopped off, somebody’s 
been decapitated with a spade’.59 It is likely such false rumours played a part in 
the deployment and use of CS gas. There were allegations that officers had 
fired the canisters incorrectly, either wilfully or accidentally, directly at members 
of the crowd thus causing injuries and five people requiring hospital treatment.60 
This action was severely criticised by the local police authority and community 
relations leaders, with officers accused of not having received sufficient training 
and using cartridges intended for penetrating walls and buildings.61 Despite this, 
Michael Nally observed that Oxford was unapologetic about his officers’ 
‘undisciplined response with CS gas’.62 Oxford later recognised that some 
believed use of CS gas, baton rounds, and water cannon was ‘repressive and 
an over-reaction’, but he defended their necessity as an emergency response to 
protect officers after the ‘staggering number of injuries that were inflicted in 
1981’.63 The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir David McNee, 
recognised that a drawback of CS gas was its inability to selectively target 
people and that therefore it should only be used as a last resort; however he 
agreed with subsequent recommendations that the police should have sufficient 
supplies.64 Whitelaw later revealed how Oxford had telephoned him at the time 
to approve use of the gas but he believed, later leading him to eradicate such a 
requirement and further empower police Chief Constables, that such decisions 
must be made by those in charge of operations with knowledge of the situation: 
‘So, amazing as it seems now, I turned over and went to sleep again.’65 
Continuing the focus upon how best to quash future disorder, it was even 
suggested that arming the police or deploying the army was necessary to 
protect the British streets. It is true that the disturbances in 1981 were deemed 
serious enough threats to British law and order to warrant a radical policing 
response. Amongst others, John Benyon blamed the way in which they were 
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portrayed by both the media and many politicians for the fact that such a 
response was deemed necessary: ‘They were interpreted as exceptional threats 
to law and order which required exceptional responses’.66 For example, 
Thatcher warned journalists that ‘The veneer of civilization is very thin’ and an 
unnamed ‘senior Government official’ was quoted in The New York Times 
claiming that, in some cities, ‘we are facing anarchy’.67 Graham Murdock later 
analysed the media’s response to the use of CS gas in Toxteth, concluding that 
they all presented it as ‘an entirely necessary and justified step, given the 
violence of the rioters and the inadequacy of standard police equipment’.68 He 
makes the important point, applicable to all arguments that increased police 
powers and equipment were needed to combat future disorder, that ‘This 
perspective comprehensively wrong-foots the counter arguments that tough 
policing may be a cause of rioting rather than a cure for it.’69 
Both the level of violence and associated fear caused the Liberal 
Liverpool City Council leader, Sir Trevor Jones, to appeal for troops to be 
readied and put on standby: ‘It is a legitimate request. If the police cannot cope, 
as clearly they have not been able to, then the military should be available to 
protect the city centre’.70 It must be noted that Jones was far from a left-wing 
liberal, as can be seen by a letter from the Council to Downing Street advising 
against Thatcher’s visit and describing hard-line left-wingers as ‘militants who 
are round the corner sharpening their knives’.71 Similarly local Conservative MP 
Anthony Sheen also appealed for troops to be deployed and stated that the 
Conservatives, ‘being the Party of law and order’, needed to make it clear that 
they would do what was necessary.72 He argued that ‘simply providing [police] 
with stronger protective headgear has made many of our supporters feel that 
the bigger issues have not been fully comprehended’.73 This echoes arguments 
made from people more sympathetic to the black population’s situation, albeit 
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there was disagreement on what those ‘bigger issues’ actually were; their 
argument was that the focus upon criminality and police equipment did not 
address the discontent which led to the collective violence. Nevertheless, as R. 
W. Apple Jr writing in The New York Times summarised, Whitelaw was 
considered one of the more liberal members of Thatcher’s government but even 
he could not rule out the ‘highly undesirable’ use of troops to combat ‘extreme 
ferocity’.74 Apple continued that either the use of troops or water cannon would 
be a ‘radical departure from the passive tactics generally used by British 
policemen’, although Benyon pointed out that soldiers had been utilised in 
Northern Ireland for almost twenty years previously, and between 1869 and 
1908 troops had intervened in 24 separate disturbances.75 Regardless, their 
appearance on the streets in 1981 certainly would have been a drastic 
measure. 
A telephone conversation between Whitelaw and Thatcher agreed that 
the ‘use of troops could not be contemplated: if necessary, the police should be 
properly equipped, and even armed, before such a step was taken’.76 To that 
end Whitelaw was actively organising with John Nott, Secretary of State for 
Defence, the acquisition by the police of ‘more offensive types of equipment’ 
such as water cannons, on which he was ‘anxious to move very quickly’.77 
Whitelaw took up Nott’s offer that the police be loaned army riot guns and baton 
rounds, deeming it ‘imperative’ that police have access to such equipment and 
requested 50 guns and 4,000 rounds.78 Nott, perhaps surprised that Whitelaw 
accepted his offer, expressed his ‘considerable reservations’ about arming 
police forces with Army weapons; not least that it would limit their ability to aid 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary in replacing weapons in Northern Ireland.79  
In yet another example of how pervasive the example of Northern Ireland 
was in debates regarding public disorder, a brief circulated prior to a debate in 
the Commons stated that Northern Irish experience had shown the dangers of 
use of rubber or plastic bullets and that further thought should be given before 
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their use within Britain.80 Additionally, after a large number of head and neck 
injuries were received by officers during earlier disorders, better-suited helmets 
and visors were soon requisitioned and by 9 July almost 1,800 were available to 
the police with the army subsequently attempting to fulfil Home Office requests 
for two thousand more.81 Based on similar design to those used by army ‘snatch 
squads’ in Northern Ireland, their use during the subsequent Moss Side 
disturbances were cited as a factor in greatly reduced police injuries.82 
Additionally shorter, more manoeuvrable shields and flame-retardant overalls 
were issued and training in public-order was intensified.83 In November a 
working group published a report on ‘Protective Clothing and Equipment’, which 
supported these developments and further recommended baton rounds, 
stronger body armour, and increased protection to police vehicles.84 By the 
beginning of 1983, and regardless of their link with at least eleven deaths in 
Northern Ireland, police forces in Britain had thus stockpiled around 10,000 
rubber bullets.85 
Whitelaw stated he had met with representatives of all the police 
organisations following Brixton and they had all agreed that resorting to use of 
water cannons and plastic bullets was undesirable; however violence spreading 
around the country in July had seemingly made him rethink this position.86 
Senior Merseyside police advised Thatcher that water cannons were ‘now a 
necessary part of the equipment of the police’ and ‘a lot of urgent thought’ must 
be given to how police responded to such outbreaks of disorder.87 Similarly 
McNee agreed with Thatcher that the police should have available to them 
sufficient stocks of rubber bullets.88 Furthermore the Police Federation, who in 
1980 had been against such developments and adamant that the image of the 
traditional British police ‘should be maintained at all costs’, was by 1981 making 
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demands for ‘proper riot equipment’.89 A number of incidents involving a 
proportionally small number of people led most authorities concerned with 
policing to swing wildly towards demands for increased equipment, regardless 
of their effect upon the deteriorating public perception of the police. 
As Brain concluded, the violence of 1981 had caused the authorities to 
make a collective decision to alter its approach to public disorder.90 This altered 
approach seemed to focus upon criminality and combat equipment and tactics 
to deal with outbreaks of disorder, rather than attempts to address the 
underlying causes:  
Mrs Thatcher, not unnaturally, could not accept that unemployment was 
a root cause of the riots, for to have done so would be tantamount to 
undermining her whole social and economic philosophy, so her first 
response was to talk tough and prepare mothballed army camps in 
readiness for an anticipated stream of prisoners arising from future 
riots.91 
Shadow Home Secretary Roy Hattersley summarised the opposition’s view that, 
in such serious situations, use of imperfect means such as CS gas was 
‘infinitely better than the risk of death and injury’.92 However he continued to 
warn that the strategy of calling for stronger powers for police ‘wins cheap 
cheers, but it can have wide and potentially disastrous consequences’; which 
suggests that such a response, instead of improving the relationship between 
police and public through a wholly independent complaints procedure, played a 
role in the continuing disorders.93 This was supported by John Alderson, who 
argued against the increased ‘militarisation’ of the police: ‘We must not advance 
the police response too far ahead of the situation. It is even worth a few million 
pounds of destruction rather than get pushed too far down that road.’94 This was 
not a widely held belief amongst the Conservative Government, with the 
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majority falling in line behind Thatcher’s public pronouncement: ‘We have to 
give the Police all the equipment and protection they want’.95 
MOSS SIDE, MANCHESTER: 7-11 JULY 1981. 
Moss Side is an inner-city area of Manchester, which in the 1980s was 
home to a large Afro-Caribbean community and growing gang culture.96 The 
level of unemployment in Moss Side, particularly for black youths, was deemed 
‘pretty grim’.97 A former youth worker stated how many youths in the area 
seemingly had given up on life, with questions regarding the future being 
greeted with responses such as ‘I can’t think about the future’ or ‘I suppose I’ll 
die eventually’.98 This pessimistic outlook was one which can be seen in varying 
levels amongst many within the communities which saw outbreaks of disorder in 
1980-81, and is telling of the mind-set of many of those participating in the 
violence. As discussed further in Chapter Seven, this also fits into a general 
trend for visions of disaster and apocalyptic trends which manifested in 
numerous television series and films during the period.  
Rather than simply stating a need for more investment in the area, a 
general criticism was levelled that there had been a lack of consultation with 
local residents on what the area needed.99 It was remarked that any local 
community centre or group was required to fall within the confines of the 
government, which limited their usefulness and impact due to the government’s 
wish to remove issues of race from the mainstream political arena through such 
‘buffer institutions’.100 Moss Side was a community containing many who were 
plainly disillusioned with the role and worth of British government, best 
illustrated by poor housing standards with stories emerging of residents 
presenting bottled cockroaches to the Housing Department protesting their 
living conditions.101 Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police James 
Anderton, who began his career as a constable in the area in 1953, described 
the architectural history of Moss Side:  
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An accidental ghetto of depressing slums and inadequate social 
amenities was replaced with an unimaginative development of high-rise 
flats of colossal magnitude. It seems the lessons and failures of urban 
redevelopment in the United States of America had not been learned or 
had somehow been ignored. The slums went but the ghetto mentality, 
unfortunately, remained.102 
Similar to St Pauls and Brixton, Moss Side had a reputation for a high crime rate 
and, consequently, high levels of invasive policing. The Moss Side Defence 
Committee, established to provide financial aid to those arrested during and 
after the disturbances, argued that this ‘myth of Moss Side’ was believed by the 
police but rested largely upon ‘implicit racist assumptions’.103 They reasoned the 
result of this assumption was that policing of the area took place ‘as if it were a 
dangerous, alien colony in an otherwise wholesome society’.104 It is not hard to 
see why many from this community felt little alternative than collective violence 
against the police, as they felt they had been systematically excluded from 
British society and political participation over previous years.  
Anderton, by this time having acquired a reputation for political views and 
a religious extremism that would intensify in future years, undertook tactics and 
expressed public opinions which did nothing to placate dissatisfaction of the 
local community. Even Whitelaw acknowledged Anderton was ‘an 
individualist…well-known for his outspoken and controversial remarks’.105 
Martin Kettle and Lucy Hodges highlighted a speech Anderton had made in 
September 1980, in which he claimed that organisations concerned with race 
relations ‘have been infiltrated by anti-establishment factions, one of whose 
aims is continuously to impede the police’.106 Mike and Trevor Phillips further 
noted how he ‘had never been patient with the idea of policing by consent’.107 
Anderton stated a desire to not ‘exacerbate public feeling or create situations in 
which undue public hostility towards the police may be aroused’, whilst 
simultaneously criticising that ‘public opinion is often so ill-informed and 
ambivalent it is necessary occasionally for the police to take initiatives which, to 
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say the least, may not always attract immediate and popular approval’.108 He 
believed that past experience had shown formal liaison committees between the 
police and local community were worthless, ‘they tend to exist for their own 
sake and are guilty of too much profitless talk and too little positive action’, 
hardly suggestive of a Chief Constable who believed it was his duty to be seen 
to be accountable to the local community.109 Attempts in Brixton and Toxteth for 
such liaison had suggested improvements could be made, but such an attitude 
undermines the attempted liaison during the Moss Side disturbances discussed 
below. Whilst few seriously suggested the total removal of police from the area 
it was noted that, whilst impossible for police to do their jobs without upsetting 
some areas of the public, there was a limit to how much that public was willing 
to tolerate.110  
As with many other areas of the country at that time, officers within Moss 
Side were often young and inexperienced. It was also noted that local officers 
were now less familiar to the community than previously as they were currently 
being provided housing outside of the Moss Side area, rather than within as 
was the case before.111 As with both St Pauls and Brixton, an officer familiar 
and popular with the community had not been present when violence flared, 
having been relocated just two weeks before violence erupted; many people 
complained that ‘when trouble brews up, the Community Contact Police isn’t 
there it’s the hard nosed ones that come’.112 This lack of foresight that removing 
a popular community officer may cause discontent is reminiscent of St Pauls, 
where a raid was undertaken on the local officer’s day off, and in Brixton, where 
the Community Liaison Officer went on weekend leave as a police presence 
swelled into the already tense area. 
A march and a rally had been held in the area on 16 August 1980, 
protesting the perceived police harassment of black people and Bishop of 
Manchester Stanley Booth-Clibborn sent evidence to the Home Affairs 
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Committee on 14 October 1980 warning of potential conflicts.113 Community 
leaders had allegedly warned for numerous weeks of the likelihood of unrest 
due to allegations against the police and the impact of events elsewhere.114 
These warning signs were either ignored or went unnoticed and, as Eloise 
Edwards, Moss Side Defence Committee member, later summarised, the 
disturbances ‘were an attempt from people in the area to put a lot of the wrongs 
to right’.115 The police and local government had done nothing to convince the 
local community that any progress would occur for their situation within the 
existing framework of the British legal system; in their view they had no option 
but to resort to collective violence. 
DISTURBANCES 
Following a weekend of disturbances in nearby Liverpool, the 
Manchester Town Clerk on Monday 6 July 1981 reviewed the City Council’s 
emergency procedure if similar unrest occurred in Manchester.116 This 
highlights the view that spreading disorder was probable and ultimately proved 
a wise precaution as disturbances began the following night when growing 
tension erupted into violence. 
TUESDAY 7 JULY 
Barri Potter, a local community worker, stated he had received consistent 
accounts of police officers patrolling the area and taunting the local youth on 
Monday 6 and Tuesday 7 July.117 The Moss Side Community Action Committee 
furthered this accusation into claims that officers were shouting that, unlike 
‘niggers’ in Brixton and Liverpool, Moss Side black youth were ‘too soft to riot’. 
Other accounts substituted officers for instead simply white civilians, but 
retained the similar taunting that ‘there could never be a riot in Manchester’.118 
Whether or not such taunts originated from the police, it shows a clear dispersal 
and impact of events elsewhere to goad Moss Side residents to follow their 
example. The Action Committee also suggested that an older officer had been 
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heard a few weeks previously stating that, ‘although he was getting too old for 
“aggro”, the younger police officers were “itching for the opportunity to put their 
recent riot training into practice”’.119 This accusation was repeated throughout 
the disorder that officers were ‘spoiling for a riot’ and such further escalation in 
antagonism without punishment was the final straw for a group of local black 
youths. 
Disturbances began around 3am and involved around one hundred 
youths. Police reported that, between 3am and 3.30am: thirteen shops were 
damaged, three of which ‘absolutely gutted and destroyed by fire’; police and 
firemen were stoned and three police cars and two fire tenders damaged; and 
extensive looting had taken place.120 It was noted that violence had started the 
same time as a crowd had emerged from the local Nile night club.121 This was a 
popular venue for black people in the city shown by Benet Hytner, chairman of 
the subsequent local inquiry into the disorder, asking an eyewitness who had 
seen the crowd leaving the club that, if they were leaving the Nile, then 
‘presumably they were all black were they?’122 Unexpectedly for Hytner the 
answer to that supposition was no.123 Patrick Paget, Councillor for Moss Side 
Ward, later noted that some had remained inside the Nile and were unaware of 
the disturbances, suggesting that it had not been widely disseminated inside the 
club that violence was planned.124 This was consistent with elsewhere in 
suggesting that the disorder was not pre-planned, it was a violent reaction to 
immediate police action igniting increasing tensions. Mirroring earlier flashpoints 
which arose after some form of police activity, it was suggested that there was 
increased anger towards the police due to the alleged wrongful arrest of a 
number of youths on the Tuesday morning in connection with a supermarket 
raid some weeks previously.125 However the police and official reports recorded 
that seven youths arrested that day were not actually detained until after the 
outbreak of disorder.126 This is yet another example of a possible rumour 
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feeding upon the inherent distrust and discontent of the police. Whether or not 
the seven had actually been arrested before the disturbance is not the point, the 
key fact was that many of the local black youth were willing to believe and 
challenge the police because of it; or, at the very least, it could be claimed as a 
possible motivation afterwards. 
WEDNESDAY 8 JULY 
The following day a press conference at the Greater Manchester Police 
headquarters saw Anderton describe the ‘near anarchy and lunacy’ of the 
previous night.127 Considering the previous overwhelming focus upon these 
events in terms of criminality, this was not an unpredictable response. More 
constructive responses included various meetings held on Wednesday in an 
attempt to calm the situation and prevent further outbreaks. Firstly the Town 
Clerk met with representatives of the Manchester Council for Community 
Relations (MCCR) to inquire what assistance could be offered by the City 
Council and inform them that the Council Leader wished to meet with local 
community groups.128 The MCCR, notably described by the Town Clerk as 
‘Community Leaders’, stressed the need for a lack of police retaliation and low 
presence in Moss Side that night.129 This can be seen as a consistent response 
with previous outbursts, identifying the police as a highly visible target for angry 
and discontented members of a marginalised group, and pleading for police to 
refrain from confrontationally ‘swamping’ the area with high numbers of officers. 
Although, as discussed further below, the idea that community leaders could 
truly represent the entire community is problematic to say the least. 
COMMUNITY MEETING 
The police appeared to have learned some lessons from the previous 
disorder and were keen to discuss, or at least be seen to be discussing, the 
situation with local community representatives. Therefore Divisional 
Commander Chief Superintendent Albert Leach arranged a meeting with local 
community leaders to discuss what could be done to prevent a recurrence of 
violence.130 Anderton later stated that such a meeting was usual police 
procedure, as had occurred in Brixton, and aimed to employ older members of 
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the local community to discourage younger members from repeating or 
escalating disturbances.131 However, as discussed throughout, the 1980-81 
disturbances appeared to provoke a contradictory response from different 
generations and the youth did not appear willing to listen to any attempts to 
discourage such violence. In the report of this meeting, at which he was initially 
not present, Anderton noted that the first concern of those present was the 
welfare of the youths arrested the previous day.132 This was another sign of the 
level of distrust of the police at the heart of the disturbances as they believed it 
likely some harm had come to them at the hands of the police. A few minutes 
into the meeting approximately two dozen black youths arrived, described by 
Ronald Mitchell of the Acquarius Youth Club as representatives of the black 
youth of Moss Side.133 Anderton’s phrasing, that Leach ‘had certainly not invited 
the youths’, suggests the police did not want them present and perhaps belies 
subsequent claims that they were ‘made most welcome’.134 If there existed a 
new police willingness to meet and discuss policing with representatives of the 
local community, that seemingly did not extend to empowering the black youth 
actually affected by such measures. Indeed, despite the presence of these 
youths, Father Sumner of St. Wilfred’s in Hulme noted he did not know any local 
young people aware of the meeting.135 Hytner would later conclude that many 
difficulties arising during this meeting was due to these youths, who were 
demanding information regarding the arrested youths; just like their older 
counterparts, this was their first thoughts upon arrival.136 Leach did not have all 
the requested information to hand, so left to make inquiries due to believing the 
meeting would not progress until after such information had been found.137 
Leach then left the meeting, tasking the head of the Police Community Contact 
Department and a Community Contact Inspector in Moss Side with beginning 
discussions.138 
Leach stated that upon his return some twenty minutes later, he found 
that the meeting had begun to disintegrate and faced accusations that he had 
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refused to meet with community representatives.139 The youths had left the 
police station and were allegedly complaining to assembled journalists that 
police officials had not met with them.140 If Sumner’s judgment is believed, then 
it must have come as a double insult for those youths who had not even heard 
about the meeting to further discover that the police had seemingly snubbed 
those actually present. Jeffrey Wilner, City Councillor for Moss Side Ward, 
reported that Leach was actually not present for forty-five minutes and caused 
many to leave the police station in exasperation.141 Some of those present were 
sufficiently upset to claim a loss of confidence in Leach and even call for his 
resignation.142 The level of previous discontentment and poor relationship 
between the police and local community had caused a relatively minor and 
commonplace occurrence to escalate into something much more, an apt 
comparison for how the majority of disturbances discussed originated.  
The Hytner Inquiry pointed out it was unlikely that Leach would have 
personally arranged the meeting just then to deliberately alienate those present 
by refusing to actually meet.143 No accusations of such have been found, but if it 
had been a police ‘power play’ to remind the community who were in charge, 
then it was vastly misjudged. The Hytner panel refused to make a judgement 
upon Leach’s actual absence, simply stating that there were disagreements as 
to whether community leaders had been provided with an adequate 
explanation; but that ‘rightly or wrongly’ they had been offended by his 
absence.144  
Despite Anderton’s belief that they ‘must have been aware of the 
reasons for the Chief Superintendent’s absence’, Deputy Chairwoman of the 
Greater Manchester Police Authority, Councillor Gay Cox suggested that 
Anderton’s personal appearance was the only way to appease those present. 
Cox had previously visited Anderton at 10.30am that morning to discuss events, 
at which she had been duly informed of the later meeting.145 It is likely she was 
disappointed to not discuss matters directly with Anderton and, regardless of 
later explanations, the seemingly routine dismissal of the local community’s 
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concerns by the police added to the discontent. Anderton arrived around 
4.15pm and by 4.30pm some community representatives and youths had been 
persuaded to return to the meeting. Anderton stated that in the time between his 
arrival and the meeting restarting, Cox and Linbert Spencer, Director of 
Operations at the Greater Manchester Youth Association, privately advised him 
that, in order to repair the damaged police-community relations, a personal 
public apology must be made for that day’s events and Chief Superintendent 
Leach must be relieved of his command as he had lost the confidence of the 
community. Anderton recorded being ‘absolutely dismayed by this appalling 
proposition’ and deemed Leach’s proposed dismissal as ‘brutal and irregular 
treatment’. He told Cox and Spencer that he ‘would not crucify any of [his] 
officers in public to please or placate any disgruntled people’, concluding in his 
report that, if this was an example of ‘democratic community policy’, then ‘God 
help us!’146 It is hard to imagine any police Chief Constable dismissing a Chief 
Superintendent based solely on suggestions from the local community, but such 
a strong reaction shows how far Anderton was from believing that the local 
community should have a say in the running of the police.  
Anderton, along with Leach, did both offer personal apologies to the 
meeting but some still demanded a public apology be made through the press. 
Anderton believed this was evidence that some at the meeting were seeking ‘a 
sacrificial lamb’ but, in his words: ‘they did not get one from me’.147 This 
response seems in keeping from a Chief Constable known for personally 
supporting his officers, with it occasionally suggested that such support 
extended beyond available levels of evidence. Hytner concluded that, despite 
Anderton’s belief that complaints about Leach were being made ‘with malicious 
intent’, they were no more than genuine concerns regarding the absence of a 
senior policeman in a time of emergency.148 Anderton did not hesitate in 
believing this to be a sign of broader subversion of the police, indicative of his 
previous reactions to suggestions of police misconduct. 
Although, sensing the discontent of the assembled group, Anderton did 
allow more access to the arrested youths than normal.149 Similarly Wilner 
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recorded that Anderton appeared very open to the suggestion of a low police 
profile, agreeing it was the correct course of action without having to be 
convinced by community leaders.150 Hytner even suggested that this tactic was 
Anderton’s own suggestion, whereas Nally instead stated he simply agreed to 
avoid ‘excessive’ policing as long as ‘hotheads’ were restrained.151 Hytner 
indicated that the previous deployment of some of his officers during the violent 
Toxteth riots had affected Anderton’s tactics, which were seemingly vindicated 
by three days of rioting in Manchester resulting in no officers requiring a stay in 
hospital.152 This is another example of how there was a spread of not only 
violence but also tactics in both conducting and responding to the disorder, 
based upon previous experiences. A low-profile approach was supported by 
Cox, who later stated that she preferred to see windows smashed than 
policemen’s heads.153 Many disgruntled residents and business owners may 
well have later questioned whether she would have been quite as sympathetic if 
it had been her windows bearing the brunt of attack, but the low-profile 
approach had been agreed. 
Anderton continued however that, if necessary, firm policing tactics 
would have to be employed to deal with emergencies, to which community 
leaders all reportedly agreed.154 The general public perception of this 
arrangement was summed up by local schoolteacher Arthur Somerville Byfield, 
who told Hytner that ‘community workers persuaded the Chief Constable to 
assume a low profile posture and a paucity of Police presence’ but, once 
violence had flared up again, Anderton had ‘no choice but to initiate firm Police 
action’.155 Indeed Anderton drew praise from many areas for his handling of this 
meeting. Hytner went so far as to claim he should be ‘warmly and unequivocally 
congratulated’ and, thanks to him, ‘the day was saved’.156 The level of 
discontent felt towards the police and the simple fact that violent disturbances 
were still to occur after this meeting suggested otherwise; the immediate battle 
may have been won, but the war continued. Linbert Spencer, later Community 
Liaison Officer for Greater Manchester Council, sought to minimise the portrayal 
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of this meeting as a great success and claimed that police and governmental 
bodies overestimated the influence of community groups and leaders: 
So if there is going to be a riot you call the six leaders in and say ‘let’s 
sort this out’ and they go away and they stop the riot. Well the world isn’t 
like that… [Police are] actually conferring on…again, ‘community leaders’ 
in quotes, this amazing amount of control.157 
Nonetheless, a member of the Hytner Panel would later comment that the mere 
fact the police were willing to discuss the situation with local community leaders 
at all ‘can only be good news’.158 Indeed attendance at such a meeting implies 
community leaders wished to remain engaged with the political process and, if 
the local community had been made to feel more involved with the policing 
decisions regarding their own district, perhaps the level of discontent would not 
have reached the level of taking to the streets. Anderton’s future actions and 
comments would lead some to reassess his intentions and motives during this 
meeting, including comments he made the next day which restored feelings of 
hostility and negated any goodwill fostered during the community meeting.159 
Anderton’s description of this meeting depended upon who he was 
addressing. His report submitted to the Hytner Inquiry labelled the meeting 
‘interesting and informative’.160 He recorded that it was the community 
representatives who had stressed a desire to avoid an increased police 
presence in order to reduce the probability of confrontation, declaring their belief 
that they could ‘control their own young people’.161 However his report 
determined that, once disorder had recommenced and escalated into a 
confrontation at Moss Side Police Station, it was clear that community 
representatives had no such control which therefore necessitated a stronger 
police response.162 On the other hand, in a paper presented to the Police 
Committee on 4 September also released to the press, Anderton alternatively 
viewed the meeting in less favourable terms and described it as ‘a saga’.163 
Undoubtedly responding to criticism that his tactics had led to a lack of a 
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required police presence during rioting, Hytner described his second account of 
the meeting as characterised by ‘unrestrained vigour’.164  
Whilst Anderton had agreed to the suggested low-profile approach, he 
also believed that there was a desire from some to see the streets of Moss Side 
completely free of police. He also dismissed as nonsense the complaint that 
numerous officers present and visible within the police station yard were in 
effect tantamount to provocation. Simply put, Anderton did not understand or 
fully appreciate the fundamental distrust of the police that had led to such 
accusations he deemed ‘remarkable’.165 Therefore it is unsurprising his 
response did not calm such mistrust. Anderton summarised that the ‘heavy 
pressure’ applied to him and his officers during this meeting was ‘out of all 
proportion to the problem’, seemingly missing the irony behind his words and 
possible parallels to policing tactics against the local community.166 He recorded 
that at 5.45pm all the black youths left the meeting, linking this to reports less 
than an hour later of large numbers of young people present in the area. Clearly 
viewing the youths’ attendance at the meeting as some form of reconnaissance 
mission, he concluded: ‘I cannot help but feel that a guarantee of virtually 
unpoliced streets and an unprotected Moss Side Police Station suited and 
served some terribly ulterior purpose.’167 Hytner detailed disappointment at this 
alternative account by Anderton of the meeting and whilst the panel believed, or 
at least publically stated that they believed, Anderton had not meant to imply 
that some community leaders were assisting the rioters, they criticised his 
phrasing which could be interpreted thus.168 Anderton’s second account of this 
meeting was not one which appeared particularly amenable to an increased 
participation of the local community in political and policing matters. 
Despite the police’s seeming willingness to address some of the 
community’s discontent, there was still a lack of understanding of the particular 
concerns and issues of the local community they represented. The meeting 
which was called in an attempt to avoid further violence was plainly not 
conducted with enough care to even avoid angering community leaders 
opposed to the violence and suggestions made to Anderton, except the low-
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profile police presence addressed below, were at best ignored and at worst 
claimed as proof of some nefarious plot to undermine or deceive the police. 
Whilst the meeting had been called in an attempt to prevent a repeat of violence 
by improving police and community relations, the lasting legacy was to further 
the mistrust between police and members of the local community. 
Whichever of Anderton’s descriptions of the meeting is considered its 
main theme and seemingly positive outcome that a normal non-elevated police 
presence would remain in Moss Side was later believed to have actually been 
an active deceit. Many residents contested that rather than low-profile policing 
there had actually been ‘no policing whatsoever’ and an anonymous witness 
later claimed the police had agreed to the low-profile approach, but then ‘didn’t 
keep the bargain’.169 The media’s response, discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Seven, was also criticised as it appeared to blame community leaders 
for the failure of low-profile policing and thus allowing Anderton to defend his 
subsequent more heavy-handed approach.170 As Andrew Fender, County 
Councillor for Hulme & Moss Side, later summarised: ‘The conclusion that the 
Police Force drew from that was that this so-called low-profile policing hadn’t 
worked.’171 It was claimed by many locals that such a conclusion had been the 
plan all along; further highlighting the lack of trust awarded the local police. 
Hytner recorded this ‘wild allegation, which we wholly discount,’ that it 
was in fact a police policy to ‘let Moss Side burn’ in order to teach the 
community a lesson and endorse a more forceful police response.172 Arnold 
Spencer was one to level such an accusation, stating the police wanted to ‘let 
Moss Side burn just a bit before they could move in in their full riot strength’; the 
fact that such an accusation was made by a City Councillor was not 
insignificant.173 Another anonymous witness seemed to suggest it was in fact 
government policy to instruct police to deliberately let the disturbances escalate 
through their absence.174 As with other such accusations, the likelihood is that 
this was not the case; but the fact that people were willing to believe it clearly 
shows their view of the authorities. Hytner dismissed this accusation outright; 
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for example when obtaining evidence from Chairman of the Greater Manchester 
Police Authority Councillor Peter Kelly, Hytner did not ask him to comment on 
the suggestion that police deliberately kept away to ‘teach the blighters a 
lesson’ as he believed it obvious what Kelly’s answer would be.175 To many in 
the local community believing such accusations, this was just another example 
of the authorities not adequately investigating their concerns and accusations. 
The allegation was also, unsurprisingly, fiercely denied by Anderton, who 
pointed to the fact that an average of 1,600 emergency calls were received at 
the height of each night’s disturbances and any delay in police response was 
purely due to there being more emergency calls than officers able to attend.176 
The fact alone that Anderton had to include such a strong denial and 
explanation in his report of events shows how widely such a belief had 
permeated. 
It is hard to seriously believe that it was a deliberate police ploy to ‘let 
Moss Side burn’ due, amongst others, to the possible consequences of such a 
policy becoming public knowledge. More plausible is the belief expressed by 
many that the events of Wednesday night were used to justify a more robust 
police response.177 The Moss Side Community Action Committee accused 
Anderton, having recently stocked up on special riot equipment, of using the 
seeming failure of low-profile policing to ‘embark on a calculated and brutal 
attack on the whole Moss Side Community’.178 Eloise Edwards later supported 
this accusation, stating that the police ‘had just bought this brand new riot gear 
[and] they were itching to try it out’.179 Barri Potter summed up many people’s 
feelings when he stated that Anderton ‘knew darn well that the kids would riot 
that night no matter how many police were on the streets’.180 In this assessment 
Anderton could have his cake and eat it. By agreeing to a reduced police 
presence on Wednesday night he could be seen willing to cooperate with the 
local community and, when disorder had continued regardless as he believed it 
would, he could use this failure to endorse a subsequent tougher police 
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response. Fender argued that the time taken for police to respond to incidents 
wasn’t due to a low-profile approach, rather the deployment of reserve forces 
was far too slow; but that this was subsequently used as a ‘red-herring’ to argue 
an increased police presence was necessary.181 Although Kelly countered that, 
especially following the reserves sent to Toxteth, gathering together large 
numbers of police officers takes time and it was this that had caused delays in 
response rather than any kind of predetermined police strategy to do so.182 
Anderton himself, clearly highlighting his views on the events, later suggested 
the police had been forced into harsher actions by the failure of the community: 
‘People must realise that when police have to resort to tougher tactics, it is 
generally the fault of the community and not of the struggling police. We should 
stop making excuses for conduct that is palpably wicked and nothing else.’183  
The later Hytner Inquiry stated that as panel member Linbert Spencer 
had been present at this meeting they were unable to consider or comment 
upon such disputes.184 This added another level of distrust and disillusionment 
for local people towards the inquiry as it appeared that the police’s actions were 
not being adequately scrutinised. Whether the police had in fact deliberately ‘let 
Moss Side burn’ in order to then crack down with a more forceful police 
presence is rather a moot point; the important aspect is that such an immoral 
police tactic was widely deemed possible, if not even probable. 
FURTHER DISTURBANCES 
As has been alluded to, this meeting between the police and members of 
the local community did not prevent further disturbances from taking place. At 
10.22pm on Wednesday night, approximately 300-1,000 youths attacked Moss 
Side Police Station.185 Most of the windows were broken, nine police and seven 
private vehicles were damaged, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to 
ignite petrol spilled in the station yard.186 Eye witnesses claimed to have seen a 
crowd, including some noted to have been outsiders to the area, being led 
towards the police station by a 9-year-old white boy.187 Whilst some attempted 
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to attribute this to a particularly assertive youth, the Hytner Inquiry panel 
suggested the more probable conclusion that he was leading others simply 
because he knew the way.188 Despite the accusations of outsiders coming into 
the area to cause trouble and having to be told where the police station was; the 
panel ‘wholly reject[ed] the implication that the attack had in some way been 
planned in another city’.189 This was supported by their connected conclusion 
that, for a group intending to storm a building, they seemed ‘remarkably ill-
prepared’ and once their ‘first and pathetically hopeless attack’ had failed, they 
soon retreated when police reinforcements arrived.190 This supports the 
analysis of these events as not having any real leadership, planning or 
structure; simply it was a collective outpouring of anger from some local 
inhabitants towards the police.  
It was also suggested that this crowd had been attempting to free the 
seven youths arrested previously, although these were actually being held at 
nearby Platt Lane station.191 Somewhat ironically, it was police reinforcements 
arriving from Platt Lane which soon ended the attack.192 Mike Freeman, at that 
time a police officer for less than a year, recalled travelling from Platt Lane to 
Moss Side and how a relaxed police attitude that ‘it was a bit of a giggle, a bit of 
a joke’ was quickly replaced with fear once the van approached Moss Side 
Station and began to be hit by rocks and bottles.193 A black youth involved in 
the attack allegedly proclaimed soon after: ‘I’m here to see the pigs get theirs. 
They’ve done this for years. Now they know what it’s like to be hit back.’194 This 
can clearly be seen as how the focus of the anger was upon the police and their 
historic treatment of and attitude towards local black youths. The high level of 
discontent towards the police in Moss Side was summed up with Arnold 
Spencer recounting a meeting with a 61-year-old white Conservative-leaning 
man, who believed the attack upon the Moss Side Police Station was the best 
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thing that had happened in years.195 Whilst he had no sympathy for the rioters 
themselves, it was clear he approved of the action that had been directed 
against the police.196 Such a reaction is noteworthy from someone with 
Conservative-leanings, who typically supported the party line of this being a 
breakdown of law and order, showing how widespread the antipathy towards 
the police existed in the area. 
As Frederick Garside, Chairman of the Lloyd Street ward Labour Party, 
stated, it came as a surprise to many that this attack upon the police station was 
not a signal for a change in police tactics away from the low profile approach.197 
There were reportedly 600 officers waiting in reserve in Platt Lane Station, 
whereas Moss Side station contained only fourteen.198 The police had 
reportedly begun to hear rumours of an attack earlier that afternoon and 
Superintendent Robin Oake recalled the decision to limit the number of police 
present in Moss Side in the face of a likely attack.199 Possibly in keeping with 
the promised low police presence, this could also be seen as a protective 
method for limiting police casualties. However a different kind of tension 
materialised through negative reaction to the absence of police in the area 
during that evening’s events. Robert William Goldsby, husband to the Moss 
Side Conservative Party candidate for the previous 5 years, complained that the 
local community’s business owners had paid the price for Anderton proving he 
could keep a low profile.200 Similarly Hytner noted the level of discontent 
regarding the lack of a police presence rose whilst looting was occurring.201 An 
anonymous witness claimed that officers had informed local businessmen early 
on Wednesday that they should take steps to protect themselves as more 
disturbances would happen that night.202 When asked why police wouldn’t 
provide protection, officers allegedly replied: ‘We don’t want any confrontation 
direct with them. You have to protect your own property.’203  
Evidence suggested that the few police officers that were present 
seemed to disappear soon after crowds of rioters arrived. Hytner refused to 
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criticise this desertion as it was suggested they ‘might have been in 
considerable danger if they had remained’; indeed, one Police Inspector was 
struck by a crossbow bolt during this time.204 Also at around 10.40pm a police 
officer, described as very young and very afraid, was seen running down the 
street shouting at cafes and shops to close and leave as rioters were coming in 
that direction.205 It was alleged that despite the police being warned earlier that 
evening that violence would occur, no protection against vandalism or looting 
was provided to the area for a two and a half hour period.206 Hytner recorded 
that ‘Much bitter comment’ had been made regarding this absence, but stated 
that it had actually lasted only one hour or less.207 In the same manner that 
Chief Constable Brian Weigh was roundly criticised for his withdrawal of officers 
during the St Pauls disturbances in 1980, such criticism further galvanised the 
government’s response which focussed upon punishing participants and 
strengthening the police to ensure there would be no similar situations in the 
future. 
 ‘Eventually’, in Hytner’s words, the police arrived in numbers both on 
foot with riot gear and in vehicles.208 A large crowd gathered to oppose the 
police and, despite no attempt by the police to disperse them, a number of 
officers allegedly charged into the crowd soon followed by the entire police line. 
As Hytner concluded, it is almost impossible to believe that this charge 
focussed its forcefulness solely against those who had warranted it.209 
Furthermore a large amount of evidence suggested that police vehicles drove at 
high speed into crowds in an attempt to disperse them, likely a tactic copied 
from Northern Ireland examples. A number of witnesses, when asked by the 
Hytner Panel whether this was a clever manoeuvre or a reckless and 
dangerous approach, recounted numerous stories of people desperately diving 
away from oncoming police vans.210 When questioned what would have 
happened if someone had been unable to get out of the way of the oncoming 
vehicles, Arnold Spencer responded: ‘Well, I think, tough; they would have been 
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dead, I guess.’211 If those participating in collective violence to protest their 
situation and police treatment had believed that such dangerous and seemingly 
uncontrolled tactics were to be punished by investigations into events, they 
were to be disappointed. Hytner later in fact determined it was foolish for 
residents to be confronting the assembled police in the first place, as they had 
increased the mood of confrontation.212 It was nevertheless conceded that, had 
the police made an appropriate attempt to disperse the crowd initially, many 
may have vacated the streets.213 It is likely that many would have nevertheless 
remained and faced the police’s charges but, without even attempting to 
disperse the crowd before heavy-handed tactics led officers to drive cars 
directly towards them, this showed the extent of the police’s tactics and 
opinions. 
THURSDAY 9 JULY 
A further meeting was held on the morning of Thursday 9 July, between 
local government officials and community representatives, also hoping to 
alleviate tensions.214 This meeting similarly did not prevent further disturbances, 
but this time the police actively engaged immediately with those on the streets. 
Merseyside Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford later explained how traditional 
police tactics of lines of officers using riot shields to attempt to disperse large 
crowds had proven to be ‘completely and utterly ineffective in the face of the 
tactics adopted by the protagonists in 1981’.215 Therefore, as opposed to lines 
of static officers with plastic riot shields which provided rioters a target for 
violence, Anderton instead advocated the use of officers in vans to increase 
police speed and mobility and to target influential rioters.216 Eyewitness Michael 
Nally estimated that around thirty vans, alongside various other police vehicles, 
attempted to break up groups of people and force others to retreat indoors.217 
R. W. Apple Jr described this approach of dispersing small groups of people as 
being a response after previous tactics had failed elsewhere, ‘resulting in 
hundreds of injuries to policemen’.218  
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Anderton later detailed that his tactics were indeed influenced by 
previous injuries inflicted upon officers, particularly personal experience in 
Toxteth, and that similar high levels of police casualties ‘simply could not be 
tolerated’ in Manchester.219 As discussed previously, this highlights how it was 
not only the disturbances themselves which spread around the country but that 
police tactics and general response evolved due to the spread and experience 
of disorder. Whitelaw stated publically that he gave his ‘fullest support’ to 
Anderton’s tactics and that they had been a ‘conspicuous success’.220 A Home 
Office note recorded how riot damage was less extensive on Thursday due to 
the ‘more positive approach of the police following the disappointing result of 
their “softly softly” approach of the previous evening’.221 However Fender 
criticised the move towards ‘very heavy-handed’ police tactics, which flooded 
the area with officers ‘swooping onto people indiscriminately as they walked the 
streets…whatever a situation is, that can’t possibly contribute to policing in a 
civilised society’.222 Moreover Mike and Trevor Phillips later deemed this ‘a 
watershed in police violence’, describing how fifty-four vans full of ‘snatch 
squads’, influenced by tactics used previously in Northern Ireland, were sent 
‘speeding through the area…to crack heads and drag their targets away’.223 
This further shows the prevalence of a Northern Ireland influence as the 
rioters in England were equated with the prolonged violence that had been seen 
there and the same tactics were used in order to combat them; indeed six 
senior English police officers would later visit Northern Ireland on 14 July to 
discuss riot control and, in Robert Reiner’s description, learn lessons from the 
‘success’ of Royal Ulster Constabulary tactics.224 If the Home Office note 
detailed the reduced riot damage due to employing such tactics, it did not 
reference the further negative impact that such tactics had upon relations 
between the police and members of the local community. Many believed that 
their collective violence was a legitimate political protest against a police force 
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and system which had failed them, to which they were greeted with snatch 
squads and increasingly aggressive tactics. 
FRIDAY 10 JULY 
Repeating Brixton and Toxteth before it, Friday 10 July saw a visit to 
Moss Side by Whitelaw who told reporters the disturbances had resulted from 
feelings of ‘hopelessness’ and ‘social alienation’ from the local youth, in addition 
to a Conservative favourite description of ‘criminal hooliganism’.225 Although he 
did not meet with representatives of local community groups during his visit, he 
indicated a willingness to do so in the future.226 Consequently his appearance 
was criticised as a ‘flying visit’ and that community leaders had not been given 
adequate time to arrange a meeting.227 Whereas it had been noted important in 
other locations to engage and listen to the local community, at this point 
Whitelaw did not feel it essential to take such action; undoubtedly disappointing 
many. Thus the Manchester Council for Community Relations later arranged for 
28 community leaders to travel to London to meet Whitelaw who repeatedly 
asked whether there were demands to remove Anderton, to which the leaders 
explained the only criticism of him was linked to general criticism of the 
police.228 Such questions are telling and highlight the reputation Anderton had 
gained by this point that Whitelaw thought many from the local community may 
be calling for his dismissal. Alternatively, Whitelaw may have been personally 
wishing for a reason to remove this controversial and politically active Chief 
Constable. 
Whitelaw telephoned Thatcher the day after his visit and, seemingly 
disregarding the incident at the police station and evidence that anti-police 
feeling had been behind the disturbances, he informed Thatcher that the Moss 
Side disturbances had been characterised by ‘looting and hooliganism, rather 
than confrontation with the police’.229 He deemed the low-profile police tactics 
requested by the community ‘a complete failure’, also claiming that community 
leaders had since admitted as much to Anderton.230 He believed the ‘relatively 
little trouble’ which greeted a saturated police presence the following night, 
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‘showed the need for decisiveness on the part of the police’.231 Unsurprisingly 
from this reading of events, and fitting with the general establishment response 
to other outbreaks of disturbances, he believed the top priority was thus to 
ensure that the police were necessarily equipped to deal with such disorder. 
This included the threat of water cannon, ‘even if it was unlikely to be used in 
practice’, and the possibility of arming the police.232 This is one of the most 
obvious examples of how the response at the very highest levels of government 
ignored the actual discontent behind the collective violence and instead 
focussed purely upon the criminality of the largely unrelated looting which 
followed. The problem was of maintaining law and order, so the answer was 
supplying the police more equipment to do so. 
THE END OF DISTURBANCES 
After sporadic incidents of violence on Friday 10 and Saturday 11 July, 
the disturbances came to an end. Over the period of some five days in Moss 
Side 135 people had been arrested for criminal offences and 106 for public 
order offences, 18 officers were injured of which nine required hospital 
treatment and 130 days total of sick leave were taken, and damage to vehicles, 
police station, and police uniforms and equipment totalled over £10,000.233 
Echoing other disturbances around the country, the vast majority of those 
arrested were aged between seventeen and twenty-four and, despite the 
accepted stories and media reports suggesting otherwise, the majority were 
white rather than black.234 Similarly as with previous examples it was noted that 
violence was directed against specific targets, or at least had attempted to be, 
and fire officers recorded that the majority of hostilities from the crowd was 
directed towards the police, rather than the fire service.235 Some even 
attempted to stop the subsequent looting, reasoning that it was shifting focus 
away from the main anti-police sentiment and was turning neutral locals and 
media against them.236 As this had been the case in previous disturbances, it 
can also be viewed as an attempt from those participating in collective violence 
to adapt and make sure that their protesting voices were not drowned out by 
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subsequent looting. Unfortunately for them, the main focus from many remained 
upon the criminality aspect. 
The immediate reaction of many to the disorder was to point to the 
extremes that people felt they had to go to in order to make their voices heard. 
A local social worker claimed more riots may be needed, as they were the only 
thing which produced results.237 As an anonymous witness told the Hytner 
Panel; ‘Look what it’s taken to get people like you here to make any inquiry and 
perhaps listen’.238 With echoes of previous events, it was noted that a feeling 
amongst the youth was that through this uprising they had made something 
happen and, possibly for the first time, forced a reaction: ‘Their actions had 
been seen to be significant’.239 H. Warm, District Inspector for Manchester 
Education Committee, later summarised that the disturbances reflected the 
local community’s new ability to tell authority that they did not know what was 
best for them, that they were going to do so themselves.240 Thus the collective 
violence of the disorder can be viewed within a broader range of political 
responses to achieve an increased level of attention and participation in the 
political arena for this previously marginalised societal group. 
CONCLUSION 
After the violence of Brixton had ended and Lord Scarman was beginning 
his investigations, numerous other locations saw disorder spread to within their 
borders. Some three months had passed between Brixton and the July 
disturbances but increased tensions from that example undoubtedly played a 
role in the summer violence. Also the knowledge that Brixton’s collective 
violence had resulted in a judicial inquiry undoubtedly encouraged others to 
employ such methods to attract similar attention and resources to their own 
situations. The main focus from the authorities remained on law and order and 
criminality and, consequently, new methods of police tactics and equipment 
were utilised such as the first use of CS gas within Britain during Toxteth and 
Northern Ireland-inspired ‘snatch squads’ in Moss Side. Scarman’s ongoing 
inquiry into Brixton was widened to purportedly include examination of these 
further disturbances, but in reality he was not able to include much more than 
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basic discussion of some of these events. Thus a local inquiry was established 
by the Manchester County Council but, as elsewhere, this was boycotted by 
local organisations who believed that such an inquiry was not adequate for 
investigation of the matter. This will be discussed in the following chapter, 
alongside the publishing and reception to the Scarman Report, as well as the 
overall reaction to events more generally. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
TAKING STOCK: HYTNER AND SCARMAN 
  
After violence had spread around the country in July 1981, even the most 
ardent believers could no longer claim that St Pauls or Brixton were isolated 
local incidents that bore no broader significance for black communities in 
Britain. However there remained an overwhelming response from some 
quarters to focus reaction and recommendations exclusively upon ideas of 
criminality, law and order, and intensified police tactics and equipment. For 
those involved in initial uprisings, attempting to finally force the authorities to 
address issues they faced on a day-to-day basis, their hopes rested largely 
upon a small number of inquiries that promised to consider why the events had 
occurred. Accordingly this chapter discusses in detail the Hytner Report into the 
Moss Side disturbances, the Scarman Inquiry which was subsequently 
expanded to consider all the July disorders, and the overall reaction to events 
which had occurred throughout 1980-81. 
HYTNER REPORT, MOSS SIDE 
Soon after the Moss Side disturbances, the Manchester City Council 
resolved to request the Home Secretary extend the Scarman Inquiry to consider 
events in Manchester or, if not possible, to establish another similar 
independent inquiry.1 Town Clerk J. Hetherington emphasised the importance 
of an inquiry into complaints and allegations against the police which, most 
importantly, needed to be seen by all to be independent and impartial.2 The 
Greater Manchester County Council (GMC) agreed that a local independent 
inquiry was needed and, as such, declined to submit any observations to 
Scarman.3 This was a similar response to the Bristol Council for Racial 
Equality’s refusal to submit evidence to the Select Committee on Home Affairs. 
Whilst their tactic was undertaken to continue demands for a public inquiry into 
St Pauls, the GMC instead believed that a local inquiry would better examine 
the specific case of Moss Side. Both circumstances resulted in the scarce 
official inquiries not receiving all possible important evidence for their 
investigations. The GMC subsequently established a local inquiry chaired by 
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Benet Hytner QC, a decision outwardly supported by the Greater Manchester 
Police Authority.4 Hytner was chosen due to being a local and distinguished 
crown court recorder with a reputation for having a social conscience.5 However 
the City Council resented not having been consulted or involved in establishing 
this inquiry, as they believed it fell within their jurisdiction.6 City Council leader 
Norman Morris somewhat petulantly claimed the inquiry had ‘started nowhere 
and it’s going nowhere’.7 On top of the issues of a supposedly full and 
independent inquiry immediately alienating the City Council, it is not hard to see 
how sections of the local community lost faith in the local forms of government 
when they appeared more concerned with bickering amongst themselves. 
Similarly to Scarman, this inquiry’s terms of reference was to examine 
the circumstances leading to disorder, the manner they were dealt with, and 
recommendations to avoid reoccurrences.8 Upon opening inquiry proceedings 
however, Hytner stressed that it was an investigation constituted by the GMC 
into the immediate causes of the disturbances, rather than an examination of 
the underlying conditions.9 As with other cases, this immediately threatened to 
overlook the collective accumulation of tensions and discontent at the heart of 
the disturbances. Again mirroring previous examples he also dispelled any hope 
of this inquiry addressing specific allegations of police misconduct, arguing that 
they could not provide the strict safeguards that ‘basic fairness and justice’ 
required for such accusations; despite ‘basic fairness and justice’ appearing 
exactly what many of those with accusations of police misconduct were hoping 
this inquiry would have provided.10 Hytner noted the police had accepted the 
panel’s request not to attend public hearings unless invited, in an attempt to 
encourage participants to provide evidence without fear of personal 
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repercussions.11 However the police rejected the inquiry’s later invitation for 
questioning, with the local inquiry incapable of making such attendance 
compulsory.12 Chief Constable James Anderton indicated he did not believe it 
was right, ‘in view of the statutory relationship between himself and the Police 
Committee that he should be expected in any way to answer criticisms made to 
or by’ the Hytner Inquiry.13 In a blunter statement reported in the press, 
Anderton deemed it ‘plainly ridiculous’ and ‘too intolerable’ for a Chief Constable 
to address the inquiry’s ‘petty comments’.14 The effect such a response had 
upon those who had taken to the streets in desperation because their ‘petty 
comments’ were not being addressed through normal democratic means is not 
difficult to envisage.  
Jeffrey Wilner, City Councillor for Moss Side Ward, accused Anderton of 
complacency and the published Hytner Report admitted being ‘disappointed’ by 
his response, despite expressing they understood his position and in no way 
resented this refusal to attend.15 Hytner also noted that the panel were 
‘dismayed’ to learn at an early stage the level of hostility felt towards police from 
the local youth.16 If the inquiry panel were so downhearted about the declared 
relationship between the police and local youth, it is difficult to see why they did 
not resent the police’s refusal to attend their inquiry. Hytner later conceded it 
would have clearly been helpful if Anderton had cooperated, but that he did not 
believe this absence prevented the inquiry from uncovering the facts.17 It is 
clear that this view was not shared by everyone; indeed many questioned how 
the truth could be reached or accountability obtained when the police had not 
answered questions or faced accusations against them. During the inquiry 
Hytner recited a report submitted by Anderton and, wishing to ‘avoid 
disappointment to avoid provoking another riot’, assured the assembled public 
that the police version of events would not go unchallenged.18 This apparent 
understanding of the level of local discontent and hostility towards the police did 
not seem to result in a relative extent of police criticism in the completed report.  
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Indeed during proceedings Hytner often appeared sympathetic to the 
local community’s situation and difficulties, such as requesting during hearing 
evidence that people of West Indian origin born in the area were no longer 
reductively referred to as West Indians.19 It is likely that such a gesture made 
some, feeling entirely alienated from British society, feel a bit more welcome. 
Furthermore when, on more than one occasion the panel received testimony 
blaming the disorder solely on ‘black immigrants who don’t know how to 
behave’, Hytner dismissed such accusations out of hand, declaring that authors 
of ‘that sort of rubbish’ were ‘talking through their hat’.20 Similarly the report 
described some evidence as being submitted to the inquiry by ‘pathetic, old or 
sick people’ who blamed black immigration and demanded deportations, but the 
panel rejected these ‘scurrilous allegations’. However, they did report being 
heartened that those espousing such prejudices usually felt the need to do so 
anonymously.21 Despite these seemingly positive aspects and attitudes 
emerging during the inquiry, black communities still faced having their futures 
decided by those not living through their situations and Hytner’s appointment 
and the inquiry itself had not been universally liked or accepted. A picket line 
protested outside the inquiry during the open hearing sessions, and an angry 
member of the public threw a jug of water over Hytner.22 Although this was 
regarding an unrelated high court case, it was used as a metaphor for the 
reaction of some towards the inquiry itself. 
DEFENCE COMMITTEE BOYCOTT 
Following the disorder a group of local people had established the Moss 
Side Defence Committee to help young people arrested during and after the 
disturbances, giving lectures and talks to various unions and organisations to 
raise money for fines and legal fees.23 Its formation and name followed the 
example of the St Pauls Defence Committee the previous year; it was not 
however named, as a local youth worker seemingly believed, because the Moss 
Side community needed to defend itself against the police.24 Whether this was 
genuine confusion or a pointed comment is unknown, but the fact that anyone 
could suggest the local youth needed an organisation to defend itself against 
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the police is illustrative of the views of many within the local community. The 
Defence Committee also called for a public inquiry prior to the Hytner Inquiry 
being established, but committee member Eloise Edwards later lamented: 
‘Where we fell down again was that we should have stated the way how we 
wanted that enquiry to go.’25 Despite the GMC discussing potential inquiry 
members with the Defence Committee, they were not granted any further 
involvement and subsequently informed the GMC that they disagreed with the 
inquiry’s format and would boycott it. Following a number of public meetings this 
threat was carried out when changes satisfactory to the Committee’s desires, 
such as immunity from prosecution for witnesses, were not implemented in the 
inquiry.26  
It was noted that ‘genuine belief’ existed within the boycotters that ‘the 
ordinary legal system isn’t going to help them, that the courts aren’t doing their 
jobs properly’.27 This is consistent with years of growing disillusionment with 
British authorities which had led to collective violence. Others simply did not 
believe the inquiry was the most effective way of addressing inherent problems. 
For example, one witness claimed most people already knew the police were to 
blame and the inquiry was another waste of time and money which could be 
spent solving the problems in Moss Side.28 Another went further and accused 
Hytner of actually being paid by the police to cover up their misconduct.29 Whilst 
such an accusation is highly questionable, again the mere suggestion is telling 
of a widely-existing belief that the legal system was being manipulated to 
protect the police’s wrongdoings. 
This situation resonates with other examples seen throughout this thesis. 
Such inquiries and investigations that were established into events, despite 
seemingly answering the calls and pleas of many from the local community, 
were not trusted by large sections of those communities or believed to be fair or 
actively supporting their interests as they originated from the same authorities 
whose perceived legitimacy had been eroding for years. Therefore they were 
often boycotted or not enthusiastically supported which undoubtedly affected 
their findings, regardless of the attempted spin placed upon them by the 
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authorities. This dichotomy shows the range of political responses employed by 
this marginalised group to achieve increased participation within the British 
system. 
Hytner expressed disappointment at the boycott and, alongside GMC’s 
Labour leader Bernard Clarke, offered to meet the Defence Committee before 
the inquiry began.30 Hytner further appealed to them to provide valuable 
evidence despite their thinking it could not achieve anything: ‘if there is 
evidence that the Chief Constable has not pursued honestly, in the past, 
complaints of Police conduct, then all I can say is that those who suppress that 
evidence must be his very best friends’.31 Whilst this must have been a logical 
and persuasive argument in Hytner’s mind, its failure to convince the boycotters 
shows the level of distrust which existed. Similarly panel member Linbert 
Spencer claimed the danger of boycotting was that the police could later claim 
the local community had opportunities to voice their discontent, but that their 
silence could be used by the police to justify ‘cart blanche to do what [they] 
want’.32 Many, especially those who had taken to the streets to protest, believed 
this situation already existed and a local inquiry would not alter that. Chairman 
of the Lloyd Street Ward Labour Party, Frederick Garside, called the Defence 
Committee ‘blind’ and argued that their refusal to provide evidence to the inquiry 
was a sure way for it to not achieve anything.33 An anonymous witness further 
criticised the Defence Committee’s boycott, questioning: ‘Who the hell’s 
defending if they’re going to walk out of here and not say anything?’34 Others 
conversely claimed the Committee was not actually representative of the 
community and that initial exuberance towards it had quickly faded.35 This again 
highlights the problematic characterisation of ‘community leaders’, whether such 
organisations actually represented the views of the local community, and if they 
themselves were any more accountable to the general populace than the 
authorities. 
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Despite the media highlighting low attendance at the inquiry, suggested 
by Hytner to be evidence the local community believed further disorder would 
not materialise, the panel recorded pleasure that boycotters were reportedly still 
attending public hearings as it would allow them to personally judge the 
impartiality of proceedings.36 The very fact of the boycott itself was noted by 
Hytner as clear evidence of the lack of trust in local authorities, and the panel 
questioned whether it was an indication that no useful dialogue could occur 
between the police and local community.37 On at least one occasion a local 
Councillor, after providing evidence to the inquiry himself, immediately implored 
the Defence Committee to attend, to no avail.38 The boycott was a clear sign of 
the strength of feeling and a lack of confidence in the inquiry, despite calls 
having been made for such investigation. Conversely the published report 
claimed that the Defence Committee’s boycott actually aided the inquiry as it 
thus avoided claims that allegations of police conduct were coming solely from 
those branded ‘enemies’ of the police.39 Whilst this may have been true to a 
degree, the lack of detailed information and allegations undoubtedly weakened 
the final report. Hytner believed the most damaging aspect of the boycott was a 
lack of constructive recommendations for the future.40 Panel member Linbert 
Spencer later considered the boycott ‘sad and counter-productive’ and that, had 
they attended and provided evidence of negative police activities, such 
testimony might have been damning.41 This inquiry, however, was not deemed 
sufficiently effective or impartial by the boycotters for such evidence to be 
presented to it. 
PUBLISHED REPORT 
After three weeks of collecting evidence, the Hytner Inquiry had received 
oral evidence from seventy witnesses in public and over fifty more in private, 
received almost 100 letters, and visited seven institutions. The report boasted 
how after visiting local youth they ‘were rewarded at the end with a rousing 
cheer’, which gave the panel ‘the impression that they were not often asked for 
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their views on anything’.42 This nonetheless did not lead to the level of political 
participation likely desired by those local youths. The published report began by 
calling such an inquiry an ‘unsuitable body to answer a number of the questions 
implicit in our terms of reference’, pointedly highlighting this had been 
expressed repeatedly to the GMC throughout, and that Scarman’s Inquiry would 
address such questions.43 It was suggested that some perceived deficiencies of 
the Report were due to its being addressed to the Policy Committee of the 
GMC, rather than the Police Authority or the police themselves.44 Similar to 
accusations that Scarman’s Inquiry was incorrectly established under the Police 
Act rather than as a full public inquiry, this also appeared to validate 
suggestions of an unsuitable inquiry and calls for a boycott from the Defence 
Committee and undoubtedly angered some other members of the community as 
it appeared to openly admit it had been an inappropriate response. 
ANDERTON’S RESPONSE 
The published report was careful ‘not to cause the Chief Constable to 
feel that he is being treated unconstitutionally’, so made a point of not drawing 
judgments on allegations against him.45 Whilst further aggravating those who 
accused the inquiry of a pro-police bias, this also did not prevent Anderton from 
disliking his depiction in the report and thus deciding against making any further 
submissions to the Scarman Inquiry. Anderton contended that opinions 
previously submitted to Scarman had been turned against him in the Hytner 
Report, and that a number of personal references had been ‘unfair and very 
unkind, to say the least’. He complained of ‘damaging conclusions’ based on 
‘the flimsiest and most tentative material’, as well as ‘personal attitudes and 
postures [which] have been attributed to me without any justification 
whatsoever’.46 Perhaps this would not have been the case if he had not deemed 
it ‘too intolerable’ to attend the inquiry. It is likely that Anderton would have 
criticised whatever the report concluded and, in keeping with his general 
reaction, used its findings to allege an anti-police campaign. The report did 
record the number of criticisms, ‘amidst a chorus of praise’, that Anderton did 
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not accept complaints against the police.47 Noting his complete rejection that 
any complaints had been stifled at police stations, the report determined such a 
blunt denial ‘may be regarded by the public as about on a par with finding, 
which we do not make, that the allegations were true on the say so of the 
complainants alone’.48 This astute observation is supported with available 
evidence suggesting the developing general feeling that the police were 
covering up their crimes, which, if investigated properly, may not have actually 
been accurate. A later radio interview with Anderton further illustrated this point 
when, addressing Labour Counsellor Jack Wilner’s suggestion that to improve 
police/community relations the police must accept their failings, Anderton 
rejected that the police had to admit any such issues.49 At the same time as 
Scarman was publishing the report of his inquiry, Anderton sent plaques to the 
police stations in Manchester to commend his forces on their handling of the 
disorder.50 Whether this was a direct reaction to the report, which would not be 
inconsistent with Anderton’s other behaviour, it certainly portrayed the message 
that he would support his officers over seemingly any criticism levelled towards 
them. Discontent towards the police complaints system was cited by Hytner as 
a ‘major source of friction’ and, although not deemed a direct contribution to the 
outbreak of disorder, it added to the hostility felt towards the police with no 
functioning method of addressing police misconduct.51 Again, it is clear to see 
why the local population believed that violent measures was their only recourse 
for increased political participation when the vocal head of the local police force 
was so adamant that the police should not be criticised. 
DEFENCE COMMITTEE RESPONSE 
Initial reaction to the Hytner Report was positive from many sectors, with 
the Police Committee, GMC, and media giving a generally favourable 
response.52 However, and perhaps predictably, the Moss Side Defence 
Committee was less complimentary. They deemed the positive response of 
others understandable due to the report’s ‘thin veneer of liberalism, humanity 
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and scholarship’ and ‘the superficial appearance of a balanced and objective 
analysis’. They considered the report inconsistent, condescending, biased, 
avoided the central issues, and an attempt to influence Moss Side residents into 
tolerating largely unchanged policing methods.53 The Moss Side People’s 
Centre agreed it had ‘evaded the main issues’ and the Defence Committee 
concluded this justified their decision to boycott.54 Although similar to Anderton’s 
criticism of the report’s content, boycotting the inquiry to then later criticise it for 
not focussing on the aspects they deemed most important may have been an 
expected consequence. Defence Committee Chairman Gus John subsequently 
rejected a proposed meeting with the police, thus reinforcing their belief that 
meeting with those representing the establishment was a pointless endeavour 
until real change had been seen.55 
As in other situations the report’s focus upon the criminality of the 
disorder was criticised, particularly when no police faced any form of retribution 
for their own alleged misconduct as discussed in detail below.56 The Defence 
Committee’s most stringent criticism was directed against the report’s refusal to 
fully examine assertions of police harassment, instead focussing upon the 
hostility fostered by the belief of such persecution. Similarly they attacked 
labelling Anderton’s limited submissions to the inquiry as simply ‘disappointing’, 
querying how the report could possibly hope to form any accurate conclusions 
without having investigated the policing situation in Moss Side. And if, the 
Defence Committee argued, the Hytner Report wished to refrain from passing 
judgement on Anderton’s efficiency as they had stated, they should not have 
included references to praise he had received for his handling of the 
disturbances. This was seen, in contrast to the simplistic and reductive view of 
rioters, as supporting the establishment in detriment to those without such 
political powers. By not interviewing police officers or examining possible police 
racism and discrimination, the focus of the report was thus upon Moss Side 
itself, suggesting that this was where the problems lay.57  
Where the report did attempt to make recommendations, such as a 
proposed community representative to mediate complaints against the police, 
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this was dismissed as a superficial change intended to ‘placate’ the community 
and restore confidence in the complaints procedure rather than actually improve 
it.58 The accusation and explanation forwarded by many, that the local black 
youth felt alienated from society and had no stake in surroundings they rioted 
within, was deemed ‘deeply insulting’.59 Unemployment, declining discipline, or 
divisions between young and old black people was not the cause; rather their 
continuing experience of a discriminatory society and police abuse led to a 
violent declaration that such a situation was unacceptable. Preceding the 
findings of the Stephen Lawrence murder inquiry by some seventeen years, 
which found the Metropolitan police to be ‘institutionally racist’, the Defence 
Committee claimed that police harassment was simply one of a number of acts 
‘designed to define black people as a sub-class in white society’.60 They 
consequently concluded that local residents could not rely upon the system 
‘which has so badly let them down in the past’ and that, as the actions of the 
‘powerless’ rioters were a desperate but rational attempt following legitimate but 
ultimately unsuccessful protests to highlight problems that were not being 
addressed, the Hytner Report threatened to undermine and detract from that 
meaning.61 This characterises the disturbances firmly within the ‘bargaining by 
riot’ framework, despite the implication that such actions were not as ‘legitimate’ 
as previous non-violent action. 
This negative response had been predicted by members of the Hytner 
Panel, who noted the difficulty of convincing the public that the inquiry was not 
simply a means of covering the faults of the police and GMC.62 As seen by the 
reaction from the Defence Committee, local community, and continuing unrest, 
it did not appear that the Hytner Panel achieved such an aim. The report itself 
ended with the statement that, as they believed Scarman’s Report would make 
appropriate recommendations regarding policing and political changes, the 
worth of the Hytner Report lay in refuting some of the myths and 
misunderstandings which had arisen during the disturbances.63 Accordingly the 
report was sent to Lord Scarman to further his investigations, although the 
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response noted it had been received late into their proceedings.64 During the 
taking of evidence, it had been agreed by the panel that an inquiry which 
achieved nothing was worse than no inquiry at all.65 It is debatable whether the 
Hytner Inquiry did in fact achieve any of its goals. 
RUMOURS? 
As with the other disturbances discussed in this thesis, spread of 
information relating to the Moss Side disorder was characterised by a high 
degree of rumour. Such rumours are undoubtedly worthy of comment because, 
as Anderton summarised, ‘The rapid spread of rumour and lies presents as 
many dangers as any realisation of the truth.’66 They suggest the general 
feelings of the local community by highlighting what people were willing and 
disposed to believe and share with others. An anonymous witness agreed with 
the impact of these rumours, suggesting they made people more active and 
violent as a response to such speculations.67 Numerous examples existed such 
as the bus depot being on fire, the attacked police station being taken over by 
local youths or actually going up in flames, alongside multiple accounts of police 
activity and alleged impropriety.68  
If disorder spread around the country by word of mouth, as evidence 
suggests it did to some extent, it appears this was made easier by pre-existing 
views on the police aiding the dissemination and perceived credibility of 
allegations. For instance Father Sumner, of St. Wilfred’s in Hulme, argued there 
was no smoke without fire and actual examples of police misconduct and 
brutality gave rise to further stories, more readily believed.69 As summarised by 
Hytner: ‘You only need 10% [of police] who harass, and the population would 
get the impression that everybody harasses.’70 This, coupled with police officials 
such as Anderton displaying blind support for their officers, created the feeling 
amongst many within the local community that the police were not punished for 
widespread impropriety. Addressing the argument that complaints against the 
police were manufactured by those with political or ideological axes to grind, 
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Hytner identified that even if this was the case then the propensity of the local 
youth to believe the accounts, based upon their own experiences with the 
police, needed to be addressed.71 Hytner concluded that whilst Anderton 
continued to staunchly dismiss accusations of police wrongdoing as 
fabrications, the situation would not improve because such ‘fabrications’ were 
widely believed throughout Moss Side.72 
‘COPYCAT’? 
Relatedly Hytner and others often discussed whether the Moss Side 
events were ‘copycat’ disturbances and where ideas of rioting originated. Home 
Secretary William Whitelaw labelled many of the 1981 disturbances ‘copy-cat’, 
as youth nationwide attempted, in Timothy Brain’s words, to get a ‘piece of the 
action’ themselves.73 Richard Clutterbuck firmly maintained that disturbances 
following news coverage of Liverpool and Southall on 3 July ‘can have no 
possible explanation other than the copycat phenomenon’.74 Such arguments 
characterised collective violence as irrational and imitative and, as Peter Fryer 
summarised, if these were ‘copycat riots’ then they were ‘Some cats – and 
some claws!’75  
The idea that the media had played a significant role in the spread of 
disorder led the British Broadcasting Corporation and Independent 
Broadcasting Authority to commission a report from Howard Tumber of the 
British Film Institute.76 After conducting interviews with young people, police, 
and broadcasters themselves, Tumber concluded that television played a minor 
role with less than ten percent of the twelve to nineteen age-group watching 
television news and having seen reports of the riots.77 He instead argued that 
the youth heard about disorder due to information ‘gathered in the classrooms, 
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the streets and the pubs’.78 However Graham Murdock contended that the 
media did play a role in the spreading disturbances: 
Some observers have argued that this kind of coverage raised the 
consciousness of inner city youth and increased their readiness to take 
on the police. This is a possibility, but the coverage also had lessons for 
the police. It primed them to expect major trouble in the cities and 
strengthened the resolve to crack down on it early by stepping up their 
activities in inner city areas. This in turn cemented youth resentment at 
police behaviour and fed local rumours that a riot was imminent. As a 
result, both sides ‘tooled up’ for trouble, so that eventually it only took a 
minor incident on the streets to trigger a confrontation.79 
This is certainly a view of the spreading of disorder shared by many, including 
the author of this thesis. 
Within Moss Side, Charlie Harries summarised the thoughts of many by 
stating that the media multiplied the disturbances: ‘I’m sure a hundred years 
ago, when communications were not so good, that riots would not have 
occurred simultaneously in various parts of the country in the way they did.’80 
Whilst countless previous examples exist of disorder spreading without relying 
upon the influence of mass media, it indisputably allowed information and 
images of disorder to spread quickly around the country. It was suggested the 
media ‘glamourised’ the violence, with television and newspaper images 
blamed for inspiring others to copy examples set and even showed them 
exactly how to do so.81 The Hytner Report stated the previous years had seen 
‘almost weekly’ television reports of street violence, again invoking comparisons 
with the influential Northern Ireland example and placing events within England 
in 1981 within a wider context of spreading disorder throughout the 1980s. Thus 
the Moss Side youth had ‘become conditioned to those of their own age 
banding together to smash windows and throw petrol bombs’.82 It was even 
suggested that the 1977 television miniseries Roots, centred upon an African 
family line’s journey from enslavement to emancipation, had ‘set a lot of black 
people against whites’.83 Similarly a trend in popular culture over previous years 
had seen a growing attention awarded to apocalyptic themes, no doubt 
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influenced by nuclear weapons and the ongoing Cold War. Television dramas 
such as Survivors (1975), The Changes (1975), and Threads (1984), as well as 
films Dawn of the Dead (1978), Mad Max (1979) and the Planet of the Apes 
series (1968-73) all contained depictions of the apocalypse and visions of life 
after society had crumbled. Peter Hutchings highlighted that the growth of 
apocalyptic themes within British popular culture ‘might in some instances be 
articulating in a covert or unconscious manner a socially and historically specific 
sense of despair and negativity’.84 Living within such, it is perhaps not surprising 
this led to an explosion of violence around the country. 
Conversely numerous witnesses maintained that events were made to 
look worse in the media; one example of a recounted visit to America 
supposedly largely consisted of assuring inquirers that England was not entirely 
‘in flames’.85 It was also noted that the French press devoted a large amount of 
coverage to events.86 This shows the level of influence that the media played in 
disseminating information worldwide, often magnifying rumours and 
misinformation on a much larger scale. Additionally Anderton blamed the media 
for spreading hostility towards the police, accusing them of often displaying a 
‘most noticeable bias against the police’.87 Again, from a Chief Constable famed 
for his revulsion of anything approaching police criticism, this is not an 
unexpected stance. Using the example of the infamous ‘sus’ law, he suggested 
this small issue in a single community in South London had been ‘fanned and 
fanned again with considerable help and attention from the media’ until it had 
spread around the country and ‘young blacks and Asians everywhere 
challenged the authority of the police often without really understanding why’.88 
He cited recent Manchester arrest statistics that just 0.13 percent of all recorded 
crimes in 1980 had fallen under ‘sus’, concluding that discontent at its supposed 
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large use within Manchester was ‘therefore, patently absurd’.89 This 
characterisation of many participants in the collective violence as not 
understanding their own motives and the stark use of numerical statistics, which 
only recording arrests and not the continuous harassment of stops and 
searches, overlooked the nuances of dissatisfaction towards the police. 
The media was also accused of exacerbating belief that violence would 
specifically erupt within Moss Side, and that disturbances were the realisation of 
that expectation.90 This view was later espoused by Anderton: 
Greater Manchester Police knew as long ago as May and June 1981 that 
there would be rioting in Moss Side…not for any sane or defensible 
reason, but to fulfil a much publicised prophesy. Yet there was nothing 
we could do to prevent it…There were frequent and – in my opinion – 
thoroughly irresponsible references in the national press and in television 
programmes to the likelihood of clashes between police and young 
blacks in Moss Side, although there was no compelling evidence to 
support it.91 
The Defence Committee rejected this simplification that black people in Moss 
Side took to the streets simply because it was expected of them after Brixton 
and Toxteth; rather they did so because they were suffering under the same 
circumstances.92 Committee member Eloise Edwards voiced her rejection of the 
idea of copycat disturbances, arguing that the disturbances began when they 
did because people had had enough.93 An anonymous witness during the 
Hytner Inquiry furthered this point: ‘Why does war happen one year and not the 
year before? It’s just a certain point you reach and then it goes. It’s like bottling 
something up inside you.’94  
The Defence Committee drew comparisons with the example of early 
nineteenth century chartist protest erupting in sequence around England and 
Wales, stating that in both examples there was not a ‘chain of expectation 
based on myth’, but rather the ‘chain reaction…was one which inspired 
courage: people who might not otherwise have openly protested were inspired 
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to do so by the example of others’.95 They differentiated this from the sequence 
they believed had been suggested by Hytner, as ‘there were real causes of 
grievance in each of the areas in which it was expressed’.96 This explanation is 
consistent with the widespread belief that tensions had been growing in the 
area for years and the triggers for the violence were seemingly minor clashes 
with police which sparked a response of collective violence. This was similarly 
true of Brixton where Scarman concluded that ‘Operation Swamp’ built upon 
previous discontent, leading to the situation where any relatively minor event 
would have led to the collective violence witnessed. 
Nevertheless events such as Bristol and Brixton markedly increased 
tensions in the area which undoubtedly influenced events.97 An anonymous 
witness argued that events around the country had provided an example of a 
new way of making the point they had been attempting to make for years.98 For 
many local residents who had felt let down by and marginalised in British 
society, St Pauls and especially Brixton had shown a method of collective 
violence towards a common goal and seemingly getting their voices heard. The 
positive outcomes, attracting attention and resources, of previous examples of 
‘bargaining by riot’ showed that this was a strategy that could be successful in 
obtaining increased political participation. It had become commonplace for local 
residents to discuss the possibility of ‘another Bristol’, and a Moss Side 
schoolteacher confirmed that children were talking about events in Toxteth just 
before the disturbances spread to their area, with reactions ranging from fearing 
it would happen in Manchester to excitement at the possibility.99 A news report 
after the first night of disturbances suggested that, during disturbances in 
Liverpool, many assumed Manchester would be next; ‘and this morning they 
were proved right’.100 In fact, as far back as May 1981, posters had appeared in 
the area suggesting that, after Brixton, Moss Side would be next.101  
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Whilst some argued this demonstrated that a riot was being planned, 
Hytner instead characterised this as consistent with the ‘mood of inevitability’.102 
Whether such disturbances would have occurred without such an expectation is 
of course impossible to know, but it is clear that such a widespread feeling 
encouraged many into action. 
At least one vocal witness at the inquiry hearings blamed the spread of 
the disturbances on a perceived leniency towards previous rioters in other 
locations. Lee Lawrence claimed the police had been ‘absolutely hammered’ 
and that, by not making a sterner example of rioters in Brixton, ‘you might just 
as well have issued tickets – “Come to the riots on Wednesday”’.103 This was an 
issue that the highest levels of government clearly felt could have been a factor 
in the multiplying disorder. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had telephoned 
Whitelaw after visiting Liverpool and Brixton police station to stress ‘the need to 
bring some of the rioters before the Crown Courts without delay’.104 Whitelaw 
agreed, although he highlighted the ‘possible danger’ that they may be 
acquitted, as had happened following St Pauls.105 It is clear that, fitting within 
their general response of focussing upon criminality aspects, authorities 
believed an immediate response to the events would calm those questioning 
whether British law and order had crumbled and act as a deterrent for others. 
The fact that such disorder spread around the country so quickly suggests it did 
neither. 
Disturbances also spread throughout Manchester, similar to Southmead 
following St Pauls within Bristol. Councillor Paget noted that he had seen a 
message chalked on the wall which simply read ‘Wilmslow Road tonight’.106 It 
was alleged that police observed a small car driving six black men from Moss 
Side to Wythenshawe, a district some five miles south of Moss Side, where 
disturbances subsequently occurred.107 The Manchester Council for Community 
Relations had previously asked the Manchester Evening News not to over-
report the incidents as it was feared this would escalate disorder.108 However a 
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radio news report after the first night of disturbances in Moss Side ended with 
the question: ‘will the problems start once more and, if so, where will it happen 
next?’109 Foreshadowing the recent ‘twitter revolutions’ and 2011 England riots 
which utilised social media to spread information regarding the disturbances, it 
was also claimed that Moss Side saw the use of CB short-distance radio 
communications allowing for the spread of information regarding police 
locations and tactics.110 With such accusations originating from the police they 
may be incorrect or used to justify stricter police actions, but it appears that, as 
police were utilising new equipment to respond to the disturbances, so too were 
those participating in them. 
The media was additionally accused by some of inherently supporting 
the authorities: ‘In the struggle between oppressed and oppressors the decision 
to stay neutral is to side with the oppressor and this is the game that the media 
play when they claim to be neutral.’111 Their focus upon violence and criminality, 
to the detriment of the people involved, was criticised, with it being suggested 
that a better headline might have been: ‘Congratulations to the folk of Moss 
Side for saying things aren’t going right, let’s do something about it.’112 Local 
community worker Barri Potter cited the example that the brief attack upon the 
well-protected police station caused only minor damage, but the way the media 
reported it characterised the police as innocent victims of a violent mob.113 He 
continued to claim that many community workers and residents had 
purposefully not spoken to the media in the aftermath, as he ‘knew they would 
mis-represent us any way’.114 Such a media response was in-keeping with the 
broader summer disturbances. Murdock abridged the vast majority of 
newspaper reports into three main points: firstly that rioters were portrayed as 
an ‘alien black presence threatening the property and safety of established 
residents’; secondly that the police were attempting to protect those residents 
and thus they were both mutual victims of the ‘mob’; and thirdly the exceptional 
threat necessitated an exceptional response, i.e. heightened police equipment 
and weaponry.115 He also cited both Tumber’s study of television news and 
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Anders Hansen’s analysis of newspaper reports, which established that senior 
police officers had received significantly more media attention than community 
leaders, rioters, or even government ministers.116 
MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE – INCLUDING POLICE 
In another parallel to other incidents, many alleged that outsiders had 
come into the area in order to create trouble. It was reported that groups from 
other cities had travelled to Moss Side and stories emerged of people with 
Liverpudlian accents attempting to convince local youths to riot.117 Also political 
extremists, particularly those with left-wing leanings, were alleged to have been 
in the area manipulating the situation for their own political ends.118 A black 
revolutionary had purportedly travelled from London some months previously to 
tell a public meeting that ‘guns would soon be available’, although Hytner did 
not believe many would find this an appealing prospect.119 Some saw the 
suggestion of outsiders as an attempt to shift blame from the local community, 
but in other quarters it was seen as another example of people in Moss Side 
being deemed unable to think or act for themselves.120 Removing the action of 
the Moss Side community rising against the police was insulting to many within 
the local community and considered another example of British paternalism. 
Some 103 officers from the Greater Manchester Police had been drafted 
into Toxteth to provide support, returning with personal stories of the ferocity 
which had greeted them.121 This meant the spread of, not just the idea of riots, 
but also of the police’s own reactions. It was suggested that some of those 
involved in the Moss Side disturbances had travelled to ‘settle a score’ with the 
police after Toxteth.122 Similarly that Moss Side was a means of enacting police 
payback towards rioters, either by officers involved at Toxteth or colleagues 
                                                     
116 In a study of the major evening bulletins shown on the two main channels from 14 to 16 July, 
Tumber recorded that whilst government minister received 373 seconds of air time and senior 
police officers 367, community leaders received only 147 and rioters themselves just 52 
seconds. This was reflected in Anders Hansen’s analysis of the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror and The 
Guardian 6-12 July where statements of senior police were awarded more space than the views 
of any other group, particularly participants themselves: Tumber, Television and the Riots, p. 38 
and Anders Hansen, ‘Press coverage of the summer 1981 riots’, unpublished M.A. dissertation, 
University of Leicester, Centre for Mass Communication Research, 1982, as cited in Murdock, 
‘Reporting the Riots: Images and Impact’, p. 78. 
117 Byfield, 19 August 1981; Lewis, 20 August 1981. 
118 Anonymous community worker, MSI, JS. 
119 ‘Hytner Report’. 
120 Barri Potter, MSI, JS. 
121 James Anderton, ‘Serious Incidents of Public Disorder in Greater Manchester 8th to 12th 
July 1981’, 4 September 1981, Appendix 4B, ‘Hytner Report’. 
122 Byfield, 19 August 1981. 
  
291 
 
who had heard of their exploits and were keen to see such action 
themselves.123 It is highly unlikely that police were unaffected by previous 
disturbances, either through personal experience or accounts from media or 
word of mouth. As discussed in the previous chapter, Anderton altered police 
tactics to minimise police casualties and this was born out of witnessing officers 
sustain high levels of injury during Toxteth. It is likely that officers were also 
angered, excited, or worried by events elsewhere, leading some to overact in 
their handling of the Moss Side disturbances and generate a large number of 
accusations of police misconduct. Some of the allegations that emerged are 
examined below. 
POLICE MISCONDUCT 
As with the other inquiries, one of the main criticisms of the Hytner 
Inquiry was that it did not examine the numerous allegations of police brutality. 
Such accusations were instead directed through the normal police complaints 
procedure, a method which had lost the faith of the community and was 
deemed a waste of time at best, and at worst a method of selecting oneself for 
further police prejudice. There were certainly many complaints of police 
misconduct during the disturbances emerging both during the inquiry and 
subsequently. These allegations, present during other disorders in 1981, should 
also be viewed within broader accusations of police brutality, corruption, and a 
lack of accountability for their actions throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Numerous allegations emerged that police vans drove up and down 
streets, with officers threatening people with batons and riot gear, shouting 
‘Nigger, nigger, oi! oi!’, calling people ‘black bastards’, and threatening a man 
that they would ‘kick his fucking black face in’.124 Police taunts such as ‘you 
blacks are soft’ and ‘you’ve not got the guts of them in Liverpool’ were also 
recorded, further highlighting how knowledge of other disorders spread and 
influenced subsequent situations.125 Multiple graphic stories emerged during the 
inquiry, such as police kicking and beating a young boy, causing his 
grandmother whom he had been supporting to fall to the ground, and another of 
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a five year old boy being punched by an officer.126 A priest even felt he had to 
pull an officer off a civilian in order to prevent harm.127 Local GP Doctor Donald 
Bodey stated he had treated a number of injured youths in the days following 
the disturbances, recording cuts and bruises, suspected broken ribs, and an 
instance of a man’s dreadlocks being ripped from his head.128 He believed 
many Moss Side residents were simply too frightened of repercussions to 
discuss the abuses they had been put through.129 This again suggests why 
many felt that collective violence was their only recourse against such police 
actions, as they perceived there to be no other way of reporting such abuse.  
Local musician DJ Wizzy Dan recalled returning to Moss Side late on 
Friday night in a car of four young black men, which was surrounded by three 
vans full of police officers. They were beaten both in the police van and at the 
station, with Dan being hit with a police helmet which punctured his eardrum, 
having his face held under the sink tap by police, and having his dreadlocks 
forcibly detached. After a four year campaign the men were later awarded 
damages totalling £9,000, but Dan labelled this ‘peanuts’ in comparison to the 
treatment they had received.130 Even for those who did achieve some kind of 
compensation for the manner in which the police treated them, it was 
insufficient to excuse a lack of punishment for those officers.  
It was widely alleged that there was often no attempt to arrest those 
unfortunate enough to be caught by the police, they were simply beaten.131 
Officers were accused of wielding riot shields and visors before warning the 
assembled crowds to retreat.132 Another story told of a mother and her three 
teenage children being chased into their house by three officers emerging from 
a van yelling ‘You black bastards’ and waving their batons.133 The officers 
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kicked at the closed door to attempt entry into the house and, in the words of 
the woman, ‘it looked as if they were just trying to terrorise us’.134 To a 
community already believing the police were discriminatorily violent towards a 
section of the population they considered ‘alien’ from British society, this 
appeared a continuation of that approach. 
Stories of incidents involving members of the public deemed more 
‘respectable’ than black youths gave credence to claims the police acted 
improperly. An Irish baker was reportedly badly beaten by police whilst walking 
alone when four officers simply leaped out of a car and attacked him, surprising 
the eyewitness with their blatancy.135 Similarly local youth leader Hartley Hanley 
was arrested outside his own club after attempting to intervene between police 
and local youths, and Councillor Paget believed these actions signalled to many 
that police were not using standard methods: ‘The Police, it struck us, must be 
in a mood of arresting everything that moves on the street, rather than just 
arresting people who are caught in the act of doing something if they would do 
something like that.’136 Another local youth worker was beaten, one more was 
arrested for purportedly distributing bombs, and a father was told his son was 
being arrested because ‘The good have to suffer for the bad’.137 It was claimed 
that police indiscriminately targeting people, including respected members of 
the community, combined with high levels of blatant misconduct, led to an 
increased willingness to believe accusations of past police brutality towards the 
youth.138 As discussed previously, such accounts would likely not have been so 
readily believed or spread if there had not already existed common accusations 
against the police. 
Indeed this was allegedly merely a continuation of the treatment the local 
population received at the hands of the police. Accusations of previous police 
brutality were linked with unpopular tactics such as stop and searches, and 
extremely unpopular use of dogs; accusations reminiscent of the other locales 
discussed in this thesis.139 Black youths in the area had even begun wearing 
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badges declaring: ‘Help the police, beat yourself up’.140 An anonymous local 
teacher later recounted the ease with which they had begun to share animosity 
towards the police since moving to Moss Side, but also how difficult it was for 
others to believe the stories: 
I know family and friends who don’t live in the inner-city, who just 
disbelieve me. They think I’ve exaggerated it. You see they take the line, 
well there’s no smoke without fire. They must cause trouble and 
therefore the police are only doing their job…The resistance, by people 
who know me really well, to believe me has really shocked me.141 
The teacher concluded by drawing comparisons to the complacency which saw 
the growth of Nazism and Fascism.142 Whilst such comparisons could be seen 
as hyperbolic, it shows just how serious many people believed the situation to 
be and those who took to the streets to violently protest the police clearly 
shared this view. 
Even after the disturbances died down, it was alleged that officers were 
driving around shouting at black youths, drinking alcohol, and indiscriminately 
beating innocent people.143 A press statement from the Moss Side Community 
Action Committee accused the police of transforming Moss Side into a ‘no-go’ 
area and harassing and arresting innocent local inhabitants: ‘WE ARE IN 
EFFECT A COMMUNITY UNDER SIEGE, LIVING THROUGH WHAT 
AMOUNTS TO MARTIAL LAW!’144 This juxtaposition of the term ‘no-go’, 
previously used to describe areas where police feared to tread but here used to 
accuse police of inhibiting the local population from accessing their own 
neighbourhood, shows the very different viewpoint of many in these black 
communities to that of the general populace. 
As repeatedly noted previously, Anderton had historically been 
dismissive of reports of complaints against police being stifled or ignored, 
despite Hytner pointing out that it was likely to have been occurring.145 Likewise 
Superintendent Robin Oake also refuted such suggestions of police racism or 
brutality, claiming that if he had been aware of such an incident, the officer 
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would have been disciplined.146 However, similar to Anderton’s statements, this 
does not address the possibility of such behaviour occurring either unseen or 
after a senior officer had turned a blind eye. To the local community there was 
ample evidence that police officers had acted improperly and they were resolute 
that something needed to be done. 
POLICE COMPLAINTS 
During the inquiry Hytner made it repeatedly clear that it was not the 
place for individual complaints against specific officers and that a Court of Law 
or disciplinary tribunal, where appropriate statutory safeguards were provided, 
should be utilised for those accusations.147 Although as George Green, who had 
appeared at the inquiry to attempt to make such a complaint, summarised; to 
the people of Moss Side the complaints system was so ineffective it might as 
well not exist.148 Other witnesses claimed that those who attempted to make 
complaints soon found themselves victims of police targeting, and one 
individual detailed how over 500 personal complaints had been made without a 
single positive outcome.149 This was taken as evidence that ‘the law supports its 
own’.150 The situation appeared no better for those backed by larger 
organisations or public office. Youth Worker Dorothy Lewis claimed that 
community workers ‘feel a bit like the coloured youths’ when attempting to make 
complaints, as they were not listened to or ever saw the complaints have any 
positive outcome.151 The fact that comparison with black youths was seen as a 
shorthand way of saying that their complaints were not acknowledged speaks 
volumes for how those black youths themselves must have regarded the 
complaints system. City Councillor Jeffrey Wilner stated his experience over the 
preceding years led him to advise individuals not to pursue a complaint, as ‘it is 
a waste of time, there is frustration and the net result is that simply time has 
passed and the complaint is not listened to’.152 Similarly Moss Side Ward 
Councillor Patrick Paget and local Labour MP George Morton complained of 
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achieving nothing through the complaints system, and Paget’s conclusion likely 
reflected the thoughts of the local community: ‘if the MP cannot get any change 
out of the situation I am not very likely to be able to do either’.153 It is difficult to 
believe much faith was put into a system where even those elected within it 
could not achieve anything, making collective violence more probable.  
Councillor Peter Kelly, Chairman of the Greater Manchester Police 
Authority, additionally confirmed Hytner’s belief that the majority of people were 
unaware of a higher authority to complain to regarding the police, describing the 
numbers of civilians who had approached the police authority as ‘a little below 
nil’.154 City Councillor Arnold Spencer, when questioned why he had not 
discussed the high level of police complaints with the Chief Constable, 
suggested that Anderton would represent such action as politicians interfering 
with police operations and thus ‘it was just not worth the bother’.155 He 
continued that politicians of ‘a certain hue, which is not particularly liked by Mr 
Anderton’, would most likely do more damage than good by addressing issues 
with the complaints system.156 Again this is both a case of the local systems of 
government and political oversight of the police having failed and alienating 
those who needed it the most, and a Chief Constable who portrayed any 
questioning of the police as an attack upon their independence and 
undermining of their authority. 
The published Report documented the ‘great deal’ of evidence alleging 
police misconduct during the disturbances, noting that some of this was being 
investigated by the police complaints system.157 They summarised that it 
alleged officers had used excessive force and arrested people indiscriminately 
whether they were involved in the disturbances or not, citing a repeated charge 
that ‘you got arrested for not running fast enough’, and officers were ‘actively 
spoiling for trouble with young blacks’.158 Evidence directly relating to Thursday 
9 July, when the police initiated invasive hard-policing tactics, was deemed by 
the Hytner Panel ‘unhappy listening’.159 Despite this Hytner still refrained from 
passing judgement on the police’s activities, preferring to leave that to the 
                                                     
153 Paget, 19 August 1981. 
154 Kelly, 19 August 1981. 
155 Arnold Spencer, 17 August 1981. 
156 Ibid. 
157 ‘Hytner Report’. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
  
297 
 
Police Committee. They believed there was sufficient evidence to warrant an 
‘effective and searching police enquiry’, either to prevent recurrences or to 
redeem the widely-established negative police reputation.160 To the local 
community who had hoped Hytner’s Inquiry would be an ‘effective and 
searching’ inquiry into the police, it was another disappointment. Hytner later 
summarised that the Inquiry was also ‘satisfied’ it was true that, prior to the 
disturbances, a number of officers had misused powers to stop and search and 
had racially abused black youths.161 Seemingly addressing previous 
accusations that Anderton was unwilling to entertain such accusations against 
his officers, the Report recommended that the Police Committee initiate 
‘suitable enquiries within the statutory machinery to ascertain the truth of the 
allegations’.162 Lastly they stated that, as they had not allowed officers to be 
identified, there was no chance to initiate disciplinary proceedings against 
specific officers; however they hoped the police would not simply discount the 
amount of evidence that had been given to them.163 It is not hard to see why, 
when an inquiry supposedly investigating the background situation leading to 
collective violence against the police resulted in the hope that the police 
address general dissatisfaction, this would not appease those protesters. 
Anderton detailed that twenty-four complaints against the police were 
received relating to the disturbances alleging assault, criminal damage, or 
abuse of authority.164 Of these, twelve related specifically to incidents within 
Moss Side and three withdrew their complaints when interviewed by an 
Investigating Officer.165 The remaining twenty-one were investigated and 
submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions and Police Complaints 
Board.166 Additionally a police inquiry was launched, largely on the strength of 
evidence provided to Hytner, which was conducted by Greater Manchester 
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Police’s Assistant Chief Constable John Stalker.167 After a 10-month 
investigation, the police were cleared of brutality when the Director of Public 
Prosecutions deemed the evidence submitted to him by Stalker worthy of no 
further action.168 Considering the strength of evidence discussed in this thesis, it 
is hard to believe that this did not add to feelings of discontent. 
It seems clear how such a lack of response to seemingly abundant 
evidence of police misconduct further weakened the local community’s 
confidence in the machinery for making complaints against the police or holding 
them accountable for their actions. This was combined with statements from 
central government and local City Council that the entire community should give 
the police their full support after such ‘difficult circumstances’.169 Local youth 
worker Dorothy Lewis aptly questioned, after the level of police brutality and 
discrimination that had gone unpunished, how anybody could thus seriously tell 
black youths to respect the police.170 
FURTHER DISTURBANCES 
Timothy Brain, and Mike and Trevor Phillips listed just a selection of 
areas home to violent disturbances during July 1981: Battersea, Birmingham, 
Blackburn, Blackpool, Bradford, Cirencester, Crewe, Derby, Fulham, 
Gloucester, Halifax, Huddersfield, Hull, Leeds, Leicester, Lewisham, Luton, 
Nottingham, Portsmouth, Preston, Reading, Sheffield, Slough, Southall, 
Southampton, Wolverhampton, and Woolwich.171 As Brain concluded; ‘It was, to 
say the least, a very tense time for police officers across the country’.172 Fryer 
detailed how the ‘size and scope and ferocity of the rebellion astonished 
everyone, including the youth themselves’, criticising the resultant turn towards 
‘hard’ policing and concluded that the authorities should not underestimate the 
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‘intelligence, determination, and proud traditions of those they desire to 
control’.173 
In addition to the disorder spreading, violence also returned to many of 
the areas it had previously appeared. Brixton once more erupted on 15 July as, 
in Mike and Trevor Phillips’ words, ‘incredibly, the police staged a raid on eleven 
houses in the heart of the front line in Brixton’s Railton Road where the hottest 
fighting had taken place’.174 176 police officers, with 391 waiting in reserve, 
descended upon properties ostensibly searching for unlawful drinking and petrol 
bombs that were never found.175 Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Sir 
David McNee, who agreed to the application for the warrants ‘in the full 
knowledge that tension in the area was running high’ and this ‘was a potential 
flashpoint for further disorder’, nonetheless believed to not have acted upon 
information received would have been ‘tantamount to burying my head in the 
sand’.176 These raids, resulting in five charged with possession of cannabis and 
one with obstruction, ignited a further night of rioting and damaged the houses 
to the extent of the Metropolitan Police paying compensation of £8,500.177 Such 
a poorly planned raid, so soon after Brixton’s first disturbance and whilst the 
rest of the country was engaged in similar disorders, clearly highlights a police 
force that were slow to learn lessons or, as seen by Anderton’s previous 
response, did not believe any continuing problems were of their own making. 
When Whitelaw informed the House about damage caused during the 
raids he stated it would not be appropriate for him to comment, to which other 
members loudly inquired ‘Why not?’178 Whitelaw subsequently pointed to the 
ongoing investigations that he did not wish to pre-empt, although it is likely he 
just did not wish to answer questions about why the police had carried out such 
an operation.179 Local MP John Fraser described the scene: ‘I could come to no 
conclusion other than that a large number of policemen had deliberately set out 
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to wreck the houses, to make them uninhabitable’.180 Due to the level of police 
involved and their general tactics, it can certainly be suggested that this raid 
was in fact ‘revenge’ for anti-police violence and an attempt to reassert police 
authority upon an area where it had violently been challenged just three months 
previously.181 Indeed even McNee later stated that such actions ‘smacked of 
revenge’.182  
An internal inquiry was established and concluded that, whilst 
compensation would be paid, officers involved were essentially absolved of any 
blame.183 The Director of Public Prosecutions likewise decided to take no action 
regarding formal complaints.184 However a Police Complaints Board 
investigation found ‘serious lapses from professional standards’ and an 
‘institutional disregard for the niceties of the law’, concluding that improprieties 
shown in this operation could have mirrored a similar lack of professionalism in 
general.185 Many sharply questioned why the internal police inquiry and Director 
of Public Prosecutions had not reached similar conclusions, and what this 
suggested about their investigations into previous accusations against the 
police. 
Similarly rioting also returned to Toxteth on 26 July whilst Michael 
Heseltine was visiting Liverpool.186 During these renewed disturbances twenty-
six officers were injured, twenty-one rioters were arrested, and a disabled man, 
David Moore, was killed when hit by a police Land Rover.187 This was attributed 
to the Merseyside Police’s adoption of the same Northern Irish crowd dispersal 
techniques employed successfully in Moss Side.188 Copying examples 
established in the battlegrounds of Northern Ireland, which seemingly placed 
more emphasis on maintaining law and order than protecting the public, 
displayed a more hard-line policing approach towards British disorder. 
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Merseyside Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford defended his adoption of stronger 
tactics: ‘To put it crudely the people have spat in my face. It is the only way that 
I can protect them from themselves.’189 Moore’s death can hardly be seen as 
protection, tragically answering the Hytner Inquiry’s question of what would 
have happened if a member of the public was unable to get out of the way of 
oncoming police vehicles. Michael Smith, then a 13 year-old local, witnessed 
Moore’s death: 
The police were getting a lot more violent, a lot more equipped. They 
were calling it dispersal at the time; it was basically ramming 
people…We were running to the fence, thinking they couldn't get past 
this bollard, and this guy just went that way and, well, the [police vehicle] 
just flattened him, and went right over him. I think he died there and 
then.190 
A further two men narrowly avoided the same fate, both sustaining very serious 
injuries.191 In response, Oxford bluntly stated: ‘They can see the vehicles 
coming and they know what will happen if they get in the way.’192 The 
policemen involved in Moore’s death were charged with manslaughter but found 
not guilty in April 1982, with the police van apparently having disappeared from 
police custody days after Moore’s death.193 With the seemingly unending 
spread of disorder and violence around the country, coupled with a more 
aggressive and well-equipped police response, it had seemed inevitable that 
there would be a fatality. The fact that those officers involved in Moore’s death 
were not punished was consistent with the belief that police were not held to the 
same standards of accountability that the general public were. 
There were other areas which did not see such violence and the 
disturbances notably stayed within England. The Hytner Panel posed such a 
question, citing the example of Glasgow with similar, if not worse, conditions 
and questioning why disorder had not followed suit there.194 No satisfactory 
answer was offered, short of suggesting that conditions were not quite right. As 
previously noted in Chapter Three, although it was blamed for initiating the 
following disturbances, St Pauls remained peaceful in 1981. In fact, during the 
weekend that Toxteth was embroiled in conflict, more than 15,000 people 
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attended the climax of the annual St Pauls festival and witnessed local police 
constables joining in with the dancing.195 Seemingly a more integrationist police 
policy, as opposed to a combative one, avoided similar violence. Additionally 
David Waddington, Karen Jones, and Chas Critcher detailed a confrontation 
between black youth and police in Haymarket, Sheffield in August which did not 
lead to similar collective violence.196 They noted that the altercation contained 
many conditions present in other rioting locations such as use of police dogs, 
arrest of a local youth worker, allegations of police brutality, and officers 
taunting youths with comparisons to disorder in other areas.197 Nevertheless 
they reasoned that less visibly segregated black districts meant an absence of 
the belief that a whole community was under siege, which thus prevented the 
situation from escalating as it had in other locations.198 As they eloquently 
concluded: ‘The flashpoint sparked but it did not ignite. The environment was 
not conducive to a fire.’199 
NATURE OF DISORDER 
Attempting to understand why some areas did not riot touches upon 
larger questions of the nature of those disorders themselves. The explanations 
for the disorder spreading around the country were almost as many as the 
number of locations they reached: 
To some they were the revolt of the underclass and a precursor of the 
revolution. To some they were race riots, to others they were youth riots 
or anti-police affrays. To some they were universal events, to others they 
were highly differentiated outbursts. To some they were a continuation of 
the American Black ghetto revolts of the 1960s, to others they were a 
response to a uniquely British situation. To some they were the mindless 
hooliganism of the unemployables, to others they were a protest against 
unemployment. Some saw working class insurrection, others criminal 
vandals enjoying themselves.200 
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John Benyon summarised the various responses and explanations of the 
disturbances into two broad groups, liberal/radical or conservative.201 He 
characterised the liberal/radical perspectives as both focussing upon ‘basic 
flaws’ in society and politics, although the liberal views believed improvement 
could be achieved working within the current framework, whereas the radical 
view advocated a more fundamental restructuring.202 The analysis of the 
disturbances in this thesis places many of those involved within a radical 
perspective; they believed no advancements would or could be achieved by 
using the current framework of politics and law and order, hence they moved 
violently outside of it. Benyon also abridged the interpretations categorised as 
conservative, which tended to focus more upon aspects of law and order as 
opposed to social disadvantage or political power.203 He stated how these in 
America were termed ‘riff-raff-theories’, as they perceive the rioters as 
representing the most worthless and disreputable aspects of society: ‘If the 
liberal and radical perspectives focus on the basic flaws in social and political 
arrangements, the conservative interpretation stresses the basic flaws in human 
nature.’204 In these assessments rioters were rationally choosing to engage in 
criminal activity, either through a desire to loot, excitement or fun.205 Whilst 
undoubtedly there were those who participated in the disorders because of 
these stimuli, especially within the largely unconnected looting often focussed 
upon more heavily than the discontent which initiated the violence, this thesis 
maintains that the initial disturbance in each case examined here was a rational 
response to perceived continuing unfair actions and a desire for increased 
political participation. 
Unsurprisingly, as highlighted throughout this thesis, many of those in 
government favoured conservative explanations of the disturbances which 
focussed upon a rejection of law and order. Fryer highlighted how baffled 
politicians and sensationalist media described and focussed upon the looting 
and illegality, but that using the word riots ‘to describe what were in fact 
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uprisings by entire inner-city populations, black and white together, served to 
obscure the true nature and causes of these events’.206 Benyon considered that 
Thatcher’s repeated comments contended that any explanation other than 
‘sheer criminality’ was an attempt to excuse the violence.207 Similar to 
Anderton’s believing any criticism of the police was a determined effort to 
undermine their authority, Thatcher appeared to believe any attempt to explain 
the violence was in fact wishing to exonerate those involved. This was 
supported by others in her cabinet, such as Whitelaw: ‘No reason, no 
explanation, for recent troubles justifies what has occurred.’208  
SCARMAN REPORT 
Thus by the time Scarman produced his report of the disturbances, many 
had already made up their own minds about what had happened. Similarly 
claims were made that Scarman’s Inquiry was established purely as a political 
exercise in being seen to be doing something, but his eventual report, published 
after public interest had waned, would not actually be taken notice of. As 
Lawrence Marks stated in The Observer on 13 September 1981: 
The scenario was familiar. Both the law-and-order lobby and its liberal 
critics would be reassured that the outbreak was not being ignored, the 
politically weak black community would be divided, the media would soon 
lose interest - and in the autumn there would be a judicious report on 
race relations in the inner city to place along side all the other judicious 
reports on the same subject in the Home Office library.209 
However Benyon argued that, due to the level of continuing disorder occurring 
around the country in July 1981 and Scarman’s ability to inspire the confidence 
of many Brixton locals during his inquiry, it was impossible for the government 
not to respond to its findings.210 Acknowledging and responding to findings is 
different than actually implementing real changes in policy, as discussed below. 
Although the terms of reference for the ongoing Scarman Inquiry were 
widened in order to include discussion of the spreading disorder, in reality these 
disturbances did not achieve the level of examination that many people desired. 
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Cursory visits were undertaken to Birmingham, Coventry, Wolverhampton, and 
Liverpool but, whilst evidence was collected from other locations, they did not 
receive the same level of scrutiny awarded to Brixton.211 John Rex unfavourably 
compared Scarman’s Inquiry to the American Kerner Inquiry into disorders in 
1967, which had collected vast quantities of social science evidence.212 This 
included teams of researchers interviewing those actually involved in riots, 
allowing their voices to be added to the analysis.213 Rex pointed out that 
Scarman was not a social scientist and was ‘totally unequipped’ to consider all 
of the English disturbances, so his resultant attempts to obtain similar evidence 
were ‘both random and trivial’.214 Scarman later attempted to defend his report 
in comparison to Kerner’s, highlighting the comparatively small number of 
people and short timeframe.215 Whilst these are undoubtedly significant points 
and accusations that should be levelled against the government who did not 
deem Scarman’s Inquiry worthy of a fuller team or expanded budget, it is 
unlikely that such explanations would appease those disappointed with his 
inquiry. 
Before his report was published, Scarman discussed its probable 
contents with Permanent Under Secretary of State for the Home Office, Sir 
Brian Crossland Cubbon.216 Despite the inquiry being touted as including 
examination into events in July, it was noted that Scarman ‘clearly was, and 
feels he was’ more comfortable with investigations into Brixton than 
elsewhere.217 This unease was apparently due more to the nature of such 
materials being more like ‘opinion evidence’, as opposed to any issue of 
geographical location.218 It is unclear whether such a meeting prior to the 
publishing of Scarman’s findings could have or did affect them in any way, but 
public knowledge of such a meeting may well have resulted in further 
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accusations that it was a case of the establishment conspiring and protecting its 
own. 
CONTENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Scarman Report was published on 25 November 1981 and the tone 
was largely that described by Benyon as liberal, as Scarman concluded that the 
disorders emerged out of political, social and economic disadvantage, and 
widespread racial discrimination. He also acknowledged some aspects which 
would be categorised as a more conservative response, such as suggesting the 
thrill of participation and reward of looting as possible motives, maintaining 
there could be no excuse for the violence.219 Kenneth Oxford, unsurprisingly, 
supported this view that there could be no defending or tolerating the ‘grave 
criminal offences which society cannot condone’.220  
Scarman also hinted towards the radical interpretation of the 
disturbances when stating that some rioters believed the violence was an 
effective way of protesting and making their voices heard in a way they had 
previously not.221 This has been a recurring theme of this thesis, that collective 
violence was undertaken by some as a last resort when it appeared that no 
other method of voicing their discontent would be acknowledged. However 
Benyon also highlighted how Scarman’s Report further perpetuated the 
interpretation that these were exceptional threats to British law and order, 
demanding exceptional responses which focussed upon issues of police 
training, tactics and equipment for responding to outbreaks of public disorder.222 
John Clare supported this by critiquing Scarman’s language: ‘That, in case you 
are confused, is no media hype…Those are the measured words of a High 
Court judge…far from stepping back from what happened and judging it coolly, 
he has propelled himself into the very thick of it and been overcome by the 
smoke’.223 This played into the hands of those who had been appealing for and 
obtaining changes in the way police dealt with the disorder, often to the 
detriment of addressing the original causes.  
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At the time the report received a generally favourable response. 
Muhammad Anwar cited an Opinion Research Centre poll which showed 
‘massive support’ for Scarman’s proposals amongst respondents who had 
heard of the report; however the majority of respondents were white.224 Mary 
Venner summarised the newspaper reaction, which was largely positive but 
seemingly in agreement that some aspects could have been improved such as 
suggestions for preventing further disturbances, solving policing issues, or 
regarding positive action to counteract racial discrimination.225  
Zig Layton-Henry described it as a ‘diplomatic report’ in which everyone 
concerned could find things with which they both agreed and disagreed.226 Due 
to this the common reaction of politicians was also generally positive, as they 
could all seemingly focus upon aspects with which they agreed; although Vice-
Chairman of the Police Federation Basil Griffiths criticised this seeming 
impossible aspiration to ‘be all things to all people’.227 Darcus Howe described 
the report a ‘failure’ that was ‘way off beam’ due to the lack of radical 
suggestions to address the level of police power, and Russell Profitt claimed 
that most Scarman’s conclusions had been said before and Scarman had 
neglected to discuss certain aspects, such as obstacles to progress.228 Devon 
Thomas dubbed Scarman’s Report ‘the most successful diversionary 
mechanism that the state could have constructed’, creating the ‘false sense of 
hope’ that the underlying issues of the disturbances would be investigated and 
addressed, whereas the method of its construction made this unlikely.229 The 
constant criticism and widespread belief that the police were not being held 
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accountable for their actions either to the public or local government was not 
addressed in a manner to appease those most fervently objecting. 
There were many political and social aspects and policies examined and 
criticised by Scarman, but the focus of the report’s recommendations was 
largely for the police. Although much of the discontent at the heart of the 
disorders involved the police, this focus was criticised by some as it appeared to 
be concentrating upon the consequences, rather than causes, of 
disadvantage.230 As highlighted previously, the inquiry’s establishment under 
the Police Act 1964 led to that organisation being the main focus of 
investigation. A handwritten note by Thatcher on a summary of its contents 
clearly summarised the authority view, claiming: ‘I'm afraid the report seems 
highly critical of the police’.231 Despite this Brain reasoned that, in light of the 
level of criticism directed at the Metropolitan Police from many angles, Scarman 
was not overcritical.232 As during his 1974 Red Lion Square Inquiry, Scarman 
refused to advise the dissolution of the infamous SPG, much to the 
disappointment of their opponents, and also allocated some blame to the local 
community leaders.233 This was viewed by some as a continuation of a pro-
police bias that refused to deal with the real areas of discontent and problems.  
Scarman stated that the Metropolitan Police’s policies were not racist, 
but that ‘racial prejudice’ and ‘harassment’ existed in some officers.234 He 
suggested a specific disciplinary offence be introduced to tackle racist conduct, 
but the government did not accept the need for such a measure. Layton-Henry 
noted that the Police Federation and Police Superintendents’ Association were 
opposed to this introduction because they believed it was already covered 
under the existing Police Disciplinary Code, and ‘They were not prepared in the 
interests of fostering good community relations to allow the offence to be 
specifically incorporated in the Code.’235 Benyon deemed this response ‘difficult 
to understand’, but Griffiths recorded the police argument that the proposed 
automatic dismissal of any police found guilty of racial discrimination was a 
‘Draconian punishment’, and it was ‘particularly unfair that policemen should be 
                                                     
230 Profitt, ‘Equal Respect’, p. 204; Rex, ‘Disadvantage and Discrimination in Cities’, p. 191. 
231 Note to Margaret Thatcher, 2 November 1981, TNA: PREM 19/1521. 
232 Brain, A History of Policing, p. 72. 
233 Scarman, The Scarman Report, pp. 97-8, 144-5. 
234 Ibid., p. 98. 
235 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race, p. 164. 
  
309 
 
placed in jeopardy in this way when the same complaint is so often levelled 
against members of other public bodies’.236 Echoing previous arguments 
resulting in their exclusion under Race Relations Act legislation from 1968-2000 
it appeared that, despite their position and responsibility within a broader 
society struggling to achieve racial equality, the police appeared unwilling to be 
held to a higher standard. Scarman concluded that ‘“Institutional racism” does 
not exist in Britain: but racial disadvantage and its nasty associate, racial 
discrimination, have not yet been eliminated.’237 Herman Ouseley, Lambeth’s 
principal race relations officer, retorted that such a rejection meant the report 
was ‘fundamentally flawed’ and later discussion by Simon Holdaway and Megan 
O'Neill questioned how individual racism could be isolated from institutional 
racism, when individuals make up those institutions.238 Many have criticised the 
lack of a detailed definition of ‘institutional racism’, claiming that Scarman 
focused upon it as a ‘knowingly, as a matter of policy’ action rather than an 
unwitting consequence of years of predominantly white institutions.239 
Scarman’s view was thus deemed characteristic of ‘the blinkered approach to 
matters about race which can affect even well-meaning white people’.240 
Discarding suggested quotas for black recruits, Scarman did believe 
more effort needed to be made to increase numbers of black people into the 
police, which in October 1981 stood at just 326 officers and 0.3 percent of the 
entire force.241 After criticism that this would not improve relations between 
black communities and the police until widespread societal discrimination had 
been addressed, Scarman later further clarified this point stating that ‘I certainly 
do not regard it as a panacea’, but related it to social issues and claimed more 
black policemen would be attained by encouraging participation of ‘black people 
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into the whole of British public life’.242 This, he believed, could counteract the 
largely negative effect that black officers received from many others within the 
black community; which again highlighted the intense level of dislike of the 
police, as joining their ranks was seen as some form of betrayal.243 Scarman’s 
Report also advocated that police training be extended to a minimum of six 
months, including a focus upon ‘an understanding of the cultural backgrounds 
and attitudes to be found in our ethnically diverse society’.244 Griffiths deemed 
the current training structure, discussed in the introduction, as inadequate to the 
point of ‘a scandalous state of affairs’.245  
Scarman also encouraged more consultation and connections with the 
local community and that the highest levels of police work closely with the police 
authorities. Michael Keith argued the reasoning behind such a recommendation 
was the provision of an arena in which grievances of the black community could 
be addressed, thus removing the need for the ‘bargaining by riot’ actions of 
1980-81 and to ‘institutionalize conflict, taking it off the streets and into the 
committee room’.246 A Home Office Circular was later published which required 
chief constables and police authorities to work together to form ‘community-
based consultation bodies’, however it was left vague as to the membership and 
whose responsibility their establishment actually was.247 Alan Goodson, 
President of the Association of Chief Police Officers 1979-1980, argued that the 
law was not a suitable tool to persuade collaboration and preferred to see such 
a system emerge from the community.248 A Chief Constable who did not wish to 
see their position and authority limited and regulated in such a statutory manner 
is, in context of the general attitudes shown throughout, unsurprising. Anderton 
criticised the ‘unfortunate impression’ that had emerged that the police were 
insufficiently aware of the problems of the local community and that this had 
played a role in the spreading disorders: ‘What a lot of silly nonsense that is. 
And how unfair. What other organised public body exists with such a wide 
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outreach to the people? None.’249 Another government attempt to allow 
increased black political participation, given the failures of the past, did not 
appear likely to appease either senior police officials or the black communities 
and was subsequently widely deemed ineffective.250 
POLICE RESPONSE 
Nonetheless it was noted in some quarters that the police responded 
positively to the report. McNee conceded that ‘some of the criticisms must be 
right’ and current President of the Association of Chief Police Officers, Barry 
Pain, accepted that mistakes had been made in policing - but similarly criticised 
local and central government.251 The December issue of the Police Federation 
magazine Police even stated that the report was fair.252 For those who had 
been so angered by police misconduct that they had violently taken to the 
streets to highlight such wrongdoing, it is hard to imagine that they were 
pleased by the police’s response. The Police Federation had pre-empted the 
report by stating that it would back a new independent body to investigate 
complaints against the police.253 However it was believed by many police that 
the complaints system was already one of the most extensive in the world and 
Goodson stated that police recognised the need for a procedure to assess 
complaints, but they believed no system would ever fully satisfy their critics.254 
Griffiths even suggested that rank and file officers felt the ‘oppressive’ 
complaints procedure was actually unfair against the police themselves.255 For 
those who had taken to the streets to protest the system’s repeated failure to 
address allegations of police misconduct, such a response would not be viewed 
sympathetically.  
The police repeatedly displayed the belief that discontent with the system 
was largely from politicians and the media, whereas the ‘average man’ was not 
particularly concerned: ‘It also seems that much of the criticism comes from 
certain small and articulate groups whose access to the media creates a 
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misleading impression of the strength of this concern.’256 This attitude fails to 
recognise that the collective violence of 1980-81 was criticism of the situation by 
a marginalised group who did not have such access to the media or other forms 
of political participation. The Police Federation had initially opposed an outside 
body investigating complaints against the police, ostensibly not because of the 
‘unlikely’ fear it would increase verdicts against police but rather the difficulty of 
creating a body with necessary expertise and impartiality to conduct such 
investigations.257 They would later reverse this position following the scale of 
events.258 Scarman deemed the only way to restore faith in the complaints 
system and appease the critics was through a costly independent investigations 
service.259 Whilst some baulked at the potential expense, Paul Boateng retorted 
that this was not a reason to avoid reforms, citing the damage costs of the 1981 
riots and concluding that ‘when one looks at the question of cost, one must bear 
in mind the costs of the crisis of confidence which the present arrangements 
have generated’.260  
The police themselves, as discussed throughout, focussed their attention 
upon calls for better equipment and powers to combat social unrest and were 
largely averse to attempts to increase sensitivity and accountability to the local 
communities they policed.261 An extreme example of this response was 
summarised by Inspector Basil Griffiths, Vice-Chairman of the Police 
Federation, who proclaimed at a Conservative Party Monday Club meeting in 
October 1982: ‘There is in our inner cities a very large minority of people who 
are not fit for salvage…the only way in which the police can protect society is 
quite simply by harassing these people and frightening them so they are afraid 
to commit crimes’.262 Whilst the Monday Club was known for long-held 
controversial beliefs such as the voluntary repatriation of ethnic minorities, 
leading to its links with the Conservative Party being severed in 2001, such a 
vocal pronouncement of targeted harassment did little to improve relations with 
the local community and further suggested the police and Conservatives at this 
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time were converging.263 Conversely Kalbir Shukra framed this as an actual 
advance in police tactics as a ‘targeting of specific black individuals rather than 
blanket repression’.264 A Police Federation spokesman would further clarify their 
position the following month: ‘There are two conflicting demands. One is to stop 
harassing young blacks in inner cities. The other is to stop young blacks 
harassing other people in the inner cities. Which demand do you respond to? It 
has to be the second.’265 Such a viewpoint was central to the outbreak of 
collective violence in 1980-81 where black communities, particularly youths, 
took to the streets to protest continued harassment and discrimination through 
the only action they perceived open to this politically marginalised group. The 
fact that police officials seemingly maintained such an approach following the 
disorders suggested the events had limited success in changing the attitudes of 
the police towards black youths. 
Scarman himself later noted the criticism his report had received, 
including that of not inquiring into specific incidents of alleged police 
misconduct.266 One memorable example of such allegations was a photograph 
of a police constable carrying a pickaxe handle being published in The Sunday 
Times. The Director of Public Prosecutions, however, decided not to initiate 
criminal proceedings and, despite the constable pleading guilty to a charge of 
discreditable conduct and a sergeant and detective inspector both pleading 
guilty to charges of neglect of duty, they all simply received reprimands.267 As 
one of the original complainants, Archdeacon Wood of the Diocese of 
Southwark, remarked: ‘If the reprimand means that their police careers can 
proceed as normal, it does not augur well for policing in this country’.268 
Scarman also agreed his recommendations regarding ‘positive discrimination’ 
should have been more explicit and more forthright about the need for 
affirmative action to combat and surmount racial disadvantage: ‘Perhaps I did 
not see far enough, or maybe for once in my life I was mealy-mouthed, and for 
that I do indeed apologise.’269 He later criticised the lack of implementation of 
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social and economic recommendations, concluding it was ‘sadly so’ that there 
had been ‘a misdirection of effort, as well as in some respects a lack of 
effort’.270 Many of the contributions to a later conference discussing the 
Scarman Report and its outcomes criticised the report for, having placed a 
number of issues on the political agenda, failing to ensure that appropriate 
action would subsequently be taken.271 Scarman countered that the report 
continued to have an influence and, although he believed it had actually 
accomplished more than this, ‘Even if the Report has achieved no more than an 
awakening, it would have served a useful purpose.’272 Stuart Hall later 
concluded that the Report ‘was no panacea’, but that it ‘broke the prevailing 
law-and-order consensus’.273 However, if Scarman’s Report was a ‘call for 
action’, there was little evidence such action had taken place.274 
CONCLUSION 
By the end of August 1981, several hundred incidents of disorder around 
the country had been recorded. Police forces had largely switched their tactics 
relating to outbreaks of public unrest to be more consistent with those seen on 
the streets of Northern Ireland, largely in response to their apparent 
effectiveness in Moss Side. As seen throughout, the impact of Northern Ireland 
upon the streets of Britain was considerable, whether through constant images 
of street violence flooding the public consciousness, examples of violence such 
as use of petrol bombs, and police experience of responding to public disorder. 
The tragic death which such tactics led to in Toxteth did not make police 
reconsider. Many theories have been put forward for how and why the 
disturbances had spread around the country, with the media being given the 
largest proportion of that responsibility.  This thesis has argued that media did 
play a role, but also personal links and movement of people and police 
themselves played an arguably larger role in the disturbances spreading. Every 
inquiry established into the events had been accused of either not addressing 
the main issues, seen as an implicit defence of the authorities, or had 
specifically defended them. Similarly there had been no disciplinary action 
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against the numerous reports of specific police officers overreacting or acting in 
an improper manner. Due to the fundamental distrust and dissatisfaction with 
the police and local systems of government, it came as no surprise to many that 
the inquiries did not examine specific cases of police misconduct or really 
fundamentally change anything. It still appeared that the current constraints and 
inequalities of the British system would not help the situation of local black 
communities, and further violence would spread around the country again in 
1985 as frustrations and anger once more spilled over in an attempt for 
increased political participation. Elements of local communities had violently 
stated that they were no longer prepared to suffer what they perceived as unfair 
and discriminatory circumstances, but authorities remained slow to listen. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This concluding chapter summarises the main arguments of this thesis 
and its contribution to the existing historiography related to the 1980-81 England 
disturbances. It will briefly address subsequent developments, such as further 
disorder occurring around the country in 1985 and 1999 Stephen Lawrence 
murder inquiry which branded the Metropolitan Police ‘institutionally racist’, as 
well as suggesting possible areas of further research. 
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout this thesis has argued that a growing feeling of discontent by 
sections of the black community within Britain towards the state, and specifically 
the police, was enlarged by the governmental refusal to acquiesce to repeated 
requests for full independent inquiries and the police’s connected refusal to 
relinquish some of their power to and engage in operational discussions with 
locally elected police authorities. In every major event discussed throughout this 
thesis a full public inquiry into events was requested or demanded, but in most 
they were also steadfastly rejected. Although it would be unreasonable in the 
extreme to suggest that the Home Office grant a full public inquiry into every 
single request received, due to logistics as much as expenditure, the fact that it 
took the shock and violence of Brixton to deem one advisable suggests the low 
level of accountability felt by the British state towards members of ethnic 
minority communities. Even the subsequent inquiry, established within the limits 
of the Police Act 1964, was restricted in terms of its scope and personal which 
arguably affected its conclusions. Other inquiries had been previously 
established into the circumstances of the deaths of Kevin Gately and Blair 
Peach, but these were criticised as not providing sufficient answers and in fact 
covering up police misconduct.  
Indeed in those examples where inquiries were established, they broadly 
fell into three categories: a government-led inquiry that was mistrusted by large 
sections of the local community and accused of either not addressing the major 
issue or actively covering up police wrongdoings; a local inquiry which lacked 
the statutory provisions to compel police and governmental officials to attend or 
provide evidence; or a local organisation’s inquiry whose recommendations 
were ignored by the government and police in turn believing that such an inquiry 
317 
 
was itself biased. The local inquiries which were established were often 
boycotted by members of the local community or organisations which 
purportedly represented them. Despite attempts being made by the inquiries to 
negate these omissions or even claim such absences nullified accusations of 
radical infiltration, such boycotts affected the results of the inquiries and further 
highlighted the lack of trust and respect awarded by many of the local 
community towards any representatives of British authorities. 
It is however interesting to note that, whilst some members of local black 
communities rejected continued peaceful attempts at participation and engaged 
in ‘collective bargaining by riot’, there remained a strong and continuous attempt 
to work within the British legal system and that a full independent inquiry was 
the answer, despite growing discontent with the British state. For members of 
ethnic minorities in Britain, in this case specifically black communities, attempts 
to obtain a public inquiry to further their situation within established British 
traditions, such as democracy and fair play, was seen as a ‘badge of honour’ 
and would legitimise their place within British society. Additionally the 
establishment of numerous local organisations and ‘pressure groups’ to 
campaign against perceived injustices suggest an attempt from sections of 
black communities, feeling disempowered and marginalised from the political 
process, to impact police and governmental policies and tactics through the 
political process. Increasing examples of police engagement with such 
organisations and community representatives throughout the period discussed 
appeared to show willingness on behalf of the police to improve the poor 
relations with those who had lost trust in the service. Despite seemingly 
acknowledging the importance of policing by consent, the fact that police clearly 
did not envisage this relationship being as influential as those community 
representatives appeared to desire led to a breakdown of such connections. For 
example in the case of Brixton this was a staunch refusal by the police to inform 
the local community of the use of the SPG or to discuss operational matters, 
and in Moss Side it was the belief that local community representatives had 
been exploited as stooges in order to initiate a stronger police response to the 
disorder. Such actions led to the furthering of discontent towards the police and 
authorities, often leading to the boycotting of local inquiries as discussed above. 
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The Institute of Race Relations journal Race & Class declared in October 
1981 that the summer disorders ‘marked a turning point in British politics’ as the 
‘actions of black youth on the streets destroyed at a stroke the myth of police 
invincibility’.1 Despite the Scarman Inquiry seemingly answering the appeals of 
many who believed such an investigation would improve the situation, no 
systematic governmental inquiry into allegations of police misconduct or 
brutality during the disturbances was undertaken. As this thesis has shown, 
such allegations were often grave and extensive. If it is agreed that the 
collective violence undertaken by predominantly black youths against the police 
was a conscious attempt to improve their situation and counteract the level of 
police harassment being exercised against them, it had seemingly failed. Such 
‘bargaining by riot’ did lead to some advances, such as increased attention 
(although not always positive) and resources awarded local communities and 
the seeming increase of black political participation leading to the first three 
black British MPs being elected in 1987, but had failed in the short-term to 
address specific incidents of police brutality that had characterised life for black 
youth. Such failures to address and appease the accusations of police 
misconduct by many of those who participated in the violence arguably led to 
increased anger and violence being exhibited throughout the decade, discussed 
below. 
Many have suggested that disorder spreading around the country in 
1981 was due to ‘copycat’ disturbances, where youths had observed previous 
events publicised in the media and decided they wanted to engage in similar 
actions; either through following an example of an uprising against the police or 
desire for the ‘reward’ of rioting and looting. This was not the only method in 
which ideas of disorder spread. It can be seen to have been furthered by the 
movement of people, including police themselves, which often played a role in 
shaping the disturbances. Such discussions invariably lead to questions of why 
certain areas produced violent scenes and others did not. It appears from this 
study that in the areas where violence erupted there were specific incidents of 
police action or misconduct that built upon pre-existing tensions and discontent 
which ‘lit the fuse’ where in other locations conditions did not force escalation in 
the same manner. It also must not be disregarded that such arguments can 
tend towards being overly deterministic, and phenomena such as pure chance 
                                                            
1 ‘The “Riots”’, Race & Class, 23 (October 1981) 225. 
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cannot be overlooked. This thesis has demonstrated that the pervasive 
influence of events within Northern Ireland influenced both participants’ attitudes 
and tactics towards street violence as well as the police and authorities’ 
response. Indeed it was no coincidence that Lord Scarman had previously 
chaired an inquiry into Northern Irish disturbances before his examination of 
events in 1981. 
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In order to make any constructive conclusions, events discussed in this 
thesis must be viewed within the broader environment of Thatcherism and ‘the 
Long 1980s’. Harry Goulbourne argued that the disturbances, Brixton 
especially, led to an increased interest in the police and desire for them to be 
more accountable to the communities that they served.2 The Scarman Report, 
although criticised for not being strong enough or going far enough, did make a 
number of recommendations for ways in which the situation might be improved; 
however a number of these were either ignored or not effectively implemented, 
which is hardly surprising from a government based on supporting the police 
and rejecting conciliation. For example after Home Secretary Douglas Hurd 
claimed, during a trip to Handsworth in Birmingham following the 1985 riots, that 
Scarman’s recommendations had been largely implemented, John Clare 
deemed this ‘such patent breath-taking nonsense’.3  
Such an apparent lack of response from the authorities led to further 
disturbances occurring around the country in 1985, which included the violent 
death of PC Keith Blakelock during disturbances at the Broadwater Farm estate 
in Tottenham, north London, the first constable to be killed in a riot in Britain 
since 1833. Similarly to events of 1981, it was argued that a breakdown of 
relations and absence of local community leaders with whom local police 
regularly liaised had contributed to the outbreak of violence.4 Thus during the 
conference convened to discuss the 1985 disturbances, similar to the one after 
                                                            
2 Harry Goulbourne, Race Relations in Britain since 1945 (Basingstoke, 1998) p. 69. 
3 John Clare, ‘The Ratchet Advances Another Turn’, in John Benyon and John Solomos (eds.), 
The Roots of Urban Unrest (Oxford, 1987) p. 63. 
4 Jennifer Davis, ‘From “Rookeries” to “Communities”: Race, Poverty and Policing in London 
1850-1985’, History Workshop Journal, 27 (1989), 77. 
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1980-81, a main theme emerged at how little progress had been made.5 The 
government refused to hold another inquiry in the mould of Scarman’s, further 
highlighting the difficulty of obtaining such public inquiries and inherent 
expectations on Scarman to have achieved more. Even Liverpool, an area 
which had received a ‘Minister for Merseyside’ and some level of governmental 
expenditure, continued to have issues relating to race; for example a report on 
Liverpool headed by Lord Gifford in 1989 concluded that racial discrimination 
was ‘uniquely horrific’ in the city.6 William E. Nelson, Jr, argued that violence 
returned in 1985 because, after 1981, ‘many of the most basic issues remained 
unresolved’.7 
The true situation of the police in the 1980s is only recently fully coming 
to light. Recent revelations regarding police misconduct and attempts to pervert 
the course of justice during the miners’ strike of 1984-85 and the 1989 
Hillsborough disaster suggests a continuation of the belief amongst many 
officers that they had free rein to do as they pleased without personal negative 
consequences. It is thus hard to argue that the events of 1980-81 significantly 
altered the entire police forces’ attitude towards accountability in such 
circumstances. Moreover the report in 1999 of Sir William Macpherson’s public 
inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence, established some four years after 
the racially motivated murder of the young black man on 22 April 1993, found 
that there had been a failure of leadership by senior Metropolitan Police officials 
and many recommendations from the Scarman Report had been ignored.8 It 
also confirmed that the police were ‘institutionally racist’; nearly twenty years 
after Scarman had rejected such accusations. Macpherson’s definition of 
‘institutional racism’, much broader and far ranging than Scarman’s, was: 
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic 
origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour 
which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
                                                            
5 John Benyon, ‘Interpretations of Civil Disorder’, p. 35; Usha Prashar, ‘Too Much Talk and Not 
Enough Positive Action’, pp. 116-17; and John Benyon, and John Solomos, ‘The Roots of 
Urban Unrest’, pp. 191-2; all in John Benyon and John Solomos (eds.), The Roots of Urban 
Unrest (Oxford, 1987). 
6 Ed Vulliamy, ‘Toxteth Revisited, 30 Years after the Riots’, The Observer, 3 July 2011. 
7 William E. Nelson, Jr, Black Atlantic Politics: Dilemmas of Political Empowerment in Boston 
and Liverpool (Albany, 2000) p. 207. 
8 Sir William MacPherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (London, 1999). 
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thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantages minority 
ethnic people.9 
In June 1982 Scarman defended his definition, which addressed only knowing 
discrimination, by stating criticism and debate around the issue was ‘a matter of 
semantics’.10 However public acknowledgement that the Metropolitan Police 
were institutionally racist was the result that many had been waiting decades to 
hear; although for countless members of the black community, such as 
Lawrence and his family, it had come too late. 
The public’s relationship with systems of police accountability remains 
problematic. When police authorities in England and Wales were abolished by 
the coalition government in November 2012 and replaced with directly elected 
Police and Crime Commissioners, seemingly allowing greater levels of 
accountability from the local communities which they served, the British public’s 
reaction was far from enthusiastic.  Jenny Watson, Chair of the United Kingdom 
Electoral Commission expressed disappointment at voter numbers, concluding 
that ‘the extremely low turnout – at just 15.1% – must be a concern for anyone 
who cares about democracy’.11  
This thesis began with reference to the 2011 England riots and 
comparisons with 1980-81 are indeed apt.12 Both waves of disorder began the 
year following a Conservative return to government, albeit in a coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats in 2010, with a background of economic crisis which saw 
economic neoliberalism, either through the economic policies of Thatcherism or 
cuts to public spending, affecting most those at the margins of society. Many 
aspects of 1980-81 can be seen as a direct parallel with 2011, where a protest 
march in Tottenham against the contentious police killing of Mark Duggan, a 
local black male, was met with a questionable police response, increasing 
tensions, and later escalated into violence and looting.13 The police, similarly to 
Moss Side in 1981, attempted to use low-profile policing tactics to avoid 
                                                            
9 Ibid., p. 28. 
10 George Greaves, ‘The Brixton Disorders’, in John Benyon (ed.), Scarman and After: Essays 
Reflecting on Lord Scarman’s Report, the Riots and Their Aftermath (Oxford, 1984) p. 69. 
11 The Electoral Commission, Police and Crime Commissioner Elections in England and Wales: 
Report on the Administration of the Elections Held on 15 November 2012 (London, 2013) p. 3. 
12 For a comparison of disturbances in Manchester in 1981 and 2011, see: Neil Wain and Peter 
Joyce, ‘Disaffected Communities, Riots and Policing: Manchester 1981 and 2011’, Safer 
Communities, 11 (2012), 125-34. 
13 Paul Lewis, ‘Tottenham Riots: a Peaceful Protest, Then Suddenly All Hell Broke Loose’, The 
Guardian, 7 August 2011; Hugh Muir, ‘Tottenham Riots: Missteps in the Dance of Police and a 
Frustrated Community’, The Guardian, 5 September 2011. 
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provocative confrontation with the rioters; although, like Moss Side, these were 
deemed a failure.14 Similarly the focus of the events, response, and media 
coverage again appeared to be concentrated more upon subsequent criminal 
acts of looting, largely from unrelated persons not involved in the disturbances 
themselves, rather than the underlying social issues. Interestingly on 8 August 
2011 Home Secretary Theresa May, when questioned whether criminals had 
hijacked a ‘genuine cause’ in order to ‘steal trainers and steal TV’s’, utilised the 
exact language of thirty years previously in a blanket condemnation of the riots 
as ‘sheer criminality’.15  
In the same way, many examples emerged of shocking accusations of 
police misconduct and racism during the riots. For example a black youth 
recorded audio of officers telling him they had strangled him during his arrest 
‘because you’re a cunt’, before concluding: ‘The problem with you is you will 
always be a nigger’.16 The officer in question was later sacked for gross 
misconduct, despite twice facing trial for racially aggravated public disorder and 
in both cases jurors being unable to reach a verdict.17 In the aftermath of the 
violence similar police equipment arguments and debate about the use of water 
cannon, baton rounds, and possibility for police curfews and ‘no-go’ areas for 
the public suggested that little had changed in the intervening thirty years.  
Although the 1981 disturbances seem to have, in some quarters at least, 
taken on an air of legitimacy and respectability as an attempt to utilise collective 
violence within the framework of legitimate responses to achieve a political goal, 
their 2011 counterparts seem to have been dismissed purely as, in the recurrent 
words of Conservative politicians, ‘sheer criminality’.18 This of course could be 
due purely to historical proximity to events, suggesting time and distance is 
                                                            
14 Paul Lewis and Ben Quinn, ‘London Riots: How Did the Metropolitan Police Lose Control of 
the Capital?’, The Guardian, 8 August 2011. 
15 ‘Theresa May: London Rioters “Will be Brought to Justice”’, BBC News, 8 August 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14449979 (last accessed 12 December 2014); echoing 
exactly the words of Conservative MP for Putney David Mellor thirty years previously: HC Deb 
13 April 1981 vol. 3 c. 26. 
16 Paul Lewis, ‘Police Face Racism Scandal after Black Man Records Abuse’, The Guardian, 30 
March 2012. 
17 Paul Lewis, ‘Met Police Officer Who Used Racial Slur against Suspect is Sacked’, The 
Guardian, 3 July 2013. 
18 Diane Frost and Richard Phillips, ‘The 2011 Summer Riots: Learning from History - 
Remembering ‘81’, Sociological Research Online, 17 (2012), 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/17/3/19.html (last accessed 2 February 2015). As a personal 
example; a recent university seminar on the topic showed how, whilst no student could 
remember the community discontent and protest march regarding the controversial police 
shooting of Mark Duggan, every student recalled and condemned the subsequent looting. 
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needed from events before such objectivity or perspective can be achieved – 
however it is also due to the framing of the 1981 disturbances as successful 
uprisings against oppression within a broader movement of political participation 
and liberation for black Britons which was not, or has not yet been, the case of 
the 2011 disturbances. Despite advances being made in some aspects since 
1981 relating to police accountability, black political participation, and relations 
between the two groups, there is clearly still a lot that needs to be addressed. 
FURTHER WORK 
As has been described in this thesis, the proximity of events suggests 
that there is still much work that can be done on this topic. For instance this 
thesis has shown the utilisation of two dichotomous tactics of attempted political 
participation, namely collective bargaining by riot and continual demands for a 
state-initiated public inquiry. More investigation is needed into the extent this 
was a replication of tactics utilised by other groups in society, such as from 
Northern Ireland or America, and the impact of the understudied Black Power 
movement within Britain. There is scope for similar examination of the 1985 
disturbances, especially as government and organisational records and papers 
relating to those events become similarly available. There existed many 
examples of similar themes as has been discussed in this thesis; examples of 
police misconduct or errors which exacerbated existing tensions on part of the 
local black community, the spread of protest between various locations, and the 
involvement of organisations established to defend black people after the 
disturbances. For example the shooting of Dorothy ‘Cherry’ Groce by the 
Metropolitan Police whilst attempting to question her son in relation to a 
suspected firearm offence in Brixton, and the death of Cynthia Jarrett who had a 
heart attack as police were searching her home in relation to the arrest of her 
son, led many in the area to believe that the police were still not accountable for 
their actions. No public apology materialised from the police for their role in 
Jarrett’s death, and it was only three years after Groce’s death that the police 
accepted liability for their failings. In comparison six people were immediately 
charged with the murder of PC Blakelock in 1985; three juveniles who all had 
their cases dismissed due to confessions being deemed inadmissible owing to 
the inappropriate conditions they were subjected to during interrogations, and 
three adults sentenced to life imprisonment despite a lack of eyewitnesses or 
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forensic evidence.19 The subsequent Broadwater Farm Defence Campaign to 
exonerate ‘The Tottenham Three’ bore many similarities to organisations 
established during the events discussed in this thesis as the black community 
attempted to participate in their own form of local politics that they felt that they 
had been excluded from, eventually leading to their exoneration by the Court of 
Appeal.  
As this thesis has argued throughout the dissimilar treatment within 
British society of those within the political establishment and those outside, 
particularly through political and social discourses which portray black 
communities as more predisposed to criminality, appears to have persisted into 
the twenty-first century. Political participation remains an ongoing issue for 
black communities within Britain, and thus the dual strategies of collective 
violence and appeals for the perceived legitimacy of public inquiries of this 
period must be considered to have failed to achieve its aims. 
                                                            
19 David Rose, ‘They Created Winston Silcott, the Beast of Broadwater Farm. And They Won't 
Let This Creation Lie Down and Die’, The Observer, 18 January 2004. 
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